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ABSTRACT.
In the 1980s and 1990s, privatisation has been widely adopted across the developing world and has
reversed the previous trend towards the expansion of state enterprise. This thesis examines the
establishment, operation and privatisation of the state enterprise sector in Zambia between 1968 and
1998. Following the economic reforms announced at Mulungushi (1968) and Matero Hall (1969), state
enterprise came to dominate the economy. In 1990 a policy of limited privatisation was introduced
which was subsequently extended to cover the entire state enterprise sector. By the end of 1998, this had
resulted in the privatisation of the majority of state enterprises.
The thesis examines the changing role of state enterprise from a political perspective, with the state
analysed as the agent of policy choice and implementation. It examines the reasons for the growth in
state enterprise, evaluates its performance and identifies the factors which prompted the adoption of
privatisation and influenced its implementation. It argues that the growth of state enterprise was
primarily a response to the inadequacies of the existing private sector in meeting the state's
developmental objectives. However, the strategy pursued by the state enterprise sector proved to be
commercially and financially unsustainable. To these problems were added pressure from creditors and
donors for Zambia to adopt policies of market liberalisation. This resulted in the adoption of a strategy
of comprehensive privatisation.
The thesis examines how the choice of the method of privatisation of individual enterprises reflected the
objectives of the government in undertaking the programme and the constraints under which it was
implemented. The Zambian Government sought to promote competitive industrial structures, indigenous
ownership and the viability of the enterprises involved in the process. It has, however, been constrained
in this by a number of factors, including the existing legal rights of minority shareholders, the weak
commercial and financial position of many state enterprises and the macro-economic environment in
which the programme has been undertaken.
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NOTE ON CURRENCIES AND DATES. 
CURRENCIES.
The Kwacha (K) replaced the Zambian Pound as Zambia's currency in January 1968. One Kwacha is
equal to a hundred Ngwee.
In this thesis, $ refers to United States Dollars.
DATES.
Financial years are differentiated from calendar years by the prefix FY.
The financial year within the Zambian state enterprise generally ran for 12 months from the 1st of April
to the 31st of March. The two principal exceptions to this were INDECO prior to 1969, which had a
financial coinciding with the calendar year, and RST, for which the financial year ran between the 1st of
July and the 1st of June.
Where the financial year covers more than one calendar year, it is identified by the year in which it
closed. For example, ZIMCO's FY 1980 covered the period from 1/4/1979 to 31/3/1980.
'Dr. tAse_ of parent-heses 1%-n tabLes deirotes a reestive Value .
1CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY.
This thesis argues that the establishment of the Zambian state enterprise sector was primarily a
response to the inadequacies of the existing private sector in meeting the states' developmental
objectives. The strategy pursued by the state enterprise sector was designed to achieve economic
diversification through the reinvestment of the revenues that were generated by the copper industry.
However, from the mid-1970s, declines in the international price of copper undermined the ability of
state enterprise to implement this strategy, and although the Zambian state undertook a variety of
measures to revitalise the sector, by the end of the 1980s it was commercially and financially
unsustainable. In 1990 a policy of limited privatisation was introduced which was subsequently extended
to cover the entire state enterprise sector. By the end of 1998, the majority of state enterprises were
privatised and substantial progress had been achieved in the divestiture of the state mining enterprise,
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines.
In the 1980s and 1990s, privatisation has been widespread, reversing the previous trend
towards the expansion of state enterprise. 1 The explanation of the changing role of state enterprise in
this thesis is approached from a political perspective in that it is focused upon the state as the agent of
policy choice and implementation.2 Manzetti (1993) argued that the establishment of state enterprises
and the adoption of privatisation involves a process of policy substitution, through which the state
chooses alternative means to pursue its economic and political objectives. In this thesis, this is examined
through a historical approach, in which the development of the opportunities and the constraints within
which the Zambian state has operated are examined in an empirical context over time.3
This thesis examines the growth, operation and privatisation of the state enterprise sector in
Zambia between 1968 and 1998. Zambia achieved independence from Britain in 1964. As a result of the
economic reforms announced at Mulungushi in 1968 and at Matero Hall in 1969, state enterprise came
1 Letwin (1988,p.24), Young (1987) and Young (1995).
2 This contrasts with other approaches to state enterprise which are based on an economic perspective
and have sought to explain these issues within the framework of welfare economics and property rights
analysis (Jones and Mason, 1982; and De Allessi, 1982).
3 The approach draws on that undertaken by Sobhan (1979), Ahmad (1982) and Allende (1988) and is
in contrast to public choice approaches such as Backhaus (1989).
2to dominate the economy and constituted one of the most extensive state enterprise sectors in Africa. In
1990 a policy of privatisation was adopted, the subsequent implementation of which has resulted in the
privatisation of most state enterprises by the end of 1998.
The focus of the thesis on a single case study is justified by a number of factors. The availability
of data on state enterprises and on privatisation programmes is limited and in many cases where data
can be located, differences in definitions undermine its cross-national comparability.4 In most cases
where comparative analysis has been conducted on state enterprises, it has relied on the existence of a
considerable body of existing single case studies. 5 Such studies of privatisation are, to date, less
common, primarily reflecting the recent implementation of many of the programmes that have been
adopted.
This study makes reference to a number of works that have examined aspects of the Zambian
experience of state enterprise and privatisation over the period. The aim of this thesis is to provide an
encompassing account of the entire period and to identify the continuity and change in the factors which
have shaped state policy. 6 In pursuit of this, the research has examined a number of areas which have
not been subject to previous research. In particular, the longitudinal approach to the financial
performance of the state enterprise sector, the comprehensive survey undertaken of the privatisation
programme and the documenting of the privatisation of ZCCM are important new areas of research.
Section 1.1 of this Chapter outlines the theoretical framework in which the study has been
undertaken and the design of the thesis is outlined in Section 1.2.
SECTION 1.1 THEORETICAL ISSUES. 
The scope of state enterprise within national economies has differed widely between countries
and over time. 7 In some cases it has been restricted to a few infrastructural industries, while in others it
4 As Adhikari and Kirkpatrick (1990, p.26) noted "none of the international organisations publish
comprehensive information on public enterprises on a regular basis, and the majority of countries do not
identify them separately in their national statistics. The paucity of accurate and systematized data makes
cross-country comparisons difficult since one is compelled to rely on data drawn from various sources in
which different criteria may have been used." The availability of data has improved little in the
meantime, and has extendedpprivatisation statistics (World Bank, 1994c, p.103-6 and Bennell, 1996).
5 Ahmad (1982) and Wilson (1990).
6 The thesis has been designed to overcome the problem identified by Backhaus (1989) and Yaffey
(1995), of the treatment of growth of state enterprise and its privatisation as unrelated phenomena.
/ Short (1984).
3has been more extensively involved across the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors. In addition,
State enterprises have differed greatly in their origin, legal forms and the objectives which they pursued.
State enterprise may be collectively defined, however, as businesses in which a state, directly or
indirectly, owns a controlling interest. 8 As businesses, they share similarities with those in private
ownership, as the goods and services they produce are primarily traded and the revenue accruing from
their sale equated to the costs of their production. This contrasts with other services provided by the state
to which entitlement is determined by administrative criteria, and which are funded primarily from the
general pool of government resources.
States are faced with a choice of alternative means through which they may pursue their
objectives and state enterprise constitutes one instrument through which they may be implemented. 9 For
example, the objective of increasing the level of industrial activity in a region could be pursued through
instructing state enterprise to locate new investment in that area or through offering selective grants or
tax concessions to private enterprises. The factors which contribute to this choice of policy instruments
vary widely with the political and economic structures in which the state is embedded. Section 1.1.1
examines some of the factors that have contributed to the extension of state enterprise in the context of
post-colonial Africa.
The successful pursuit of these objectives through state enterprise is dependent on the ongoing
commercial viability of the state enterprise sector and its ability to reconcile competing objectives within
a single strategy. Section 1.1.2 outlines the approach to the analysis of state enterprise performance that
has been pursued in this thesis.
Zambia has been among many states to have adopted a policy of privatisation since the mid-
1980s. Privatisation may occur within the context of a single enterprise, a group of enterprises, or the
state enterprise sector as a whole. While defensive programmes have involved the privatisation of a
limited number of non-strategic enterprises to strengthen the state enterprise sector as a whole, in the
8 This characterisation of state enterprise draws on Gillis (1980), Fernandes and Sicherl (1981), Shirley
(1983), Ramanadham (1984) and Koldiere (1990). The term state enterprise is used interchangeably in
the literature with the terms state-owned enterprise, parastatal and public enterprise. Ownership of an
enterprise is generally considered to consist of a number of transferable rights including those of
appointing its senior managers, receiving dividends relating to its profitability and receiving any net
assets at the liquidation of the firm (Eggertsson, 1990, p.34).
9 Jones and Mason (1982), Biersteker (1990) and Wilson (1990). On the relationship of the state and the
economic process see Block (1994) and Chang and Rowthom (1995).
4past decade privatisation has become synonymous with comprehensive privatisation programmes, which
have been oriented towards the wholesale dismantling of the state sector and the divestiture or
liquidation of virtually all state enterprise. 10 The term privatisation has also been subject to a wide
variety of definitions. In this thesis it refers to the relinquishing by the state of ownership of productive
assets. 11 The two primary forms of this are divestiture, in which state enterprises are sold as going
concerns, and liquidation, in which they are sold as their constituent assets. 12 The consequences of
different designs of privatisation programmes and different methods of enterprise privatisation are
examined in Section 1.1.3.
1.1.1. State Enterprise and State Strategy.
This Section examines the expansion of state enterprise within the context of post-colonial
Africa. While the historical experiences of colonialism differed greatly among different territories, the
generalisations presented below are intended to highlight some of the principal factors that have been
identified in previous studies.13
As Magdoff (1982) argued, rather than extract resources produced through existing economic
activities, colonialism transformed the economic structures of the territories that were subjected to it and
created economies in which production was restructured towards the needs of the colonising power.14
Economic activity was frequently reoriented towards the export of primary products which created
minimal internal linkages within the local economy. Indigenous enterprise was marginalised and often
faced administrative restrictions constructed to protect imperial and settler capital.
With the retreat of the colonial power at independence, the state was formally turned over to
domestic political forces and its legitimacy was frequently tied to its ability to redirect economic
opportunity towards them. 15
 While the struggle for independence had prompted political groups to align
themselves in opposition to an external power, in the post-colonial context they faced one another in
10 Odle (1993).
11 The state may, however, retain special veto rights, known as a golden share. This does not generally
entitle the state to interfere in the normal business of the enterprise or to receive any financial benefits.
12 This definition excludes cases in which the management of state assets is contracted to the private
sector with the ownership remaining in the hands of the state.
13 Frank (1971), Ghai (1973), Rood (1976).
14 Green (1970), Amin (1976, p.237-99) and Kennedy (1988, p.10-59).
15 On the post-colonial state see Baylies (1985). The particular problems of constructing its legitimacy
are discussed by Sandbrook (1985 ,p.83-111), Charney (1987), Forrest (1988) and Fatton (1988)..
5competition for access to state power. In this context, post-colonial states frequently sought to promote
rapid economic development through promoting local production and industrial diversification to
respond to these demands.16
The response of the existing private sector to the development initiatives which were
undertaken were, however, limited by a number of factors. Since local enterprises were often small
in scale they could not mobilise the resources necessary to undertake large investments. 17 Their access
to capital was further constrained by the thinness of capital markets and financial institutions primarily
oriented to the funding of trade. While transnational enterprises had a greater capacity to undertake
investments, they were often tentative in committing themselves. Vertical integration of local operations
within an international framework, and a need to realise returns to their home economies, were often
reflected in a lack of commitment to diversified investment in a local economy. In this context, state
enterprises were frequently introduced to undertake the entrepreneurial role that the existing private
sector was unwilling or unable to undertake.18
Political objectives were also pursued through state enterprise. 19 Central to the capacity of the
post-colonial state to respond to the political pressures which it faced was its ability to direct the
allocation of resources and opportunities. This was commonly pursued through the construction of
clientelist structure through which the distribution could be managed. In this context, state enterprise
proved a useful tool to, for example, provide employment or contracts for the benefit of supporters.
This thesis examines the construction of the Zambian state enterprise sector. State enterprise is
examined as one alternative policy instrument, the choice of which reflected the political and economic
constraints under which the Zambian Government sought to pursue its developmental objectives.
1.1.2. State Enterprise Performance. 
The performance of state enterprises across Africa and much of the developing world over the
last thirty years has been widely characterised as poor, in terms of profitability and impact upon state
16 On economic strategies pursued see Nixon (1982) and Mytelka (1989).
17 An alternative policy that was commonly followed was that of strengthening the indigenous private
sector so that it was able to take a more substantial role in the economy. Wilson (1984) argues that the
use of state enterprise was associated with cases in which the indigenous private sector was relatively
small, whereas when it was more extensive, other policy instruments were more widespread.
18 Hanson (1965), Holland (1974), Sheahan (1976) and Levy (1988).
19 Sandbrook (1988) and Grosh (1994).
6budgets. 2° It has been suggested that the primary cause of this has been the effects of their political
objectives on their commercial viability. 21 The provision of additional employment and the subsidising
of consumer outputs have frequently been cited as examples of measures that have been pursued to meet
political objectives, but which have had a detrimental impact on the commercial development of the
enterprises. Among the possible results of such policies may be trading losses, shortages of investment
funds and an inability to provide the state with an adequate return on its investment, many of which are
often identified as among the problems faced by state enterprises.
However, while these factors may undermine the commercial viability of state enterprises as
business organisations, they are not necessarily the primary cause for this. There are many reasons that
enterprises in either state or private ownership experience problems in maintaining themselves as going
concerns. Changes in the local economic or industrial environment may result in problems emerging in
an enterprises trading relationships, production processes or financial structure. 22 Attempts to identify
the effect of the ownership of an enterprise on its ability to respond to these factors requires that they be
controlled and a number of empirical studies have sought to identify comparable groups of state and
private enterprises to examine whether the latter perform better by commercial criteria. 23 Overall these
studies have provided mixed results with some supporting the superior commercial performance of
private enterprises and others not.24
Corporate strategy is central to the ability of state enterprises to reconcile the pursuit of diverse
objectives with the resources available to it. 25 In the case of a state enterprise group with multiple
subsidiary companies, different subsidiaries may be assigned different objectives. For example, profit
maximisation may be designated to some enterprises while others are required to produce low priced
consumer goods or maintain high levels of employment. If the state enterprise group is to internally
20 Killick (1983), Nellis (1986), Nunnenkamp (1986), Van de Walle (1989), Adhilcari and Kirkpatrick
(1990), Drum (1993) and World Bank (1994c, p.104-8).
21 Waterbury (1992) and Boycko, Schliefer and Visliny (1996).
22 Slater (1984) and Chang and Singh (1992, p.22-6).
23 Many criticisms have been made of the comparisons on which many of the studies have been based.
Critical surveys of these studies include Boyd (1986), Domberger and Piggott (1986), Millward (1988),
Chang and Singh (1992).
24 Kim onnp,yo ) Boardman and Vining (1989) and Abdouli (1989) conclude that private ownership is
positively related to performance, while Cakmak and Zaim (1992) and Grosh (1990) are unable to locate
differences and emphasise positive aspects of state participation.
25 Schachter and Cohen (1973) and Sikorslci (1989) both examine state enterprise performance within
the context of the development strategy of the state. Shirley (1983, p.17-48) discusses the structure and
control of state enterprises.
7finance an investment programme, this can also be achieved through the reinvestment of funds
generated by the profitable enterprises within the group. Where the internal balance between the
objectives and resources of state enterprise sectors have not been reconciled, the strategy pursued by the
sector may become unsustainable.
This thesis examine the performance of the Zambian state enterprise sector. The objectives of
the Government are outlines and the strategy, through which state enterprise sought to fulfil them, is
evaluated.
1.1.3. Privatisation.
Different forms of privatisation will affect in what form, on what terms and to whom the
enterprises are sold. 26 When attention has focused on the method of privatisation, it has usually been
examined within the context of the technical difficulties encountered in implementation. 27 By contrast,
this thesis emphasises the degree to which these choices reflect the objectives of the government in
implementing the programme and influencing the future ownership of the enterprises and the structure
of the economy.
Two principal types of divestiture may be identified; public sales of shares and private sales of
shares.28
 Where an enterprise is sold through a public offering of shares this will generally result in the
establishment of an independent company with a diversified base of shareholders. Such an offering may
be structured so as to influence the pattern of shareholding that will result. The participation of small
indigenous investors may, for example, be encouraged through preferential pricing and allocation terms.
Private sales, by contrast, involve the sale of the enterprise to a new controlling shareholder. In many
cases this will entail the new shareholder replacing the existing management of the enterprise, and may
also involve its integration into any existing business of the buyer. Exceptions to this are management or
employee buy-out which, while a form of private sale, involve a sale to groups already associated with
26 Bell (1995) examines the distributional implications of a number of methods, while Shin (1990) and
Newbery (1992) examine privatisation as an instrument for developing the institutional structure of the
economy.
27 Coburn and Wortzel (1986), Commander and Killick (1988,p.109-117), Dia (1992), Adam,
Cavendish and Mistry (1992) and Beenhakker and Stephens (1994).
28 Coyne and Wright (1986) and Vuyleteke (1988). On occasions these may be combined. For example
a private sale of a controlling interest may be supplemented by the public sale of a minority share.
8the enterprise. In contrast to the entry of a new controlling shareholder, the management buy-out is
likely to produce a continuity of control in the enterprise and its independence.
The structure of the industry in which privatisation is being undertaken may also be influenced
by the design of the policy. While monopolistic structures may have been acceptable to the state when
the enterprises were held under state ownership, they may not be under private ownership. The
privatisation process may, therefore, involve the unbundling of existing enterprises into competing units
prior to their sale, ensuring that they are sold to independent interests. In the case of the liquidation of
an enterprise, it will cease to exist as a legal entity and its component assets will be sold. While these
assets may be reassembled by others to re-establish the business formerly undertaken by the enterprise,
they will usually be put to other uses. This will affect the industrial structure either through a reduction
in the number of firms competing in various industrial sectors or, in cases where the state enterprise was
the only firm engaged in an activity, the disappearance of an entire sector of production.
The design of the programme by the state will be subject to a number of constraints. The
development of the enterprise within state ownership will have consequences for the method of
privatisation adopted. Where an enterprise is profitable, has strong management and has adequate
financial resources, the ability to sell it as an independent entity through a public sale will be greatest.
This may be contrasted with an enterprise which is currently unable to continue as a going concern, but
which may have the potential for recovery through the introduction of new finance, management,
technology or business partnerships. The sale of such an enterprise as a going concern will be dependent
on finding buyers who are able to address these needs and in such cases a private sale will be more
likely.
Between these two conditions lie a number of intermediate possibilities in which actions by the
state may determine the future requirements of the enterprise. An example of this would be where the
underlying business of the enterprise is profitable, but a financial structure requiring heavy debt
repayments threatens its liquidity. In such a case the state could itself restructure the finances of the
business before privatisation, leading to the privatisation of a financially stable enterprise, or privatise
the enterprise in its illiquid state, requiring buyers themselves to undertake the restructuring.
9This thesis explores the different methods of privatisation used in Zambia. The choice between
them is examined in the light of the objectives of the government and the constraints under which the
programme was undertaken.
SECTION 1.2. DESIGN OF THESIS.
Section 1.2 of this Chapter examines the design of the thesis. Section 1.2.1 discusses the
sources of data which have been utilised in the research presented in this thesis, and Section 1.2.2
outlines the structure of the six Chapters, through which the argument of the thesis is explored.
1.2.1. Principal Sources Data.
The research conducted in the preparation of this thesis involved the assembling of a wide
range of resources to document the events of the period under study, 1968 to 1998. This section
identifies the principal sources of evidence which have been used.
The development policies of the Zambian Government have been outlined through a variety of
sources including Development Plans, Presidential Speeches and other occasional policy statements. The
principal primary source that has been used for the analysis of the Zambian state enterprise sector is
their Annual Reports. Although doubts have commonly been expressed as to the extent to which the
financial statements of state enterprises in Africa provide an accurate record of their performance, in
Zambia they were generally subject to audits conducted by international accountancy firms which
provides a higher level of assurance. Additional information on the conduct of the Zambian state
enterprise sector has been drawn from the reports that have been published by state agencies, such as the
Office of the Auditor-General, which was required to investigate their performance.
Studies of privatisation have frequently encountered problems in assembling data due to the low
level of disclosures by governments and the problem of commercial confidentiality. During the
implementation of the privatisation process after 1992, the Zambia Privatisation Agency was required by
legislation to publish information on its activities, and this has lessened the problem of data scarcity. In
some cases, particularly where a transnational corporation has acquired an enterprise, they have
published additional information on the terms of sale.
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Where the privatisation process has involved enterprises with publicly traded equities, further
information has entered the public domain through disclosure requirements related to their listings. In
addition, the public trading of these securities has generated evaluation of the enterprises by investment
analysts. Such information sources were particularly useful in the case of ZCCM, which is listed on a
number of major stock exchanges, providing data which may not have otherwise been available.
Documents produced by international organisations have also provided useful information.
Among those to which access has been made available are internal World Bank documents on proposed
adjustment lending and reports commissioned by the Zambian Government from organisations such as
the International Labour Organisation. Such documents have provided both factual data and
information on the perspectives of external actors who have influenced the process of policy formation
within Zambia.
Newspaper reports, magazine articles and press digests have provided an important source of
additional information. Access to these sources has been facilitated by the use of electronic news
databases such as Reuters Business Briefing. The wide selection of news sources that have been used has
generally provided complementary sources of information reflecting individual editorial policies and
access to sources of intelligence. Domestic newspapers have also been consulted. The Times of Zambia
has been selectively consulted for the period between 1968 and 1992, reflecting periods of particular
activity in state enterprise policy, and consulted comprehensively between 1996 and 1998. The Times of
Zambia has generally represented a view of events sympathetic to the Zambian Government, and this
has been supplemented by consulting the non-aligned opposition newspaper the Post comprehensively
between 1995 and 1998. These have been further supplemented by news reports from Reuters Zambian
news service.
Specialist news publications have also been used. Principal amongst these has been the
Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Reports on Zambia which have been consulted for the period
between 1971 and 1998. These have provided summaries of the major political and economic
developments that have occurred. In addition, regional news magazines and mining industry
publications have provided useful information for the period as a whole.
Research for the thesis also involved the undertaking of a number of interviews. These were
undertaken in an open ended format and most were conducted over the telephone. The majority of these
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were conducted with investment analysts involved in the mining industry, in African equities or in
privatisations. In most cases they were undertaken to ascertain the opinion of the interviewee, or to
confirm factual data.
1.2.2. Chapter Plan of the Thesis.
The arguments advanced in this thesis are presented in six chapters. This Chapter has
presented the conceptual framework of the study and reviewed the debates over the problems of state
enterprise and privatisation. The adoption of a case study approach to the examination of these issues
has been discussed and the choice of the case of Zambia justified.
Chapter 2 discusses the reasons for the growth of the Zambian state enterprise sector and
identifies its place in the economy. It is argued that from 1968 the Zambian government extended the
state enterprise sector primarily to address concerns that the existing private sector lacked commitment
to its development objectives. In particular, it was envisaged that an enhanced state enterprise sector
could more effectively act as an agent for the diversification of the domestic economy.
Chapter 3 examines the operation of the state enterprise sector between 1970 and 1990. It is
argued that the strategy of redirecting copper surpluses was undercut from the mid-1970s, by the decline
in copper prices. Despite this, the Government remained committed to the use of state enterprise and
pursued a number of initiatives to revitalise them. However, these were unable to sustain the commercial
and financial viability of the state enterprise sector.
Chapter 4 explains the adoption, design and implementation of privatisation. It identifies the
factors which prompted the initial adoption of the policy, its subsequent development and the experience
of its implementation. It argues that a substantial degree of privatisation has occurred in Zambia since
1992, although less among enterprises in strategic and utility industries. The methods through which
enterprises have been privatised is examined in the light of the objectives of the Government and the
constraints underwhich the programme was undertaken.
Chapter 5 extends this analysis with a case study of the privatisation of the state copper mining
enterprise Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited, an enterprise of particular strategic importance
to Zambia. The Chapter examines the reasons for the decision to privatise the company through
unbundling it into separate units and the outcome of its implementation.
12
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the principal arguments which are advanced in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2.
CONSTRUCTING THE ZAMBIAN STATE ENTERPRISE SECTOR.
This Chapter aims to explain and document the construction of the Zambian state enterprise
sector. It argues that the Zambian government came to favour state enterprise over other instruments of
policy in response to the perceived inadequacies of private enterprise to meet its development objectives.
Following the achievement of independence in 1964, the Zambian government sought to rely on the
existing private sector as the basis of its development policy. The perceived failure of these measures
prompted a reassessment of the policy and in 1968 the emphasis shifted towards state enterprise.
Section 2.1 examines the background to the expansion of the state enterprise sector after 1968.
Section 2.1.1 outlines the structure of the economy at independence in 1964. It draws attention to the
dominant role of the copper mining sectors, which alone accounted for around half of the economy, and
its limited role in generating growth in other sector. Section 2.1.2 examines the policy framework
between 1964 and 1968. This was based on a range of incentives to encourage the existing private sector
to pursue the governments aims of economic growth with sectorial and regional diversification. In this
period the role of state enterprise was generally restricted to the establishment of new projects and
enterprise in sectors in which the private sector was reluctant to invest. Section 2.1.3 examines the
development of the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) through which these projects were
established. In most cases they were undertaken in partnership with foreign enterprises and state
ownership was envisaged to be for a limited duration.
From 1968 policy changed to make state enterprise the main instrument of Zambian
development policy. The nature of the change and the reason for it are the subject of Section 2.2. Of key
importance to this were the announcements at Mulungushi Hall in 1968 and at Matero Hall in 1969
which brought major privately owned enterprises, including the copper mining companies, under state
ownership. Section 2.2.1 discusses the explanations for the growth of the state enterprise sector after
1968. It identifies the pressures of the clientelist political system and the government's concerns over the
effectiveness of the existing policy framework as important elements in promoting a change of strategy.
The choice of an approach based on the extension of state enterprise, it is argued, reflected the apparent
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success that had already been achieved through INDECO, and the problems that were faced in the use of
other policy instruments.
The agreements through which these takeovers were enacted are examined in Section 2.2.2.
Section 2.2.3 examines the investments in the resulting state enterprise sector. Reflecting the patterns of
the wider economy, the copper mining enterprises were a dominant feature of the sector, although
among the industrial holdings, the assets acquired by takeovers were less significant than those
established through new investment. Section 2.2.4 examines the place of state enterprise sector within
the economy as a whole. It argues that, in line with the stated policy of the government, while the
majority of large enterprises were state owned, private enterprise retained a role as a minority
shareholder in many of them.
The success of the state enterprise sector as an instrument of government policy depended upon
a number of factors. The ability of the Government to utilise the state enterprise sector as an instrument
of policy depended on its ability to exert control over it. Section 2.3.1 examines the aspects of the legal
and substantive relationship between the Government, minority shareholders and state enterprise
management. It argues that when enterprises were more dependent on their minority shareholders, the
obstacles to the government to exercising control were greater. In acquiring state enterprises through
takeovers, the state acquired both additional assets and liabilities which affected its future financial
position. Section 2.3.2 examines these financial relationships in the case of the acquisition of the mining
companies. It argues that although the financial arrangements for the takeovers was not onerous, they
reproduced the government's dependence on mining revenues within the state enterprise sector and
increased its vulnerability to a downturn in the copper price. In acquiring enterprises that were
integrated subsidiary companies, the state also risked undermining the commercial viability of the
companies. In Section 2.3.3 this argument is addressed within the context of the state mining
enterprises. It is argued that the nationalisation did not damage vertical integration, and while it lost
horizontal integration, this had not helped Zambian development.
SECTION 2.1 CONFRONTING THE COLONIAL LEGACY. 
Zambia achieved independence from Britain in 1964 and inherited an economy that had been
transformed by three-quarters of a century of colonial rule. Section 2.1.1 examines the development of
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the economy to 1964. Section 2.1.2 examines the strategy that was established by the independent
Zambian government to reconcile the existing economic structure to its development objectives. The
strategy that was pursued relied primarily upon the existing private sector to respond to the incentives
provided by the Government. Within this framework the role of state enterprise was restricted to
establishing new projects in areas in which the private sector was reluctant to invest. This implemented
through the Industrial Development Corporation which is examined in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.1. The State and Economy at Independence.
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the territories which now constitute the Republic of
Zambia were controlled by a number of indigenous rulers.' In the 1890's control over the territory was
secured by the British South Africa Company (BSA) operating under a charter from the British state,
and in 1911 the area was unified as Northern Rhodesia. 2 While the motivation of the BSA had been to
gain access to mineral resources, initial prospecting revealed a limited potential for mining and in 1924
the British state took over the administration of Northern Rhodesia. The status of the colony was further
amended in 1953 by its inclusion with Southern Rhodesia and Nyassaland in the Central African
Federation, of which it was part until its attainment of independence in 1964.
During the three quarters of a century of colonial rule, the structure of economic institutions
that were established was oriented towards providing economic opportunities to transnational capital
and to the growing population of European settlers Through the imposition of taxation to force the
indigenous population to engage in the monetary economy, and the transfer of the most fertile farming
lands to European settlers, African economic activity became largely confined to the supply of labour to
the mines and the undertaking of subsistence agriculture.3
Despite having handed the administration of the territory to the Crown, the BSA continued to
enjoy the control of mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia. In the 1920's it began to grant exclusive
1 This section draws on the accounts of Roberts (1976, p.149-194), Baylies (1978, p.175-463),
Biermann (1979) and Mumeka (1987, p.109-198).
2 In 1889 the British South Africa Company obtained a charter from the British State allowing it to
make treaties with indigenous rulers under the authority of the state.
3 Taxation was introduced to the North East of the territory in 1900 and by 1913 included even the most
remote areas; in 1914 it was replaced by a poll tax. Under the colonial office rule, European settlement
increased and African reserves were established and between 1928 and 1930, around 60,000 Africans
were removed into areas from their land. The reservation of market share for, and payment of higher
prices to, Europeans further restricted the development of African agriculture.
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concessions over extensive areas to large mining houses with the capacity to undertake further
exploration and development of deposits. This was to provide an important stimulus to the development
of the mining industry and the exploitation of the country's copper resources.4
By independence the copper industry had grown to dominate the economy. It was the source of
over half the revenue that was received by the new Government and accounted for over 90 percent of the
value of exports. 5 The sector was, however, limited in its integration with the domestic economy. It was
owned and operated by the South African based Anglo-American Corporation and the Roan Selection
Trust, itself an associate of American Metal Climax (AMAX) of the United States. 6 Mining rights,
acquired from the BSA, were held in perpetuity and covered much of the country. 7 The principal
resource which the mining industry drew from the local economy was labour. 8 This was for the most
part relatively unskilled, the result both of the failure of the colonial authorities to undertake the
education of the African population, and of a colour bar within the copper industry which prevented
African advancement. 9 The industry also required considerable importation of non-labour inputs, 30
percent of which was directly imported, with a further 19 percent accounted for by the imported content
of local produced inputs.10
While most of the revenue generated by the copper industry was extracted from the territory,
the expansion of mining nevertheless provided the primary impetus for the development of other sectors
of the economy, providing the demand for commercial agriculture, for the generation of power and for
4 Roberts (1976, p.185-90)
5 The copper industry's contribution to Government revenue averaged 62.7 percent between 1964 and
1966, and the contribution to exports averaged 93.3 percent over the same period (calculated from
Copper Indusrty Service Bureau, Zambia Mining Yearbook, 1973, Table 2, p.20).
6 The structure of the two companies is discussed by Saasa (1987, p.17-20). The degree to which RST
was controlled by AMAX is disputed. While Burdette (1977, p.4'7'7) states that "All major decisions on
RST in Zambia came from AMAX Head Office in New York," Cunningham (1981, p.197-8) argues that
RST maintained a degree of independence from its principle shareholder.
7 Ushewolcunze (1974, p.'79) and Sklar (1975, p.34-8) provide an accounts of the entrenched mining
rights of the copper companies.
8 In 1966, for example, domestic payments for wages and salaries were 11 percent greater than
payments for locally produced inputs, and 54 percent greater after adjustment for their imported content
(Kessel, 1971, p.259-261).
9 At independence 961 Africans had secondary school certificates and only 76 had university degrees.
Africans were not admitted to apprenticeships until 1960 (Turok, 1989, p.3'7). On the colour bar see
Baldwin (1966, p.100-105).
10 Figures for 1966. It may be noted that by 1966 the Government had already undertaken measures,
such as the domestic production of coal, that reduced dependence on imports from that which had
existed at independence. Of the domestically produced non-labour inputs, 24 percent was accounted for
by construction, 14 percent by electricity and water and 13 percent by distribution (Kessel, 1971, p.259-
63).
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secondary industry. 11 The ownership of these sectors was dominated by foreign and expatriate interests
and Zambian entrepreneurship remained marginalised. 12 As presented in Table I, this development was
also unevenly distributed throughout the territory and was concentrated in the three provinces through
which the line-of-rail travelled. While inhabited by only 43 percent of the population, these provinces
contributed 89 percent of gross domestic product.13
The geo-political context within which the newly independent state emerged also posed a
number of problems. As a landlocked country, Zambia was dependent on neighbouring states,
particularly Southern Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique, for the transit of imported and exported
goods. This posed political problems for the Zambian Government since Southern Rhodesia continued to
be under white minority government and Angola and Mozambique were under the colonial rule of
Portuga1. 14 The situation deteriorated further in 1965 when Southern Rhodesia, rejecting pressure to
politically enfranchise the African population, unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from Britain.
Although the Zambian economy was extremely dependent on Southern Rhodesia, it sought to reduce
these links and comply with the United Nations sanctions which were established.
11 Under colonial rule most of the revenues from the mining industry flowed to the British treasury, and
with the creation of the Central African Federation, funds were diverted to the development of Southern
Rhodesia (Lanning and Mueller, 1979, p.198). On secondary industry see Bates (1974, p.6-'7) and
Fortman (1971, p.193-4).
12 The First National Development Plan noted that "such industries as existed at independence were
often subsidiaries of Rhodesian firms and.., such development as has occurred in Zambia has been
necessarily as a by-product to operations whose primary financial and managerial interests are in
Rhodesia" (Republic of Zambia, 1966a, p.1). On the inherited economic structures see also Chileshe
(1981, p.82-6) and Saasa (1987, p.7-21).
13 The line of rail provinces were Copperbelt, Central and Southern. Population figures from Bates
(1974, p.8). Income figures calculated from Republic of Zambia (1966a).
14 Transport links to independent Tanzania were, by contrast, minimal.
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TABLE I.
Sources of Zambian National Income.
1964.
Sector. Sectorial Contribution to
National Income.
Proportion generated in
Line-of-Rail Provinces.
Mining and Quarrying. 50.65 100.00
Commerce and Finance. 9.59 88.00
Government Services. 7.89 67.57
Subsistence Agriculture. 7.46 30.29
Manufacturing. 5.58 96.95
General Services. 4.73 83.78
Transport and Communications. 4.39 94.17
Construction. 4.35 89.61
Commercial Agriculture. 3.92 84.87
Electricity and Water. 1.44 95.88
Total 100.00 89.00
Source: Calculated from Republic of Zambia (First National Development Plan, 1966a, p.87,
p.103, p.121, p.137, p.159, p.177, p.193 and p.209).
2.1.2. Initial Development Strategy. 
The achievement of independence produced a sharp disjuncture between political and economic
power. While control of the political institutions was claimed by the citizens of Zambia, the economy
continued to be dominated by a foreign and expatriate private sector. The challenge faced by the
independent Government was to address the needs of the majority of citizens while the economy was
still controlled by a minority.
Independence brought to power the United National Independence Party (UNIP), which
represented a broad coalition of African interests united in the struggle for self-determination. With
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support for the main opposition party, the African National Congress, confined mainly to Southern
Province, UNIP was the dominant party in the newly independent state. 15 Its continued dominance was,
however, conditional upon its ability to satisfy the expectations of the electorate.
The independent Government outlined ambitious development objectives in the First National
Development Plan (FNDP) in 1966. 16 Objectives included the diversification of the economy so that it
was not reliant solely upon mining; the increased domestic production of goods to meet local demand;
the increasing of employment and real output per head; the minimising of the inherited inequalities
between the rural and urban sectors; the raising of the level of education and social welfare and the
development of the economic and social infrastructure.
These were to be pursued within the context of a mixed economy in which there would be room
for private, state and co-operative enterprise. 17 The role of state activism in the economy was conceived
as being that of a catalyst, inducing and quickening private sector activity. As the Plan stated:
A vigorous investment policy by the Government is a prerequisite for dynamic private
enterprise, especially when a large percentage of the investment is devoted to establishing the
economic infrastructure which promotes the expansion of productive private investment.18
This emphasis on infrastructural expenditure was reflected in the investment programme. Of the capital
investment planned for the period 1966 to 1970, 38 percent was allocated to infrastructure and transport,
18 percent to social infrastructure and 7 percent to administrative infrastructure. 19 In addition, a
15 UNIP itself had emerged from the ANC following disagreements over tactics in 1958. While Tordoff
and Scott (1974, p.148) characterised the ANC as "more pragmatic than UNIP in both domestic and
foreign policy," they note that its "policy proposals generally lacked substance and were simply the
reverse of those advocated by the ruling party." Molteno (1974, p.65) and Hamalengwa (1992, p.42)
have argued the broad base of UNIP was largely reflective of minimal differentiation within the African
population as regards their relationship to the British Empire.
16 Government of the Republic of Zambia (1966a). Discussions and evaluations of the plan are
presented by Jolly (1971b), Fry (1980) and Bell (1981, p.5-18).
17 The Joint United Nations/Economic Commission for Africa/Food and Agricultural Organisation
Mission (1964, p.13) ("Seers Report") noted that "On the question of public or private enterprise the
Government's attitude appears to be pragmatic; the test of any programme is primarily whether it will
succeed in raising employment and incomes. There is, however, a recognition that the country must
depend on private enterprise for the foreseeable future, including expatriate firms."
This is probably accurate, as Jolly (1971a, p.4) noted "The Seers Report was constructed in very close
liaison with the whole Cabinet. Four all-day sessions were held at different stages of the mission's work,
in addition to detailed discussions on particular points with individual Ministers and President Kaunda."
18 Republic of Zambia (1966a, p.11). It further noted that "it is essential for the implementation of the
plan that private interests in the industrial sector should seize the opportunities open... The Government
places great weight upon the encouragement of investment whether from within or from any source
outside Zambia"(ibid., p.36).
19 Calculated from Republic of Zambia (1966a, p.12, Table III).
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substantial amount of remaining capital expenditure, projected for the productive sectors of industry,
mining, agriculture, and land, was also planned for infrastructural projects.2°
The independence settlement gave the Zambian Government access to two additional sources of
revenue that had previously been denied to the territory. The first was the revenue which had been
transferred to the Federal Government, worth over K19 million per annum, which would now be
retained by the Zambian Government, and the second was the transfer of the rights of the British South
Africa Company which produced additional revenues of around K34 million per annum. In addition to
this, the high copper prices prevailing in the mid-1960's lifted Government revenue further to allow it to
quadruple total spending between 1964 and 1967, without running a budget deficit or depleting its
foreign exchange reserves. 21 These were to provide the Government with the resources to undertake a
strategy of economic development.
Alongside this the Government established a framework of incentives to encourage the growth
of private enterprise. Tariff protection was provided on a selected basis to support the establishment and
growth of new industries; the Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income Tax) Act of 1965 provided for tax
exemption for up to five years for selected new industries; local producers were to be preferred in
Government tendering; and a liberal policy was pursued with regard to the repatriation of dividends,
interest and capital and the use of expatriate skilled labour. 22 The emergence of specifically Zambian
enterprise, both private and co-operative, was encouraged through new schemes offering finance,
training and other assistance.23
20 Planned expenditure on industry and mining accounted for 21 percent of total expenditure and on
agriculture and land for 15 percent. Details of this spending are provided in Republic of Zambia (1966a,
p.21-36, and p.228-40). The percentages given do not equal 100 due to rounding. Within the productive
expenditures private investment was also expected to play a substantial role. The FNDP detailed fifteen
industrial projects with a total investment of almost K50 million. Private investment was expected in
nine of these, and in all but one, was anticipated to account for a greater part than state capital (ibid,
p.238). In aggregate, private investment was projected to be 56 percent of expenditure, against the 44
percent projected for the state (ibid, p.35).
21 Faber (1971, p.303).
22 See Republic of Zambia (1966c) and discussion in Young (1973, p.181-212). Its continuity with
policies pursued by the Federal Government is noted by Martin (1972, p.56-7) and Saasa (1987, p.24).
In the judgement of the World Bank (1968, p.16), these policies were "administered with ability and
rigour."
23 Republic of Zambia (1966c, p.6). A facility to provide unsecured loans to Zambian business was
established under INDECO management in FY 1965, and incorporated into the Credit Organisation of
Zambia at the end of 1967 (INDECO, Annual Report, 1967).
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Zambia had inherited a diverse collection of around fifty state owned companies and statutory
boards, some directly from the territorial government and some created from the splinters of divided
federal institutions. 24 They included utility industries such as railways and electricity, agricultural
finance and marketing boards and an Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). 25 INDECO was
created by the colonial territorial government to act as a development agency, promoting private
industry through finance and research. 26 The Independent Government declared it to be its "principal
instrument for the administration of industrial policy" and extended its role to include the promotion of
specifically Zambian entrepreneurship and taking direct equity investment in projects. 27 It was not,
however, envisaged that the state sector would displace the dominant position of private enterprise in the
industrial sector. As the Government stated in 1966;
There is no question of the Zambian Government nationalising industries that are already in
existence, the policy being for state ownership of certain new basic industries and for state
participation jointly with private enterprise in certain others. The remainder of the industrial
field is open to private investors and the Government has created a tempting investment
climate to encourage the inflow of capital for private investment.28
This was in line with the advice of the Seers Report (1964, p.80) that defined a role for Government as
"an entrepreneur, either partially or completely, in industries where the private sector is not prepared to
establish plants or is doing so to an insufficient extent," arguing that in such circumstances state
24 Only nine of these had been transferred directly from the territorial Government of Northern
Rhodesia: the Natural Resources Board; the Land and Agricultural bank; Victoria Falls Electricity
Board; African Housing Board; Pneumoconiosis Compensation Board; Preservation of Historical
Monuments and Relics Board; Central Electricity Supply Corporation; Northern Electricity Supply
Corporation and INDECO. Among the those recreated with the dissolution of the Federation were-. the
Bank of Zambia, Zambia Broadcasting Corporation, Grain Marketing Board, the Dairy Produce Board,
Cold Storage Board and Tobacco Board of Zambia (Simwinga, 1977, p.124-127). In addition to this,
Zambia also moved to effect the division of the integrated services, such as Rhodesian Railways
giostock, 1971, p.329-46).
25 Although previously used as an abbreviation, the name of the corporation was formally changed to
Indeco Limited from 1st April 1970 (INDECO, Annual Report, 1970).
26 INDECO had begun life as the Industrial Loans Board. Established by the territorial government in
1951, it was transformed into a company, the Northern Rhodesian Industrial Development Corporation
in 1960 and transferred to private ownership in 1962 (Young, 1973, p.23). It was returned to state
ownership shortly before independence.
27 Republic of Zambia (1966c, p.5). The centrality of INDECO to Government strategy is also
emphasised by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Justin Chimba, in his foreword to the INDECO
Annual Report of 1965.
28 Republic of Zambia (1966b, p.1).
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participation could create greater confidence in the economy and encourage further private
investment.29
2.1.3 Expansion Through INDECO 1964 to 1968. 
Although the Government undertook investment during this period through a number of
institutions, INDECO was the primary vehicle through which this was undertaken. 3 ° While it continued
to promote private enterprises after independence, INDECO increasingly became dominated by direct
equity investments in state enterprises. 31 Between 1964 and 1967 INDECO expanded rapidly, its net
assets rising from K2 million in FY 1964 to over K16 million in FY 1967. As Table II shows,
INDECO's portfolio changed markedly between FY 1964 and FY 1967, with equity investment,
particularly in subsidiary companies, replacing loans as the principal form of investment activity
undertaken.32
INDECO's stated criteria for establishing state enterprises targeted industries which constituted
domestic monopolies and were basic to the economy, or those in which the opportunity for utilising local
resources required a greater investment than private enterprise would contemplate 33 . Many of the
projects selected followed those outlined in the First National Development Plan. In addition to these,
other projects were identified in the light of the developing crisis of the Rhodesian UDI, which
underlined the strategic importance of sectors such as trading and transportation 34. The preferred route
29 UN/ECA/FAO (1964, p.86). Rothchild (1972, p.230) also argues that state participation encouraged
foreign capital in the context of political uncertainty.
30 Zambia established a National Coal Board, in 1967 to exploit Zambia's coal reserves, and also
expanded the role of existing parastatals, such as the Cold Storage Board and the National Agricultural
Marketing Board into retailing activities (Johns, 1971, p.221-2).
31 An event commonly regarded as central to the success of INDECO's expansion during this period
was the appointment of Andrew Sardanis as full-time Chair and Chief Executive in 1965. Sardanis, a
Zambian citizen of Greek Cypriot origins, had been "one of the few businessmen in the country to have
backed UNIP. and the Zambian leaders unreservedly" (Martin, 1972, p.61).
32The structure of INDECO was also developed to serve those objectives (INDECO, Annual Report,
1966). The Development Finance Section continued the corporations original role of providing finance
to the private sector on ordinary commercial terms. In addition, a Commercial Department was
established to provide unsecured loans to African entrepreneurs. Although administered by the
corporation, the Commercial Departniiwas funded separately by the Government and was transferred to
the COZ in 1966 (INDECO, Annual Report, 1967, p.36).
33 See INDECO (Annual Report, 1965, p.17) and Republic of Zambia (1966c, p.6). INDECO was
willing to tolerate cost increases up to around 30 percent to secure domestic production (Martin, 1972,
UDI was material to the establishment of new projects through the National Coal Board of Zambia
and Zambian Railways, and the INDECO enterprises Zambia-Tanzania Road Services and TAZAMA
Pipelines. The impact of UDI on the transport and energy sector is discussed by Sklar (1974, p.330-46).
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of participation was to undertake new ventures in partnership with private enterprise 35 . INDECO's
partner was expected to provide technical and managerial expertise to the enterprise, and through equity
participation, would have a direct interest in ensuring that operations were efficient and profitable36.
TABLE II.
INDECO's Asset Allocation by Type of Investment.
FY 1964 to FY 1967.
Financial
Year.
Loan Principals.
%
Investments in
Subsidiaries
Companies.
%
Other Equity
investments.
1964 86 5 9
1965 42 5 53
1966 21 26 53
1967 9 49 42
Source: Calculated from INDECO Annual Reports (Annual Report 1965, p.6, Annual Report
1966, p.5, Annual Report 1967,p.7).
By early 1968, INDECO had interests in 22 companies, of which 7 were fully operational, and
the remainder were in the process of initial development. 37 They ranged from minority stakes in foreign
transitional subsidiaries to wholly owned INDECO subsidiaries. The largest INDECO investments were
35 Republic of Zambia (1966c, p.6) stated that policy was to "participate in certain basic industries
which are of major significance to the economy. This participation will generally be in partnership with
private investors, but, in certain circumstances, the Government itself will undertake the establishment
of certain industries considered to be in the national interest." Although 1NDECO's partners were, in
many cases, State Enterprises from other states, principally the Commonwealth Development
Corporation from Britain and Italy's EM corporation, they were not considered distinct from private
enterprise (Chaput, 1971, p.209-10).
36Sardanis referred to the "participation of technical partners who, while providing their expertise, will
also take a substantial equity interest in the venture. We feel that this will ensure the efficient
establishment and profitable operation of such ventures" (INDECO, Annual Report 1965 p.4).
37 The operational companies were Chilanga Cement, Zambia Sugar, Zambia Tanzania Road Services,
Zambia Clay Industries, Zambia National Wholesale Corporation, Zambia Steel and Building Supplies,
Country Hotels (INDECO, Annual Report 1967).
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in four associated companies (Chilanga Cement, Kafue Textiles, Zambia Sugar and Zambia-Tanzania
Road Services), four INDECO subsidiaries (Zambia Clay Industries, TAZAMA Pipelines, Zambia Hotel
Properties and Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia) and two wholly owned INDECO subsidiaries (Zambia
National Wholesaling Corporation and Zambia Steel and Building Supplies).38
Chilanga Cement was among INDECO's first major post independence equity investments. In
1965, INDECO acquired 40 percent of the shares, taking effective control of the company, and
embarked upon a programme to expand cement production. 39 INDECO also acquired a 12 percent stake
in the Tate and Lyle subsidiary, Zambia Sugar Company. While existing operations were limited to
sugar refining, with INDECO's participation, sugar growing and milling were undertaken to replace
supplies previously produced in Southern Rhodesia. Kafue Textiles was a newly established, fully
integrated textile mill, using local supplies of cotton. INDECO held 50 percent of shares, with the Swiss
Amenital Holding Trust holding 25 percent of shares and providing management and technical
services.40 Zambia-Tanzania Road Services was established as an emergency measure in response to
Rhodesian UDI A road freight company, its shareholders were INDECO, holding 35 percent, the
Tanzanian Government, holding 35 percent and the Italian company, Intersomer S.p.a., holding, 20
percent.
Zambia Clay Industries was the product of planning undertaken before independence to
establish a pipe and brick factory, and was established with INDECO holding 56 percent of the shares
and two minority shareholders, Hume (Zambia) Ltd. and Zambian Anglo American Ltd., with equal
holdings of the balance. TAZAMA Pipelines was a venture undertaken by INDECO, with 67 percent of
the shares, and the Tanzanian Government, with 33 percent of the shares, which was constructed and
financed by Italian companies. The project was a response to the problems presented to Zambia by the
Rhodesian UDI. Zambia Hotel Properties, with INDECO holding 80 percent of the shares, was
established to build hotels to be leased on completion to the minority shareholder, the U.S. company
Intercontinental Hotels. INDECO held 83 percent of the shares in Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia, a new
38 Other companies within INDECO at this time, and not discussed in the main text, were the wholly
owned subsidiaries Kafue Estates, Country Hotels, Mukonchi Tobacco, INDECO Properties, Progressive
Developments and RUCOM Industries; and the associated companies African Farming Equipment and
Falmouth Properties.
39 Chilanga had been controlled by Southern Rhodesian investors and the Government along with
CDC's participation was able to gain a majority intrrest (Faber, 1971 p.315-8).
40 The balance was held by British interests.
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enterprise constructed by minority shareholder, Kobe Steel of Japan. Its links to other sectors of the
Zambian economy were strong, taking inputs from Zambia's newly established collieries, to produce
nitrogen fertilisers for Zambia's agricultural sector and ammonium nitrate for explosives.
Zambia Steel and Building Supplies and the Zambia National Wholesale Corporation,
established in 1966, were INDECO's first wholly owned subsidiaries. Both were trading operations
designed to play a strategic role in raising stock levels within Zambia and diversifying sources of supply,
while also assisting Zambian entrepreneurs in retailing and contracting.
In addition to these enterprises, INDECO was progressing with a number of other important
investments. Kafironda Ltd. was to be developed as an associated company with Imperial Chemical
Industries of the UK and De Beers of South Africa, to supply explosives to the copper mines. INDECO
was to participate in Dunlop (Zambia) Ltd., a subsidiary of the UK based Dunlop Company, to produce
tyres and tubes in response to the increased use of trucks following the Southern Rhodesian UDI. Kabwe
Industrial Fabrics was established as a wholly owned subsidiary, to use local fibres to produce hessian
and grain sacks for local agriculture. INDECO Milling was formed as a wholly owned NDECO
company to establish small scale maize roller mills in rural areas.
Although INDECO was establishing a major presence in Zambia's economy, its role in
ownership was seen as transitory. The Seers Report had suggested that ownership could be transferred to
private interests at subsidiary level through the sale of equity in enterprises to private interests or
through the sale of shares in the corporation itself, and following the announcement, in 1968, that a
stock exchange was to be established, INDECO announced plans to sell equity in its divisional holding
companies.41
SECTION 2.2. PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF POLICY. 
The economic strategy of the Government changed in direction in 1968. At the centre of this
new approach was the expansion of both the size and the scope of the State Enterprise sector, and a
41 UN/ECA/FAO (1964, p. 87). Enterprise (1969, quarters 3/4, p.4), the INDECO journal, noted that "It
is expected that a portion of the shares in the various holding companies controlling Indeco's sub-groups
will be made available for sale through the stock exchange. This is in line with the belief that not only
should the nation benefit from participation in the economy but that this should be translated into a form
which can encourage individual participation." These plans were not fulfilled and although legislated
for, the plan to establish a stock exchange was abandoned in 1972.
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restructuring of the states relationship to private enterprise. The extension of state control over a wider
group of enterprises was combined with an extension of the objectives to be pursued through the sector.
The key to the expansion of the state sector was a series of take-overs between 1968 and 1970,
aimed at the major expatriate and foreign owned enterprises that covered much of the economy. The
announcements of the takeovers were delivered in three speeches by President Kaunda at Mulungushi in
1968, at Matero Hall in 1969 and again at Mulungushi in 1970. 42 In 1968 President Kaunda announced
that INDECO would be taking over a number of private enterprises involved in the supply and
manufacture of building materials, brewing, transportation, and retailing. 43 These takeovers made
INDECO the third largest company in Zambia behind the mining companies Anglo-American and
RST.44 It was to these latter companies that attention turned in 1969, when President Kaunda
announced the take over of 51 percent of their mining interests. 45 Finally in 1970 President Kaunda
turned his attention to the financial sector and announced plans to takeover a number of financial
42 See Kaunda (1968a), (1969) and (1970) respectively. The takeovers of 1968 could only be requested
by the President because of the protection afforded to private property by the Zambian Constitution. This
protection, written into to the constitution by the British Government before independence, prevented
the Zambian Government undertaking the forcible acquisition of property. To overturn this, and other
clauses, required the approval of a majority of the registered electorate. In June 1969 a Referendum
approved a change in the constitution to allow its future amendment by a two-thirds majority of the
National Assembly, and the Constitution was duly amended to allow the Government to undertake
compulsory purchase of property (Martin, 1972, p.151-3 and Kaunda, 1969, p.6-8).
43 The Companies were:
-three window and door frame manufactures: Anros Industries Ltd; Monarch (Zambia) Ltd.; Crittal-
Hope (Zambia).
-seven builders merchants: Johnson and Fletcher, Anglo-African Glass Company Ltd; P.G.Timbers;
Baldwins Ltd; Steel Supplies of Zambia Ltd; Zamtimbia Ltd; May and Hassel (Zambia) Ltd..
-three quarries: Nicholas Quarries; Gerry's Quarries; Greystone Quarries; and their jointly owned
subsidiary Crushed Stone Sales.
-two timber companies: Zambezi Sawmills Ltd; Mining Timbers Ltd.
-two breweries: Northern Breweries Ltd; Heinrich's Syndicate Ltd.
-three road transport companies: Irvin and Johnson Ltd.; Central African Road Services Ltd.; and Smith
and Youngson Ltd.
-five retailers: C.B.C. Stores; O.K. Bazaars; Standard Trading; Solanki Brothers; Mwaiseni Stores Ltd.
While the trader Solanki Bros. Ltd had refused to offer shares to the state, Sussman Brothers and
Wolfsohn, also traders, volunteered for state participation, and their offer was accepted (Kaunda, 1969,
p.13-6).
44 Chaput (1971, p.112).
45 The operating companies that were affected were Anglo Americans Nchanga Consolidated Mines,
Rokana Corporation, Kansanshi Copper Mining, Bancroft Mines, Zambia Broken Hill Development
Company, and Rokana Copper Refineries. RST had two operating companies, Mufilira Copper Mines
and Luanshya Mines.
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institutions along with a further tranche of other enterprises. 46 This represented the end of the period of
major takeovers and while further acquisition occurred, they were incremental.
Section 2.2.1 examines explanations of the change in policy from 1968. These explanations
draw upon both political and economic factors, which are examined at Sections 2.2.1a and 2.2.1b
respectively. Section 2.2.2 examines the implementation of the takeovers and outlines the terms on
which the enterprises were acquired. The balance between enterprises that were acquired and new
enterprises that were established within the Zambian state enterprise sector is examined in Section 2.2.3
and the impact of the takeovers on the patterns of ownership across the Zambian economy as a whole is
discussed in Section 2.2.4.
2.2.1. Explanations of the Course of Development Policy.
The evolution of government policy was prompted by political pressures on the government
combined with the limitations of existing economic policies to achieve the objectives of development
policy. In this context, the expansion of the state enterprise sector through acquisition of a number of
major private enterprises appeared to offer a more direct course through which the development
objectives of the Government could be realised.
The analysis begins with an examination of the political factors involved. It focuses upon two
factors that have been identified as material to the development of policy in this period, the first being
the ideological preferences of the Government and the second the effects of the factional conflicts within
UNIP. It is concluded that the ideological position of the Government did not predispose it towards the
extension of state enterprise and that political pressures were important in prompting the government to
re-evaluate its existing policies.
The choice of state enterprise is addressed in the discussion of the economic factors
contributing to the course of policy. It is argues that by the late 1960s, the government had become
concerned with some of the results of the policy framework which it had initially established. In
particular, its confidence in the foreign and expatriate private sector was eroded and the promotion of
46 The attempt to takeover the Banks failed (see below), although the building societies were
nationalised. Of the other enterprises targeted; Lever Brothers; Refined Oil Products; National Milling
Company and Supa Bakeries had been taken over by 1973, while negotiations continued with Duncan
Gilbey and Matheson and BAT/Rothmans. In addition to this the state-owned insurance company was
granted a monopoly of the Zambian market.
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new Zambian enterprises proved slow and problematic. In this context, the takeover of existing
enterprises appeared to offer the Government a more direct instrument to influence the development of
the economy. Despite this, the Government continued to experiment with other policy measures aimed at
reconciling the behaviour of the existing private sector to the objectives of the government. It is argued
that continued problems with these measures contrasted with the apparent success of the takeovers,
further promoting the option of nationalisation.
2.2.1a Political Factors.
The case that the takeovers reflected the ideological predisposition of the Government has been
made by Libby and Woakes (1980). They argue that the rationale behind the takeovers in Zambia was an
ideological commitment to the control of the economy, stating that;
The populist and socialist ideology of Zambia's ruling party, the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) made the nationalization of the private sector inevitable.47
To the extent that UNIP did articulate an ideology, it was broad based and inclusive. A statement of
ideology entitled "Humanism" was prepared by President Kaunda in 1967 at the request of the Central
Committee of UNIP. It drew on an idealised African tradition in which "all was done for the good of
Man as a Person. It could be done collectively, it could be held individually- Man was central" and
defined the challenge of development as "fighting to preserve the Man-centred society." 48 Humanism
outlined an economy in which there would be space for state enterprise, private enterprise and co-
operative enterprise.49 The prescription of boundaries between these sectors was primarily a description
of the structure of the economy at that time and was non-committal on its future direction. 5° Rather
47 Libby and Woakes (1980, p.33-4). Scott (1978, p.326) suggests that Humanism "anticipated" the
policy changes while Thomas (1968, p.13) suggests that Humanism was the "overriding principle
behind" the reforms.
48 Kaunda (1967a, p.13 and 4 respectively)
49 President Kaunda (1967a, p.23) outlined seven ownership patterns that could co-exist within a
humanist economy. They were: "Where only Government will participate;" "Areas where Government
will participate with another government;" "Areas where Government will participate with another
government and private enterprise;" "Areas where Government will participate with private enterprise
and by mutual agreement Government may take over full control at a latter stage;" "Areas where co-
operatives will operate with or without Government;" "Those areas where the Government will
participate with private enterprise;" "Those areas where only private enterprise might participate."
The scope of co-operatives within the economy was to be "determined as time goes on" (Kaunda,
1967a, P.23).
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than providing a framework for the formulation of policy, therefore, it indicated at most that the
Government viewed the issue of ownership as one of pragmatism rather than principle.
As an ill-defined ideology, Humanism constituted part of the continued attempts by the
leadership of UNIP to maintain the unity and dominance of the party, and to appeal to all citizens,
regardless of class, regional or tribal identities. 51 The imperative of maintaining the unity of UNIP and
its electoral support, became increasingly important within the context of the development of
factionalism. In the years following independence, the political system consolidated around clientelist
structures, oriented towards the distribution of economic opportunities to the African population. UNIP
sought to maintain its political dominance through controlling access to these resources, summed up in
the phrase first used in 1965 and later used by President Kaunda in the 1968 election campaign, "It pays
to belong to UNIP."52 However, the competition for these resources, resulted in intense factional
conflicts within LTNIP and the formation of break-away parties.53
These political problems experienced by UNIP in the period have also been identified as a
factor prompting the reforms. Discussion of the relationship between the economic reforms and the
factional struggles within UNIP has concentrated on the issue of the copper mines, but it is important to
note that the announcement of the takeovers at Mulungushi in April 1968 was also made at a time of
significant political pressure on the leadership. 54 The factional politics which erupted within UNIP in
August 1967 intensified to such a degree that in February 1968 Kaunda threatened to resign the
Presidency of both the Party and the Republic. UNIP's position was also challenged by other political
parties. In March 1968, the opposition ANC won four by-elections in Southern Province. Although this
51 Szeftel (1978, p.375).
52 Szeftel (1978, p.282-4) notes that this manifested itself through the rewarding of those joining UNIP,
and the penalising of those affiliated to other parities. Johns (1971, p.236-7) argues that this was
reflected in appointments to the boards of statutory bodies and state enterprises.
53 In 1966 the United Party was founded, being strengthened in 1968 by the defection to it of Nalumino
Mundia who had served as a Minister in the UNIP Government. Following the banning of the party,
many of its activists resurfaced within the ANC. In 1971 the United Popular Party was founded by the
Simon Kapwepwe, the former Vice President of both UNIP and the Republic. The nature of the
factionalism and accounts of its course are found provided by Rasmussen (1969), Molteno (1974),
Tordoff and Scott (1974) and Szeftel (1978).
54 It is also suggested that the financial takeovers of 1970 were a result of the political pressures on the
leadership at the time (Africa Contemporary Record, 1970, part B, p.211)
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area was an ANC stronghold, UNIP expected to win, having made a concerted effort since independence
to channel resources to the province to secure electoral support.55
The Matero announcement on the mines was also made within the context of political
pressures. Despite the election victory in late 1968 and the successful constitutional referendum in June
1969, factional agendas were set to dominate the meeting of the National Council of UNIP scheduled for
August 1969. 56 In the event, President Kaunda announced the takeovers of the mines and then
dissolved the meeting. These developments were identified by Hall (1973) as the primary impetus
behind the mining takeovers, while others have accepted that these factors may have influenced the
timing of the announcement.57
The benefit of these announcements at a time of political pressure has been identified as two-
fold. Firstly the initiative of populist measures by the leadership could rally the support among members
of the party and the wider electorate. 58 In particular the nationalisation of the mines could appeal to the
Copperbelt which was an important UNIP stronghold. Secondly, the measures could bring more
resources under the control of the leadership and extended it sources of patronage. 59 While the
extension of state enterprise could increase the immediate scope for patronage, more important was its
potential to promote the overall growth of the economy in the longer term.6°
2.2.1b Economic Factors.
The development programme outlined in the FNDP placed substantial new demands on the
Zambian economy, which without a corresponding increase in the supply of goods and services would
prove inflationary. Alongside this, other developments added to the costs base of the economy of the
newly independent state. Attempts to disengage from trade with Southern Rhodesia increased costs as
55 The by-elections had been prompted by the defection of four sitting ANC Members of Parliament to
UNIP. Under the Zambian Constitution this necessitated a by-election (Rasmussen, 1969).
56 At the meeting it was expected that attempts would be made to remove the leader of one of the
factions, Simon Kapwepwe, from his position as UNIP Vice President.
57 Simwinga (1975, p.91), Sklar (1975, p.34), Scott (1978, p.236) and Laming and Mueller (1979,
p.206-8).
38 Hall (1973, p.220) and Scott (1978, p.326).
59 Southall (1980, p.97).
60 These factors, however, failed to prevent the continued deterioration of UNIP which culminated in
the imposition of the one-party state. Rasmussen (1969) argues that the growing authoritarianism, which
was subsequently to lead to the imposition of the one-party state, reflected UNIP's inability to maintain
dominance by patronage alone, while Scott (1978, p.328-9) argues that one of the factors leading to the
formation of the UPP in 1971 was the continued shortage of patronage available within the state.
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imports had to be sourced from further afield and less developed transport routes were used. A further
increase to the cost base of the economy was the rising level of wages. 61 While the Government,
following the advice of the Seers Report, was concerned that rises in wages should be linked to
improvements in productivity, the differentials between European and African employees were
unacceptable in the new context. 62 Following the report of a Government appointed commission, the
mineworkers were awarded a 22 percent wage increase, which was generalised to other sectors.63
Concerned with the rate of wage rises, the inequalities between the rural and urban sectors, and
the rate of employment creation, in April 1969 the Government commissioned a study on wages and
prices which was undertaken by the ILO • 64 The report ("the Turner Report") identified the high level of
wage rises as the primary source of inflation alongside the rise in costs associated with UDI The Report
found that while the average real wage of a Zambian employee had risen by two-thirds between 1963
and 1968, productivity had declined.65
While the report was subject to a number of criticisms, the conclusion that the cost of labour
had risen faster than its productivity was generally accepted. 66
 The effect of this rise in the level of
wages on the economy was, however, subject to debate. Fry (1970) argued that, since most of the
manufactured goods consumed in Zambia were imported, that the cost-push impact of wage rises was
limited and that UDI was a more substantial factor in the increase in costs. While Harvey (1971b) also
argued that the cost-push effects of wage rises were limited, he argued that wages had raised the price
61 The Seers Report (UN/ECA/FAO, 1964, p.33) had warned that a rise in the level of wages would slow
the rate of growth that could be achieved. This argument was influential on the Government who
identified rising wages as a threat to the development plans of the FNDP and sought to dissuade the
trades unions from seeking rises in wages (Bates, 1971, p.32-8).
62 Bates (1971, p.198-200).
63 As Fry (1970) notes, the wage rises may have constituted a one off adjustment or an ongoing process
of wage pressure from urban workers. The issue of wage leadership is discussed by Baldwin (1962),
Knight (1971), Daniel (1979, p.144-62) and Chiwele (1996).
64 ILO/UNDP (1969, p.1). Concern over the rate of inflation was also expressed in the deflationary
budget adopted by the Zambian Government in 1969. As Elliott (1971, p.397) noted "within five years
the main thrust of government economic strategy has been diverted from development to the control of
inflation." The World Bank (1968, p.14) also expressed concern over the rise in the cost base of the
economy since independence.
65 The Report cited the rises in wages prompted by the Brown Commission which set a target of 22
percent for workers in other sectors (ILO/UNDP, 1969, p.12).The explanation of the decline in
productivity, on the other hand, focused on the erosion of colonial discipline, without the development of
any new managerial authority in its place (ibid., p.18).
66 Fry (1970, p.53-64) critically examined the basis on which Turner had calculated productivity and
argued that it actually rose by 8 percent between 1964 and 1968, but that this still did not match the
larger rise in wages.
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level through a demand-pull effect. In fact, Harvey (197 lb) argued, that given the overall increase in
demand since independence, the level of inflation experienced by the Zambian economy was relatively
moderate. This was primarily because of the capacity of the economy to finance an increasing level of
imports. While this allowed the Government to expand the economy rapidly, it also conflicted with the
aim of the FNDP to move to a diversified economy, in which a greater proportion of local demand was
served by local production. 67 For this to be achieved, substantial investment was required in the local
economy.
Despite the framework of incentives that were established, the performance of the foreign and
expatriate private sector was disappointing. 68 The private sector's response to the post independence
economic boom appeared to be one of raising prices and externalising the resulting profits through high
levels of dividends. 69 Levels of new investment appeared to be low, with a preference to finance
activities from local sources and concentrate on projects with a short payback period. 70 It appeared that
through these leakages, the growth potential of the Zambian economy was being dissipated. Alongside
this, the commitment of the private sector to wider development goals of Zambianisation, of the re-
sourcing of imports and of diversification of the domestic economy, appeared to be minimal.
The Government's discontent with this situation was made clear at the National Convention in
1967. President Kaunda (1967b, p.7) warned business that they were;
simply inviting Government-and soon they may find out that they have forced Government-
to move in with compulsory check upon the free price system, or to go even further and
67 Rothchild (1972) argues that the course of government policy since 1964 also acted to exacerbate the
inequalities between rural and urban dwellers, in contradiction to the objectives of the FNDP.
68 The behaviour of the private enterprise sector is discussed by Martin (1972, chapter 4) and
Liebenthal (1978, section 1).
69 Kaunda (1968a, p.37-8). In 1967 President Kaunda (1967b) complained of those "taking deliberate
advantage of the transportation and economic problems besetting the country for their own private gain.
There is increasing evidence of grossly-inflated mark-ups, inflated beyond any level justified by
transportation costs and costs of distribution in Zambia." In the announcements of the takeover,
prominence was given to the role of state enterprise in managing the level of prices. The level of prices
was cited as the primary reason behind the takeovers in building manufacture and supply and general
retailing in 1968, and in 1969 the state trading enterprises were instructed to introduce own brand
products priced at cost (Kaunda, 1968a, p.38-40 and 1969, p.57)
I° The experience in these early years was of foreign investors having little interest in the Zambian
economy even when incentives were offered. The Pioneer Act, 1965, had established a framework of tax
incentives for undertaking investment in sectors. By 1969, however, only three enterprises, all of which
had INDECO involvement (Dunlop, Kafue Textiles and Metal Fabricators), had been granted this status
(Young, 1973, 183-5) and (Martin, 1972, p.65).
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replace it altogether in some sectors of the economy. Zambia would be by no means the first
country in which such action has been forced upon an unwilling Government.71
The Government stated that its preferred route was for itself and private enterprise to begin to work
more closely together. 72 This was constrained, however, by the mutual distrust between the Government
and elements of the expatriate private sector, many of whom were connected to Rhodesia or South
Africa and whose commitment to the long term development of Zambia was questionable.73
Schemes to promote Zambian enterprise alongside the expatriate sector had made only limited
progress. The Credit Organisation of Zambia was established in 1967 to bring together a number of
different schemes offering loans to Zambian enterprise. The administration of the agency, however,
placed more emphasis on the patronage than the ability or willingness of the recipient to make
repayments, and was itself replaced in 1970. 74 The Government also encouraged the formation of co-
operatives in the building sector, in the production of materials and contracting. While these sectors
were well suited to low level entry, requiring limited capital, the success of the projects was variable.
While some of the contractor co-operatives were quite successful, the producer co-operatives were less
so. In 1968, in recognition of this, the Government established a Federation of Building Co-operatives to
assist them.75
71 While noting that "We cannot pass a law saying to private enterprise, 'Get more productive and keep
your costs down!'," Kaunda (1967b, p.8) asserted that "There are, in fact, a number of steps which
Government can take in these circumstances, short of moving into the private sector itself, and these are
now under active consideration." What these measure were was not specified.
72 As Kaunda (1967b, p.8-9) stated "Neither Government nor business stands to gain anything from
perpetuating the tradition of mistrust, suspicion and arm's-length relationship which has grown up
between them in Zambia."
73 President Kaunda (1968a, p.26) speaking of resident expatriate business noted that "my Minister and
I have been making repeated appeals to the members of these communities, calling on them to identify
with the nation and urging them to Zambianise their businesses as soon as possible" and criticised those
who "have kept only one foot in Zambia in order to take advantage of the economic boom created by the
Transitional and the First National Development Plans. The other foot they have kept outside Zambia in
South Africa, Britain, Europe, India, or wherever they come from, ready to jump when they have made
enough money." As Hall (1973, p.183) noted, many whites; "made no secret of where they would travel
away to when their savings seemed substantial enough" and stated that incidence of sabotage and the
passing of information to the South, further undermined Government trust of expatriates (ibid., p.184-
190).
74 The loans by the COZ were commonly treated as grants, rewarding the recipients for services in the
struggle for independence. By the time of its replacement by the Agricultural Finance Corporation in
1970, COZ had lost between K20 million and K30 million (Harvey 1973, p.388-9 and Szeftel, 1978,
R.186-7).
Christie (1971, p.388-94). In the case of farming co-operatives, Martin (1972, p.232), estimates that
although about 800 had been registered and received Government assistance, that at most, ten were
operating by the early 1970's.
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As discussed in Section 2.1.3, INDECO was able to initiate a number of major projects,
utilising both state and private capital. Its continuing expansion was, however, problematic. In focusing
on industries that required a large investment and had a longer payback period, INDECO's ability to
generate funds for reinvestment was limited in the short and medium term. Further to this, the task of
establishing new enterprises proved to be difficult, even when undertaken with a private sector partner,
and involved heavy start-up costs. 76 INDECO had not always been able to find a suitable partner to
undertake joint ventures and in cases where it decided to act on its own, such as in trading, INDECO
experienced problems in recruiting competent management. 7' Despite these problems, the development
of new industries under INDECO was considered to be a success, prompting the Government to
establish an agricultural development corporation, to parallel the role of INDECO in the agricultural
sector.78
By 1968, therefore, a number of problems had emerged in the initial policy framework that had
been established. The existing private sector was reluctant to undertake the leading role in economic
development that had originally been envisaged, while the development of an indigenous private sector
was proving to be slow and required Government support. While the experience of state enterprise was
positive, the existing strategy based on the development of new industries was proving difficult. In this
context the option of acquiring controlling interests in existing enterprises appeared as an attractive
strategy to modify the behaviour of some of the leading enterprises.
The extension of state enterprise was not, however, the only option with which the government
experimented. In 1968, a limit was set on the level of dividends which could be remitted overseas to
encourage reinvestment within Zambia. 79 One sector which this was aimed at was the mining
76 As President Kaunda (1968a, p.37) commented, "so far we have tried to promote state enterprise the
hard way." Kafue Textiles, for example, experienced problems with damage to imported machinery and
a reluctance of local manufacturers to purchase its output (Young, 1973, p.219). Martin (1972, p.61)
notes the problems encountered by Zambia Clay Industries, whose plant design, supplied by its minority
shareholder Hume "was forty years old and worked only at sea level."
77 Martin (1972, p. 67). The case of the nitrogen fertiliser factory is also noted where INDECO "was
unable to interest a single manufacturer of fertilisers in the project... and had to resort to a 'turn-key' deal
with Kobe Steel and find the management [itself]" (ibid., p.65).
78 INDECO (Annual Report, 1967, p.27). An Agricultural Development Corporation was established in
1968, becoming the Rural Development Corporation in 1969 with wider responsibilities establishing
new projects and undertaking loans to farmers (Johns, 1971, p.220-1).
79Dividends could not exceed either 30 percent of the equity capital of an enterprise or half of its profits,
with companies wholly owned by Zambian citizens being exempt (Kaunda 1968a, p.28 and p.50). While
these regulations were contrary to the requirements of the International Monetary Fund, of which
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companies. In 1968 President Kaunda objected that mining development had been minimal since
independence, while most of their profits were distributed overseas as dividends. 80 It was hoped that the
tightening of exchange control restrictions in 1968 would compel the mining companies to raise their
investment in Zambia. Instead their response was to allow large cash balances of undistributed profits to
accumulate in bank deposits and to adjust their accounting policies so as to increase the potential level of
dividend which could be declared. 81 Other businesses also, rather than undertaking new fixed
investment, merely increased their liquid assets and sought avenues for exchange control evasion.82
Another area addressed by the Government was the availability of credit and loan facilities to
Zambian business. 83 In 1968 President Kaunda extended to expatriate business restrictions on
borrowing within Zambia that already applied to foreign enterprise. The intention of the policy was that
the commercial financial institutions would divert the funds they had previously lent to expatriate
business to Zambian business." This measure, however, relied not just upon a willingness of the
financial institutions to lend to Zambians, but upon them lending to less well secured borrowers and
Zambia was a member, they were still considered to be "fairly liberal" by the World Bank (World Bank,
1968, p.14). These regulations were amended in 1969, 1970 and 1972 (Leibenthal, 1978, p.42).
80 Kaunda (1968a, p.49-50). Kaunda (1968a, p.50) referred to "80% or 90%" of the profits as being
distributed as dividends. This was only a slight exaggeration. The dividends paid as a percentage of net
profit for 1965-6 and 1966-7, were 83 percent for Nchanga Mine, 87 percent for Rokana Mine, and 75
percent for RST Group (calculated from Leibenthal, 1978, p.47). Cunningham (1981, p.193-201)
provides an alternative explanation for the lack of investment based upon the paucity of profitable
investment opportunities available to the mining companies.
81 Liebenthal (1978, p. 49-50) notes that it was the constraint of dividends as a proportion of net profit
which capped the remittances of the mining companies. Anglo American's mining companies changed
their practice of accounting for depreciation of fixed assets, with the effect of increasing declared net
profits, although Liebenthal could not confirm whether this treatment had been accepted by the Bank of
Zambia for exchange control purposes. His analysis of the accounts of the mines also confirms a marked
increase in their holdings of liquid assets. (ibid., p.51). Martin (1972) notes that the amount became so
large, at K60 million, that it could not be absorbed within Zambia and that the Bank of Zambia had to
allow its investment in securities in London.
82 Leibenthal (1978, p. 60-7). In 1969, in response to cases of exchange control evasion, it was
announced that the State Enterprises and Trading Organisations would undertake all importing of goods
in their respective fields. Announcing this, President Kaunda (1969, p.10-11) complained of
"unscrupulous people who, in collusion with their suppliers overseas inflate the prices of merchandise
and in this way build fat accounts for themselves overseas while the nation is suffering from foreign
exchange drain and from inflated prices."
83 While the Government was concerned to provide assistance to emerging enterprise, its general
preference was outlined as being that "the provision of finance to private investors should itself be in the
hands of private enterprise" (Republic of Zambia, 1966c, p.7).
84 Kaunda (1968a, p.29). Harvey (1971a, p.134) notes that by giving a veto to the Bank of Zambia over
a large extent of bank credit, the measure also created an effective tool of monetary policy.
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extending their geographical coverage beyond the urban areas. 85 Their perceived reluctance to develop
this area of business was the rationale behind the establishment, by the Government, of the state owned
National Commercial Bank in 1969. 86 It was recognised, however, that the growth of the National
Commercial Bank would take a considerable time and that a change in the behaviour of the existing
private sector financial institutions would be necessary.87
In the cases of dividend and lending restrictions, the Government found that their new policy
initiatives were not able to secure the desired response from the private sector. This contrasted with the
apparent success with which it was able to implement the takeovers of enterprises. 88 In August 1969,
President Kaunda could announce that all but one of the acquisitions that he has announced 15 months
previously had been completed. 89 In the case of the negotiation of the mining takeovers, formal
negotiations began at the end of that September, producing agreement of the principle issues by the
middle of October and resulting in signed agreements by the end of December." The apparent success
of the initial takeovers, compared to other measures, can only have encouraged the Government along
this course, in addition to which, evidence of the conduct of the firms taken over reinforced the
Government's view that these private enterprises had lacked commitment to Zambian economy.91
In addition to this, the acquisition of enterprises offered the government new and more direct
means through which development policy could be pursued. In the case of the Government's attempts to
limit the rate of inflation, the extension of the state enterprise sector into the retail and wholesale sector
85 Harvey (1973, p.391) writes that; "Many Zambians find it hard to get credit, not because they are
Zambian, but because their enterprises are high risk and small." It should be added that, given the
colonial setting, it was because they were Zambian that their business was often high risk and small.
86 The Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Zulu (1970), argued that the establishment of the National
Commercial Bank would encourage existing financial institutions to follow it into these new areas of
activity.
87 President Kaunda (1970, p.64-5).
88 Assessing the takeovers the World Bank (1970, p.37) noted that "The mixed enterprise approach
seems to be working well. The management of foreign companies has been retained, and the companies
have been left a significantly large financial interest to keep them interested in the success of the
enterprise... The success of this approach was to a large extent due to the efficient organisation of
Indeco."
89 Martin (1972, p.176-8).
90 The agreement of December 1968 was subject to amendment in June of 1970, and subject to a further
number of legal formalities before completion.
91 As Kaunda noted in late 1968; "Some of the firms we took over were suspected of profiteering and, in
fact, examination of their affairs after takeover has proved us to have been very correct... net profits of
some firms taken over amounted to between 25 per cent and 30 per cent of turnover. Dividends were
often 100 per cent and 150 per cent of capital...when a Zambian Company was making a slight loss the
parent company was enjoying fees as high as 10 per cent. In this way our Inland Revenue was deprived
of the taxation, which went to the country of origin of the company" (1968b, p.299-300).
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placed the level of prices of many goods directly under the control of the Government. 92 The reforms
also made the state enterprise sector the principal employer in the economy, and thereby gave it more
direct control over the determination of the level of wages. As the Turner Report (1969, p.25) argued,
this potentially increased the institutional capability for the Government to pursue a prices and incomes
policy.
While the Government of the newly independent Zambia had initially attempted, therefore, to
pursue a development strategy through the inherited economic institutions, it increasingly sought to
reshape them. As President Kaunda (1971, p.12) stated;
The country's institutional set-up at independence was thin on the ground, it did not reflect
our aspirations and, most important of all, it was inadequate for channelling the large capital
investment programme and the new sense of urgency and vision. Today, the institutional set-
up is our own creation.
2.2.2 Expansion Through Acquisition 1968 to 1973.
The formula announced for takeovers at Mulungushi in 1968 was for INDECO to negotiate the
acquisition of a 51 per cent shares of each company, at a price based upon their book value. 93 Although,
the terms negotiated differed between companies, repayments were usually made at the commercial rate
of interest, were guaranteed by INDECO rather than the individual enterprise, and the management
services of the minority shareholder were generally retained .94
This formula was also the basis for the negotiations of the mining takeovers. 95 The acquisition
of control of the mining companies was to be negotiated by INDECO on the basis of book value, and to
be paid out of future dividends. 96 The mining interests of Anglo American and RST were consolidated
92 At Matero in 1969 President Kaunda (1969, p.56-7) announced that INDECO had been instructed
not to increase the prices of certain goods without Presidential permission and had also agreed to
introduce new low cost brands of goods.
93 It is common practice for a business asset to be priced on the basis of future earnings potential. This
method of valuation was rejected by President Kaunda (1968a, p.46), who stated "I cannot see why we
should pay extra for the boom we have ourselves created." Nevertheless, INDECO Annual Accounts for
1969 show Goodwill at a value of K1.9 million. While a total value for the takeovers is not stated, the
net book value of the fixed assets acquired is stated at K22.8 million (INDECO, Annual Report, 1969,
p.27 and 30).
94 Martin (1972, p.199-205) discusses the various outcomes that were negotiated. In some cases
problems arose with existing shareholders. In the case of Johnson and Fletcher, INDECO acquired the
whole of the equity of the company from the Southern Rhodesian owners and located a new foreign
partner to manage the enterprise.
95 The principal sources for the details of these presented in this section are Maxwell Stamp Associates
(1970), Bostock and Harvey (1972), Martin (1972), Ushewokunze (1974) and Sklar (1975).
96 Kaunda (1969, p.36-7)
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into the new companies Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Copper
Mines (RCM) respectively, with the Zambian Government acquiring a 51 percent share of the equity of
each. 97 The vehicle for payment was the issue of Government guaranteed loan stock, carrying a 6
percent interest rate, and remitted in six monthly instalments over a number of years. 98 The industry
would continue to be managed by Anglo American and RST, through the agreement of service contracts
relating to the management, technical and marketing requirements of NCCM and RCM respectively.
Agreements were also reached .binding the Government to the legal framework, and in particular the
taxation and foreign exchange regulations, at the point of the agreement.
The relationship between the Government, the minority shareholders and the jointly owned
companies, was set out in detailed agreements. The Board of Directors was to have two divisions of
Directors; 'A' Directors were to represent the Government and 'B' Directors were to represent the
minority shareholders. The minority 'B directors had a veto over a range of issues including: the raising
of additional finance through shares or borrowing; the disposal of any significant asset of the business;
any changes to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the companies; any expenditure on
prospecting, exploration or capital appropriations; any reconstruction or winding up of the business;
diversification into non-mining sector; and any act of the company which they considered was not aimed
at the maximisation of company profitability. In addition the operational control of the mines remained
with Anglo-American and RST through the agreement of management, sales, purchasing and recruiting
contracts.
The Government negotiation team believed that it was vital to make an agreement which kept
the companies committed to the mines. 99 The arrangements for these takeovers, however, attracted
97 While the balancing 49 percent of NCCM was held by the Anglo American controlled Zambia
Copper Investments (ZCI); the balance of RCM equity was made up of a 20 percent holding by RST, a
12.25 percent holding by ZCI, with the remaining 16.75 percent held by smaller shareholders. The
takeover agreements provided for the pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders to subscribe to new
shares, before any offer to the outside parties.
98 The Governments share of NCCM was valued at K126 million, to be paid over 12 years, and of RCM
K84 million, repaid over 8 years. In addition to this the transnational companies were allowed to
externalise their non-mining assets, including funds which the Government had previously restricted the
companies ium distributing as dividends with the aim of encouraging re-investment. All payments were
additionally to be free of taxation and exchange restrictions. If dividends from the companies rose above
a stated level, payment would be accelerated, although there was no reciprocal facility to reduce
payments should dividends fall below expected levels
99 Burdette (1977) and Martin (1972, p.163-80) discuss the companies' and government's negotiating
strategies. Important aspects of these were the determination by the Government to secure the continued
participation of the mining companies, to secure their expertise in running the mines and to avoid the
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criticism from within the Zambian Government. Among others, the Governor of the Bank of Zambia,
Dr. Justin Zulu, was concerned at the level of foreign exchange outflows which were involved. M° It is
likely that such criticisms had influence since President Kaunda cited the need to conserve foreign
exchange as an important factor in the revised formula offered in the failed takeover of the banks. 1 ° 1 It
was proposed that the state would acquire 51 percent of their equity, through the issue of additional
shares, so that its payment represented a new capital injection to the business, rather than a payment to
the former shareholders. A requirement for local incorporation by the Banks would also require the
existing shareholders to bring new funds into Zambia. 102 In further contrast to the previous method of
takeovers, it became apparent that the state did not intend to offer management contracts to the minority
shareholders at the banks. While the banks were willing to conclude an agreement along the lines of the
mining takeovers, they resisted an arrangement on the basis of the new terms offered by the
Government. 1 °3 The Government withdrew its plans to take over the entire sector, and settled for the
acquisition of the small Commercial Bank of Zambia alongside the local incorporation of the remaining
banks.1°4
The Government also began to re-evaluate the agreements that had been reached for the
acquisition of the copper industry and Government discontent was fuelled by continued disagreements
with the minority shareholders over a number of issues. These included Government proposals for
diversification into the production of copper products within Zambia, for rationalising facilities
duplicated by NCCM and RCM and initiatives for import substitution which would switch supplies from
problems encountered by Zaire and Chile in participating in their copper mining industries. As regards
the transnationals, Anglo American was particularly concerned to protect its non-mining interest within
Zambia, and was less confrontational than RST/AMAX.
100 Martin (1972, p.189) and Williams (1973, p.46).
101 President Kaunda (1969, p.65-6) stated that "all the takeovers and bank mergers I have announced
today are to be made so as to ensure least possible outflow of foreign exchange... the price of copper is
no longer K1,400 a ton and we must therefore be doubly careful... In view of this, instead of buying 51
per cent of their shares and thus making a payment, we shall acquire control by additional contribution
thus ensuring that all existing capitals of the banks will remain in the country." In the case of insurance
companies, he noted that "we are NOT taking over foreign insurance companies. I am simply closing
them down so that they leave the field free to our own State Insurance Company. In this way we shall be
saving considerable foreign exchange, because we shall have nothing to pay" (emphasis in the original)
(ibid., p.65).
102 Harvey (1972, p.17)
103 Harvey (1972, p.15-6) notes that before this, Barclays Bank had already offered a 51 percent share
to the state and had completed six months of negotiations with the Ministry of State Participation This
progress was set aside and new negotiation begun. See also Martin (1972, p.24'7-8).
104 Harvey (1972, p.18). Saasa (1987, p.52-3) argues that local incorporation gave the Government
significantly more control over the banks.
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the minority shareholders group companies. 105 In 1973 these prompted the Government to announce
the cancellation of the management, marketing and technical contracts agreed with the minority
shareholders of the mining companies NCCM and RCM. 106 Subsequent negotiations produced
agreements that the Managing Directors of the companies would be appointed by the Government and
that the 'B' directors rights of veto were amended. 1 °7 These changes were, however, bought at a high
price. While the Zambian Government had expected that the immediate redemption of the outstanding
bonds would secure the changes it required, it subsequently had to agree compensation for the
cancellation of the service contracts. 108 In addition to this NCCM and RCM were still reliant on outside
expertise, which they continued to contract from the minority shareholders.1°9
2.2.3. The Balance Between New Investments and Acquisitions.
Regrouped into a new state holding company Zambia Industrial and Mining Company
(ZIMCO), state enterprise net assets totalled K695 million in FY 1971, compared to the K35 million of
105 Simwinga (1977, p.245-8). Simwinga (1975, p.90-1) notes that MINDECO and other Government
officials did suspect that the transnationals were involved in transfer pricing in this period, while
O'Faircheallaigh (1984, p.129-30) believes that the scope for transfer pricing was low because the
Government was dealing with two separate transnationals and could itself through "a simple comparison
of invoices" detect overcharging. This would appear to overstate the degree to which MINDECO
supervision focusecrhauditing operational behaviour, rather than on strategic issues.
106 Arguing that the takeover agreements had left "effective control of the industry vested firmly in the
minority shareholders" and that the minority shareholders had "taken out of Zambia every Ngwee due to
them," President 1Caunda criticised many of the key points agreed in 1969, specifically citing the 'B'
directors veto; the formula for bond redemption; the exemptions relating to foreign exchange regulations
and taxation; and the provisions for the service contracts (UNCTC, 1984, p.43-7).
107 The 'B' directors retained a veto over: any reconstruction of the company; any material asset
disposals; any changes to the powers of the directors; any diversification of business or undertaking of
new mining operations; any material loan or borrowing of funds; any sale of products not for money or
at below market price. For the Board to decide on any of these issues required that at least two 'B'
directors must be present and a veto could then be affected by the 'B' directors absenting themselves. In
1974 Anglo American confirmed that the Government of Zambia had accepted that any such action by
the 'B' directors to prevent a decision would be legal and legitimate (UNCTC, 1984, p.48-50). Despite
these provisions, Aron (1992, p.13) states that the veto power of the 'B' Directors has never been used,
although they have opposed a number of policies that have been pursued.
108 The Government agreed compensation for the cancellation of the service contracts of K55 million
and paid K146.6 million to redeem the bonds. Additional cost were incurred in the redemption of the
bonds which carried a coupon of 6 percent, with funds borrowed at 12-13 percent (Burdette, 1977,
p.494).
109 Saasa (1987, p.41) notes that services which continued to be supplied by the minority shareholders
included the "secondment of technical personnel; provision of operational plans, both short- and long-
term, estimates of capital expenditure, viability studies; advice on marketing and research and
development (R&D); and computer and management services."
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assets held by INDECO before the takeovers began in FY 1968. 110 As the ZIMCO Annual Report noted
"based on the 1973 results ZIMCO ranked 123rd in size amongst the 300 largest corporations outside
the United States of America and was far and away the largest in independent Africa."111
In the new structure INDECO became a sub-holding company of ZIMCO alongside
MINDECO, which held the groups mining assets, FINDECO, which held the group financial assets, and
the National Transport Corporation and National Hotel Corporation, which were demerged from
INDEC0. 112 The centrality of the mining assets to the of ZIMCO group (Table III), was a reflection of
the importance of the copper mines to the Zambian economy, and implied that at least three quarters of
ZIMCO assets were acquired by takeovers, rather than through the establishment of new businesses' l3
In the case of INDECO, however, there was a mix of assets acquired through takeovers and
through the establishment of new enterprises. An analysis by the World Bank (1977b) estimated the
contributions of takeovers to INDECO on the basis of the net book value of consolidated fixed assets
ascribed in the INDECO accounts to takeovers. These figures in FY 1970 show that 1NDECO's
consolidated net book value of fixed assets stood at K106 million, of which K23 million (22 percent)
were acquired by takeover. The final year in which INDECO accounts recorded material additions
through takeovers was FY 1973. The INDECO Report of that year showed Net Book Value of Group
fixed assets at K224 million, to which should be added the K13 million of value demerged in FY 1972,
to show a total of K237 million, of fixed assets accumulated through INDECO. The aggregated net book
value of fixed assets acquired through takeovers to FY 1973 was K88 million, 37 percent of the total.
While such an analysis fails to account for the value of the assets held in associated companies,
which are treated separately on consolidation as investments, it does suggest that takeovers accounted
110 This excludes the Statutory Boards and other state enterprises held outside the ZIMCO group.
Statutory Boards continued under the conditions of their enabling legislation, for a discussion of these
see Himonga (1984).
111 ZIMCO (1974, Annual Report, p. 3).
112 Following the cancellation of the service contracts and the renegotiation of terms with the minority
shareholders announced in 1973, the operating companies NCCM and RCM became subsidiaries within
ZIMCO. MINDECO was removed from direct involvement with the copper mines, being left to
supervise Maamba Colliery and other smaller projects and the marketing of copper production was
placed in the hands of a newly established ZIMCO subsidiary, MEMACO
113 The mining assets of ZIMCO constituted the largest sector of the company throughout the period in
terms of both turnover and asset value and their profitability was the greatest determinant of that of the
entire group, ZIMCO Annual Report notes this 1973 (p.5); 1974 (p.5); 1975 (p.5); 1977 (p.23); 1979
(p.4).
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for a minority of the assets value established through INDECO and that the main source of the groups
expansion continued to be through the undertaking of new projects.
TABLE III.
Net Assets of ZIMCO Group by Division.
FY 1972.
Sub-Holding Company. Share of Aggregate Group Net Assets Before
Consolidation.
%
MINDECO. 77.9
INDECO. 19.8
National Transport Corporation. 1.3
National Hotel Corporation. 0.5
FINDECO. 0.4
Source: Calculated from ZIMCO (Annual Report 1972, p.10).
Note: Total does not add up to 100 due to rounding.
2.2.4. Ownership Patterns and Policy. 
The takeovers of the period 1968 to 1970 established a mixed economy in Zambia, the main
outlines of which were to endure over the following two decades. Although UNIP (1974) asserted the
"right [of the Zambian State] to participate in any new venture involving private investors" and
committed the Government to continue to "explore further areas where the state could effectively
participate," it was also accepted that there were limits to the extent to which the expansion of state
ownership would be feasible or beneficial. 114 The commitment to a mixed economy was maintained,
114 Kaunda (1969, p.59-60). Although the failure to secure the takeover of the banks in 1970 could be
seen as a discouragement to further initiatives, the speech in which they had been announced
emphasised that they completed the programme of takeovers (Kaunda, 1970, p.66)
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alongside the qualification that private enterprise should also display a commitment to the development
of the local economy.115
Foreign enterprise remained welcome "as participants, and not controllers, of our economic
development process" and expatriate business was called upon to "move from distribution to production,
that is from commerce to industry and agriculture." 116 This was encapsulated in the provisions of the
Industrial Development Act of 1977 which offered incentives to private investors on the basis of their
alignment with specific objectives of the Government development policy. 117 The Act also offered an
"immunity from nationalisation unless the highest considerations of public interest so require" to
enterprises which "employ within Zambia a significant amount of foreign capital."118
Alongside this the takeovers themselves brought many existing large foreign enterprises into
joint ventures with state enterprise, and, as President Kaunda stated with regard to these, "our policy of
partnership with private and foreign investors is regarded by us as a permanent aspect of the nation's
economic life.., as a means of harnessing resources and obtaining skills and capital."119
115 While President Kaunda (1968a, p.5) stated that "we have declared ourselves in favour of a mixed
economy," it should be noted that his definition of a mixed economy was very broad. As he stated
(Kaunda, 1968a p.6), "no matter what is proclaimed from the rooftops I know no country, whether it is
in the Eastern or Western world, where the economy is not in some measure a mixed one today." It may
also be noted that the stated guidelines for private enterprises which wished to operate in Zambia were
not particularly onerous. As President Kaunda (1970, p.64) stated, "I want the goods which they order
and they pay for in Zambia to arrive in Zambia and not be redirected elsewhere... I want the prices of
these goods to be genuine and reflect the true costs... I want people who earn profits in Zambia to utilise
their profits in accordance with the law of the country and not spend more time and energy trying to
evade our exchange control regulations than they spend on their businesses."
116 Kaunda (1969, p.41-43) and (1970, p.61) respectively. UNIP (1974, p.39-40) committed the
Government to "support the continued development and prosperity of the private sector" and "ensure
conformity of the private sector with the countrys philosophy." In particular, support was to be directed
to new industries, especially those involved in export or import-substitution and manufacturing, to
regional diversification; and to promote reinvestment.
11/ The Industrial Development Act (1977, Section 18) outlined the following criteria to be met for the
extending of incentives to an enterprise: (a) "maximum utilisation of domestic raw material," (b)
"production of intermediate goods which are used by other industries," (c) "diversification of its
industrial structure," (d) "creation of substantial opportunities for permanent employment," (e)
"improvement of domestic industrial skills in fostering the development of domestic technology;" and (f)
"promoting industrial development in rural areas."
118 Industrial Development Act (Pt. IV, 24,d). Mwanakatwe, then Minister of Finance, commented in
1977 that "we have accomplished our nationalisation programme... we already own 65-70% of our
industrial sector and have more or less reached the limit" (New African, November, 1977, p.1051).
119 ZIMCO (Annual Report 1972, p.3). President Kaunda was also keen to present the takeovers as
benefiting the private partners. In reference to the trading companies, he stated that; "the minority
shareholders will be even better off in their 49 per cent ownership than they have been when they owned
100 per cent. Turnovers will increase substantially in view of the elimination of competition and with
the increased turnovers the profits of these companies will rise" (Kaunda, 1968b, p.299).
44
Measures were taken to promote Zambian ownership through the reservation of certain areas of
the economy. These included retailing, wholesaling, road services, building materials and
subcontracting, which had previously been dominated by expatriate enterprise. 120 However, President
Kaunda was concerned that the reforms should not lead to the emergence of a privileged Zambian elite.
In 1968 he announced that the state would;
set the limits of the Zambian Enterprise that can remain a purely private enterprise. These
limits will be based on the amount of capital employed, on turnover and on the number of
employees. When an enterprise grows beyond these limits, then it must become a public
company. When it grows even further, it will be taken over by the state. This is another
warning I must make straight away. We do not propose to make of Zambians business barons
now or in the future.121
This was the reason cited for the only take-over of a Zambian owned firm announced in this period,
although when the size limit was defined it was set high enough to exclude any other Zambian owned
company. 122
 A leadership code was also introduced, aimed at preventing political leaders from
acquiring business interests.123
The position of private enterprise which developed within the Zambian economy can be
examined in the manufacturing sector. An indication of the relative roles of the state and private sector
in the non-copper economy in the first part of the 1970s can be drawn from a selection of industries,
together constituting 83 percent of manufacturing GDP. 124
 This data is presented in Table IV and
suggest that although enterprises wholly owned by the private sector represented 86 percent of the total
number of enterprises they were concentrated in smaller scale operations. 125
 While they accounted for a
greater number of enterprises employing up to 500 people, state ownership was more common above this
120 For an account of these measures and their implementation see Beveridge (1974) and Baylies
(1982).
121 Kaunda (1968a, p.36-7).
122 Szefiel (1978, p.238). Fortman (1969, p.101) notes that Mwaiseni stores had an equity capital of
K150 thousand, and a turnover of K1.5 million in 1967. President Kaunda (1974) referred to a limit of
"a gross profit margin which goes beyond K500,000 per annum" as the trigger for a takeover by "either
the state, city, municipal or rural council, township management board, co-operative, credit union, a
thrift society or indeed a public corporation."
123 The code was first referred to by President Kaunda in 1969 (p.62-3). In 1970 President Kaunda
outlined measures to prevent "the rise of the capitalist group of exploiters," emphasising "the promotion
of Zambian companies rather than individual entrepreneurs" and the expansion co-operative enterprises
and workers participation (Kaunda, 1970, p.40).
124 Central Statistical Office (Industrial Monogrphs, 1975-77). The sectors with their share of
manufacturing GDP in 1972, are as follows: food, beverages and tobacco (53.1 percent); textile, wearing
apparel and leather (7.7 percent); wood and furniture (2.7 percent); paper, paper products, printing and
publishing (3.8 percent); chemicals, rubber and plastics (10.3 percent); non-metallic mineral products
(5.7 percent).
125 Of the private enterprises surveyed, 73 percent employed under 50 people.
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leve1. 126
 State and private enterprise were also involved in the majority of economic sub-sectors. Of the
44 constituent subsectors covered by the data, ZIMCO was present in 64 percent and other state bodies
in 20 percent, combining together to cover 73 percent of subsectors, while private enterprise was present
in 84 percent.127
As noted above, many of the enterprises within the ZIMCO Group were themselves
partnerships between state and private capital. These enterprises were often among the largest in the
state sector. Between FY 1979 and FY 1983, 71.5 percent of the turnover of INDECO's subsidiaries was
from enterprises with a minority shareholder, while only 28.5 percent was from wholly owned
enterprises.128
This would suggest that the stated aim of the Zambian Government to secure ownership of the
largest enterprises within the economy was achieved, while still allowing substantial space within which
private enterprise could develop. 129
 Indeed as Baylies (1982) observed, in sectors where state enterprise
competed with private enterprise, the success of the former was by no means assured, and some private
enterprises operated successfully in these sectors.13°
126 It should be noted that the number of ZIMCO enterprises was relatively evenly spread over each of
these categories. The number of ZIMCO enterprises in each group were: 16 with less than 50 employees;
8 in the range of 50 to 100; 13 in the range of 101 to 500; and 14 with over 501 employees.
127 Despite this 42 percent of privately owned enterprises were engaged in just two manufacturing sub-
sectors, "the manufacturing of wearing apparel, excluding footwear, by cutting and sewing fabrics and
other materials," and in "baking."
128 Calculated from INDECO (Annual Reports, 1979 to 1983).
129 Turok (1989, p.169-92).
13 0 The retail sector and the public transport sector were both ones in which private enterprises were
able to withstand competition from state enterprises.
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Table IV.
The Balance Between State and Private Enterprise in Selected Sectors of the Economy by Number of
Enterprises.
1972. 
Number of
employees,
Total number of
enterprises,
Proportion
privately owned.
%
Proportion State
owned within
ZIMCO Group.
%
Proportion State
owned by other
agency.
%
Under 50. 314 94 5 1
Between 50 and
100.
74 84 11 5
Between 101 and
500.
59 68 22 10
Over 501. 25 32 56 12
Total for all
enterprises.
472 85 11 4
Source: Calculated from Central Statistical Office (Industrial Monographs, 1975-77).
SECTION 2.3. STRUCTURE AND CONTROL IN THE STATE ENTERPRISE SECTOR. 
Central to the economic reforms was the objective of constructing an instrument through which
the development objectives of the state could be undertaken. Whether this was achieved by the economic
reforms that were undertaken has been questioned on a number of points. In particular, it has been
argued that the structures that were created failed to provide the government with control over the
enterprises that it had acquired, that the financial terms on which the enterprise were acquired were
disadvantageous to the Government and that the commercial viability of the enterprises was diminished
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in cases where they were removed from integrated corporate structures. The relationship between the
Government, the state enterprise management and the minority shareholders is examined in Section
2.3.1. In Section 2.3.2 the financial arrangements attendant to the takeovers is examined and in Section
2.3.3 the issue of the dismantling of integrated corporate structure is discussed.
2.3.1 Ownership and Management.
State ownership of the major enterprises operating in the Zambian economy offered the
Government the prospect of a greater control over the national economy and a more direct means of
implementing its development strategy. However, it has been argued that while the Government gained
formal ownership of these enterprises, it did not secure effective control, which continued to reside with
their management. 131
 Seidman (1979) and Makgetla (1994) argue that the legal ownership of state
enterprises in Zambia was not translated into effective control. Makgetla (1994) places particular
emphasis on the framework of commercial law established under British rule, which granted enterprises
an autonomy that allowed them to pursue their own strategies independent of the Governments
development plans .132
While Seidman and Makgetla's accounts stress the formal legal constraints under which the
sector operated, they under-emphasise the effective authority which the Government derived from its
shareholding, which substantially displaced the former. 133 The directors nominated by the Government
to the boards of the state enterprise did not sit as independent authorities, but followed the directives of
the Government. 134 In addition to this, as the management of the enterprises themselves was
Zambianised, these appointees also became more subject to the influence of the Government.135
An important constraint on the degree to which the Government could assert control over the
management was, however, the existence of a minority shareholder. This may be illustrated by the case
131 A useful discussion of the problems of ownership and control in the mineral sector is provided by
Fortin (1979).
132 Makgetla (1994) states that the Government enacted no laws specifically to restrain the commercial
freedom of state enterprise. This overlooks the provisions of legislation including the Parastatal
Services Act, discussed in Chapter 3, which did create additional legal regulation for state enterprises.
133 Ushewolcunze and Mushota (1976), Chona (1976) and Mulwila (1980).
134
 Simwinga (1977, p. 167-174).
135 A member of INDECO management in the early 1970's, Frederick Mwanza (1993, p.10) notes that
"the parastatal sector more or less became an extension of party machinery and structure." See also
Simwinga (1977, p.225-6).
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of NCCM, in which Anglo American held a minority interest and additionally, until 1974, provided the
management. Between 1972 and 1976, while NCCM undertook three projects at the direction of the
Government, an additional four were rejected by the company. 136 Although the influence of the
minority shareholder in NCCM had extensive veto rights at the level of the Board of Directors, influence
could also be exercised through management staff supplied by the minority shareholder. This was the
case even in enterprises which did not operate under a comprehensive management contract. 137 Chaput
(1971) observed that in INDECO joint ventures it was common for the technical managers to be
supplied by the minority shareholder. 138 Frequently the Government Directors delegated decisions over
issues, including the choice of production techniques and purchase of machinery, to them, despite the
implications which these had for employment and import dependence in the future.139
While both Seidman and Makgetla emphasise the partial extent to which Government control
was exerted over state enterprise, the limits upon this were less dependent upon formal legal constraints
and owed more to the substantive relationship between the shareholders and the enterprises
management. Following the cancellation of the management contracts for the copper mines in 1973,
INDECO reduced the number of management contracts for their subsidiary companies although a
dependence on the technical skills of minority shareholders often remained.140
136 The three projects implemented were the establishment of a formed coke plant, the establishment of
a Slimes Plant and the implementation of a 15 percent production cut back in 1975. NCCM rejected
proposals for the rationalisation of facilities with RCM, the production of explosives, the establishment
of a copper fabricating plant and the production of welding electrodes (Simwinga, 1977, p.245-8).
137 In cases where a management contract was operational, extensive powers were often delegated to
the minority shareholder. Mulwila (1980, p.75-6) cites the management agreement made with Bookers
(Zambia) Ltd. during the 1968 takeover of CBC. This agreement was for a period of ten years and
provided for management to control the business affairs and trading operations of the company,
including all staffing decisions below the level of Divisional Manager and capital expenditures up to
K100,000.
138 Typically, within the jointly owned subsidiaries of INDECO, minority shareholders supplied the
General Manager and key technical staff and had access to operational decisions and the implementation
of company policy. Management were not always co-operative with INDECO, Chaput (1971, p.174-8,
and p.347) notes that "often expatriate managers return from board meetings with negative feelings
towards Indeco and with every intention of not implementing those decisions considered to be politically
motivated or counter productive." Martin (1972, p.204) discussed the problems of transfer pricing of
supplies by the minority shareholders.
139 Chaput (1971, p.341-6 and p.298-301) and Mudenda (1985, p.8)
140 Johns (1980, p.113-4). While Simwinga (1977, p.193) reported that only 6 of 32 INDECO
subsidiaries still had management by minority shareholders, Tangri (1984, p.117) puts the figure at 2 of
over thirty but notes over 12 technical constancy contracts. The Industrial Development Act of 1977
(part III) required registration of, and imposed certain conditions upon, agreements for the "transfer of
technology and expertise."
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2.3.2 The Financial Balance of the Takeovers. 
As a result of the takeovers, the Zambian state acquired, on the one hand, assets yielding a new
source of revenue, and on the other, additional liabilities in the form of the compensation payments. For
this to generate new resources for the Government and the local economy, the new sources of revenue
acquired by the takeovers had to be sufficient to meet the additional liabilities. 141 While this applied to
all the takeover agreements, the discussion presented here is limited to the case of the copper industry,
which has been the focus of discussion on the issue in Zambia.
As noted previously, President Kaunda announced that the basis of the valuation would be the
book value of the assets. A valuation on that basis would be likely to be lower than a commercial
valuation based on expectations of future investment returns, as the mines were securing a substantial
positive return on their assets. 142 Despite this, as discussed earlier, contemporary criticisms were made
of the financial basis of the agreements and subsequent assessment have also been critical.143
An evaluation of the agreements is complicated by a number of factors. The negotiation
between the Government and the private shareholders for the takeover of the mines was concerned not
only with the agreement of a price for the shares but also with other issues which affected the net flow of
funds between themselves and the new state enterprises. 144 Under the new structure, the future
financial flows due to the former controlling shareholders from the Zambian Government were made up
of the repayments made on the compensation bonds and the interest payments on those bonds. They also
received a proportion of the dividends from the state mining enterprises relating to their continued
minority shareholding, the fees relating to the management and technical service agreements, and
payments for any further goods or services provided by them from the enterprises. 145 The net income
received by the principal minority shareholders was, therefore, an aggregation of different financial
141 See Bronfenbrenner (1963) and Yaffey (1995).
142 For the period 1967 to 1969 the return of net profits on assets employed averaged 20.5 percent for
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines; 24.6 percent for Rokana Corporation; 11.6 percent for Bancroft
Mines; and 27.8 percent for Roan Selection Trust (calculated from Daniel, 1979, p.78, Table 4.1).
143 Mpande (1992, p.295) criticised the "agreement that would progressively drain capital out of the
country."
144 The case that the terms of the takeovers were generous to the shareholders of the companies is
supported by Potter's (1971, p.115-9) observation that the value of their shares on the London Stock
Exchange "did not lose their capital value as a result of the nationalisation."
145 Potter (1971, p.97-100)
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flows, some of which were guaranteed at a fixed level and others of which were dependent on the
subsequent performance of the industry.146
The impact of the nationalisation was also complicated by the concurrent changes to the basis
on which the industry was taxed. 147
 Before the takeover of the copper industry, taxation had been levied
upon three different bases, the price of copper, the level of production and the profits of the mining
companies. 148 In response to the complaints of the mining companies and advice from the International
Monetary Fund, the Government's revised structure of taxation was based exclusively upon profits, while
as a shareholder it acquired a dividend income which was also profit dependent. 149 As a result of the
takeover and the changes to the taxation of the mining companies, all Government revenue from the
industry became dependent solely on the profitability of the companies.
Stoever (1985) calculated that the cumulative tax revenue and dividends received from the
nationalised mining companies by the Government between FY 1971 and FY 1981 amounted to 1(920
million. When account is taken of the cost of acquiring the shares, the net income of the Government for
the period falls to 1(586 million. 150 This is contrasted with the estimated K2,041 million that would
have been received without a dividend income had the mines been taxed under the previous formula.151
These results include both the effects of the change in the taxation of the companies and of the share
acquisition. When recalculated to identify the separate elements, the impact of the changes to the
146 Evaluations of the takeovers by Potter (1971) and Bostock and Harvey (1972), which were
completed shortly after agreements were made, could only be speculative were based on projections of
the copper industries performance.
147curry (1984) argued that the nationalisation arrangements made the Zambian Government revenues
far more vulnerable to a downturn in the copper market.
148 The royalties that the Government acquired from the BSA were levied at 13.5 percent of the London
Metal Exchange Prices for each tonne of copper produced. An export tax introduced in 1966 was based
upon 40 percent of the LME price in excess of K600 per tonne, and the resulting profits were subject to
income tax (Saasa, 1987, p.26).
149 World Bank (1972, p.21). The companies had long argued that taxes levelled on production rather
than upon profitability of that production were a disincentive to marginal output (Martin, 1972, p.128-
132). Following the bond redemption in 1973, the Government did make changes to the taxation of the
companies, but did not reintroduce a unit based mineral export tax until 1983 (UNCTC, 1984, p.6'78)
and (Saasa, 1987, p.43).
150 These figures include costs that were incurred due to the renegotiation of the original agreements
including compensation payments made for the subsequent cancellation of the management contracts
and the repayments of the loan used for the early redemption of the bonds.
151 Stoever does not make clear the basis of the calculation of many figures and they must be treated
with caution. An inspection of the footnotes and appendices provided, moreover, suggest that Stoever's
calculations may include errors, including the calculations of the repayments of the bonds based on the
value of the entire company and not the 51 percent acquired by the Government (Stoever, 1985, p.153,
note 10).
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structure of taxation, estimated at K1,332 million, far outweighs the agreed valuation of the shares
acquired in the mining companies of K334 million.152
The estimation of the level of lost tax revenues is, however, open to question. Stoever's (1985)
calculations were based on the assumption that the production, costs and revenues of the mines over the
period would have been achieved under the preceding tax structure. However, failure of the mines to
provide revenue to the Government in the mid-1970's was primarily due to the inability of the industry
to operate profitably during the that period. 153 Under the pre-1969 tax regime, a copper price falling
below production could have resulted in the mines closing down greater capacity, given the disincentive
effect of a production based tax. 154 It is likely, however, that the revised system of taxation in operation
during the 1970's did lead to more volatile tax revenues.
Alongside this, the takeovers also increased the responsibility of the Government to provide for
the adequate financing of the industry. As the majority shareholder, the Government became the
principal source for additional funding of the mines through equity, loans, and the guarantee of
commercial debts. The potential for a scenario to develop in which a downturn in the copper industry
could cut off the government primary source of revenue, while simultaneously increasing its obligations
to provide new funding for that industry, had been established.
Underlying this was, however, was the basic dependence of the Zambian economy on the
production of a single commodity. 155 If the Government view that the takeovers of the mines could
contribute to the pace and extent of economic diversification was correct, then the risks outlined must be
152 This is before taking into account the 6 percent coupon on the bonds to finance the purchase, and
the dividend income to the Government from its shareholding amounting to K.190 million between
1971 and 1981.
153 See Curry (1984), O'Faircheallaigh (1986) and Curry (1989). The problems experienced by the
copper industry in this period are discussed in Chapter 3.
154 Stoever's (1985) estimate of the tax revenue that would have derived from the industry under the old
system of taxation would have led to taxes exceeding pre-tax profits in 1975, and in each year from 1977
to 1981. The taxation of the industry in the entire 1971 to 1981 period would have amounted to 99.62
percent of aggregate profits, against the 32.97 percent actually paid under the revised system. It is
unlikely that the degree of taxation suggested by Stoever as being achievable under a continuation of the
previous tax system would have been sustainable.
155 The Government had been heavily dependent on copper revenues before the takeovers. Between
1964 and 1969, income from the copper industry had averaged 60 per cent of total government revenue
(O'Faircheallaigh, 1984, p.128). Bell (1983, p.61) reports that Government concerns over their excessive
reliance on mineral revenues also led them to raise the tax taken from the non-mineral sectors of the
economy. Bell (1983) and Jolly and Williams (1972) discuss strategies for budget management under
conditions of uncertain revenues.
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weighted against those of a copper downturn on a more dependent economy. The primary orientation of
Government strategy was to diminish that risk through diversification of the economy as a whole.
2.3.3 Nationalisation and Integration.
It has been argued that nationalisation of subsidiaries of transnational corporations potentially
undermines the commercial viability of the acquired subsidiary unit. The argument draws upon
explanations of the behaviour of transnational corporation which explain their integration of diverse
activities on the basis of the commercial advantage achieved. 156 The acquisition of subsidiary units can,
therefore, cause the disintegration of the corporate structure and dissipate the advantages of integration.
This has the potential to damage the commercial viability of the enterprises involved. While this
analysis is applicable to the acquisition of any subsidiary company, the discussion will again focus on
the case of the copper industry.
Shafer (1983) argued that within the copper industry the management of commercial risk was a
central factor in the corporate structures that were established by the private sector producers. 157 This
was controlled through the establishment of vertical and horizontal integration by the mining
transnationals. By acquiring only a part of that structure, the nationalising Government devalued the
asset it had acquired and increased the level of commercial risk within the industry. This may be
evaluated on the basis of its effects on the global market and the integration of productive activity in the
resulting structure.
Zambia was one among a number of the major copper producing countries to pursue a policy of
state participation in their mining industries. 158 Shafer (1983, p.102-6) argues that the control of the
international copper industry by the transnational mining companies was eroded by the establishment of
these state mining enterprises which undermined the transnationals ability to stabilise the market
156 This approach to the analysis of transnational corporations is reflected in the work of Caves (1996,
p.1-23). Other perspectives are discussed by Jenkins (1987).
157 Shafer (1983) constructs this argument on the cases of the copper producers Zambia and Zaire. A
similar argument has been made in the case of Chile's nationalisation of its copper industry by Moran
(1974, p.225-46).
158 Initiatives to extend ownership over their copper industries were taken by Zaire in 1967, Chile in
1969 and 1971, Peru in 1974. They joined with Zambia to form the Intergovernmental Council of
Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) in 1967, which was intended to provide for communication and
co-ordination between themselves. Collectively they accounted for an average of 34 percent of world
mine production and 18 percent of world refined copper production between 1973 and 1981 (Nwoke
1987, p.112-5'7).
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through informal co-operation and led to greater price volatility. The degree to which this occurred in
Zambia was limited. Initially the marketing of Zambia's copper output remained in the hands of the
copper transnationals who had previously controlled it, and subsequently when state enterprises took
over the marketing themselves, they were able to establish themselves as competent participants in the
industry. 159 The nationalisations were not, however, the only factor undermining the control of the
copper oligopoly and they contributed to a process that was already underway and driven primarily by
developments in technology.160
The extent of vertical integration in the copper industry has been limited. Copper mining
companies have tended to undertake smelting and refining, but have not been heavily involved in
fabrication. 161 The Zambian copper industry reflected this pattern of integration with most of its output
being refined domestically. 162 This would support Radetzlci's (1985, p.131) view that "nationalisation
in Zambia did not cause any important rupture of vertical integration chains." The Zambian
Government was aware of the potential benefits of vertical integration and the reluctance of the mining
companies to extend the degree of integration in the local copper industry was a source of friction
between them both before and after the takeovers.
It is argued by Shafer (1983) that the mining state enterprises were more constrained in
horizontal diversification than were the transnationals which had pursued strategies of spreading their
investments between a variety of products. 163 The copper interests of Anglo American Group, for
159 Jordan (1990, p.171) refers to Zambia's copper marketing company, MEMACO, as "an experienced
international trader of copper on the world markets... who have over the years acquired the confidence of
several international customers."
160 Shafer (1983, p.101) in fact notes that "Even before the wave of nationalizations in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the copper oligopoly was in serious decline... The spread of nationalization simply
contributed to this process by markedly increasing the horizontal dilution of the oligopoly." The
contributing factors were the spread of technological know-how lowering the barriers to entry for new
producers and the spread of the use of aluminium among other substitutes. See also Nwoke (1987,
p.134-4) and Yachir (1988, p.34-8).
161 Yachir (1988, p.35). The reason for this, suggest Mikesell and Whitney (1987, p.33), is that
fabrication requires a selection of technical and marketing skills distinct from those required for mining,
smelting and refining.
162 This level of integration of local processing was unusually high for a producer country. In 1966,
while Zambia refined 79 percent of its output domestically, comparative figures for other major copper
producers were Zaire's 50 percent, Chile's 40 percent and Peru's 20 percent (Nwoke, 1987, p.143).
Factors which led to a high level of processing in Zambia were that transportation costs were relatively
high and discouraged the transportation of ores; that the mines produced sufficient capacity to provide
for dedicated processing plant to be established and finally that local labour and energy were available
relatively cheaply (Lombe, 1987, p.49-50).
163 Shafer (1983, p.102) Different product combinations have the potential to control different risks.
The combination of copper with its substitute material aluminium may provide protection against a
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example, were only a small element of its overall portfolio of investments which also included trading,
financial, brewing and engineering operations as well as other mining interests. 164 The diversification
by transnationals has, however, been on an international scale. While it provided the transnational with
protection against adverse circumstances in any particular country, it equally denied the individual host
countries of the benefits of that diversification. In the case of Zambia, a complaint against the behaviour
of the mining companies was that they had failed to reinvest their earnings in the diversification of local
economy. This was itself the aim of Zambian Government mining policy which was intended to fund the
diversification of the Zambian economy, to reduce its dependence on copper.
While the acquisition of an enterprise that is part of an integrated corporate structure has the
potential to undermine its commercial viability, it has been argued that in the case of the Zambian
copper industry this did not occur. The discussion has also emphasised that the extent to which
enterprises were integrated within corporate structures frequently did not provide the benefits of
diversification to the Zambian economy, which the constructing of the state enterprise sector after 1968
sought to remedy.
SUMMARY.
This Chapter has provided an analysis of the construction of the Zambian state enterprise
sector. It has argued that under the initial policy framework established following independence, the
Government envisaged that the economy would continue to be dominated by private enterprise. The role
of state enterprise was limited to strategic sectors and industries in which the existing private sector was
unwilling to invest. In addition, the takeover of existing private enterprises was explicitly ruled out.
From 1968 government policy changed and through a series of takeovers of existing private enterprises,
state enterprise emerged as the main instrument of development policy.
The central factor prompting a change in the Governments implementation of its development
objectives has been identified as its growing concern over the effectiveness of the initial policy
trend to replace copper with aluminium. The combination of copper and gold, the price cycles of which
have tended to be converse, may allow for a stability of earnings over the economic cycle (Mikesell and
Whitney, 1987, p.3'7-9).
164 Saasa (1987, p.19-20). In the case of RST, although its own principal assets were concentrated in
the Zambian copper industry, its controlling shareholders, AMAX, had interests in other metals, fuels
and chemicals. The diversification strategies undertaken by other mining transnationals are discussed by
Mikesell and Whitney (1987, p.46-51).
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framework. The existing foreign and expatriate elements within the private sector appeared reluctant to
respond to the incentives that the government had established, while the emergence of indigenously
based private and co-operative sector remained slow. In contrast, the Government regarded the
performance of state enterprise as successful. Through INDECO it had established a number of new
industries within Zambia and secured the participation within them of a number of transnational
investors.
The extension of state enterprise also responded to political pressures upon the government.
UNIP's ability to maintain its popular base of support was under threat from factional competition. In
this context, the extension of the state enterprise sector was perceived by the political leadership to offer
both the opportunity to increase the rate of economic growth and to control the distribution of its
benefits.
By the beginning of the 1970s, the Government had acquired control of most of the major
enterprises in Zambia, including the copper mining sector. Nevertheless, Zambia remained a mixed
economy with the private sector continuing to play a significant role in the economy. In addition,
minority private shareholdings remained in many state enterprise and was attracted to a number of new
state investment.
While the state enterprise sector that was established offered the government an instrument
through which it could implement it policies, it also reflected many of the problems of the wider
economy including the dependence on the copper industry. In particular, the financial agreements for
the acquisition of the mines increased the vulnerability of the government to a prolonged downturn in
the price of copper.
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CHAPTER 3.
THE PERFORMANCE OF ZAMBIAN STATE ENTERPRISE IN THE 1970S AND 1980S.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of the performance of the Zambian State
Enterprise sector in the 1970s and 1980s. In Chapter 2 the argument was advanced that the Zambian
government increasingly came to doubt the ability of the private sector to be the primary agent for
economic development. From 1968 state enterprise emerged as the principal instrument through which
the State took a more direct role in implementing its objectives. This Chapter reviews the operation of
that sector and the problems it encountered.
This Chapter argues that the core of the strategy of the Zambian State Enterprise sector was to
redirect the profits that were realised through profitable enterprises, particularly in the mining sector, to
fund investment in the creation of a diversified industrial structure. Between 1970 and 1990, this
strategy failed to achieve what had been anticipated. The commercial performance of the sector during
this period eroded its financial viability and led to critical assessments of its performance from the
political leadership. Despite this, the leadership continued to be committed to the use of state enterprise
as an instrument of policy and undertook measures to improve its performance.
Section 3.1 of the Chapter provides a background to the political and economic changes during
the period under consideration. In the early 1970s, Zambia established a one-party state in response to
the continued pressures generated by the factional nature of political competition. Section 3.1.1 outlines
the changes that this brought to the organisation of the state structure. The Zambian economy also
experienced changes in the period under review and from the mid-1970s experienced a sharp downturn
in the copper market. Section 3.1.2 examines the effects of this upon the economy and the policies which
were pursued in response to this.
The performance of the state enterprise sector as a whole is addressed in Section 3.2. The
commercial performance is examined through an analysis of the financial statements of the companies.
Section 3.2.1 discusses the measures that have been chosen to analyse the accounts of the Zambian State
Enterprises. These measures are applied in Section 3.2.1a to the accounts of ZIMCO, in Section 3.2.1b
to the accounts of the state mining enterprises and in Section 3.2.1c to the accounts of INDECO. In
Section 3.2.2 the criticisms that were made of the state enterprise sector by the President, UNIP and the
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National Assembly are examined. These criticisms were an important factor in prompting a series of
measures undertaken to re-organise the control structure of state enterprise in the 1970s. These measures
are examined in Section 3.2.3.
The performance of the state mining enterprises are examined in Section 3.3. The problems
that were faced by the industry during the mid-1970s in generating funds to provide for the
diversification of the economy are examined in Section 3.3.1 These reflected problems that were
generated within the copper industry, at both a local and international level, and the constraints under
which the enterprises could respond to them. From the early 1980s, a number of initiatives were
undertaken to improve the commercial performance of the industry and are discussed in Section 3.3.2.
These included the consolidation of the sector as ZCCM and investment rehabilitation plans undertaken
with external donors. It is argued that these had a limited impact on the sector investment
The performance of NDECO is examined in Section 3.4. Throughout the period, INDECO
continued to be the primary agency through which the Government sought to undertake investment in
the diversification of the economy. While INDECO continued to expand through growth and
acquisitions during the 1970s, the rate of this slowed significantly in the 1980s. Section 3.4.1 examines
the growth of INDECO during the 1970s and explores the degree to which it was able to achieve its
objectives. Section 3.4.2 examines the steps that were undertaken in the 1980s to rehabilitate the group
and its subsidiary companies.
SECTION 3.1. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT. 
The extension of the state enterprise sector across the economy was followed by the
establishment of the Second Republic in Zambia, and the emergence in the global economy of a period
of volatility and recession. Both of these factors were important in setting the context in which the
Zambian state enterprise sector operated. This Section provides a preliminary overview of the main
trends in both of these areas as a background to the analysis of the operations of the state enterprises
which is the primary subject of this Chapter. Section 3.1.1 provides an examination of the developments
in the political system, the developments in the economy are discussed in Section 3.1.2.
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3.1.1. The Politics of the One-Party State. 
The extension of the state enterprise sector across the economy was closely followed by the
establishment of the Second Republic in Zambia.' As argued in Chapter 2, one factor contributing to the
extension of the state enterprise sector was the pressures generated by clientelist politics, by which the
political class was expected to deliver material rewards to their supporters. The pressures generated
through this system, and the factionalism which it fuelled, were also important elements in the
establishment of the Second Republic.
The new constitution allowed for UNIP to be the only political party. 2 While regular elections
to the National Assembly and to the post of the President of the Republic were conducted, the choice of
candidates that was offered to the electorate was controlled by the party. 3 Although the constitution
allowed for more than one presidential candidate, in practice the only candidate was the incumbent
Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP blocked attempts by others, including the former Vice President Simon
Kapwepwe and former Leader of the Opposition Harry Nlcumbula, to stand as candidates. The selection
of candidates for the National Assembly was dependent on the approval of the Central Committee, and
this was frequently denied to those who were considered to have been overly critical of the Party
leadership.
At the apex of the one-party state was the office of the Presidency, which was strengthened by
the changes. An important aspect of President Kaunda's authority was the extensive powers of
appointment exercised over the party, government, civil service and state enterprise sector.4 This was
used to exert control over the state apparatus in a number of ways. Firstly, personnel were continually
reshuffled between different positions so that none could become entrenched in any position and
establish any autonomous authority. A second tactic employed was to use appointments to neutralise
potential opponents, with senior members of the party retained in employment through their
appointment.to the UNIP Central Committee. While the primary method of maintaining political control
was the management of patronage, the state also maintained an extensive security network. The state of
1 In October 1971 UNIP resolved to establish the one-party state, which subsequently came into
existence in December 1972.
2 Mubako (1973) discusses the constitutional features of the one party state, while Gertzel et al (1984)
discuss its functioning.
3 The process of elections in the one party state has been analysed by Baylies and Szeftel (1984) and
Chilculo (1988).
Burdette (1988, p.69-70) and Tordoff (1980, p.19-21).
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emergency that had been declared in 1965 was maintained throughout the duration of the Second
Republic, despite the achievement of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.
These constitutional changes were unable to quell the factionalism which continued to
characterise UNIP. Divisions continued through the competition of regional based factions and
antagonism between the leaders who had risen through the ranks of the party and those with
technocratic and administrative backgrounds. 5 The new political structure, however, gave the leadership
of UNIP a greater ability to contain and manage these rivalries, by precluding the option of defecting
from the party and appealing to the electorate for support. 6 With the option to establish an independent
political basis closed off, all advancement within the party and the state became dependent on the
patronage extended from the party leadership.7
Increasingly the opportunity to hold the Government accountable within the representative
structures of the state became diminished. While it had originally been envisaged that members of the
National Assembly who did not hold Government positions would be free to criticise Government
policy, from the early years of the Second Republic attempts were made to limit this. 8 In addition, the
role of UNIP itself as a conduit for popular opinion was eroded as the party machine began to
disintegrate at local leve1.9
Opposition to Government policies increasingly became articulated in bodies outside the
structure of the one-party state and ZCTU emerged as an important focus for discontent. From the
early 1970's, the failure to gain re-election by union leaders who were seen as overly loyal to the
leadership of UNIP, marked the continuing demand of union members for independent
representation. 11 While the relationship between the Government and the trade union movement
become strained during the 1970s, the first major confrontation occurred in 1980 over the provisions of
5 Burdette (1977) discusses the effects of these divisions on copper policy and Burdette (1984b)
discusses them in respect of foreign policy. See also Scott (1980).
6 Chilculo (1988, p.37)
7 As Bates and Collier (1993, p.405) note, competition in internal party elections had been suspended
during the factionalism of the late 1960's.
8 Gertzel (1984, p.85-6). Bates and Collier (1993) note that by 1990, of the 120 members of the
Assembly, only 15 did not hold some rank of Government position.
9 Scott (1978, p.331) notes, for example, that UNIP's leadership was concerned at the declining level of
party membership in the Copperbelt between 1968 and 1974.
10 Others sought to effect political change through the plotting of coups, attempts at which were
uncovered in 1980, 1983 and 1988. (Mwanakatwe, 1994, p.165-78)
11 Among those who displaced pro-UNIP leaders of ZCTU during this period were Newstead Zimba and
Frederick Chiluba (Ralcner, 1992, p.95).
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the Local Government Act. 12 The decision of ZCTU not to co-operate with the legislation prompted
UNIP to expel 17 labour leaders from the party, which in turn provoked a further round of strikes.
Although, with an agreement to co-operate with the legislation and the cessation of strikes, the union
leaders were re-admitted to the party, continuing tensions culminated in the detention of seven union
leaders in 1981 including ZCTU President Frederick Chiluba. 13 With the continuation of economic
recession in the 1980's, the friction between the Government and the unions continued. 14 By 1986 the
average level of real wages had fallen below its 1965 level, strikes were widespread and the Government
implemented further measures designed to control union activity15.
Shaw (1976) and Hamalengwa (1992) suggested that the extension of state ownership over a
large proportion of the Zambian economy recast the politicians and civil servants who administered it as
a State Bourgeoisie. 16 Collectively, through their control of the state apparatus, they exercised the rights
of ownership over a substantial share of the productive resources of the economy.
The state officials who administered state enterprises, however, differed from private sector
based bourgeoisie in their relationship to the enterprises which they controlled. Their access to them was
dependent upon the maintenance of their position within the state hierarchy, and their claims on the
income generated by the assets was limited to the duration of their appointment. 17 Reflecting the
limited basis for personal accumulation, and the insecurity of their position, many within the public
sector sought to use the resources at their disposal to establish an independent basis for themselves
within the private sector. 18 For some, the emergence of this group marked a major division within the
12 Rakner (1992, p.98-101) argues that an important element in the unions' opposition to the Act was
the fear of increased interference in industrial matters and a resistance to the monopoly power of the
party in the one-party state. UNIP attempted unsuccessfully to incorporate ZCTU as a mass organisation
in 1977-8 and again in 1982 and 1984 (ibid., p.106-8).
13 Ralcner, (1992, p.102-4).
14 Rakner (1992, p.114).
15 The course of wages is discussed by Chiwele (1996, p.214-5).0n labour unrest see Hamalengwa
(1992, p.113-6) and Ralcner (1992, p.109-10).
16 See also Mudenda (1984, p.145-'7)
17 Shaw (1976, p.8) defined the membership of the state bourgeoisie as "all members of the Central
Committee and Parliament, of the Cabinet and Parastatal Boards, and all senior civil servants and
parastatal managers," his criteria for inclusion in this class being appointment by the President.
18 Documenting the emergence of an indigenous private sector capitalist class, Baylies and Szeftel
(1982, p.196), noted that it had been drawn "disproportionately from the ranks of professionals and from
the top layers of the party, civil service and parastatals," with 36 percent of those who they characterised
as "true bourgeoisie" having held "or continued to hold positions in the upper levels of the party,
Government or public enterprise." Public office provided opportunities to pursue this through access to
good salary, managerial skills and contacts in the business world, alongside opportunities to
misappropriate state assets.
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political leadership between those with a base in the private sector and those remaining dependent on
the state. 19 However, there continued to be a substantial overlapping between these groups while many
who had acquired small private interests remained dependent on their position in the state2°
The political system established under the one party state has also been identified as a principal
cause of the problems faced by Zambia during the Second Republic. For Good (1989) and Sichone
(1989), LTNIP 's monopoly of power had a corrosive effect on the capacity of the state, allowing
corruption and inefficiency to develop. 21 The institution of the one-party system was itself an attempt to
manage the corrosive effects of factional politics that developed under the multi-party system of the First
Republic and whether the continuance of multi-party politics would have led to a more accountable state
structure during the 1970 and 1980, or to a collapse in to a more authoritarian regime is open to
question. While it is widely recognised that the administrative capacity of the state did decline during
the Second Republic, this cannot be attributed solely to the one-party state. The long term effects of the
economic problems, outlined below, increased the challenges faced by the state, while simultaneously
reducing the resources available to it.22
3.1.2. Zambia's Economic Crisis.
The initially strong rates of growth experienced by the Zambian economy following
independence began to fade from the early 1970's, and as presented in Table V, low and negative rates
of growth of real gross domestic product were experienced throughout the rest of the period under
review. The problems encountered by the Zambian economy reflected those in the global economy and
the basis on which the Zambian economy was incorporated into it. The world economic crisis of the
19 Southall (1980, p.107) argued that the key to political divisions within the Party leadership were
divisions between "the ones who have made it and those who aspire to," the former preferring a
diminution of the state apparatus, and the latter still reliant upon it. Libby (1983) also suggests a
division between the state and private bourgeoisie, while War (1975) emphasises their common interest
as members of an overall managerial bourgeoisie.
20 Baylies and Szeftel (1982) also note the increasing involvement of business people in politics, both to
promote a pro-business agenda and to enhance their own positions. See also Eriksen (1977, p.20-1).
21 Others have pointed to the constant reshuffling of personnel within the state apparatus as
undermining its capacity for efficient administration, see Tordoff (1980, p.19-21), Burdette (1988, p.69-
70) and Turok (1989, p.150).
22 Chiwele and Colclough (1996) discuss the effects of declining wage levels in eroding the productivity
of the public sector workers.
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1970's emerged in the leading capitalist economies and diffused across the rest of the globe. 23 The crisis
was transmitted to Zambia primarily through two channels, the copper industry and rising levels of
world inflation.24
As demand for raw materials in the industrial countries declined and the speculative pressure
on commodity prices subsided, sharp and lasting declines in the price of copper were experienced. In
1973 the real US dollar price of copper stood at 78 percent of its peak in 1966, falling to 35 percent of
the 1966 level by 1978, and to 30 percent it by 1984. 25 At the same time the cost of imports, on which
Zambia was highly dependent for the supply of essential goods, rose. As Table VI shows, the combined
effects of falling export revenues and rising import costs, had a strong negative impact of Zambia's
terms of trade.
TABLE V.
Real Growth Rates of the Zambian Economy.
1965 to 1989.
Period. Average Growth of Real Gross
Domestic Product per annum.
%
1965-69 7.98
1970-74 5.20
1975-79 (0.67)
1980-84 0.71
1985-89 1.89
Source: Calculated from Fry (1980) for 1965 to 1974, and from
World Bank (World Tables, 1994b, p.724-5) for 1975 to 1989.
23For an account of the crisis in the world economy see Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison (1991, p.207-
62).
24 Other factors which materially affected the Zambian economy in the period were the conflict with the
white minority regime in Rhodesia, the wars of liberation waged in Angola and Mozambique, and the
destablisation policy pursued by South Africa through the 1980s.
25 See Takeuchi et al. (1987, p.105). Mikesell (1988) also provides a discussion of price trends and the
factors determining them over the period.
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TABLE VI.
Zambia's Changing Terms of Trade.
1967 to 1989.
Period. Average Change in Terms of
Trade Per Annum.
%
1967-69 2.56
1970-74 (5.98)
1975-79 (6.13)
1980-84 (7.82)
1985-89 11.61
Source: Calculated from Republic of Zambia (Third National
Development Plan, 1979, p.8, Table 1.10), for 1967 to 1974, and
from World Bank (World Tables, 1994b, p.726-7), for 1975 to 1989.
While Zambia's accumulation strategy had been based upon the use of the surplus produced by
the copper industry for the establishment of a diversified industrial base to the economy, it remained in
the words of Burdette (1988, p.95), as "a house of cards balanced narrowly on the prosperity of the
copper mines." Many of the new industrial developments which had taken place during the period
covered by the First and Second Development Plans had relied on imported technology and inputs. As
Table VII shows, the sectors of manufacturing in which the greatest expansion had occurred during the
first ten years of independence, were those which were most dependent on the importation of inputs.26
While diversifying production within the economy, these industries with their reliance on foreign
exchange, had reproduced the dependence of the economy on the earnings of the copper sector.27
26 Introducing the Third National Development Plan (1979-83) President Kaunda noted that; "the
industrial development in the country has been rather lopsided. There has been very little genuine
import substitution and most of the industries set up during the period are heavily dependent on
imported raw materials and other essential production inputs; the technology imported has been capital-
intensive and least suited to the Zambian market"(Republic of Zambia, 1979, p.iii).
27 The need to diversify became more urgent in the 1980s as future life of the copper mines was
estimated at a maximum of 20 years (Republic of Zambia, 1984b). The problems which a booming
primary sector can create for the wider economy through "Dutch Disease" effects is discussed by O'Neill
(1987) and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1991).
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TABLE VII.
The Changing Structure of Zambian Manufacturing Industry and its Import Dependence.
1965 to 1975.
Sector. Share of
Manufacturing
GDP. 1965.
Share of
Manufacturing
GDP. 1975.
Change in
Share of
Manufacturing
Imports as a
Share of
Sector inputs
% % GDP between in 1975.
1965 and 1975. %
Chemicals and chemical products. 3.8 20.2 16.4 82.0
Basic metals and metal products. 19.1 23.6 4.5 73.1
Textile, wearing apparel. 8.9 12.5 3.6 74.8
Paper and printing. 3.9 5.5 1.6 64.9
Other manufacturing. 0.4 0.5 0.1 67.2
Wood, wood products. 5.3 5.2 (0.1) 47.7
Non-metallic mineral products. 8.7 5.0 (3.7) 12.0
Food, beverages and tobacco 49.9 27.4 (22.5) 25.2
Source: Data on Gross Domestic Product from Dewar and Seshamani (1987, p.107, Table 3.1). Data for
import content is Republic of Zambia (Restructuring in the Midst of Crisis, 1984a, Vol.! p.63, Table 2).
Notes: Totals not equal to 100 due to rounding. The figures for the import content of Food, Beverages and
Tobacco sector has been calculated as the average of the subsectors of Food Manufacturing (26.8 percent)
and Beverages and Tobacco (23.6 percent). The figure for the import content of Basic Metals and Metal
Products Sector has been calculated as the average of the subsectors of Basic Metal Products (85.2 percent)
and Fabricated Metal Products (61.0 percent).
The deterioration in the Zambian economy after 1975 brought the issue of economic
adjustment to the fore. The first response of the Government was to pursue a strategy based on the
administrative control of the economy with the aim of managing the effects of a temporary copper
downturn. This was substituted in the early 1980's by the introduction of market oriented policies aimed
at adjusting to the changed economic environment.28
28 While many analysts regard Zambia as having begun to undertake adjustment measures in the early
1980's, others such as Callaghy and Wilson (1988, p.210-1) and Shafer (1990) argue that it was not
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The initial response of the Government to the economic problems experienced from 1975
onward was influenced by the expectation that the decline in copper prices would be temporary. 29 This
was in line with the prevailing view within the industry and among international financial
institutions. 30 The Government, therefore, pursued a measured response, intending to insulate the
domestic economy from the full effects of the downturn.31
The extent to which this policy response by the Government proved inadequate was in a large
part due to the steepness of the decline that was experienced. Between 1966 and 1974, minerals
contributed on average 48 percent of Zambian Government revenue. For the years 1975 to 1982 this
averaged 2 percent. Although total Government expenditure was reduced in real terms, falling by an
average of 4.5 percent each year between 1974 and 1980, this was insufficient to match an average fall
in revenue of 9.1 percent each year.32 In response to the deteriorating export revenues, measures were
taken to maintain the Balance of Payments and around 40 to 50 percent of the decline in Zambia's
foreign earnings between 1975 and 1978 were met by reductions in the level of imports. 33 Despite this,
by 1978 Zambia had accumulated a level of payment arrears which threatened normal trading
relationships and necessitated an agreement with the IMF.34
From 1978 onward, relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
became increasingly material to the conduct of economic policy by the Zambian Government. 35 The
until the middle of the decade that policy addressed adjustment. Bratton (1994, p.107) noted the
adoption of "a more serious commitment to economic reform" in 1985, describing earlier measures
undertaken as "half-hearted."
29 See O'Neill (1987, p31), Ndulo and Sakala (1987, p.1) and Young (1990, p.'7).
30 Copper prices were understood to be cyclical, a view Takeuchi (1987, p.65) states, which was held
widely until the early 1980's. Ndulo and Sakala (1987, p.27) reported that the record of the IMF in
predicting copper prices was poor, while the ILO (1981, p.137-8) note that they had considered the
problems of 1975 to be exceptional, rather than the beginning of a downtrend in the price.
31 Michalski (1982) provides an account of the variety of policy responses that can be employed to cope
with export revenue instability.
32 Within this, capital expenditure was hardest hit, falling at 15.8 percent a year with recurrent
expenditures falling at 2.2 percent (Bell, 1983, p. 63).
33 ILO (1981, p.141).
34 Zambia had borrowed from non-concessionary sources and therefore was paying relatively high rates
of interest. Debt servicing rose to 15 percent of export earning in 1978, compared to 4 percent in 1974,
and total debt costs, including those due to domestic debts, reached 23 percent of Government
expenditure, compared to 13 percent in the earlier year (ILO, 1981, p.142-3).
35 Ndulo and Sakala (1987), Ncube et al (1987) and Reinildca-Soininen (1990, p.63-6) have traced the
evolution of Zambia's agreements with the IMF. Zambia first borrowed from the IMF in 1971 in
response to the Mufilira Mine disaster. The conditionalities attached to the earlier loans were light and
continued to be so until 1976 when a 20 percent devaluation of the Kwacha was required (Mwanza et al,
1992, p.12'7).
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central aim of the programmes was to restructure the external relationships of the economy and reduce
its balance of payments deficit, and the primary instrument employed to achieve this was the devaluation
of the Kwacha.36
In 1983 the exchange rate became more actively managed, being based on a crawling peg
linked to a basket of currencies, against which it was steadily devalued.37 This system was subsequently
replaced by the foreign exchange auction, which entailed a substantial liberalisation of both the
allocation and the rate of foreign exchange. Alongside this, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies were
pursued to contain domestic demand, administrative controls dismantled and a new framework
established to facilitate foreign investment. 38 The prices of most wholesale and retail goods were
decontrolled at the end of 1982 and the rate of interest was decontrolled in 1985.39
However, the capacity of the economy to respond to these policies was limited.° For
devaluation to correct the imbalance in external trading, without production being further curtailed,
required that either imports were replaced by the development of locally produced substitutes, or that
new export products or markets were established. Both of these entail adjustment in the productive
profile of an economy which requires time, stability and a supportive policy framework to promote
investment. These conditions were not generated by the policy reforms introduced between 1983 and
36 Mosley and Weeks (1993, p.1591) categorise the Zambian programme as one which focused
particularly on trade liberalisation and much of the literature on Zambia reflects the centrality of
exchange rate policy. See UNDP (1986), Ndulo and Norton (1987), Seshamani (1988), Wulf (1989) and
Mwanza et al (1992).
37 While import licences and foreign exchange allocations continued to be administered by the
Government, exports were encouraged through the establishment in 1983 of a foreign exchange
retention scheme to allow exporters to retain 50 percent (or in the case of the copper industry 35
percent) of their foreign exchange earnings for their own use. The regulation of exports was streamlined,
taxation reduced on export sales, and an Export Development Act was passed in 1985 which established
an Export Promotion Board.
38 The Investment Act, 1985, was passed creating a new investment authority with the authority to
approve all aspects of an investment
39 After December 1982, only three commodities (maize meal, wheat flour/bread and candles) remained
under the control of the Government. In September 1985 this was reduced to only maize meal, the price
of which became subject to a series of upward adjustments (UNDP, 1986, p.95, and Seshamani, 1988,
p.59). Before 1982 the list of goods whose prices were controlled was extensive and included beef, flour
and bread, cooking oil, charcoal, candles, soaps and detergents, blankets, maize meal, motor vehicles,
tyre and tubes, cigarettes, biscuits, liquor, footwear, bicycles, sugar, soft drinks, fish, salt, rice, milk,
clothing, matches, reflective number plates, petrol and petroleum products, toilet rolls, traditional beer,
pharmaceuticals, stock feed, margarine and fat, beer, and all imported goods (Republic of Zambia,
1984b, p.9).
° For further critical accounts of the programmes see Ndulo and Norton (1987), Gulhati (1989),Wulf
(1988 and 1989), Young (1990), Andersson and Ndulo (1991), Reinildca-Soininen (1990), Fardi (1991)
and Siakalange (1994).
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1987. Measures such as the decontrol of interest rates hampered those undertaking new investments,
while the liberalisation measures reduced the scope of the Government for strategically targeting
resources.41
Adjustment measures, in particular the rapid devaluation induced by the auctions and the
decontrol of interest rates, also had secondary effects on the Government's budgetary position. The
devaluation and decontrol of interest rates introduced additional inflationary pressures into the
economy.42 While this raised the general level of costs, it particularly raised the level of interest
payments incurred by the Government on the servicing of its debt.43 Alongside this, the rising level of
costs increased the pressure on the Government to provide subsidies, particularly for essential
subsistence items such as maize mea1. 44 The combined effects of these pressures was a loss of budgetary
control by the Government as substantial deficits were incurred in 1985 and 1986.45
The structural adjustment measures agreed with the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank have been portrayed by some as representing a framework through which the Zambian
economy could be reconciled to the changed economic environment.46 The policy measures, however,
did not deliver an improvement in the Zambian economy and were replaced in May 1987 by the
Zambian Governments own New Economic Recovery Programme. 47 The Programme was marked by a
rhetoric of self reliance alongside the reintroduction of administrative controls to regulate the
economy.48 The exchange rate was fixed, with the allocation of foreign exchange being placed in the
41 Makgetla (1986, p.414) criticised the foreign exchange retention scheme for reducing the ability of
the Government to direct the priorities of imports, and argued that the extent to which the scheme acted
as an incentive to exporters was reduced by the operation of the foreign exchange auction (LTNDP, 1986,
p.96).
42 Seshamani (1990, p.18-9) and Fardi (1991, p.340-2).
43 Gulhati (1989, p.3'7) noted that the decontrol of interest rates and the depreciation of the Kwacha,
increased debt repayments from 15 percent of Government expenditure in 1984 to 31 percent in 1985
Estimates for 1986 stood at 41 percent of expenditure.
44 Sano (1988) argued that while the consumer subsidy on maize meal had been "effectively abolished
during 1983 and 1984," the rising costs of imported fertilisers, grain bags and fuel renewed the pressure
for subsidisation.
45 It was in this context that the Government attempted to reduce the maize meal subsidy in December
of 1986, sparking what the Economist Intelligence Unit described as "undoubtedly the worst outbreak of
unrest in Zambia's independent history," and providing the immediate reason to break with the IMF
programme (EIU, q1/1987, p.5 and Gulhati, 1989, p.45).
46 The reform package has been presented as representing an economic logic which would, if fully
implemented, ensure the successful adjustment of the Zambian economy, (Callaghy, 1990 and Hawkins,
1991).
47For a discussion of the pre-manoeuvring before the break see EIU (q211987).
48 See EIU (q3/1987 , p.11-13 and q4/1987, p.7-10). Bates and Collier (1993, p.425) note that while
NERP reintroduced administrative controls, it continued the tight fiscal and monetary stance of the IMF
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hands of a new Government committee, price controls were reintroduced and the rate of interest was
reduced.49 This was accompanied by an announcement of a ceiling on debt repayments at 10 percent of
export earnings net of priority items.5°
The success of the NERP depended on the ability of the programme to secure a higher level of
net foreign exchange for the economy than that offered by the reaching of a new agreement with the
IMF. While the ceiling on debt repayments limited outflows, the abandonment of agreed policy reforms
resulted in the suspension of further funding from the World Bank and IMF, and reduced flows from
other donors. 51 On balance, Zambia's foreign exchange position deteriorated and it was unable to
pursue its alternative strategy.52 In July 1989 the Government began to dismantle the administrative
controls that it had introduced in 1987, which led to renewed agreement with the IMF in September
1989.53
SECTION 3.2. STATE ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE. 
The objectives which the Government required the State Enterprise sector to pursue reflected
those of its overall development strategy. In both the Second and Third National Development Plans,
published in 1971 and 1979 respectively, state enterprise was identified as a principal vehicle through
which the strategy could be implemented. 54 While it was expected to fulfil a variety of objectives
programmes, while Mwanza et al (1992, p.164) argue that only in its ceiling of debt servicing did the
NERP differ fundamentally from the previous policies. EIU (q1/1988, p.8-9) reported that while the
Zambian Government was willing to negotiate with the IMF on issues of the exchange and price
controls, they were not willing to lift the ceiling of 10 percent repayment.
49 In May 1987 eleven goods, other than maize meal, were placed under price controls (Bates and
Collier 1993, p.425).
50 The priority areas for foreign exchange allocation were ZCCM, International Air Traffic Association,
and oil and fertilisers imports (Reinikka-Soininen, 1990, p.52).
51 See EIU (q3/1987, p.10-13, q4/1987, p.9-10 and q1/1988, p.8-9). Mwanza et al (1992, p.145) note
the fire at Kafue Gorge electricity generation plant in 1989 as a key moment as "the government
urgently needed international assistance in order to repair the facility."
52 Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1990, p.72-3), Seshamani (1990, p.26-'7) and Mkandawire (1993, p.469-'70) The
plan relied on the assumption that it would be supported by international donors. However, this was not
forthcoming, in the absence of the Zambian government reaching renewed agreement with the IMF.
53 See E/U(q3/1988, p.13, q4/1988, p.11-3 and q4/1989). See also Andersson and Ndulo (1991).
54 See Republic of Zambia (1971, p.194-5 and 1979, p.418). ZIMCO (1990) continued to define its role
in terms of these objectives.
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including the supply of goods at affordable prices and increasing employment, particular attention was
focused on its capacity to reinvest its profits in the creation of a diversified industrial structure.55
As noted in Chapter 2, from the beginning of the 1970s, most of the major state enterprises
were placed within ZIMC0. 56 The capacity of ZIMCO to fulfil these diverse objectives was founded on
the complementary characteristics of the businesses with were included within it. The mining sector
provided a potential source of profits, while INDECO had experience of establishing new industrial
enterprises. In addition to this, ZIMCO also had extensive wholesaling and retailing networks and was
an important manufacturer of essential consumer goods.57
In examining the performance of state enterprise this Section follows the approach outlined in
Chapter 1. They are evaluated in terms of commercial viability and ability to meet the objectives of the
government. The commercial viability of the sector is examined through an analysis of the financial
statements of the state enterprises. Section 3.2.1 outlines the approach that has been chosen to analyse
the Financial statements produced by the Zambian state enterprise sector. In Section 3.2.1a, 3.2.1b and
3.2.1c, this is applied to the accounts of ZIMCO, the state mining enterprise and to INDECO,
respectively.
Section 3.2.2 examines the criticisms of the performance of the state enterprise sector made by
the President, UNIP and the National Assembly from the mid 1970s. These prompted a series of reforms
to the structures through which the government controlled the state enterprise sector, which are
examined in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1. Evaluating the Financial Performance of State Enterprise.
This section outlines the approach that has been taken to the interpretation of the accounts of
ZIMCO, the state mining companies and INDECO. It discusses the presentation of the companies'
profitability and capital structure, and the problems involved in assessing them. 58 The Financial
55 These were identified by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Development Planning, Nkowani
(n.d., p83), who observed that without proper co-ordination there was scope for conflict between these
objectives. See also Mwanza (1978).
56 The main state investments which remained outside ZIMCO were statutory bodies. The problems in
the administration of them are discussed in Himonga (1984).
57 As President ICaunda noted "virtually all the price controlled items were products of the parastatal or
statutory boards" (Republic of Zambia, 1984b, p.9).
58 The analysis of financial accounts in this thesis has drawn on the work of Smith (1992) and Holmes
and Sugden (1994).
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statements of these companies were each prepared on a consolidated basis to reflect the performance of
all of the companies within the Group. Since both ZIMCO and INDECO had a number of subsidiary
companies which were not wholly owned, the values stated in the accounts combine assets and liabilities
attributable both to the shareholder of the parent company and those due to minority shareholders. In
contrast, the state mining companies, while themselves having a substantial minority shareholding, did
not have minority shareholders in their subsidiary companies, and the value of these was, therefore,
wholly attributable to the parent company.
The profitability of the companies is presented below on the basis of the profit margin
calculated from the Financial statements. This measure of profitability has been chosen to control for the
effects of inflation on the financial accounts published by the companies. ZIMCO Group generally
followed the historic cost convention of accounting in which items are stated at the nominal value at
which they entered the accounts. This convention becomes problematic in inflationary environments,
since the divergence between current and past nominal values may introduce distortions. Measures of
profitability calculated in relation to the value of capital employed, will compare current revenues to past
costs, and systematically overstate the relative scale of the current profit or loss. The profit margin
measurement that has been employed in this analysis, however, substantially overcomes this problem by
comparing the contemporaneous flows of current turnover and profit.
The average annual Profit Margin has been calculated for selected periods on the basis of
Group pre-tax profit, profit after tax and exceptional items, and, where applicable, the profit that is
attributable to the shareholders of the company, rather than to the minority shareholders of subsidiaries.
This data is presented in Tables VIII, X and XII for ZIMCO, the mining companies and INDECO
respectively.
The changing capital structure of the companies has been presented on the basis of the balance
sheet values of different sources of capital. An important relationship in the capital structure of a
company is the relative balance between the capital that has been provided by the shareholders as equity,
or is otherwise attributable to them, such as profits retained by the company, and the capital which has
been raised through long term borrowings. The level of debt to shareholders' funds provides a useful
indication of the extent to which the companys financial returns will benefit the shareholders. As levels
of borrowings rise, the income generated by the company may increasingly be diverted from the
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shareholders to provide for the servicing of its debts and should the company fall into insolvency, a
smaller proportion of residual value would be attributable to the shareholders.59
The capital structure of the companies has been presented as the average annual balances stated
in their accounts over selected periods. Where applicable, a distinction has been drawn between the
value of shareholders funds attributable to the shareholders of the company and those attributable to the
minority shareholders' of Group companies. This data is presented in Table IX, XI and XIII, for
ZIMCO, the mining companies and INDECO respectively.
The capacity of a company to finance capital expenditures is a function of its ability to generate
positive cash flows and is not equivalent to the concept of profit that is expressed in the Profit and Loss
Account. Profits are stated net of items such as depreciation which do not involve cash outflows, and do
not reflect other items, such as changes in the level of working capital, which may reflect positively or
negatively upon cash flow. Although Cash Flow Statements have recently been adopted in Zambia, they
were not produced during the period discussed. The level of profit has, therefore, been used as an
approximation of the net resources generated by the Group.°
The analysis of the accounts of ZIMCO and its subsidiary companies during the period is also
affected by changes in a number of the accounting policies employed by the Group. 61 These were
introduced to mitigate the effects of inflation and devaluation on its financial statements, but reduced the
comparability of the financial statements over time. In 1984 ZIMCO Group began to defer the
accounting recognition of losses incurred on long term borrowings due to inflation over the period of
repayment. 62 This reversed the previous policy of recognising the entire loss in the Profit and Loss
account in the year in which it arose. The effects of this revised policy on profits, following a
59 The relationship of borrowings to equity capital will in each case be influenced by the specific rights
that are attached to each at their issue, for example whether debts are secured upon specific assets. The
burden of debt servicing will also vary between cases depending on the rate of interest and the schedule
of repayment.
60 To the extent that depreciation is charged against profit to represent the consumption of fixed assets,
it may itself be a useful proxy for the value of capital expenditure used to replace existing assets. As
discussed below, while this is undermined by the use of historic cost accounting in an inflationary
environment, the adoption of asset revaluation should make depreciation charges more representative of
the replacement values. The deferment of unrealised exchange losses, will also have the effect of making
profit flows more representative of cash flows, than if the entire exchange loss was charged against
profit in the year it arose.
61 This section does not provide a full account of the changes to accounting policies within the state
sector, but rather focuses on two major changes which had material affects during the period.
62 This was contrary to that outlined in International Accounting Standards.
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devaluation, were to increase their immediate level, at the expense of those in future years. This
accounting treatment also created an unrealised exchange loss in the Balance Sheet. The presentation of
this was also subject to change, being either netted off against shareholders funds to give a lower value
for net assets, or stated as an asset and producing a higher valuation of net assets.
The Group also amended its previous practice of stating fixed asset values at historical cost. To
counter the effects of inflation in eroding the value of assets in company Balance Sheets, from the mid-
1980s Group companies began to undertake asset revaluation programmes. In 1985 ZCCM declared that
it was aiming to systematically and periodically revalue its fixed assets, and in 1986 INDECO
announced that it had instituted a three year cycle of revaluation for its fixed assets. Once again this had
a two-fold effect on the accounts of the companies involved. While the revaluation of assets increased
the level of shareholders' funds stated in the balance sheet, it also increased the depreciation charged
against pre-tax profits in subsequent years.
An additional factor that reduced the transparency of the Group's accounts was that the
accounting categorisation of the Group's liabilities did not always accurately reflect their substantive
nature. As Turok (1989, p.92) noted:
It has become common practice for some parastatals to borrow from the [Zambia National
Commercial] Bank without paying interest so that after several years the loan effectively
becomes a grant. It is suggested that half the loans to ZIMCO are now in fact bad debts.63
Despite these factors, an examination of the accounts provided by the state enterprises can
provide an indication of broad trends within the sector. The following sections present this information
firstly for ZIMCO Group, followed by the mining companies NCCM and RCM and their successor
company ZCCM, and finally for INDECO Group. The mining companies and INDECO have been
highlighted for particular attention due to their central role in the diversification strategy of ZIMCO.
63 The National Assembly (Committee on Parastatal Bodies, 1980) noted the case of INDECO Milling,
a company which it only refrained from recommending for liquidation because it provided an essential
service. The Zambian National Commercial Bank had been reluctant to increase its overdraft facility,
but later agreed to following pressure from its holding company ZIMCO and from the Prime Minister's
office. UNDP (1986, p.114) notes that during the foreign exchange auctions the Government protected
some State Enterprises from the full effects of the devaluation by providing them with currency at pre-
auction rates for the payment of some debts and expatriate staff costs. Again, this was not reflected in
the accounts of ZIMCO.
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3.2.1a ZIMCO
Since most of Zambia's State enterprises were included within the ZIMCO Group, a review of
its Financial statements provides an preliminary overview of the aggregate performance of the Zambian
State Enterprise Sector as a whole.
TABLE VIII.
Profitability of ZIMCO Group.
FY 1971 to FY 1989.
Period. Average Pre-tax Profits
Margin,
%
Average Profit Margin
after tax and
exceptional items.
%
Average Profit Margin
attributable to ZIMCO.
%
1971-74 30.61 16.31 7.98
1975-78 7.12 2.81 1.15
1979-82 4.48 2.17 1.11
1983-86 2.93 (1.67) (1.66)
1987-89 11.04 (a) 5.03 (b)-
Source: Calculated from ZIMCO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1971 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for
1973 to 1981, (Annual Report, 1986) for 1982 to 1986, (Annual Report 1987) for 1987, ZIMCO (1990)
for 1988, and Republic of Zambia (Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies
1988) for 1989(c).
Note: (a) data unavailable for FY 1988. (b) data unavailable for FY 1988 and 1989. (c) The Report of
the Auditor-General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies (1988) was in fact presented in March 1990.
Table VIII presents information on the performance of the ZIMCO Group between FY 1971
and FY 1990. Although profitability revived at the end of the 1980s, the performance of the group did
not attain the levels of profitability achieved at the beginning of the 1970s. While profitability was not
the only objective of ZIMCO, the generation of new funds was central to its capacity to reinvest in
existing enterprises and fund new projects. With diminished levels of profitability, much of ZIMCO's
expansion was financed by debt. The capital structure of the Group is presented in Table IX. As noted in
the previous section, the full effect of the rise in debt was mitigated by the revaluation of its assets which
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substantially increased the book value of shareholder funds and minority interests from the mid-
1980s. 64 While this also raised the net asset value of the Group, recognising the increase in their
nominal value, it did not provide any new funds for investment.
Table IX.
Sources of Capital as a Proportion of Net Assets of ZIMCO Group.
FY 1971 to FY 1989.
Period. Shareholders'
Funds.
%
Minority Interests.
%
Long Term Debt
%.
1971-74 24.60 35.87 39.53
1975-78 32.26 24.97 42.77
1979-82 32.10 17.53 50.37
1983-86 32.37 18.30 49.33
1987-89 39.32 22.32 38.36
Source: Calculated from ZIMCO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1971 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for
1973 to 1981, (Annual Report, 1986) for 1982 to 1986, (Annual Report 1987) for 1987, ZIMCO (1990)
for 1988, and Republic of Zambia (Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies
1988) for 1989(b).
Notes:(a) Total Capital Employed has been calculated by adding together shareholders funds minority
interests and long term debt. This excludes certain other liabilities stated in the Group's accounts. The
most significant of these was Insurance Funds, related to the activities of ZISCO, and at no point did
these did not exceed 6 percent of ZIMCO's capital employed. (b) The Report of the Auditor-General on
the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies (1988) was in fact presented in March 1990.
3.2.1b State Mining Enterprises.
The analysis of the profitability and capital structure of NCCM and RCM, and of its successor
company ZCCM, follows that presented for ZIMCO group above. 65 As Table X shows, rates of profit to
64 Although the accounts of ZIMCO did not provide a breakdown of the sources of reserves within
shareholders funds, ZIMCO (Annual Report, 1987) notes that asset revaluations were the main source of
the Groups non-distributable reserves, which in FY 1987 accounted for 120 percent of the net value of
ZIMCO shareholders funds
65 In contrast to ZIMCO, although ZCCM itself had minority shareholders, its subsidiary companies did
not. The figures presented in Table X, therefore represent the profits attributable to all the shareholders
of ZCCM and its predecessor companies, of which a proportion was attributable to ZIMCO Group.
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turnover achieved by the copper companies in early 1970s were not matched subsequently. 66 Over this
period, the Zambian copper producers recorded pre-tax losses in four years FY 1976, FY 1978, FY 1982
and FY 1983.
Table X.
Profitability of State Mining Companies.
FY 1971 to FY 1990.
Period. Average Profit Margin
before tax,
%
Average Profit Margin
after tax.
%
1971-74 38.81 23.90
1975-78 3.04 2.76
1979-82 4.59 2.61
1983-86 2.32 (3.59)
1987-90 10.09 3.26
Source: Calculated from Radetski (1985, p.120), for 1971 to 1982, and from
ZCCM respective Annual Reports for 1983 to 1990.
As Table XI shows, the level of long term debt steadily increased in relation to the level of
shareholder capital. The trend was halted temporarily at the end of the 1970s, by the capitalisation of
existing debts of the companies which lifted the Government shareholding of both RCM and NCCM to
61 percent of equity. 67 Debt levels, however, continued to rise through the 1980s despite the revaluation
of fixed assets which bolstered shareholder funds.68
From the early 1980s the company began to have difficulty in adequately servicing its debts. In
FY 1982 ZCCM announced that it was unable to comply with the covenants attached to a number of its
66 While accounts of the mining companies also reflected the production of other minerals, they were
primarily reflected the contribution of copper and the decline in its real price from the mid-1970's was
magnified by the declining level of production achieved in Zambia.
67 Burdette (1984a, p.46-'7).
68 By FY 1989, 81 percent of shareholders funds was accounted for by asset revaluations (ZCCM,
Annual Report, 1989).
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loans, a situation which was only resolved by the Government agreeing to the subordination of K203
million of loans due to itself. 69 This provided only a temporary solution to the problem, and from FY
1984 the management of the company's debt became contingent on agreements for rescheduling of
repayments to both Government and commercial debtors.7°
Table XI.
Sources of capital as a Proportion of the Net Assets of State Mining Companies.
FY 1971 to FY 1990.
Period. Shareholders' funds.
%
Long term Debt.
%
1971-74 87.95 12.05
1975-78 76.85 23.15
1979-82 78.53 21.47
1983-86 68.45 31.55
1987-90 60.58 39.42
Source: Calculated from Radetski (1985, p.120), for 1971 to 1982, and ZCCM respective Annual
Reports for 1983 to 1990.
Notes: (a) Total Capital has been calculated by adding together shareholders funds minority interests
and long term debt. This excludes certain other liabilities stated in the Group's accounts. The most
significant of these was deferred liabilities, which principally related to provisions for employees
retirement benefits.
3.2.1c INDECO.
The profitability and capital structure of INDECO between FY 1971 and FY 1990 are outlined
in Table XII and Table XIII respectively. As with the other State Enterprises analysed, the performance
69 Mining Journal (14/10/1983) commented that this provided only a temporary solution and that new
equity was required to strengthen the balance sheet. This was also the preferred option of ZCCM
(ZCCM, Annual Report 1982 and 1983). The company's auditors qualified their report on the 1982
annual accounts noting that while they had been prepared on the basis of ZCCM continuing as a going
concern, this assumption was subject to the conclusion of agreements for financing (ZCCM, Annual
Report, 1982, p.13).
70 The 1983 Government agreement with the IMF allowed for the rescheduling of debt under London
and Paris rules, from which the company has benefited (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1983).
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of INDECO deteriorated sharply from the mid-1970's, although it did show a recovery at the end of the
1980s.71 In FY 1979 and FY 1980 the Group recorded a pre-tax loss.
TABLE XII.
Profitability of INDECO.
FY 1971 to FY 1989.
Period. Average Pre-tax Profit
Margin,
%
Average Profit Margin
after tax and
exceptional items.
%
Average Profit Margin
attributable to
INDECO.
%
1971-74 9.32 5.69 2.83
1975-78 2.21 0.35 0.09
1979-82 0.37 (1.89) (2.06)
1983-86 2.96 1.49 (0.06)
1987-89 12.52 9.41 6.52
Source: Calculated from INDECO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1971 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for
1973 to 1980, and (Annual Report, 1989) for 1981 to 1989.
Since the earnings of the Group were depressed, INDECO increasingly relied on long term
borrowings to finance their activities and by FY 1979 these had risen to over 78 percent of INDECO's
net asset value. The solvency of INDECO was addressed in FY 1980 through a capital restructuring
scheme supported by ZIMCO and the Government. The programme included the capitalisation of some
amounts owed by INDECO companies, alongside the provision of new funds for the repayment of loans
71 In assessing the financial performance of INDECO over these periods, account must be taken of the
changing profile of the Group. While the Group was particularly oriented to undertaking new ventures,
key divisions were demerged in FY 1972 and FY 1975. A comparison of the accounts for FY 1971 and
FY 1972 reveals little change in the levels of profitability or indebtedness, while the accounts for FY
1974 and FY 1975 do reveal a fall in assets, turnover and profits, although debt levels remained
unaffected. The affects which the FY 1975 demergers would have upon turnover and profits was noted
in the FY 1974 INDECO Report.
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and the undertaking of new projects. 72 In FY 1981 and FY 1982 INDECO's share capital was increased
to more than three times the level at which it stood before the recapitalisation, while asset revaluations
through the 1980's further increased the level of shareholders funds and minority interests.73
Despite this, INDECO's auditors qualified their annual accounts each year between FY 1980
and FY 1986, noting that the preparation of them on a going concern basis was dependent upon
continued support from ZIMCO, and in 1987 INDECO (Annual Report, 1987, p.14) noted that "the
profit margins earned still remain inadequate to meet the group's debt servicing obligations, asset
replacement expenditure and working capital requirements." In addition, the structure of INDECO's
debt also suggests that it was dependent on non-commercial sources of finance. By FY 1989, INDECO's
two largest creditors were the CDC and the International Finance Corporation, which accounted for 38
percent and 17 percent of its debts, respectively.74
Table XIII.
Sources of Capital as a Proportion of the Net Assets of INDECO.
FY 1971 to FY 1989.
Period. Shareholders' funds.
%
Minority interests.
%
Long term Debt.
%
1971-74 35.42 16.18 48.40
1975-78 29.55 13.89 56.56
1979-82 21.92 6.92 71.16
1983-86 (a) 40.92 10.89 48.20
1987-89 51.54 18.50 29.96
Source: Calculated from INDECO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1971 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for
1973 to 1980, and (Annual Report, 1989) for 1981 to 1989.
Note: (a) Figures do not total 100 due to rounding.
72 The balance of these components is not shown in the accounts of INDECO. However, in FY 1981 at
least two-thirds of the increase in equity was accounted for by the conversion into equity of amounts
owed to the Government by just three companies, Zambia Sugar (K16 million), National Milling (K13
million), ROP (K7 million).
73 The recapitalisation continued, on a smaller scale, in FY 1983 and FY 1984. Asset revaluations
became significant after FY 1985 and by FY 1989 the revaluation reserve stood at 27 percent of
shareholders' funds.
74 INDECO (Annual Report, 1989).
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3.2.2. Discontent with State Enterprises. 
Through the 1970's a mounting wave of discontent over the performance of the state enterprise
sector, emanated from within the political leadership. The tone was set by President Kaunda who, in
1975, declared that "the name Parastatal is now virtually a derogatory term," citing "carelessness and
out-right robbery" and "corruption and nepotism" as factors in their disappointing performance. 75 In
1977, the National Council of UNIP voiced similar criticisms of state enterprise noting that;
some managements and indeed some of the workers generally have shown total disregard for
honesty and integrity... [the] colossal amounts of public funds which have found their way out
of the parastatal bodies into private pockets... [and that] there is a lot of misplacement of
personnel, sometimes vividly related to tribal affiliation as against merit.76
Concerns were also expressed within the National Assembly. The Report of a Special Parliamentary
Select Committee (National Assembly, 1977, p.4-5), appointed to examine the economic problems,
noted that:
With the exception of the mining sector few parastatal bodies have exported anything of
substance... Government annually makes a large allocation of capital funds to support projects
undertaken by parastatal organisations. This has arisen largely because these bodies are not
able to generate their own capital for plant renewal and new investment.... Poor management,
absence of inventory control, overstaffing, inadequate pricing of products and political
interference have been named as some of the reasons for the poor performance of the
parastatal sector.77
Many of these areas of criticism were also raised by individual members of the National
Assembly in the mid-1970s, such as during the debate on the Second Reading of the Parastatal Services
Commission Bill in March 1976. 78
 Many complained of the overall performance of the state enterprise
sector, which was charged with failing to make an adequate return on the capital that had been
75 Kaunda (1975).
76 Kaunda (1977, p.14). The National Council of UNIP emphasised the need to appoint politically
motivated managers committed to Humanism rather than those motivated by "principles such as profit
and fringe benefits which are offshoots of capitalism and imperialism" (ibid, p.13-5).
77 The Report also criticised the political structure as being "a serious constraint to efficiency" and when
it was presented to the National Assembly, much of the debate concentrated upon the structures of the
one party state rather than the economy (National Assembly, Daily Parliamentary Debates, 30/11/1977
and 1/12/1977).
78 Criticism of state enterprises were also made during debates on the Industrial Development Act and
the Report of the Select Committee in 1977. The Government accepted much of this criticism and, as the
Minister of Lands and Agriculture, Chikwanda, stated during one of the debates "Members of
Parliament have used the occasion of the Bill to air the grievances they have about mismanagement in
some of our parastatal organisations, which we in the Government are the first to admit. His Excellency
the President has come out and decried the inefficiency in the parastatal organisations and has directed
that these organisations run well. So, you are not really stating a case which we in the Government do
not agree with" (National Assembly, Daily Parliamentary Debates, 12/8/1977, co1.217).
80
invested. 79 Criticisms were also made that managers were frequently appointed on inappropriate
criteria, such as their home province or record of service to the party, rather than on the basis of
technical competence. 80 In addition, it was argued that since State enterprises were subject to little
commercial pressure or public scrutiny, that there was little motivation for their managers to perform
efficiently, and much leeway for them to pursue their personal interests.81
The criticisms of widespread maladministration in state enterprise were supported by the
findings of a number of investigations. 82 The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of
Zambia Railways (Republic of Zambia, 1978, p.59) concluded that "tribalism is practised on a very large
scale" through "appointments, promotions, the exercise of disciplinary functions, and in showing
hostility and harshness to members of other tribes." Such practices, it was suggested, led to the
entrenchment of particular groups within particular departments. The report also detailed cases of
corruption and theft which illustrated the ways in which state enterprise property had been privately
appropriated. 83 Incidents were cited of the rerouting of purchases, which had previously been procured
directly from the supplier, through an agent at inflated prices; the sale of enterprise assets at low prices,
without advertisement or competitive tendering; and the employment of external contractors on
generous terms, when internal staff could have been used. The most prominent case involved allegations
that the General Manager of Zambian Railways had been involved in the theft of cattle from the railway.
Procedures of investigation were bypassed by the General Manager who disbanded the Railways Fraud
Squad and dismissed the Superintendent of Railway Police when each had sought to investigate the
matter."
79 National Assembly (Daily Parliamentary Debates, 17/3/1976, co1.3275 and co1.3279).
80 National Assembly (Daily Parliamentary Debates, 17/3/1976, co1.3229-30 and co1.3286). Malawo
(ibid., co1.3246-7) noted the cases of a manager who had just received training in rubber technology
being appointed to National Milling and where a manager who had received training for the motor
industry had been appointed to Steel and Building Supplies Ltd.
81 Chitupi and Ndhlovu complained that tendering procedures allowed heads of parastatals to enter into
contracts with companies of which they were directors (National Assembly, Daily Parliamentary
Debates, 17/3/1976, co1.3233 and co1.3257).
82 State Enterprise were not the only, or even predominant arena of corruption within the public sector.
Other cases in which high ranking government and civil service officials were implicated are discussed
by Woldring (1984).
83 It was reported that the incidence of theft had become so widespread that many customers were
establishing their own fleets of road transport to avoid using the railways (Republic of Zambia, 1978,
p.54).
464 The Commission concluded that the Superintendent had been dismissed "because of his
determination to investigate all crimes, his insistence that those found guilty should be punished, and, in
particular, because of his part in the investigation of the cattle theft allegation in which the General
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In 1978 the National Assembly established a Committee on Parastatal Bodies to investigate the
performance of state enterprises and determine whether they were being operated "in accordance with
sound business principle and prudent commercial practice."85 It's first report cited widespread
shortcomings in the operation of basic accounting functions, such as the maintenance of debtors'
accounts, alongside cases of the maladministration of property disposals and the personal use of
company assets by employees. 86 Other issues were also raised regarding the commercial viability of
certain enterprises. Particular attention was paid to the affairs of the National Transport Corporation
which was close to insolvency and had not recorded a profit since it was established in 1972. In a
number of its subsidiaries, such as Contract Haulage, United Bus Company of Zambia and Freight
Holdings, attention was again drawn to inadequate financial and managerial controls which undermined
both the commercial viability of the companies and the security of their assets.
The ability of the Parastatal Bodies Committee to undertake investigations was strengthened by
the Public Audit Act, 1980, which gave the Auditor-General access to the accounts of all parastatal
bodies, and required an annual report on these to be submitted to the Assembly. Alongside the
Committee, the Reports of the Auditor-General also highlighted weaknesses in the management of state
enterprises. 87 Despite this increased level of public scrutiny, state enterprises were frequently slow in
taking remedial action to address areas of concern. By . 1984, for example, 135 recommendations of the
Parastatal Bodies Committee had not been acted upon by the enterprises concerned, including 6 dating
from 1980. 88 The continued delays prompted the Auditor-General in 1988 to warn that,
Manager was a suspect" (Republic of Zambia, 1978, p.60). To further avoid the scrutiny of outside
bodies, in early 1977 the Zambian Railways General Manager had ordered that "Railway employees
found stealing should not be handed over to State Police without Management's decision and those
acting against this directive will be dealt with accordingly"(ibid., p.38).
85 National Assembly (Report of the Committee on Parastatal Bodies, 1978, p.1). This area had fallen
within the remit of the Public Accounts Committee, but the burden of work that it constituted prompted
the establishment of a Parastatal Bodies Committee of the National Assembly in 1978 (Himonga, 1984,
p.218-224).
86 National Assembly (Report of the Committee on Parastatal Bodies, 1978). The non-collection of
debts, while a matter of poor accounting, can also be a method through which the property of the
enterprise can be privately appropriated.
87 A number of the findings of the Auditor General's reports are considered in the discussion of the
performance of the INDECO Group in Section 3.4.2 of this chapter.
88 The companies with actions outstanding from 1980 were Zambia National Commercial Bank, Kapiri
Glass Products, Zambia Clay Industries, Zambia Railways and Kafue Textiles. While the point
concerning Zambia Clay was subject to the outcome of a court hearing, all the other outstanding items
related to the recovery of outstanding debts (Republic of Zambia, Report of the Auditor-General on the
Accounts of Parastatal Bodies, 1984, p.48).
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if timely action is not taken by the respective Chief Executives, the recommendations will
multiply to the extent that they will be rendered futile... and this may, in due course,
undermine the concept of public accountability in the parastatal sector.89
Despite these criticisms, the Party and the Government remained committed to State Enterprise
as an instrument of development. 90 President Kaunda (Republic of Zambia, 1984, p.2), while
emphasising the importance of a renewed commitment to establishing commercial viability and
financial independence, credited State Enterprise with having built,
an industrial base which is strong and diversified and which is today one of the largest in sub-
Saharan Africa... [which] would not have been possible without the Party's decision to give
direction to the economy through State Participation.
While the 1977 Special Parliamentary Select Committee recommended that greater encouragement be
offered to private enterprise, it did not advise any diminution of the role of the state sector. 91 Among
critics who did advocate the sale of enterprises to the private sector, this was commonly addressed only
to cases where performance under state ownership had been poor. 92 Announcing his candidacy for the
Presidency of the Republic in 1978, Kapwepwe stated that enterprises in which state investment was not
justified should be transferred to the private sector, but nevertheless, restated a commitment to the role
of state enterprise in "opening up industries of a strategic nature where private investors might not
venture to open due to initial high costs of production in relation to profit." 93 These proposals,
therefore, followed a defensive approach to privatisation, aimed not the comprehensive dismantling of
the state sector, but rather the disposal of weak or peripheral enterprises, to strengthen the sector as a
whole.
3.2.3 Control and Supervision.
During the 1970's, the Government's strategy to improve the performance of State Enterprises
consisted primarily of initiatives to strengthen their structures of control and accountability. This was
89 Republic of Zambia (Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies, 1988,
p.39).
90 UNIP (1985, p.22-4).
91 The National Assembly (1977, p.8) advocated a more technocratic management structure,
recommending "flexible pricing policies and stable management terms" to enable State Enterprises to
operate profitably. Southall (1980, p.105-'7) and Gertzel (1984, p.88) note that many of the proposals of
the committee were in line with the direction of Government policy, the main exception to this being the
recommendations to scale down the political machinery.
92 Speaking in the National Assembly (Daily Parliamentary Report, 1/12/1977, col. 179), Milner
suggested that former shareholders and managers should be invited back to enterprises where the state
management had performed poorly.
93 Times of Zambia (2/8/1978).
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evident from the time of the establishment of the state enterprise sector. Initially a centralised structure
was planned for ZIMCO, with the holding company as the focal point of authority under the supervision
of a new Ministry of State Participation. 94 This structure was discarded in January 1971 and in its place
a decentralised system established in which individual sub-holding companies of ZIMCO were placed
under the supervision of Government Ministries.95
To this parallel structure of ZIMCO control and Ministerial control of the sub-holding
companies, was added the parallel authority within the one party state of UNIP's Central Committee, on
one hand and the Cabinet and Government Minister, on the other. The Board of Directors of ZIMCO,
combining representatives from the Central Committee, Cabinet and Ministries, appeared to Mutukwa
(1976, p.44) as representing the "economic cabinet of Zambia." However, this overstates both the
authority and capacity of the ZIMCO Holding Company in the 1970s. 96 The holding company itself did
not have any administrative capability to oversee the development of the Group and consisted of only
three units: ZIMCO Information and Publicity Unit, to publicise the Corporations activities; ZIMCO
Accounting Manpower Unit, to assist group companies with accounting; and ZIMCO Appeals
Committee, to centralise the charitable donations of the Group. As ZIMCO (1985, p.8) itself stated, its
existence in that period was that of "only a paper holding company... [with] no executive management to
monitor, control and develop the group."97
Neither did the ZIMCO Board of Directors provide the forum through which disagreements
over the development of the state enterprise were resolved. In the early 1970s a dispute arose over a
94 The Ministry of State Participation was established in August 1969 and ZIMCO in March 1970.
Despite a wide representation at the level of the board, executive control was concentrated with two
people, President Kaunda and Andrew Sardanis. The Ministry of State Participation (whose Minister
was Kaunda and Permanent Secretary was Sardanis), supervised ZIMCO (which was Chaired by
Kaunda and had Sardanis as Managing Director) whose subsidiaries (INDECO and MINDECO) were
both chaired by Sardanis (Chaput, 1971, p.162)
95 MINDECO was supervised by the Ministry of Mines and Mining development; FINDECO by the
Ministry of Finance; INDECO by the Ministry of Trade; and the newly demerged divisions of INDECO
National Transport Corporation and National Hotel Corporation were placed under the Ministry of
Power, Transport and Works and the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism respectively.
96 The accounts of disputes over proposals for an iron and steelworks and over the renegotiation of the
mining agreements in the early 1970's make no mention of the Board of Directors of ZIMCO, but rather
focus on the personal authority of the main protagonists and the mediation of them by the President
(Africa  Contemporary Record, 1974-5, part B, p.328-9; and Burdette, 1984a, p.53-7).
91 Chaput (1971, p.190) suggested that "ZIMCO would probably have been dissolved had it not been for
the fact that when the mines were taken over, the government bond issue was legally administered by
ZIMCO." The President relinquished the post of Chair of ZIMCO to the Prime Minister in 1976, with
the Chair of the Finance and Economics sub-committee of the Central Committee remaining as the
Vice-Chair.
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proposal to established a steel works, which while supported by the Chair of the Finance and Economics
sub-committee of the Central Committee of UNIP, Humphrey Mulemba, was opposed by the Minister for
Industry and Mines, Andrew Kashita. Although both were Directors of ZIMCO, the dispute was pursued
through the channels of the Central Committee and the Cabinet.98
The divisional structure of ZIMCO and the subsidiary structures of those divisions, were subject
to continuing reorganisation through the 1970s. From the five existing divisions within ZIMCO in 1972,
the number increased to eleven by the mid-1970's. 99
 Following the 1973 decision to reorganise the
mining companies, NCCM and RCM became separate divisions within the group alongside the
diminished MINDECO and a new copper marketing company MEMACO. This was followed in 1975 by
the creation of two new divisions as INDECO's trading division was demerged to become National
Import and Export Corporation and INDECO's Chemicals division was combined with the Zambia
Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) to form the Zambian National Energy Corporation. In the mid-
1970s the Medical and Pharmaceutical Corporation and Zambian Fisheries and Fish Marketing
Corporation where also established as divisional holding companies, though both were quickly
dismantled. Throughout these changes in corporate structure, the only significant addition to the
ZIMCO Group was that of ZESC0.100
While these changes had tended to fragment authority within the state enterprise sector, a
renewed centralisation began to take root in the second half of the 1970s. In 1975 the Mwanakatwe
Commission reported on the relative pay and conditions in the public services and state enterprise sector
and found those in the latter markedly more generous. 101
 Its recommendation for the establishment of a
Parastatal Bodies Service Commission to supervise the appointment and conditions of services in
parastatal enterprise was accepted by the Government. The Commission was established in 1976, with
the power to approve, amend or reject the terms and conditions of employment in parastatal bodies, and
98 Subsequently the project went ahead, but under the control of UNIP rather than through ZIMCO, and
Kashita was dismissed from office. Similar conflicts involving these personalities were recorded over
mines policy (Burdette, 1977 and 1984a).
99 ZIIVICO's five sub-holding companies at the beginning of the 1970's were: INDECO, FINDECO,
miNDECO, the National Transport Corporation and National Hotel Corporation
100 Some consideration was given to the inclusion of other parastatals within the ZIMCO Group,
including the Development Bank, Zambia Airways, Zambia National Tourist board, General Post Office
and Zambian Television (ZIMCO, Annual Report 1972, p.4).
101 Republic of Zambia (1975).
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to prescribe procedures for appointing, transferring, disciplining and dismissing staff 102 in doing this,
the Commission was charged with ensuring "substantial parity in terms and conditions of service"
between those employed in the civil service and the state enterprise sector.103
A further step to centralise authority within the state enterprise sector was taken in January
1979 as Ministry based supervision was replaced by a reinvented ZIMCO holding company with
executive authority. 104 The capacity to co-ordinate long term Group policy was enhanced with the
creation of corporate planning and project funding capabilities to direct the long term development of
the Group. 105 The ability of ZIMCO to monitor the operational performance of Group companies was
also strengthened. Group Executive Directors were appointed, supported by teams of specialist
managers, and took over the Chairs of the subsidiary companies. Alongside this, a Group Financial
Directorate was also established to provide budget guidelines to subsidiaries and monitor their
implementation. The results of this monitoring were presented to the quarterly meetings of the Board of
ZIMCO, which was itself strengthened by inclusion of outside representatives who were not responsible
for the performance of any Group companies and could therefore provide independent scrutiny of their
performance.106
102 The Parastatal Bodies Service Commission Act of 1976 established the Commission which
consisted of a Chair and between three and six other members, appointed by the President. Members of
UNIP's Central Committee, the National Assembly, trades unions or employers organisations, and
employees of parastatal bodies, were excluded from membership of the commission (ibid., II, 3). The
Commission was permitted to delegate any, or all, of these functions to any employee of a parastatal
body, and to exempt any parastatal bodies, or categories of employees, from the provision of the Act
(ibid, p. III, 9).
103 The legislation, however, attracted criticism that the powers of the Commission were insufficient to
curtail mismanagement within enterprise and that it should have the power to investigate allegations of
malpractice in appointments, or itself appoint, discipline or dismiss staff (National Assembly, Daily
Parliamentary Debates, 17/3/1976, co1.3225-6 and co1.3276). The Commission is also discussed by
Simwinga (1977, p.203-6), Johns (1980, p.117-9) and Mulwila (1980, p.305-43). With the
reorganisation, the tasks previously performed by the Parastatal Services Commission were transferred
to ZIMCO and the Commission disbanded.
104 Gertzel (1984, p.85 and note 37) states that criticisms by the Parliamentary Committee on
Parastatals also prompted the reform of ZIMCO. The Mwanakatwe Commission reviewed the structure
of control and accountability in the State Enterprise sector and argued that "Zambia has not yet taken
positive action to control and co-ordinate parastatal affairs" and recommended that the ZIMCO holding
company should be strengthened in its "administrative capacity for supervision and control" (Republic of
Zambia, 1975, p.134 and p.137).
105 ZIMCO (1990, p.10). In 1984 the Government reported that the World Bank were assisting ZIMCO
in strengthening its project evaluation capacity (Republic of Zambia, 1984a, Vold p.14-5).
106Mwanza (1978, p.57-8) and Turok (1989, p.74-5). Among those included on the new board were the
Minister of Finance, the Governor of the Bank of Zambia, the President's economic advisor and three
private businessmen. This was followed by the appointment to the board of five trade unionists
(E/U,q2/1983, p.7). The Chair of ZIMCO remained with the office of the Prime Minister until 1983,
when President Kaunda returned to the Chair of a further expanded Board of Directors. This was part of
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The sub-holding company structure was streamlined with only INDECO and the National
Import Export Corporation remaining intact, while MINDECO, National Hotels Corporation and
National Transport Corporation were dissolved and the State Finance and Development Corporation and
Zambia National Energy Corporation transformed into operating companies. 1 °7 In addition the ZIMCO
group was extended as the Post and Telecommunications Corporation, Rural Development Corporation,
Zambia Airways Corporation and Zambia Railways were brought within it.108
Following the centralisation of the state enterprise sector 1979, the structures of control and
supervision remained relatively unchanged for the remainder of the period of its existence. This did not
represent any diminution in the commitment of the Government to improve the performance of the
sector. From the beginning of the 1980, the focus of attention, however, changed from the aggregate
structures of the sector, to the financial and management structures of the operating companies. The
measures employed by ZCCM and INDECO to improve their performance are discussed in Sections 3.1
and 4.2, respectively, in the context of the evolution of those companies.
SECTION 3.3. STATE MINING ENTERPRISES. 
Although the takeover agreements created two state mining enterprises, NCCM and RCM,
these were merged in 1982 to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines. The discussion that follows
draws on the combined experience of NCCM and RCM between 1970 and 1981, and on the experience
of ZCCM from 1982.
Libby and Woakes (1980) have argued that following the nationalisation of the mining industry
the developmental objectives of expanding production, establishing new mines and processing plant,
were sacrificed to the pursuit of profit. 109 This assessment, however, appears to confuse the end of
generating revenue with the establishment of means for doing so. From independence the Zambian
another reshuffling of economic responsibilities within the Government which also included the Prime
Minister taking over the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and being appointed Vice Chair of
the National Commission for Development Planning (Kaunda, 1983).
107 ZIMCO (1979). In 1984, the RDC sub-holding company was disbanded, although its subsidiaries
remained within ZIMCO (E/U,q4/1984, p.7 and q1/1985, p.9).
108Major State Enterprises remaining outside ZIMCO, noted by Munkonge (1981, p.142), included the
National Agriculture and Marketing Board, the Dairy Produce Board, the National Education Company,
the National Housing Authority and the Development Bank of Zambia.
109 A similar argument is made by Lanning and Mueller (1979, p.227) who note the tendency for "the
Government to identify more and more closely with the goals of the existing mine management."
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Government's primary aim in the mining sector had been to maximise the revenue available from copper
production in order to fund its development programme and this remained the case through the 1970s
and 1980s.11°
Section 3.3.1 examines the problems faced by the industry during the 1970s in generating funds
to provide for investment in other sectors, while the attempt to rehabilitate the industry during the 1980s
is discussed in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1. Performance and Problems. 
While the principal problem afflicting the mining industry was the decline in copper prices, the
mines also faced additional problems which diminished their level of production (Table XIV) and
increased both the overhead and operating expenses which they incurred. 111 A distinction can be drawn
between those problems that were common to all sectors of the Zambian economy and those which had
their origins within the mining industry itself.
In common with the rest of the Zambian economy, the mines suffered from a number of
difficulties. As a bulk exporter, the transportation difficulties which afflicted Zambia were particularly
severe. 112 The situation had deteriorated to such a degree that by the second half of the 1970's the
transport system was not able to carry all of the copper produced, leaving the mines accumulating stocks
of finished meta1. 113 The mines also suffered from the declining capacity of the economy to fund
imports. Although the companies themselves were net foreign exchange earners, their supply of
currency was rationed by the Government along with other sectors and fell short of their
requirements.114
110As Enterprise (1970, no.1, p.5), the house magazine of INDECO noted in 1970, "Mining must be
seen not as end in itself, but as a source of capital for investment in the creation of a permanent and self
generating industrial and agricultural economy"
111 According to ILO/UNDP (1978, p.39) the problem faced was not one of falling copper prices, which
in 1977 were in line with trend growth from 1953, but one of a sharp escalation of costs in the mining
industry. The World Bank (1977, p.34-5) was less concerned with the cost profile of the industry, noting
that "this situation presents little cause to fear that mining in Zambia, while relatively high cost, will
become either uncompetitive or (given current IBRD forecasts) unprofitable."
112 The disruption to transport routes involved in the border closure with Rhodesia (1973-8) and the
closure of the Angolan rail route after 1975, were eased only marginally by the opening of the TAZARA
Railway in 1975
113 Burdette (1984a, p.30-2 and p.37-8).
114 Although in FY 1981 and FY 1982 the mines generated around twice the level of foreign exchange
that they themselves required, they were only allocated around half the level of foreign exchange which
they required (Republic of Zambia, Economic Report, 1982, p.372). ZCCM (Annual Report, 1982 and
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Table XIV.
Decline in Refined Copper Production For ZCCM and its Predecessor Companies.
FY 1971 to FY 1990.
Period. Average change in annual
copper output.
1971-74 -1.98%
1975-78 -1.48%
1979-82 -1.87%
1983-86 -5.89%
1987-90 -0.55%
Source: Calculated from Radetski (1985) for FY 1971 to 1982, and
ZCCM (Annual Reports) for FY 1983 to 1990.
In addition, the industry experienced internal difficulties. The discovery of geological
problems and declining ore grades proved an obstacle to maintaining levels of production and also
increased unit costs. 115 A major accident at the Mufilira mine in 1970 also had a prolonged effect upon
the industry, as the mine was not being fully rehabilitated until 1977, and then at a permanently reduced
capacity.116
Additional costs were also incurred by the industry in pursuit of non-commercial objectives
undertaken in line with the policies of the Government. Attention has focused in particular upon the
rising levels of employment by the mining companies which it has been suggested were in response to
pressure from the Government. 117 Employment in the industry did increase after nationalisation,
1983) complained that foreign exchange allocations had become "meagre, unreliable and irregular," the
purchases of spares and inputs had reached "a virtual standstill," and the industry had "reached the stage
where stocks of many fast moving stores items are exhausted while some strategic supplies and
consumables are at critically low levels." It was noted by the Government that inadequate allocations of
currency to ZCCM undermined its ability to produce copper and reinforced the general shortage of
foreign exchange for the whole economy (Republic of Zambia, 1984a, Volume 1, p.21).
115 World Bank (1977a, p.21-3), Daniel (1979, p.88), ILO (1981, p.183-4), Burdette (1984a, p.36-'7)
and Radetzki (1985, p.116-7).
116 Radetslci (1985, p.116).
117 Auty (1991, p.178) and O'Faircheallaigh (1984, p.130-3). ILO (1981, p.198) argued that the
primary contribution of the industry should not be as a provider of employment.
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standing in 1974 at 16.38 percent above its 1969 level, but this was due to a combination of factors.118
Some of the problems previously identified reduced the productivity of labour. One result of the
geological difficulties was the sinking of deeper shafts, resulting in longer travelling times between the
surface and the workface, while the difficulties of importing adequate spare parts resulted in increased
breakdowns in machinery which reduced the effectiveness of workers. 119 These resulted in greater
quantities of labour being required to produce a constant level of output.
The size of the workforce had also increased due to the method through which Zambianisation
was implemented. Instead of replacing expatriate staff on a one-for-one basis, the positions which they
held were frequently fragmented to create a number of new posts. 120 When, for example, in 1975 the
first Zambians were appointed to the rank of Manager in the divisions of NCCM, this involved the
creation of an additional post of Manager-Administration, to which the Zambians were appointed, rather
than the Zambianisation of the existing positions which continued both to exist and to be staffed by
expatriates.121
The aggregate effect of these factors, as shown in Table XV, was an unsteady upward trend in
real costs in the first half of the 1970s, with costs peaking in FY 1975 at 9.41 percent above their FY
1971 level. However, the level of costs was more successfully controlled in the latter half of the decade,
falling below their FY 1971 level in FY 1977 and remaining below that level subsequently. Little
analysis is available on the relative impact of each source of cost pressures on the aggregate pattern of
costs. A World Bank (1977a) analysis of the development of the costs of copper production between FY
1971 and FY 1976, however, estimated that two-thirds of the increase in real costs was attributable to
the decline in recovery rates of finished copper to ore mined, with the remaining third divided between
the rising costs of inventories and declines in the productivity of labour not related to falling productivity
of other factors.122
118 Calculated from Daniel (1979, p.8'7, table 4.5)
119 World Bank (1977a, p.24-5).
120 Daniel (1979, p.99-120) studied the period from 1960 to 1976, and argued that the principal factor
behind the expansion of the mines' workforce was the method of Zambianisation that was pursued.
121 Daniel (1979, p.119).
122 The World Bank (1977a) estimated that real unit free-of-rail costs grew at 2.7 percent per annum
over the period between FY 1971 and FY 1976, a higher estimate than the 0.91 percent per annum that
is represented by the figures presented in Table 10 for the same period. The World Bank emphasised the
difficulty in attributing cost increases to various factors. For example while the declining productivity of
labour was contributed to directly by shortages of appropriately qualified staff and a rising level of
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Table XV.
Real Direct Production Cost of Producing Refined Copper in Zambia.
FY 1971 to FY 1982.
Year. Cost in Constant
Kwacha per lb.
1971 16.11
1972 16.76
1973 15.33
1974 16.48
1975 17.62
1976 16.66
1977 15.78
1978 14.33
1979 12.83
1980 13.47
1981 13.79
1982 14.60
Source: Figures for costs in United State Dollars are from Radetslci
(1985, p.122). They have been translated into Kwacha at rates recorded
in 1NDECO Annual Reports and deflated by the Zambian non-copper
wholesale prices index (Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of
Statistics).
Notes: Direct Production Costs are defined as the cost of producing
refilled copper free-of-rail. While expenses incurred in mines'
administration are included, costs relating to marketing, general
administration, distribution and finance are excluded.
Since copper is internationally traded, the behaviour of Zambian costs of production relative to
those of other world producers is a key determinant of the industry's competitiveness. An important
factor in this is the role of other minerals recovered as by-products of copper production in reducing the
employment in administrative roles, it was also a secondary effect of breakdown and other production
problems.
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overall costs of mining operations in each country. The income from these by-products has had a
significant effect upon the relative competitiveness of copper production in different countries. 123 For a
producer such as Zambia, which has had a relatively small income from by-products, the costs of copper
production are inflated in relation to other producers, leaving the industry more exposed to downturns in
the price of copper.
Table XVI.
The Costs of Zambian Copper Production as Compared to that of Other Major Producers in Selected
Years.
Type of Cost. Unit Cost of Zambian Copper Production as a Proportion of the
Average for Major Producers for Selected Years.
Year. 1975 1980 1984
% %
Direct Costs.(b) 91 83 71
Gross Costs.(c) 89 86 80
Net Costs after by-product income.(d) 126 169 118
Source: Calculated from Takeuchi et al. (1987, p.58-61) and Mikesell (1988, p.6'7-'70).
Notes: (a)Average Costs represents the average incurred by Zambia, Zaire, South Africa, Namibia,
Australia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Indonesia, Canada, United States, Mexico, Chile, Peru and
Sweden. Together these countries represent 80 percent of copper production in market economies for the
period.
(b) Direct Costs include cash costs incurred in the mining, processing, marketing and carriage.
(c) Gross Costs include direct cost, plus company overheads, research and exploration expenditures, non-
profit taxes, and interest payments.
(d) Net Costs are Gross costs calculated after crediting income from sales of by-products.
The data presented in Table XVI shows that in 1975 Zambia's direct and gross costs of
production were significantly below those of other major producers, and were reduced to even lower
levels by 1980 and 1984. The by-products produced by the Zambian industry were, however, relatively
123 The major by-products of copper are gold, silver, lead, zinc, nickel, cobalt and molybdenum.
Zambia's primary by-product of copper production is cobalt
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less valuable than those of other producers. These placed Zambia's net costs of producing copper
substantially above the average level of net costs.124
While it has been argued that the overall costs of Zambian copper production were relatively
contained, the methods through which this was achieved have been subject to criticism. It has been
argued, that rather than developing a long term strategy to produce lower cost copper, the burden of cost
cutting fell upon longer term maintenance and development expenditures, contributing to further
declines in productivity and storing up costs for later years. 125 Particular attention, however, has
focused upon the reluctance of the Zambian copper producers to close high cost production facilities. It
is argued that this not only prevented the mining companies from achieving more substantial reductions
in unit costs, but also that by refraining from reducing the level of supply of copper to the world market,
it contributed to perpetuation of the depression in copper prices.126
The ability of the Zambian copper industry to undertake closures was constrained by both
commercial and non-commercial factors. The wetness of the Zambian mines meant that temporary
closures would still leave the companies exposed to high maintenance costs and that considerable new
investment would be required for the facilities to be reopened. 127 In addition, the integration of
production and processing in the Zambian industry, and the absence of a substitute supplier of ores or
concentrates, meant that any decreases in the mined output would lead to decreases in the utilisation of
processing plant and a fall in market share.128
124 Of the Countries covered by the data, Zambia was joint highest net cost producer in 1975. Along
with the United States, Zambia was the highest cost producer in 1980 and was second to the US in 1984.
The United States is also noted as an industry that has low by-product credits.
125 Burdette (1984a, p.42) and Radetzki (1985, p.123). ILO (1981, p.183) states that the Zambian
producers resorted to high-grading as the price of copper fell, which could only defer the higher costs
incurred in recovering lower grade ores.
126 The case that state owned mineral enterprises systematically over-supply the market is discussed by
Viterbo and Wallard (1984). See also Mining Journal (11/11/1983 and 17/2/1984).
127 The experience of the Zambian industry is compared to that of the U.S. based producer, Phelps
Dodge, whose more flexible production structure allowed it to gain from mine closure (Viterbo and
Wallard, 1984). The issue of closures was addressed by ZCCM, which stated that there was "no
significant benefit to the company in the short-term from closure of mines. In the long-term, however,
some savings would be realised but at the risk of some mines not being re-opened." (ZCCM, Annual
Report, 1984, p.4).
128 In 1978, while outlining the cost cutting measures which were being undertaken, NCCM explained
that the interdependency of processing operations restricted its ability to move forward by closures,
noting that "the closure of a major production section would not only result in the loss of substantial
tonnages of revenue-earning copper, but would also severely affect metallurgical blending and
efficiencies" (NCCM, Annual Report, 1978, p.10-1).
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As Zambia's main exporter, any decision by the copper companies to reduce capacity had
impliCations for the economy as a whole. Any closures that would diminish the net level of foreign
exchange earned by the industry would impact on the other sectors. 129 A further factor was the
Government concern with maintaining levels of employment in the economy, which prompted it in the
late 1970's to veto any closures that would result in large scale redundancies. 130 How different the
constraints on the mining companies would have been if the mines had remained under private
ownership is open to speculation. In the judgement of Radetzld (1985, p.130) any private owner would
have found themselves equally subject to pressures from the Government to maintain production levels
and employment.131
3.3.2. Rehabilitation. 
Renewed declines in the price of copper at the beginning of the 1980s, increased the pressure
on the Zambia copper companies once again. In response to this the Government undertook a number of
initiatives designed to rehabilitate the industry and return it to being an engine of growth for the
economy as a whole.132
The imperative of reducing industry costs was the motive behind the 1982 merger of NCCM
and RCM, to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). 133 The merger allowed the sharing of
existing facilities and the rationalisation of activities such as management, procurement, research and
129ZCCM drew attention to this factor in 1983, noting that closures would diminish the level of foreign
exchange earned and "with virtually no substitute source of foreign exchange from other sectors of the
Zambian economy at present... the Company could not, literally, afford to shut down a section of the
Zambian economy"(ZCCM, Annual Report, 1983, p.4).
130 Economist (2/9/1978) reported that the Government had ruled out the closure of any mines, and the
Finance Minister, Mwanakatwe stated that to lay off 2,000 mine workers would affect their 11,000
dependants. See also Radetzki (1985, p.114).
131 Radetzld (1985, p.130) suggests that this could have been effected by labour legislation to prevent
redundancies, or selective subsidies to keep units in production.
132As the Government stated "without a rehabilitated mining industry, GRZ's restructuring or
diversification effort would fail for lack of financial resources"(Republic of Zambia 1984a, Vol.!, p.18).
It also declared that "The mandate of ZCCM, under those conditions, is to optimise net foreign
exchange earnings, and net contributions to the Government's budget"(ibid., p.24).
133 The Government's intention that the companies should merge was announced in May 1981 and was
completed on 25th March 1982, effective from 1 April 1981 (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1982). The
Zambian Government held 60.3% of the equity of the new company, with the balance being held by ZCI
with 27.3%; Amax with 6.9% and other shareholders with 5.5% (E/U,q2/1982, p.17-8 and q3/1982,
p.12). The only material change to this was the 1984 sale of its interest by Amax to ITM International, a
company headed by Andrew Sardanis (E/U,q4/1984, p.13).
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stockholding, in order to reduce the cost base and working capital requirements of the industry.134
However, such cost cutting measures could only provide a temporary solution to an industry which
needed to invest in new equipment and develop new sources of ore, if costs were to be reduced in the
longer term.135
In 1984 agreement was reached with the World Bank, the European Community and the
African Development Bank for a $300 million rehabilitation programme. 136 A key element of this
rehabilitation was the formulation of a Five Year Production and Investment Plan (PIP) aimed at
"improving productivity and efficiency." 137 The PIP was based on studies that had been undertaken in
previous years which had concluded that the Group's viability was dependent upon the rationalisations
of operations. 138 The agreement was also based upon the acceptance by the Government that the
rehabilitation would involve the reduction of the workforce, the closure of some productive units, and
arrangements for foreign exchange, taxation and dividends acceptable to the World Bank.139
The PIP entailed widespread changes in ZCCM. Management was restructured with the Head
Office in Lusaka refocused on corporate policy, strategic planning and financial control, while
delegating day-to-day duties to the Operations Centre on the Copperbelt. 14° The Divisional structure of
the company was also streamlined with the units previously under Konkola and Kalulushi Divisions
134 The Government reported in 1984 that the cost cutting measures undertaken in 1982/3 been
"achieved basically by reducing the local labour force from 56,223 to 55,644 and the expatriate
employees from 2,572 to 2,032" (Republic of Zambia, 1984a, Vol.! p.24).
13 Mining Journal (14/10/1983)
136 This consisted of funds from the three institutions totalling $148million with the balance of $152
million financed by ZCCM itself. Since the principal risk to the programme was ZCCM's ability to meet
this commitment, the Government sought $44.5 million additional funding from the Consultative Group
towards 12 priority projects (Republic of Zambia, 1984a, Vol.1, p.25, and Vol.2, p.9-11). By the end of
the financial year 1987/8, the rehabilitation work funded by the "Export, Rehabilitation and
Diversification Project" had been mainly completed (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1988).
137 ZCCM (1986, p.5-7 and 9), Mining Journal (7/2/1986) and EIU (q2/1986, p.24-5). The PIP had
World Bank approval in December 1985 and was launched at the beginning of 1986. ZCCM (Annual
Report, 1985) stated to shareholders that "the viability of your Company and the competitiveness of its
products on the world markets will, in future, depend, more than ever before, upon the measures to
improve productivity and efficiencies which should result in reduced operating costs."
138 Ten studies were carried out by ZCCM, while studies of mining development, metallurgical
processing and corporate planning were undertaken by Fuor, Bechtal and SRI respectively, all of the
United States (E/Uq3/1985, p.17).
139 Gulhati (1989, p.42-3).
140 Management was also reorganised at the divisional level. Not all of the measures implemented were
successful, however. The mergers of the Directorate of Corporate Planning and the Directorate of
Finance were reversed the following year (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1987, and ZCCM, Annual Report,
1988).
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merged into Nchanga and Nkana Divisions. 141 The plan also addressed the issue of the closure of high
cost production units, with three mining facilities 142 and four processing facilities 143 being shut-down.
In 1987 ZCCM reported that the PIP had progressed successfully although cost containment
had been hampered by inflationary pressures and the devaluations which accompanied the exchange
auction. 144 A second Five Year Production and Investment Plan was launched in 1988, continuing the
themes of the first, of controlling costs and enhancing productivity.145
Critics argued that the rehabilitation had been less than successful. The aim of the PIP to
stabilise production at a level of 540,000 tonnes per annum was not achieved as production between FY
1986 and FY 1989 averaged only 455,766 tonnes per annum. 146 Gulhati (1989, p.43) argued that the
PIP was undermined by the Government's inability to provide ZCCM with sufficient foreign exchange
and by increasing the taxation of the company through a mineral export tax.
ZCCM also had difficulties in achieving reductions in the level of the workforce. While the
agreement reached with the MUZ in 1986 to lay-off 3,000 employees was in line with the PIP, the
overall level of employment by ZCCM rose in the second half of the 1980s and was greater in FY 1989
and FY 1990 than it had been in FY 1985 and FY 1986. 147 Despite this, the overall contribution of
labour to the costs of copper production declined over the period. While wages and salaries constituted
33.90 percent of the total costs of labour and bought in goods incurred by the company in FY 1985, their
share declined each year to reach 13.69 percent by FY 1989. 148 A likely explanation of this is the rising
relative costs of imported inputs to local labour in a period of devaluation. This suggest, however, that
141 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1985, p.5) noted that from April 1985, Kalulushi Division has been
dissolved with Chambishi mine entering Nchanga Division and the Chibuluma mine and Chambishi
Cobalt concentrator placed in Nkana Division. In addition, the Copperbelt Power Company was formed
into Power Division.
142 Kansanshi Mine, Chambishi mine and No. 3 Shaft at Konkola were put on a care and maintenance
basis (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1988).
143 Chambishi Concentrator, Luanshya Smelter, Ndola Copper Refinery Tanlchouse and Nkana Oxide
Concentrator were closed (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1987).
144 zCCM (Annual Report, 1987, p.5-9).
145 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1989, p.4) This was despite the fact that the first five year PIP had been
launched in early 1986.
146 In 1985, 525,354 tonnes were produced, the highest annual production between 1986 and 1989 was
473,084 tonnes achieved in 1988.
147 The agreement committed the company to compensate those made redundant and assist them in
finding alternative employment (E/U,q4/1986, p.16). The MUZ suggested that the World Bank was
seeking a total of 11,000 redundancies from the company (E/U,q3/1986, p.23).
148 Calculated from Statement of Value Added (ZCCM, Annual Reports, 1985-1989).
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the PIP objective of reducing production costs could have been more effectively pursued by promoting
the local sourcing of inputs.149
A second area of criticism was directed at the extension, by ZCCM, of its non-mining
subsidiaries. In the management restructuring of the mid-1980s, the overseas subsidiaries were placed
under the control of ZAL Holdings Limited and most of the Zambian subsidiaries placed under a new
holding company, Mulungushi Investments. 150 Aron (1992, p29) argued that following these changes
the non-mining activities of the company were widened considerably. While previously they had been
either within the copper industry or provided services to the mines, they increasingly undertook
unrelated business. 151 This, in Aron's view, not only diverted the financial and managerial resources of
ZCCM from its core business, but also conflicted with the activities of other ZIMCO companies.152
Despite the initiatives that were undertaken to revitalise the state mining enterprise during the
1980s, the role of the sector as the source for the funding of a diversified industrial sector was not re-
established. Indeed as discussed in Chapter 5, by the end of the 1980s, the mining industry was unable
to generate sufficient internal funds to provide the new investment it required to secure it own future.
SECTION 3.4. INDECO. 
Over the period of the economic reforms INDECO had undergone great changes, expanding its
value from K36 million in FY 1967 to K223 million in FY 1973, and its turnover from K2 million to,
K286 million over the same period. 153 INDECO appeared to be a profitable and diversified industrial
149 Mpande (1992, p.305) argues that ZCCM had a "staggering dependency... on foreign inputs even
when local alternatives can be found."
150 The reorganisation was intended to increase the autonomy of the companies and to enhance their
viability. However in establishing Mulungushi Investments on an autonomous footing, K352 million
of loans were restructured as interest free loans with no repayment schedule and convertible to equity in
the future, and K.23 million of current liabilities to ZCCM were converted to medium-term loans,
bearing interest but without a repayment schedule (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1987, p.15). The World
Bank opposed ZCCM's non-mining subsidiaries being put into a separate holding company and
advocated their sale (Callaghy and Wilson, 1988, p.211-4).
151 A number of the milling companies nationalised in 1986 had been placed under the control of
Mulungushi Investments. In addition, a number of farms and tourist lodges which had been nationalised
were placed under ZAL Holdings and the Company also, at the request of the President, took over the
management of a Zoo and Botanical Gardens and began the construction of a commuter railway in
Lusaka (Aron, 1992, p.29).
152 Shafer (1990, p.145) reported that ZIMCO did not approve of all of ZCCM's diversifications and
they were further criticised in the National Assembly (EIU,q111989, p.16).
15J Except where otherwise stated, the source of data on INDECO in this section is the various Annual
Reports of the Company issued during the period.
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group, with its operating companies organised into seven divisions covering brewing, chemicals, real
estate, trading, transport, rural development, and building material supplies. 154 It had, however,
become overstretched and efforts were made to refocus the group towards industrial and manufacturing
activities. 155 Its hotelling interests, and the bulk of its transport division were transferred out of the
group in FY 1972, followed in FY 1975 by the demerger of the entire trading division, the oil and
petroleum interests of the chemical division and its fishery interests.
As the ZIMCO holding company for industry, INDECO was responsible for import substitution
and economic diversification through the development of new projects and it aimed to manage its
operating subsidies and associated companies on a commercial profit making basis in order to provide
funds for this. Its presence across a range of industries also provided the government with opportunities
to pursue non-commercial objectives. For example, it was a major supplier of goods and services to the
domestic market and had leverage over the level of prices across the economy. The non-commercial
objectives did not always sit easily alongside the generation of profits for reinvestment. As INDECO
(Annual Report, 1971, p.3) complained;
there is a widespread belief in certain quarters that if Indeco makes a profit, it is exploiting
people. The same proponents of this theory happily turn around and accuse the organisation
of inefficiency if a member company makes a loss. Indeco will continue to operate its
companies on a normal commercial profit-making basis and it must be remembered that every
Ngwee earned is available or ploughed back for the further development of Zambia' 56•
Section 3.4.1 discusses the ongoing investment programme undertaken by INDECO throughout
the period under consideration, while Section 3.4.2 reviews some of the problems that INDECO
encountered and the remedial action that was taken.
154 The divisional structure of INDECO was subject to frequent reorganisation. In 1976 the role of the
divisional holding companies was downgraded.
155 Mwanza (1993, p.9). Shortly after the Mulungushi takeovers, the Chair of INDECO, Sardanis,
noted that INDECO "now needs a period in which to consolidate its explosive growth of the past three
years and in particular the last three months" (INDECO, Annual Report 1967, p.3).
156 The point was made in the report of the Chair, Andrew Kashita. In 1974 Kashita, again as Chair of
the company, defended INDECO against charges that it did not accord to humanist concept. His defence
was that INDECO was a "people's organisation," committed to fulfilling social needs but that "it
requires a profit(or Santa Claus) to go hell-for-leather in pursuit of these desirable objectives"(INDECO,
Annual Report, 1974, p.8-9). INDECO also recognised a role of investing in enterprises which, while
they "do not produce a profit in commercial or accounting terms they contribute to the country's
economy by saving foreign exchange and providing employment" (INDECO, Annual Report, 1972, p.7).
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3.4.1. Diversification Through INDECO. 
While enterprises were transferred out of INDECO, the group had expanded through the
acquisition of equity in existing enterprises, the undertaking of new direct investment and the organic
growth of its businesses.
In addition to the takeovers announced by President Kaunda between 1968 and 1970, INDECO
also acquired interests in a number of other private enterprises. INDECO entered the oil and petroleum
sector in FY 1970 with the acquisition of a 51% stake in Shell/BP Zambia and a 50% stake in Agip
Zambia, and in FY 1973 acquired a majority stake in Zambia Oxygen. In addition, INDECO also
extended its equity participation in enterprises in which it already held an existing interest. At Zambia
Sugar in FY 1971 and at Chilanga Cement and Kafironda in FY 1973, shareholdings at associated
companies were increased to make these subsidiaries of INDEC0157.
Once nationalised, INDECO sought to rationalise enterprises and integrate them with related
enterprises within the group. 158 In FY 1975, INDECO reported that mergers had been effected in
bakeries, milling, aggregates and building supplies. These reorganisations often went beyond changes to
the management structures to address operational issues. When the former competitors Refined Oil
Products merged with Lever Brothers to form ROP (1975), for example, production was reorganised
with the manufacture of edible fats and oils at one plant and detergent production at another.
INDECO's direct investments into new developments during the 1970's can be divided between
those which were pursued through the incorporation of new companies and those which where made
within existing subsidiaries. In establishing new enterprises, INDECO followed their pre-reform pattern
of focusing on investments that substituted for imports, had linkages to existing sectors and sought
major private enterprise as a partner.159
157 INDECO also increased its shareholdings at a number of its existing subsidiaries. The proportion of
shares held at a number of subsidiary companies was also increased, for example in Zambian Breweries,
Consolidated Tyre Services, Steel Supplies and ZCBC. In FY 1974, INDECO also bought out the
minority shareholders in its existing subsidiaries Timber Merchants, Glass Supplies and Lake Fisheries,
in line with the policy of disengagement from South Africa.
158As the Chair of INDECO, Kashita (Annual Report 1971, p.4) noted "a number of companies at the
time of acquisition by Indeco lacked adequate planning and management controls. It is extremely
satisfying to see that the introduction of adequate financial and budgetary controls and long term
planning initiated by Indeco have begun to have a marked effect on many of the companies in the
group."
159 The proportion of shares held by INDECO ranged between 51 percent at Metal Fabricators of
Zambia; 65 percent at Kapiri Glass; 70 percent at Livingstone Motor Assembly and 75 percent at Motor
Parts Distributors.
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INDECO entered a joint venture with ANIC of Italy in FY 1970 to establish the Indeni
Petroleum Refinery. This project was completed in FY 1973 and had linkages to existing state
investments in the oil sector such as TAZAMA pipeline. Metal Fabricators of Zambia (ZAMEFA) was
also established to produce copper wire in a joint venture between INDECO and a consortium including
Phelps Dodge and Continental Ore Corporation, both of the United States. ZAMEFA was an example of
the forward linkages which the Government had encouraged the copper producing companies to pursue.
Enterprises were established to supply motor vehicles. 160 Livingstone Motor Assembly was setup with
Fiat and Intersomer to assemble cars, and Motors Parts Distributors was formed with investment from
Grindleys Bank to distribute spares for these models. INDECO also established Kapiri Glass in
partnership with Coutinho Curo of West Germany to produce bottles; Luangwa Industries with Atlas
Cycle Industries of India to produce bicycles and Mansa Batteries to produce dry-cell batteries with Oy
Ariam of Finland. General Pharmaceuticals was also established, wholly under INDECO ownership, to
produce intravenous fluids.
INDECO also invested in its existing companies. In FY 1975, for example, INDECO reported
work on expanding Nitrogen Chemicals plant, the expansion of three milling plants and the
rehabilitation of another, the installing of oil seed refining and processing facilities at ROP (1975), the
expansion of Supa Baking's bread producing plant, the installation of new equipment at Kabwe
Industrial Fabrics, and the completion of two brickworks by Zambia Clay Industries.
In response to the difficulties which emerged in the second half of the 1970s, INDECO re-
evaluated a number of its investments. Plans for a vehicle assembly plant at Kassama were abandoned in
1979, and the brickworks at Nega Nega and Kalulushi were closed in 1978 and 1980 respectively.161
Although INDECO remained the primary instrument in the state sector for the diversification of the
Zambian economy, from 1980, its emphasis moved towards consolidation and the rehabilitation of its
existing investments. As its 1980 Annual Report (1980, p.11) noted;
The financial burden on Indeco from these capital projects has become too heavy to permit
immediate further large expansion. Consequently, it is desirable that most of the Group's
attention and investment should now go towards consolidation, solving current prevailing
160 INDECO also formed a partnership with Toyota of Japan and Daimler Benz of Germany to
established Kasama Commercial Vehicle Assembly for the assembly of trucks and vans. The project,
however, was not completed.
161 HU (q3/1983, p.13 and q211984, p.10-1).
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problems, and modernising and expanding existing capacities to maintain and improve
production efficiency as well as to meet growth in demand.162
During the 1980s, INDECO was unable to continue the rate of expansion that it had achieved
in the previous decade. The establishment of new enterprises was limited, with United Milling, Choma
Milling and Zambia Ceramics, set up in the first half of the decade and Zambia Coffee and Zambia
Maltings, established in the second half. 163 All of these new enterprises were wholly owned by
INDECO, and, with the exception of ceramics manufacture, all involved the processing of domestically
produced agricultural produce.164
Despite the new industrial developments that it had undertaken, critics have argued that the
implementation of an import substitution strategy through INDECO failed to break the established
imbalances in the economy. Seidman (1979) argues that INDECO catered for the existing demands for
luxury consumer goods, whose production was characteristically capital intensive and import dependent,
rather than reorienting production towards indigenous needs. Bhagavan (1978) extended a similar
analysis arguing that the State enterprise sector was overly capital intensive and had failed to break with
the private enterprise patterns of concentrating on the production of luxury and export goods in line-of-
rail provinces. He calculated that 32 percent of enterprises produced mass consumption goods, while 24
percent produced luxury goods and 26 percent produced inputs for luxury and export goods. 165 This
classification of goods has, itself, been a matter of dispute, with criticism that Bhagavan's category of
luxuries was defined too broadly and included many mass consumption goods.166
The strategy of INDECO was to be involved in established sectors in order to raise the funds for
diversification into new industries and locations. The primary issue this raises, therefore, is not the
pattern of what INDECO produced, but of how it invested. Bhagavan makes no distinction between new
projects established by the state sector, and existing enterprises taken over by the state sector, whose
162 INDECO (Annual Report, 1983, p.4) again noted the "priority of rehabilitation of projects."
163 Zambia Coffee included assets previously held by the INDECO subsidiary RUCOM Industries,
alongside a new processing plant that was constructed in 1986. In addition, pre-existing state enterprises
Zambia Pork Products and Zambia Poultry Processing were brought within INDECO in the mid-1980s
Three milling companies (E.C.Milling, Ghiradi Milling and Robinhood Products), which were
nationalised following the riot of 1986, were also placed within INDECO.
164 The emphasis of INDECO on agricultural processing is noted by UNIDO (1989).
165 These calculations are based upon the number of industrial enterprises, rather than their
significance with respect to output or employment (Bhagavan, 1978, p.25-30).
166 Based on a reclassification of the categories presented by Bhagavan, Baylies (1978, p.649-653)
calculated that in 1973, 65 percent of INDECO turnover was derived form the production of mass
consumption goods, with luxury products accounting for 4 percent and intermediate products totalling
27 percent. Fincham (1980) also finds Bhagavan's mass consumption products too narrowly defined.
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location and structural decisions were pre-determined in the private sector. Reviewing the 36 projects
undertaken by INDECO during the period of the Second National Development Plan (1972-6),
Simwinga (1977) reported that 17 were initiated by Government instruction and in 8 of those projects
the Government instructed INDECO as to their location. 167 The degree of discretion over the choice of
location which was left to INDECO, was in fact even more limited than this suggests, since a number of
the projects examined involved extensions to existing plants for which the location was fixed.168
This section has concentrated its attention on the industrial projects that were established by
INDECO. Such an approach, however, fails to identify projects which could have been beneficially
established, but which INDECO failed to introduce. In this context, the case of the steel sector may be
discussed. Alongside the establishment of fertiliser production, the Seers Report had identified steel
production as a particular sector in which the Government could contribute to establishing domestic
production. 169 Although a plan had originally been agreed in 1964 for the construction of a mill to
process local scrap metal and imported billets, this was superseded by plans to establish an integrated
iron and steel industry which could utilise local supplies of iron ore and coal. 17° The First National
Development Plan (1966-70) identified this as a project of "national importance," allocating to it 44.82
percent of the projected capital expenditure on commerce and industry under the plan.171
INDECO, which was responsible for the project appraisals, reported in 1967 that the evaluation
of iron ore deposits had been disappointing and that revised estimates of the capital and operating costs
of the plan were higher than had been initially thought. 172 The commercial viability of the plan has
also been questioned by Fortman (1971, p.216-7), who calculated that the domestic market for steel in
Zambia provided less than half the level of demand for steel which would be required for the plant to
167 Simwinga (1977, p.217-22!)..
168 Among projects where Government discretion was exercised were Mansa Batteries, which INDECO
had planned to establish in Kabwe, and Kapiri Glass, which INDECO had intended to site in Lusaka.
The government also directed that a commercial vehicle assembly plant which INDECO planned to
locate in Kabwe should be undertaken in Kasama, although the project was never completed.
169 UN/ECA/FAO (1964, p76-8). Fortman (1971, p.215) also identified it as a key sector, the domestic
production of which could potentially generate further development through forward and backwards
linkages.
170 Faber (1971, p.317).
171 The plan anticipated that the project would be wholly financed by the Government (Republic of
Zambia, 1966a, p.35 and p.238).
172 INDECO (Annual Report, 1967, p.19).
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produce at an efficient scale, while also requiring a larger supply of coal than Zambia could provide
internally.
Although in FY 1970 INDECO announced the formation of the Kafue Steel Corporation which
was to establish a plant at Kafue and initiate production by 1974, responsibility for the project was
subsequently taken out of INDECO's hands. 173 New proposals were drawn up which aimed to establish
an iron and steel works in North Western Province by Technical Industrial Kulumbila Associate Ltd.
(TIKA), a company in which the Government held 20 percent of the equity, and UNIP's own company,
Zambia National Holdings, held 80 percent of the equity. 174 Work on the project was to have
commenced in 1975, but it was not until late 1979 that it was announced that the project had failed to be
established, despite costs of K15 million having been incurred by the Government.175
The responsibility for establishing steel production returned to INDECO in the 1980s and the
Zambia Steel and Build Supplies subsidiary of INDECO produced plans for the establishment of a steel
re-rolling mill to process steel billets imported from Zimbabwe. While the plant itself could provide for
up to three quarters of local demand, it could also provide a downstream connection for any subsequent
established iron and steel works. 176 The project was included in the Fourth National Development Plan
(1989-93), but was never implemented.177
Although the establishment of an iron and steel industry had been emphasised by the
Government and by independent advisors as an important part of the construction of a diversified
industrial structure, INDECO and other state agencies failed to establish it. This failure is open to a
number interpretations. If steel production did offer material benefits to the economy and could have
been established as a viable industry, INDECO would appear to have failed in providing a vehicle for
such diversification. However, INDECO undertook a number of studies to determine the feasibility of
various proposals, which may indicate that despite the potential benefits of steel production, no project
was considered viable. Certainly, the viability of an integrated iron and steel project was open to
question, and INDECO was not involved in the unsuccessful TIKA venture. When a re-rolling mill was
173 INDECO (Annual Report, 1970, p.6).
174 Bank of Zambia (Annual Report, 1974, p.34)
175 Woldring (1984, p.192-3)
176 Donor funding was also sought to undertake another feasibility study for establishing an iron and
steel works (Republic of Zambia, 1984,Vol.2, p.95-7).
1 77 Republic of Zambia (1989, p.529).
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proposed by INDECO in the 1980's, it reflected a less ambitious proposal, and in its sourcing of
imported billets from Zimbabwe, was one which would not have been acceptable before 1980. That this
scheme was not implemented may reflect the limited scope of INDECO for establishing new enterprises
in the 1980's.
3.4.2 Problems and Rehabilitation. 
While the Zambian economy faced severe problems from the mid-1970's, as early as FY 1972
INDECO drew attention to the rising costs of inputs and difficulties of obtaining imports and warned of
its liquidity problems, stating that "some new projects will have to be shelved as a result of lack of
funds." 178 In FY 1976 it further warned that "The viability of Indeco in the last three years has been a
matter of serious concern... Indeco is far too strategic in our economy to be allowed to go under."179
Two problems frequently identified in INDECO Annual Reports were Government restrictions
on pricing and shortages of foreign exchange to purchase inputs. Many of INDECO's products were
subject to formal price controls, although even where this was not the case, price rises required
ministerial and cabinet approval. 180 The process through which prices were adjusted was also slow and
cumbersome. As UNDP/ILO (1978, p.58) noted "the Prices of INDECO companies are first submitted to
INDECO for approval. The prices of parastatal goods and services then go to their various ministries for
detailed assessment, which is circulated to other ministries concerned, who are asked to comment. Three
or four weeks later these comments are added to the assessment, and the matter goes to the Cabinet for
decision," the result of this process being that "by the time new prices are set, they have often been
overtaken by further cost increases."181
In addition, many INDECO subsidiaries with accounting losses made large contributions
directly to Government revenue through sales and excise tax payments. 182 For the enterprises
178 INDECO (Annual Report, 1972, p.'7).
179 INDECO (Annual Report, 1976, p.4).
180 Turok (1989, p.195).
181 President Kaunda also drew attention to this, noting that "decisions on price increase applications
came to take longer and longer to make as applications increased with the rise in international and local
costs and as documentation became more time consuming. Thus it was that in some cases decisions took
as long as six months to two years... delay in determining price applications also meant that the newly
awarded prices were out of date almost as soon as they were given because costs had, in the meantime
escalated" (Republic of Zambia, 1984b, p.9).
182 Republic of Zambia (Economic Report 1979, p.72).
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concerned, however, such arrangements meant "creating an ongoing loss situation for many
subsidiaries, with consequent loss of reserves, non-replacement of plant and machinery and further loss
of efficiency." 183 In 1976 the Corporation stated that;
Indeco must work towards becoming self-financing. This will not be achieved unless the
Government reconsiders its present price policy... Indeco companies can no longer continue
operating under this situation without risking collapse.184
Although producing goods previously imported, many enterprises were still dependent on
imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs. 185 The downturn in the copper markets reduced
Zambia's supply of foreign exchange and, alongside the problems of transportation, restricted the
availability of imports. This situation was made worse by the low levels of foreign exchange that were
generated by INDECO itself. While INDECO was allocated foreign exchange to the value of K115
million against its requirement of K246 million in 1981 and 1982, it had by comparison only generated
K0.6 million itself. 186 Enterprises found themselves short of materials or unable to obtain spare parts
for machinery, and had to operate below capacity. In 1979 and 1980, rates of capacity utilisation were
below 50 percent at Livingstone Motor Assembly, Mansa Batteries, ROP, Zambezi Sawmills, Choma
Milling, INDECO Milling (stock feeds), National Breweries and RUCOM Industries.187
The overall performance of INDECO was the aggregate of that achieved by its many subsidiary
and associated companies. Information on the profitability of INDECO's subsidiary companies was
provided in its Annual Report for the years FY 1979 to FY 1983 and reveals a substantial differentiation
in the performance of the various enterprises. 188 Four sets of companies may be identified; Set A which
achieved a profit in at least 4 of the 5 years; 189 Set B which achieved profit in at two or three of the five
,
183 Munkonge (1981, p.143).
184 INDECO (Annual Report, 1976).
185 Portman (1971), Seidman (1979) and Fincham (1980, p.299-303).
186 Republic of Zambia (Economic Report 1982, p.373).
187 Republic of Zambia (Economic Report 1980, p.107).
188 This information was not provided for INDECO's associated companies.
189They are National Breweries, Zambia Steel and Building Supplies, Kafironda, Kafue Textiles, Supa
Baking, ZAMEFA, ZAMOX, Zambia Sugar, LENCO and INDECO's Real Estate interests.
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years; 190 Set C which had at most one profitable year in the period; 191 and Set D consisting of
enterprises that were not operating for the entire period due to start-up or closure.192
Between FY 1979 and FY 1983, the INDECO Group recorded an overall profit for two of the
five years and the performance of each set of enterprises during this period is shown in Table XVIII.
Despite the positive contribution of Set A to profits, this was negated by the losses incurred by the other
sets of enterprises. Although Set B enterprise recorded on average a relatively small margin of loss, their
number and average turnover magnified the impact of this on the Group as a whole. Conversely, the
impact on the Group of the large loss margins recorded at the persistently unprofitable Set C enterprises,
was minimised due to their low level of turnover and fewer number. In addition, the low number of
enterprises classified as Set D enterprises and their low turnovers, also limited their impact on the
Group.
A number of factors influenced the performances of these enterprises. Seshamani (1988, p.68)
suggested that the most "efficient and profitable" companies within INDECO group were those in which
private shareholders had the greatest influence, while those wholly owned performed least wel1193.
Because the level of minority shareholder influence does not necessarily correspond to their share of
equity, it is not possible to correlate the two variables. 194 The presence of a minority shareholder,
however, was associated with more profitable enterprises. Among the persistently profitable subsidiaries
of Set A only two of the ten enterprises were wholly state owned, while among the persistently
unprofitable enterprises of Set C, four of the six enterprises were wholly owned. Overall wholly owned
enterprises returned an average loss of 13 percent of turnover for each year of the period while those
enterprises with a minority shareholder returned a loss of 2 percent of turnover.195
190 They are Zambia Breweries, National Milling, ROP(1975), INDECO Milling, Monarch,
Consolidated Tyre Services, Kapiri Glass, Motor Parts Distributors, Nitrogen Chemicals and Chilanga
Cement.
191 They are Livingstone Motor Assembly, Crushed Stones Supplies, Zambezi Sawmills, Norgroup,
Kabwe Industrial Fabrics and RUCOM.
192 They are Choma Milling, Mansa Batteries, Luangwa Industries, General Pharmaceuticals, Zambia
Clay Industries, and INDECO Travel interests.
193 Seshamani (1988, p.68). However Turok (1989, p.105), reviewing the performance of subsidiaries
for the late 1970s, concluded that "performance in the wholly state-owned companies was no worse than
in the mixed-owned firms."
194 In addition, no indicator of the relative influence of minority shareholders in each subsidiary
enterprise is available.
195 This was not the only factor which differentiated the two groups, the turnover of enterprises with
minority shareholders was on average 2.72 times greater than that of wholly owned enterprises. While
subsidiaries with the highest turnovers were not the most profitable, Set B shows the highest rate of
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Table XVII.
The Profitability of INDECO's Subsidiary Companies.
FY 1979 to FY 1983.
Category. Average Pre-tax profit
Margin (a).
%
Average Pre-tax Profit
per enterprise per
annum.
In thousands of
Kwacha.
Average Turnover per
enterprise per annum.
In thousands of
Kwacha.
Set A. (Profitable in at
least 4 of the 5 years).
12.77 2,966 27,370
Set B. (Profitable in 2
or 3 of the 5 years).
(4.62) (810) 41,520
Set C. (Profitable in at
most 1 of the 5 years).
(35.77) (820) 3,312
Set D. (Not operational
for full 5 year period).
(b) n/a. (880) 3,054
Source: Calculated from INDECO Annual Reports (1979 to 1983).
Notes: (a) The profit margin does not equal the proportion of pre-tax profit to turnover elsewhere in the
Table as the profit margin is the average of each annual rate, while the calculation of the average levels
of profit and turnover are based on the cumulative value over the entire period. (b) The rate of profit for
Set D cannot be calculated as some of the enterprises included recorded losses on zero turnover.
The presence of a minority partner was, however, not a guarantor of the success. Mansa
Batteries was established as a joint venture between INDECO with 70 percent of the equity and Oy
Airam AB of Finland with 30 percent. 196 The initial construction of the factory and commissioning of
the plant were subject to delays, and five years after the commencement of production, output had not
exceeded 29 percent of rated capacity. While the problems experienced by Mansa Batteries included
profit with a middle range average turnover. Among wholly owned enterprises, higher turnovers were
associated with more profitable performances.
196 See Rajeswaran (1986) and Ant-Wuorinen (1987).
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those common to other enterprises, such as shortages of foreign exchange, the company also suffered
from the inexperience of the staff supplied by Oy Ariam. As a result of the poor initial performance of
the company, Oy Airam withdrew from the project in 1982, selling its entire shareholding to INDECO.
Neither did the presence of a minority shareholder and a profitable performance necessarily imply that
an enterprise was contributing fully to the other objectives of Government policy. As Mphaisha (1988)
has shown, Zambia Metal Fabricators, while classified in the period as a Set A enterprise, continued to
rely upon imported management, technical expertise and technology.
Many of the factors that determined the performance of INDECO subsidiaries affect wholly
owned companies and joint ventures alike. The unpredictable allocations of foreign exchange and
approval of price rises affected the performances recorded by enterprise year to year. 197 Commenting on
INDECO's performance, the National Commission for Development Planning noted that "It is
characteristic that the main profit makers were companies whose prices were not Government
controlled, whilst the biggest losses were incurred by those subsidiaries which produce essential
commodities and/or which had not been allowed to charge economic prices inspite of all official
pronouncements to the contrary.
also give rise to secondary effects at others. Kabwe Industrial Fabrics' shortage of materials in 1983, for
example, caused a shortage of packaging for Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia, and consequently a
shortage of fertilisers for the agricultural sector.199
The effects of differential rates of taxation on the performance of enterprises is illustrated in the
comparison of Zambia Breweries, in which INDECO held 55 percent of the shares, and National
Breweries, in which INDECO held 51 percent of the shares. Between FY 1979 and FY 1981 Zambia
Breweries recorded an average loss of 0.6 percent of turnover, while contributing around three-quarters
197 These problems were particularly prominent factors in the performance of enterprises in Set B. A
number of the enterprises within this category faced tight price controls which undermined their
viability. INDECO noted this as an impediment to National Milling in FY 1980, FY 1981 and FY 1983
and to Zambia Breweries in FY 1982, while in FY 1982 ROP was awaiting a price increase for which
they had applied in May 1980. This can be contrasted with Zambia Sugar for which the suspension of
sales tax in FY 1980 constituted an effective price increase, allowed it to record subsequent profits and
to be classified in Set A.
198 Republic of Zambia (Economic Report, 1979, p.72).
199 EIU (q2/1983, p.14). In another example Dunlop was unable to supply tyres to UBZ, which had
withdrawn 40 buses from service. Such problems increased the pressure to import goods which could be
domestically produced, as both Nitrogen Chemicals Zambia and United Bus sought to procure supplies
from abroad.
" 198 The under-allocation of foreign exchange to one enterprise could
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of turnover directly to the Government as excise duty. 200 The situation of Zambia Breweries, classified
in Set B, can be contrasted to that of National Breweries classified in Set A, which over the same period
recorded an average profit of 7.5 percent of turnover while paying between 50 and 60 percent of
turnover in excise duties. An element in their divergent results was the rate of excise duty placed on
their produce. Had Zambia Breweries paid duty at the rate of National Breweries, they could have
recorded an average profit of 15.1 percent of turnover, while had National Breweries paid duty at the
rate of Zambia Breweries, it would have recorded an average loss of 23.9 percent of turnover.
The problems of the enterprises in Set C were often deeply rooted. The only persistent loss
maker not wholly owned by INDECO was Livingstone Motor Assembly in which the Italian companies,
Fiat and Intersomer held 30 percent of the equity. Although it made early progress in localising the
supply of paint, tyres and batteries, it remained dependent on foreign suppliers for the kits from which
cars were assembled. The downturn in the enterprise's performance began in FY 1975 following the
decline in foreign exchange availability and persistent losses were recorded after FY 1976.2°1
Mismanagement and poor corporate governance could also contribute to poor performances. A
report on Crushed Stone Sales by the Auditor General in 1982 revealed a poor record of protecting the
assets of the company202 . The sale of plant in Kitwe had not received the approval of Directors or been
put out for tender. The audit revealed monies owed by former employees, sales receipts which had not
always been banked or otherwise accounted for, and provisions for bad debt which included amounts due
from ZIMCO and INDECO. The Company had recorded losses in each year since FY 1976, which at a
cumulative value of K4 million' far exceeded the share capital of K1.6 million Current liabilities had
exceeded current assets since FY 1977, and the Auditor General doubted the ability of the enterprise to
meet its obligations for debt repayment.203
200 Calculated from INDECO (Annual Report, 1980, 1981 and 1982). Figures for subsequent years are
not provided.
201 shortages of foreign exchange restricted the importation of kits and the plant's production was
restricted. It was reported in FY 1978 that kits despatched from Fiat two years before remained at an
Italian port, awaiting payment.
202 Republic of Zambia (Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies, 1982).
203 The company borrowed K1 million in FY 1983 to purchase new equipment, despite the fact that the
it had only been able to service the interest payments on a 1977 loan of K1.1 million, on which the
principal was still outstanding. In the seven years since 1976, six different General Managers and Chief
Accountants had been appointed (Republic of Zambia, Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of
Parastatal Bodies, 1982).
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The criterion for enterprises to be classified in Set D was that they did not operate for the whole
of the period. This occurred for a variety of reasons. 204 For Choma Milling, Luangwa Industries, Mansa
Batteries and General Pharmaceuticals, this was because they were establishing operations, and of these,
only Luangwa Industries, had not achieved profitability by FY 1983. The aggregate performance of Set
D was, however, dominated by Zambia Clay Industries. Although a long established INDECO
subsidiary, the establishment of new plant in the late 1970's proved a failure and the company ceased
operations in 1981. Despite this, large losses, reflecting its on-going liabilities, continued to be recorded
up to FY 1983.
In the context of the structural adjustment policies of the mid-1980s, INDECO undertook a
number of initiatives aimed at strengthening the Group's commercial performance. As part of a World
Bank Industrial Rehabilitation Project, an Economic Evaluation Unit was established within INDECO in
December 1985 to review its existing and proposed investments, in order to ensure their viability. 205 In
conjunction with this, outside consultants undertook reviews of a number of subsidiaries and made
recommendations for their rehabilitation.206 The Group also published financial objectives for the three
years, FY 1986 to FY 1989, which were to achieve a growth in earnings per share of 10 percent per
annum; obtain a return on capital employed of 20 percent; contain total borrowings at under twice
shareholders funds and at less than 60 percent of total assets and maintain a ratio of current assets to
current liabilities of over 1.25:1.207
204 Apart from the cases discussed below, the travel subsidiaries of INDECO, which were not included
in the accounts after 1980, have been included in this Set.
205 Gulhati (1989, p.46) and INDECO (Annual Report, 1986). It was reported that the Managing
Director of INDECO, Dixie Zulu, expected that the review would result in the closure or sale of some
subsidiaries (E/U,q3/1985, p.14). In January 1986 four new projects were dropped from the 1986/7
programme on grounds of viability although a further five projects, whose viability was in question,
were continued (Gulhati 1989, p.46).
206 UNDP (1986, p.107) referred to the review of six unnamed subsidiaries, a figure also referred to by
Gulhati (1989, p47) who names four as being RUCOM, Crushed Stone Sales, Luangwa Industries and
Livingstone Motor Assembly. He states that the implementation of the programme was suspended with
the break from the World Bank in May 1987. However, INDECO (Annual Report, 1989, p.14) refers to
the recent completion of diagnostic studies sponsored by the World Bank covering 12 companies.
Kaunga (1993, p.381) also refers to the project as covering twelve enterprises and cites 7 of these as
Kapiri Glass, Zambezi Sawmills, Zambia Steel and Building Supplies, Supa Baking, Zambia Ceramics,
Consolidated Tyre Services, Monarch and INDECO Milling.
207 INDECO (Annual Report, 1986) and restated in (Annual Report, 1987) although not subsequently.
INDECO did not monitor its progress towards these objectives in its Annual Reports and, while
calculating figures for Return on Capital Employed and Debt Equity Ratio, Earnings per Share was not
calculated.
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Private enterprise also began to play a greater role in the management of state enterprises, and
management contracts were agreed for a number of enterprises including Nitrogen Chemicals,
Livingstone Motor Assembly, Zambia Breweries, Luangwa Industries and Zambia Poultry Products.208
Policy toward increased equity participation by private enterprise was, however, less certain. While
Heineken was refused a request for equity participation in Zambia Breweries, an agreement was
negotiated for Heinz to acquire 49 percent of the equity and management control of a plant of ROP,
which was incorporated independently as Premium 01209
As outlined above, INDECO group performance began to recover between FY 1983 and FY
1986, and strengthened in the period to FY 1989. The UNDP (1986, p.106) noted the decontrol of prices
as a factor in INDECO's improved performance, alongside capital restructuring and tighter management
controls, and INDECO (Annual Report, 1982, p.5) welcomed "the concept of economic prices [which] is
fast becoming a reality," stating in 1984 that decontrol had allowed enterprises to operate on a viable
basis and to generate funds for reinvestment. 210 Despite this, profit margins over the direct costs of
bought-in materials fell between FY 1982 and FY 1986. 211 This casts doubt on the extent to which the
INDECO group took advantage of the decontrol to raise prices, as does the Group's record of improved
rates of profit in FY 1988 and FY 1989, when price controls had been reintroduced. 212 However,
structural adjustment policies also brought new problems to INDECO. Devalautions raised the costs of
imported inputs, while the foreign exchange auctions reduced the supply of foreign exchange to
208 Makgetla (1994, p116) and INDECO (1987, p.6)
209 Heinz withdrew from the arrangement after Zambia's abandonment of its agreement with the IMF
in 1987 (Callaghy and Wilson, 1988, p.213).
210 See INDECO (Annual Report, 1982, p.5 and Annual Report, 1984 p.4-5). Dewar and Seshamani
(1987, p.135) argued that "the deregulation of prices in 1982 has boosted profitability, while the
government's directive to ZIMCO and its subsidiaries to become profitable has effectively relieved the
parastatals of the need to support social objectives." INDECO (Annual Report, 1985, p.9) notes that
National Milling faced a controlled price of wheat until November 1984.
211 While the cost of bought-in materials accounted for under 53 percent of turnover in FY 1982, it rose
steadily to around 59 percent of turnover in FY 1985 and FY 1986. With share of turnover accounted for
by the costs of labour (12 to 13 percent) and capital (4.5 percent to 5.5 percent) remaining relatively
stable over this period, an important source of the improved profitability of INDECO may have been the
decline in excise duties from nearly 21 percent of turnover in FY 1982 to just over 10 percent by FY
1986. The cause of this could either have been a reduced level of excise duty payable by Group
companies, or a decline in the share of Group turnover accounted for by companies liable for excise
duties.
212 While INDECO's gross profit margins appear to have fallen with price decontrol, given the
devaluations and inflation during the period, the effects on INDECO's margins had decontrol not been
introduced would have been far greater.
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INDECO by 40 percent, and companies such as Zambia Steel and Building Supplies, which had been
persistently profitable, faced liquidity problems.213
One factor in the recovery in Group profitability at the end of the 1980s was the decrease in
enterprises which recorded losses. 214 In FY 1988 only three subsidiaries recorded losses and in FY
1989 only one did. Changes in the composition of INDECO after FY 1985 also contributed to the
recovery. Technical and design faults in an extension to the plant of Nitrogen Chemicals Zambia
resulted in the plant operating at under 50 percent of capacity and recording losses in FY 1983, FY 1984
and FY 1985. These were material to the performance of the INDECO Group as a whole. 215
 After FY
1985, Nitrogen Chemicals was demerged from INDECO and placed under the direct control of ZIMCO.
Livingstone Motor Assembly also ceased to be a subsidiary of the Group in FY 1988, with the entry of
the UNIP owned Zambia National Holdings as a new shareholder and the enterprise changed to the
status of an associate company of INDECO.
SUMMARY.
This Chapter has analysed the performance of the Zambian State Enterprise sector in the 1970s
and 1980s. The primary objective of the strategy pursued through state enterprise was to create a
diversified industrial sector. This required that state enterprises maintained their commercial viability
and generated sufficient profits for reinvestment and the pursuit of the other objectives specified by the
Government. This Chapter has argued, however, that from the mid-1970s, the sector failed to generate
the level of resources required to achieve this. Increasingly, the continued viability of the existing
enterprises within the sector became a cause for concern, and the resources for further investment
became minimal.
213 Seshamani (1988 p.61). INDECO was particularly dependent on expatriate labour skilled in
accountancy, financial management, engineering and industrial management. UNDP (1986, p.104-'7)
notes that "In 1982, 286 positions at senior levels were manned by expatriates, with another 56 vacant.
In early 1986, 340 positions (including about 18 provided under technical co-operation) were still
manned by expatriates, apart from vacant posts."
214 Other factors in INDECO's improved performance are difficult to identify. UNIDO (1989) cited
shortages of foreign exchange, pricing restrictions and management weakness as continuing problems at
a number of enterprises surveyed, while Nyirongo (1989) was unable to determine the extent to which
improved allocations of foreign exchange to INDECO enterprises enabled them to achieve higher rates
of capacity utilisation.
215 See EIU (q1/1984 , p.12 and q1,1986, p.25). With Nitrogen Chemicals Zambia included in the
consolidation, Group pre-tax profits averaged 0.95 percent of turnover. If Nitrogen Chemicals is
excluded they averaged 4.03 percent (Calculated from UNDP, 1986, p.105-6).
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The primary determinant of the period as a whole was the effect on Zambia of the declines in
the price of copper from the beginning of the 1970s. Although the strategy of the government was to
encourage the development of a diversified economic structure, this had not been achieved when the
copper revenues began to decline. In addition, the fall in copper revenues also removed from the state
enterprise sector its primary source of funds to undertake this diversification.
The Zambian government initially sought to insulate the domestic economy from the full extent
of the decline, a strategy which proved unsustainable as it became clear that the trend in copper prices
was no longer cyclical. From the end of the 1970s, the conduct of Zambian economic policy became
increasingly reliant on the conclusion of agreements with the World Bank and the IMF, aimed at
adjusting the Zambian economy through economic liberalisation. The Zambian government, however,
remained unconvinced that these policies could generate economic recovery, and sought alternative
means of adjustment. None of these resulted in the restoration to the Zambian economy of the level of
growth which had been experienced in the late 1960s.
The main source of profits within the state enterprise sector was the state mining companies.
Alongside the problems faced by the Zambian economy as a whole, the copper mining industry also
encountered geological problems which lowered output and productivity. Although the companies
recorded considerable success in reducing the costs of copper production in response to the decline in the
international price, they were constrained, by both technical and policy factors, in the methods through
which this could be achieved. After further falls in the copper price at the end of the 1970s, a number of
more far-reaching measures were undertaken. These included the creation of ZCCM and the formulation
of a Production and Investment Plan with the World Bank and external consultants. Although these
initiatives halted further decline in the viability of the mining industry, it remained in need of
substantial new investment, and was not in a position to provide funding to other sectors.
Within the state enterprise sector the primary responsibility for industrial diversification was
placed with INDECO. In the 1970s INDECO continued to expand through establishing new industrial
projects and enterprises. However, increasingly this effort was undermined by problems of liquidity and
in the 1980s the Group increasingly turned its attention to the rehabilitation of its existing enterprises. It
has been demonstrated that the performance of the enterprises within INDECO was subject to a wide
variety of factors. While cases have been cited in which the policy objectives of government, such as
113
price controls, placed significant costs of certain subsidiaries, in other cases factors such as poor
management undermined their performance. In the mid-1980s INDECO and the Zambian Government
undertook a number of initiatives to rehabilitate a number of the subsidiaries and to strengthen the
overseeing of the holding company. While the performance of the Group as a whole improved during
the late 1980s, it did not provide the basis for a renewed expansion.
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CHAPTER 4.
PRIVATISATION IN ZAMBIA 1990-1998.
The aim of this Chapter is to provide an account and explanation of the adoption and
implementation of privatisation in Zambia. In 1990 the UNIP government adopted a limited programme
of privatisation, the scope of which was extended after 1992 by the MMD government. The subsequent
implementation of this programme has resulted, by the end of 1998, in the privatisation of the majority
of Zambian state enterprises.
The reasons for the initial adoption of privatisation by UNIP, and the continued support for it
by the MMD are examined in Section 4.1. Section 4.1.1 examines the experience of privatisation under
the UNIP government from 1990 to late 1991. It argues that pressure from donors prompted the initial
adoption of the policy and that, although its scope became extended, it remained within the realms of a
defensive programme. In Section 4.1.2 the rise of the MMD and its displacement of UNIP as the
governing party is examined. The section accounts for the overall policy orientation of the MMD and its
support for privatisation. Section 4.1.3 provides a overview of the political and economic developments
between 1992 and 1998, during which time the MMD has been in government.
Section 4.2 of the Chapter examines the design of the privatisation programme that was
established by the MMD government. The Zambian experience is marked by the creation of a formal
legal framework for the privatisations through the Privatisation Act of 1992. Section 4.2.1 examines the
provisions of the Act, the most important being the creation of the Zambia Privatisation Agency. The
section also assesses the extent to which these provisions have provided for the efficient and accountable
management of the process. The sequence plan through which the enterprises were to be privatised is
discussed in Section 4.2.2. It was initially designed to facilitate the rapid sale of small and marketable
enterprises, with larger and more strategic enterprises to be sold later in the programme. Arrangements
were also established for the supervision of enterprises while they have remained under state ownership,
and these are examined in Section 4.2.3.
The implementation of the privatisation programme between 1992 and 1998 is assessed in
Section 4.3. In this period the majority of large, medium and small sized enterprises have been
privatised through a variety of methods. Although the initial pace of divestiture was slower than
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projected, the rate of sales rose after 1995. Section 4.3.1 examines the pattern of privatisation over the
period and discusses the factors that have affected it. As argued in Chapter 1, different methods of
privatisation will affect to whom, and on what terms, enterprises are sold. The most common method of
privatisation in Zambia has been by private sale. While in large and medium sized enterprise this had
often been achieved through private negotiations, in smaller enterprise it has more often been through
tender. Overall, less than a quarter of enterprises have been liquidated, while a substantial number of
large and medium sized enterprises have been unbundled prior to their privatisation. Section 4.3.2
examines the reasons for the methods of privatisation which have been pursued in Zambia which have
reflected both the aims which the government has sought to pursue through privatisation, and the
constraints under which it has implemented the programme.
The process of privatisation involves the dismantling of the corporate structures through which
enterprises were held in the state sector and the development of these within the private sector. This is
particularly significant in the restructuring of private capital markets, which must develop the capacity
to provide the financial resources required by former state enterprises. Section 4.3.3 examines the
development of the banking sector and the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE). Section 4.3.4 examines the
enterprises that remained in state ownership at the end of 1998. In most cases they are confined to those
with particular strategic significance, or those which operate within utility industries and in most cases
progress towards their eventual privatisation is underway.
SECTION 4.1. THE COMMITMENT TO PRIVATISATION.
Although Zambia's privatisation programme was designed and implemented under the MMD
government after 1991, the issue was first introduced onto the government agenda in Zambia by
President Kaunda. The adoption of the policy by UNIP and its initial development is examined in
Section 4.1.1. This is followed by a discussion of the formation of the MMD and its displacement of
UNIP as the governing party in Section 4.1.2. Section 4.1.3 examines the economic policies and political
development during the period from 1991 in which the MMD have been in government.
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4.1.1. Privatisation under UNIP.
As discussed in Chapter 3, in the late 1980s the Zambian government undertook a number of
initiatives to improve the performance of the state enterprise sector. While these included the appointing
of private sector management, initiatives to change the ownership structure of state enterprise were
limited toastkrre etemployee ownership. In 1988 the National Assembly passed legislation under which
the President could turn over any state enterprise to self management as a step towards this, and in 1989
pilot schemes were established at two INDECO subsidiary enterprises.'
The move towards the adoption of a privatisation programme occurred in the context of the
renewed agreement reached with the IMF in 1989. Under a Rights Accumulation Programme, Zambia
had to meet conditionalities over a number of years to qualify for new concession lending from the
TMF.2
 In the meantime, the agreement facilitated the re-opening of concessionary finance from donors.
In April 1990 the Consultative Group of donors met and, while pledging financial support to Zambia,
pressed the government to adopt privatisation as part of its approach to the state enterprise sector.3
At the Fifth National Convention of UNIP in April 1990, while privatisation was rejected by
President Kaunda, the policy committees discussed it in a positive light and resolved that "no national
interests are threatened by the opening up of any public enterprise to direct and limited individual
private citizen full or part ownership." 4
 The following month, President Kaunda announced "a scheme
by which the state will sell part of its capital in state enterprise to the general public." 5
 The scope of the
programme announced in May 1990 was quite limited, being a statement of intent to sell 49 percent of
the shares of selected state enterprises and 40 percent of shares in selected public utilities. These shares
were to be made available to Zambian citizens, with reserved shares for employees, with measures
included to guard against the concentration of ownership. To examine issues relating to the scope of the
policy of privatisation and the measures necessary for its implementation, a Special Task Force on
1 The enterprises were Zambia Pork Products and Choma Milling (Southern African Economist
April/May 1989, p.43-4 and Kaunga, 1993,p.390).
2 See Southern African Economist (June/July 1990, p.30-1) and Republic of Zambia (1990).
3 EIU (q3/1990, p.14) reported that the Consultative Group met in April 1990, pledging $450m. for
1990.
4 Kaunga (1993, p.382-3) and Africa Economic Digest (4/6/1990).
5 Times of Zambia (29/5/1990).
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Privatisation, chaired by the Minister of Finance and staffed by senior Government and ZIMCO
officials, was established in May 1990.6
The government privatisation initiative found support within the National Assembly. 7 A
Special Parliamentary Select Committee, which sat in July 1990, supported the direction of Government
policy, recommending that "the method of selling shares in parastatal companies to members of the
public be effected expeditiously" and emphasised this as a measure for overcoming the problems of loss
making enterprises. 8
 In addition to this, the committee emphasised measures for improving the
performance of the state enterprise sector as a whole, including the abolition of ZIMCO, the
streamlining of INDECO and the subjecting of enterprises to competition.
While the proposals put forward by the government were quite limited, and would not have
entailed the transfer to the private sector of a controlling interest in any state enterprise, the
contemplation of equity sales opened the door to more wide ranging proposals. While the formula of the
49 percent sales was restated in the November 1990 Budget Address, the scope of the policy was
extended through the additional statement that the government would also undertake the complete
divestiture of some enterprises.9
 In early 1991 the commitment to privatise was further extended to a
more comprehensive programme of privatisation with the Government outlining its eventual goal as
selling majority or outright ownership of all State enterprises except public utilities and other strategic
industries. 10
 Despite the broadening of the scope of the programme, the government still stated that
implementation would be based on sales to Zambian citizens with only a minority role for foreign
investors. 11
 The timeframe over which the privatisation programme was to be implemented was not
defined and the Government expected that in the medium term state enterprise would continue to play a
substantial role within the Zambian economy.12
6 Kaunga (1993, p.388).
7 ZACCI also welcomed the privatisation as "a step in the right direction which is long overdue" (Times
of Zambia 26/1/1991).
16 National Assembly (1990, p.32).
9 Republic of Zambia (Budget Address, 1992).
10 This was in line with the advice of the World Bank that Zambia's parastatal sector should be limited
to a core group of public utilities or natural monopolies. The Zambian government also undertook not to
create any new state enterprises in "commercially oriented activities that are best left to private sector
initiative" (World Bank, 1991, p.16 and 55).
11 EIU (q3/1991,p.18)
12 World Bank (1991, p.55).
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In February 1991 a 'Steering committee of the Restructuring of the Parastatal Sector" was
established to design the programme alongside a 'Technical Committee of Privatisation' which was
designated to administer it. 13 The steering committee identified ten small enterprises to be divested.
Those which were wholly owned were advertised for sale in June 1991, while for the remainder,
negotiations were open with minority shareholders. 14
 No measures were announced to facilitate the
participation of Zambian citizens. The offers attracted considerable interest with over 80 enquiries for
the 7 enterprises offered for tender. 15
 Concern over the administration of the programme was also
expressed by the Committee on Parastatal Bodies. It criticised the Government for not seeking
Parliamentary approval of the companies that it had identified for divestiture, and expressed doubts that
the administration of the sales would realise the full value of the assets.16
The implementation of these policies was cut short by the fall of the UNIP Government in
November 1991, and the potential outcome of their initiatives can only be speculated upon. Although the
scope of the initial commitment to sales was progressively extended, the Government remained
committed to retaining strategic industries in state ownership, the definition of which could have been
extensive. The timing of the initial offers for sale, and the enterprises selected, also suggest that the
programme was primarily focused on satisfying donor pressure through the divestiture of small and
peripheral state enterprises. However, the UNIP government had also undertaken a number of
complementary measures which suggest that the importance of state enterprise within the economy
would have been less significant in the 1990s than in the previous two decades. The passage of the Stock
Exchange Act of 1990 had begun the process of creating a stock market, and the Investment Act of 1991
had created an Investment Centre to promote and facilitate new private investment.17
13 Kaunga (1993, p.388).
14 The ten enterprises were AFE, Consolidated Tyre Services, Crushed Stone Sales, Eagle Travel,
Lublend, Mwinilunga Canneries, Nlcwazi Manufacturing, Poultry Processing, Zambia Clay Industries
and Zambezi Sawmills. Those in which there were minority shareholders were Lublend, Nkwazi
Manufacturing and Poultry Processing. All except Eagle Travel and Lublend were subsidiaries of
INDECO.
15 The offers attracted considerable interest with over eighty enquiries received for the seven advertised
enterprises (Kaunga, 1994, p.110-111).
16 Republic of Zambia (Report of the Auditor General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies, 1990, p.1-
2).
17 Ngenda (1994a and 1994b). The security of investments from nationalisation had also been extended,
with the stipulation that property covered by the Act could only be nationalised if specifically identified
in an act of parliament, in which case compensation at market value could be externalised without
exceptional deductions. In addition to this, the Act made provision for those purchasing enterprises
divested by the state to qualify for the incentives it offered.
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4.1.2. The Rise of the MMD and the Fall of UNIP. 
The MMD was the product of the campaign for political reform in Zambia. It was officially
established in July 1990, following the decision by the Government in April to hold a referendum on a
return to a multi-party system. When the referendum was cancelled in place of a direct move to multi-
party elections, the MMD registered as a political party.
Although pressure for greater political pluralism existed throughout the period of the one party
state, the multi-party issue came to the fore in Zambia following the collapse of the one party system in
Eastern Europe and regional changes including progress towards the dismantling of white minority rule
in South Africa. These external changes prompted domestic political groups that were discontented with
UNIP rule to agitate for political reform, with the first official call for a return to multi-party politics
made in December 1989 by the General Council of the Zambian Congress of Trades Unions. 18 The
leadership of UNIP displayed little concern for these changes and instead proposed amendments to the
constitution to further centralise power in the Presidency. 19
 When the growing pressure for political
reform was addressed at UNIP's Fifth National Convention in March 1990, President Kaunda rejected
the widespread demands for change, including measures aiming to increase participation within the
confines of a one party system. 2° However, the weight of these criticisms and the failure to win
parliamentary approval for the constitutional amendments led President Kaunda to change tack. In April
1990 a referendum on a return to multi-party politics was announced, to take place in a closely
supervised environment and in which UNIP would campaign against the multi-party option.
While UNIP was attempting to defend its monopoly on political power through constitutional
manoeuvres, its position was being undermined by a number of factors. Government attempts to pursue
economic reform, throughout 1989, provoked widespread strikes in industry and the public sector in
protest at the rising cost of living, violent demonstrations as students protested against tuition fees and
18 Ralcner (1992, p.58).
19 They included measures to further centralise the nomination of UNIP parliamentary candidates, to
create a party commission to oversee appointments in the party, civil service and state enterprise sector,
and to allow only the President of UNIP to stand for election as President of Zambia (EIU, q3/1980,
p.12).
20 In addition to ZCTU, criticism of the existing political structures were made by senior LTNIP
politicians including Arthur Wina, Daniel Lisulo and Humphrey Mulemba and Sikota Wina (SAPEM
May 1990, p.31-4; and Southern African Economist April/May 1990, p.31)
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rioting on the Copperbelt in response to the removal of price controls.21 The cutting of subsidies on
maize meal in June 1990 led to an unprecedented scale of rioting in Lusaka, Kabwe, Kafue and Kitwe
between the 26th and 28th of June in which at least 23 people were killed, and calls were made by the
protesters for a return to multi-party politics.22
The rioting was also the prelude to an abortive coup attempted by Lieutenant L uchembe in
which four soldiers captured control of the Lusaka Multi-Media Complex for a few hours on the night of
30th June 1990 and broadcast announcements that President Kaunda had been overthrown. 23
 While in
itself this did not pose a material threat to the government, it was significant in two respects. Firstly, the
radio announcements of the coup received widespread popular demonstrations of support which
underlined the unpopularity of the Government and suggested that a more effectively organised coup
attempt could have succeeded. Secondly, it had a catalytic effect on the political opposition to UNIP
prompting it to organise itself into a cohesive force.
UNIP's Fifth National Convention acted as a platform for advocates of political reform and the
party leadership's resistance convinced many that UNIP would not be the vehicle of such change. 24 In
the following months individuals linked to the Economic Association of Zambia pursued contacts with
the leadership of ZCTU and ZINCOM to organise in favour of multi-party reform. 25
 Initially plans to
organise a National Conference promoting the case for multi-party politics were delayed, but the
21 See EIU quarterly reports for 1989. This was against the backdrop of a treason trial relating to a 1988
coup plot in which state witnesses stated that President Kaunda had amassed a personal fortune of $4
billion overseas (E/Uq2/1990, p.8-9).
22 The Economist Intelligence Unit described it as "the worst rioting the country has ever seen"
(E/U,q3/1990, p.7), an assessment shared by Mwanakatwe (1994, p.173-4) who described it as "the
worst example of political unrest for 26 years of Zambian Independence." Chan (1992, p.189) prefers to
term these events an 'uprising', "for this is what it was, not a series of riots."
23 Luchembe claimed to have acted in agreement with senior officers who then failed to play their part
(EIU, q3/1990, p.8-9 and Mwanakatwe, 1994, p.149-164). Chan (1992, p.189-1990) argues that
Luchembe had substantial army support and that the suppression of the coup relied upon the airforce,
Zambian paramilitary forces and support from Tanzanian troops and the Zimbabwean Airforce. The
inaction of Zambia's own army in suppressing the coup is also highlighted by Africa Confidential
(27/7/1990).
24 This position was taken by Vernon Mwaanga (1990, p.82-3) who stated at the MMD's launching
conference; "I did not go to the Convention to advocate for the reintroduction of Multi-Party Democracy,
I went there as a member of the reformist wing of the Party demanding reforms and demanding more
democracy within the Party... [but] I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the Multi-Party
Option is credible and that the United National Independence Party to which I have belonged for the last
31 years has proved incapable of reforming itself."
25 Leading figures were Mbilcusita-Lewanika and Derek Chitala from EAZ, Frederick Chiluba and
Newstead Zimba from ZCTU and Vernon Mwaanga from ZINCOM (Chitala, 1990, p.iv-ix, and
Chiluba, 1995, p.61-3).
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Luchembe coup attempt served to underlined the urgency of action and the conference launching the
MMD went ahead in July 1990.26
The MMD came to consist of an alliance of diverse strands of opposition to the UNIP regime,
bringing together trade unionists, intellectuals, business people, students and former leaders of UNIP.27
Its formation created a focus for opponents of the regime and from their first public rallies in August and
September 1990, the MMD was able mobilise widespread public support.28
The unity of the MMD was based on a number of factors. At the tactical level it was judged that
if the movement split into a number of competing parties, the attempt to displace the political
domination of UNIP would be likely to fail. 29
 Despite discontent at the MMD Convention in February
1991, many defeated candidates, including Mulemba and Arthur Wina, argued that unity was essential
for electoral victory. 30
 This unity of convenience was reinforced by the shared conviction of those
constituting the MIvID that the one party state precluded effective developmental policies and the only
through the democratisation of the political arena could development be pursued. Alongside resolutions
at the founding conference that asserted fundamental democratic rights and addressed the issues of the
referendum, the conference resolved that;
there can be no satisfactory or sustainable solution to urgent problems, such as the foreign
debt burden, public revenue short-falls, inadequate public expenditure, economic
mismanagement and the consequent deterioration of health, education and general welfare
services, until and (sic) appropriately conductive and democratic enabling environment if
(sic) firmly established.'
With the cancellation of the referendum and the move to a multi-party election, the MMD
chose to transform itself from a popular movement into a political party with an agreed programme.
Frederick Chiluba, the President of ZCTU, was elected as President of the MA4D, and the party
26 Mbikusita-Lewanika (SAPEM August 1992) and Chiluba (1995, p.61).
27 EIU (q1/1991, p.8) reported a "growing tide of UNIP defections to the MMD" and noted the
defections of recently dismissed cabinet ministers Michael Sata and Frederick Hapundu as well as
former Secretary General of UNIP Humphrey Mulemba and former Minister of Finance Joshua Lumina.
Kees van Donge (1995, p.199) notes that nearly all of the UNIP MPs representing Southern Province
finally defected.
28 E/U(q4/1990, p.10) reported crowds of 50,000 in Kabwe on August 18th, 300,000 in Lusaka on
September 8th and 70,000 in Kitwe on September 15th. See also Petros Muyunda (SAPEM November
1990, p.22).
29 See Gilbert Mudenda (SAPEM, August 1992) and Gabriel Banda (Post 22/10/1996)
30 E/U(q2/1991, p.9), SAPEM (11/1991, p.28) and Africa Confidential (8/3/1991).
31 Mbilcusita-Lewanika and Chitala (1990, p.130-1).The point of democratisation as a precondition for
economic progress was made by Chiluba (1990, p.106) "Our argument is not that a quick return to the
Multi-Party System means an immediate end to our economic hardship... But we need an enabling
environment for concerted effort (sic) to work towards the resolving of the present developmental crisis."
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formulated an economic policy favouring private enterprise and economic reform. 32 The election
manifesto in October 1991 committed the IVIMD to "a balanced structural adjustment programme
specifically suited to Zambian conditions" and to "selling off as many state owned enterprises as
possible."33
This policy orientation of the party reflected the balance of interests within it and the policy
options open to it. 34
 Business interests, which were well represented within the MMD, had long
advocated the adoption of a liberalised economy and a programme of privatisation and through their
financial contributions to the party, they were able to secure prominent positions and influence the
formation of policy. 35
 The trades unions viewed their role as being that of an autonomous group
pursuing the economic interests of labour within the structures of a capitalist economy, and they were
not hostile to an increased role for the private sector. 36 While the trades unions had opposed the
negative impact on their members of the structural adjustment measures implemented under UNIP,
they hoped that within a democratic framework they would be better able to defend members against its
effects. Among the intellectual elements within the MMD there was also criticism of the contribution to
the economy made by state enterprise and the view that within a democratic framework, structural
adjustment measures could facilitate economic development. 37
 In addition, the attempt by UNIP to
pursue a strategy without the support of the IMF between 1987 and 1989 had, in the event, failed to
achieve a sustained growth and heightened Zambia's dependence on future donor assistance.
In confronting UNIP, the MIvID's main asset was the unpopularity of the existing regime.38
Although economic decline was a central element in this, the campaign was not based around economic
issues. Instead it was dominated by arguments over the ground rules of the election itself, which, the
32 Reuters (Lusaka, 1/3/1991)
33 Chiluba (1993, p.70).
34 Simutanyi (1996, p.832).
35 Such policies were advocated by Chilcwanda and Penza, as Chairs of ZIMCOM and the Lusaka
Chambers of Commerce respectively (News from Zambia 25/7/1989 and 17/10/1989).
36 See Liatto (1989) and Ralcner (1992). Rakner (1992, p.119) quotes Sampa, Assistant General
Secretary of ZCTU and later an MMD Minister, stating in 1991 that "We do not think privatisation is a
very bad thing, as we have seen how badly the parastatals(state owned businesses) have performed,"
while Chiluba (1990, p.98) stated that "under price liberalization policies state monopolies have
revealed themselves to be more exploitive that (sic) privately owned enterprises."
37 For example Mbilcusita-Lewanika (1990) and Donald Chanda (SAPEM, June 1990, p.24-7).
38 Kibble (1992, p.105) and SAPEM (August 1992).
123
opposition argued, favoured UNIP. 39 The results of theelection were a clear victory for the MMD,
which won the Presidency and a large majority in the National Assembly.
4.1.3. The MMD in Government.
In Government the MMD faced the same economic situation that had forced the UNIP
Government to reach agreement with the IMF and World Bank. Assessing the economic prospects of
Zambia, the World Bank (1993b, p.3) noted that;
given Zambia's debt burden, any growth or even the maintenance of economic activity
requires very large inflows of foreign aid.
These flows were dependent on the continuation of the Rights Accumulation programme agreed under
the UNIP government, to which the MMD brought an ideological commitment absent under UNIP. 40 In
his Budget statement in January 1992, the Minister of Finance, Emmanuel Kasonde, defined a limited
economic role for the state, arguing that;
Government must concern itself primarily with providing and maintaining public
infrastructure and services. Government's role in the commercial economy will be merely to
provide a conducive framework of incentives and legislation to promote rapid growth of the
private business sector and entrepreneurship.41
The Government aimed to promote economic restructuring by stabilising the economy through
a tight fiscal and monetary framework, while inducing growth through the liberalisation of existing
controls.42 The centrepiece of fiscal policy was the cash budget, introduced in January 1993, under
which government expenditure was funded from existing revenue receipts rather than through the
creation of additional liquidity. The implementation of liberalisation was also swift and far reaching. By
early 1993 the government had effectively removed all controls over prices, rates of interest, foreign
39 Bratton (1992) and Panter-Brick (1994).
40 This observation is also made by Mutukwa and Saasa (1995, p.75). McPherson (1995) suggests that
the failure of the maize harvest in early 1992 reinforced the Government's determination to follow the
policy path agreed with the international financial institutions since it would have been unable to fund
the necessary imports without donor assistance.
41 Republic of Zambia (Budget Address 1992, p.8). Evidence of this approach can also be found in the
Government's policy framework documnet for 1992 to 1994 in which the Government stated that "The
engine of growth must be private initiative, guided by market incentives. Government policy will be
redirected at creating an environment in which initiative, entrepreneurship, and effort can
thrive"(Republic of Zambia, 1992, p.10). The commitment was restated in policy framework document
for 1995 to 1998, which stated that "the Government will continue to promote free and open markets...
remains committed to not pre-empting or inhibiting business opportunities, and to privatisation of nearly
all parastatals as quickly as possible" (Republic of Zambia, 1995a, p.16).
42 The policies are discussed by Mwanza and Fundanga (1995) and Mutukwa and Saasa (1995).
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exchange rates and allocation and eliminated subsidies. 43
 Trade policy was also liberalised with the
removal of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, and the tariff structure was simplified. In
addition to this, foreign investment was to be encouraged by implementing an improved framework.
In 1992 the Zambian Government predicted that the package of economic policies could result
in an average real growth in gross domestic product of around 3 percent per annum between 1992 and
1994 and a decline in inflation to 5 percent over that period.44 As Table Mu shows, progress towards
the stabilisation of the economy was slower than expected and sustained growth has not been
established.
The World Bank (1995b) identified a number of factors that contributed to this. These included
problems in the sequencing of the policy reforms which created obstacles to stabilisation and the
continued vulnerability of the economy to exogenous factors such as drought and copper price
movements.45
TABLE XVIII.
Indicators of Zambian Economic Performance Under the MMD Government.
1992 to 1998.
Indicators. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 (a)
Real GDP Growth (%). (0.6) 6.8 (3.5) (2.3) 4.9 2.9 (3.0)
Rate of Inflation (%). 197.4 183.3 54.6 34.9 46.3 24.8 25.4
Exchange Rate (K. to $) 173 453 669 857 1,204 1,334 2,345
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Reports (1992 to 1998)
Notes: (a) Figures for growth and inflation for 1998 are Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) estimates.
Exchange rates are stated as average annual rates except for 1998 which is the EIU's forecast of the year
end rate.
43 In the assessment of the World Bank (1996a) "Since late 1991, the Government has accomplished an
extraordinary turnaround in economic policy. In particular, the pace of liberalization has been
impressive."
44 Republic of Zambia (1992, p.5).
45 Problems of policy sequencing are discussed by Adam (1995) and McPherson (1995). Chibowa
(1994) and Chilipamushi (1994) examine the impact of liberalisation on the manufacturing sector.
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Particular problems have been experienced with the government's trade policy, the result of
which has widely been characterised as eroding the manufacturing base of the economy. Enterprises
producing in Zambia have complained that they face an undue burden of taxation compared to
competitors importing finished goods into Zambia. 46
 Government Ministers have emphasised the
reluctance of neighbouring economies to reciprocate in liberalising their trade policies, and have blamed
Zambian industry for not having adjusted to competition from imports.47
 The policies have not only
affected local companies, but have also caused transnationals to re-evaluate their strategies for supplying
the Zambian market. Colgate Palmolive and Johnson and Johnson have both sought to relocate
production and investment in Zimbabwe, while Dunlop Zambia has considered relocating in Uganda.48
While the World Bank has accepted that the policy packages that it has sponsored have not
produced economic recovery, it suggests that without their assistance, the performance of the economy
would have been worse. 49
 In addition to this, continued adherence to the reform package ensured
continued flows by donors to meet the current requirements of debt servicing, alongside a route to
gradual debt relief 50
 Alongside criticism of the economic policies that it has pursued, questions have
also been raised about the extent of the MMD's commitment to political pluralism. While in opposition
the MMD was critical of the degree of presidential power and the lack of citizens' rights and called for
increased participation and accountability in the political system. In government, they have shown less
interest in this agenda and the MMD has appeared to be increasingly intolerant of opposition.51
Ongoing reports have suggested that senior members of the party and the government have been
46 Muuka (1997) and World Bank (1995b,
47 These points were made by Finance Minister Penza and Deputy Commerce Minister Acicim Nkole
(Post 19/2/1997 and 24/2/1997). The opening of South Africa's economy to Zambian exports has been
pursued through ongoing bi-lateral negotiations. In November 1997, the South African government
stated it willingness to allow greater levels of access, but has not indicated its intention to prevent the
dumping of subsidised products in Zambia (EIU q1/1998, p.19).
48 Other transnational companies facing closure have been Recicitt and Coleman, Lyons Brooke Bond,
Rover Zambia, Crown Cork, Cheesebrough Ponds and Avery (Southern African Economist, October
1994, p.7-8 and Muuka, 1997, p.681). The trade policy has added to Zambia's disadvantage compared to
its regional neighbours, as Investment Centre Director Bwalya Ng'andu noted that Zimbabwe and
Botswana provided better infrastructure and investment incentives (Post 26/2/1997).
49 The World Bank particularly notes the positive effects of its supply of foreign exchange to the
Zambian economy (World Bank, 1997, p.71).
World Bank (1996a, p.6-'7). In 1995, Zambia completed the RAP and qualified for an Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility from the IMF. This allowed for a reduction in annual debt service
payments to a quarter of their previous level (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996, p.13).
In addition to the issues of the constitution and the opposition parties discussed below, Mphaisha
(1996) also addresses the continued government control of much of the media.
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involved in corruption and other criminal activity. 52
 Although some accounts have suggested that these
problems are the result of the control of the party by a small clique, the range of allegations suggest that
such behaviour extends to a wider group of politicians both in the MMD and the opposition parties.53
Many of the MMD leadership who were prominent in its early period in government have left it
and established rival political parties. 54
 The establishment of the National Party in August 1993 brought
together many prominent individuals who had resigned or been expelled from the Government. In this
new party, Baldwin Nlcumbula and Mbilcusita-Lewanika, who resigned from the first MMD cabinet in
1992, were joined by Mulemba, Kasonde and Arthur Wina, who were sacked that April as Ministers of
Mines, Finance and Education respectively. 55
 The Zambia Democratic Congress was formed in 1995,
following the departure from the MMD of National Treasurer, Dean Mung'omba, and National
Secretary Derrick Chitala. 56
 The Liberal Progressive Front was formed by Chongwe following his
resignation from the post of Legal Affairs Minister in 1994 and the National Lima Party was established
in 1996 by, among others, dismissed Minister of Agriculture, Guy Scott.57
However, many of these parties also seemed incapable of constructing a stable organisation and
reaching beyond sectional and factional politics. The leadership of the National Party was won in 1994
by Nlcumbula at a convention reported to be "characterised by charges of regionalism, tribalism, bribery
and block voting." 58
 In 1995, Mulemba ousted Nlcumbula from the leadership, prompting Nlcumbula to
52 Ihonvbere (1996, p.184-90). Institutional Investor (31/12/1998) summarised the widespread
accusations that "public money, routinely siphoned into private hands through a network of front
companies, ends up offshore... ministers openly bid for - and win - government tenders for the supply of
goods to the ministries. Others are secretly paid for facilitating business deals." Accusations of
government corruption have also come from within the MMD. For example, Kavindele has criticised
leaders "helping themselves to government funding and property" (Post 15/5/1996).
53 Africa Confidential (3/7/1992 and 29/7/1994). Resigning from government in 1996, Works and
Supply Minister Simon Zukas stated that the party had been "hijacked" by "parasitic businessmen and
politicians with bad records" (Post 22/7/1996).
Politics in Zambia's Third Republic has been marked by the multiplicity of small parties. The
discussion below includes all those which gained more than 1 percent of the parliamentary vote in the
1996 elections.
55 The defection of Shamwana brought all the candidates whom Chiluba had defeated for the MMD
presidency in 1991 together in the National Party.
36 E/U(q2/1995, p.6-'7, and q3/1995, p.8-9). Before they left, Mung'omba and Chitala had been
identified among a group of younger politicians seeking to advance their position in place of an older
generation of politicians (Southern African Economist, September 1994).
E/U(q2/1996, p.11). It was reported that a number of MMD members from Southern Province had
defected to the party after they had failed to secure MMD nomination for the elections.
58 Southern African Economist (July 1994).
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rejoin the MMD, and in 1996, Mbilcusita-Lewanika resigned as the party's National Secretary to form a
new party, Agenda for Zambia.59
Neither has UNIP avoided internal disputes and schisms. Disputes over the successor to
Kaunda led to the break away of Enoch Kavindele and the formation of his United Democratic Party in
1992, which the following year dissolved as Kavindele joined the MMD. When Kaunda decided to
return to active politics, renewed factional disputes erupted, with the parliamentary leader of UNIP
among those defecting to the MMD.6°
Burnell (1995, p.15) has characterised this fluidity as the "politics of the revolving door" in
which "politicians remain mobile in terms of their party allegiance and strive to reposition themselves
inside the parties." 61 As many of the competing parties reflect personal rivalries, rather than differences
in their ideology or social basis, they have generally failed to differentiate themselves in their economic
policies. UNIP, for example, has drawn attention to the fact that the policies pursued by the MMD are a
continuation of the policies which they adopted in 1989, but criticised their implementation by the
MMD. 62 In the case of privatisation, they argue that the present policy has benefited only MMD leaders
and foreign enterprise, whereas they would have sought a wider local involvement. 63 At the time of the
1996 elections all the main parties presented a similar economic prescriptions and supported
privatisation, with the main issue of contention being the new constitution forced through by the
Government in the face of widespread opposition.64
59 Following the death of Mulemba in 1998, Daniel Lisulo has become President of the party. In 1997
Kasonde left the National Party to rejoin the MMD (Post 5/6/1997).
60 EIU (q4/1995, p.8).
61 Burnell (1995, p.19) "In the light of the above, much of the intra-party and inter-party manoeuvring
may be best characterised in terms of 'fractions' rather than factions. This signifies that the groups are
more like tendencies than factions, for they appear to be transient and informal; and it could be
premature to depict groups individually in terms of shared attitudes and common currents of opinion...
A fraction can be as small as just one individual." The fragmentation might have been greater had the
Supreme Court ruled that members of parliament who changed parties must seek re-election (EIU,
g1/1994, p.9).
132 Post (15/5/1996).
63 Post (3/11/1995, 8/11/1995 and 13/8/1998).
64 The Constitution is examined in SAPEM (December 1997, p.21-6). Among the most controversial
clauses was one which had the effect of barring Kenneth Kaunda from re-contesting the Presidency as
his parents were born in an area which is in present day Malawi.
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Although the 1996 elections returned the MMD to government, they were boycotted by UNIP
and many local and international observers doubted that they could be judged free and fair. 65 The major
opposition parties rejected the results of the election and tensions between them and the government
increased. In August 1997, following an attempt by opposition leaders Kenneth Kaunda and Rodger
Chongwe to hold a rally without police permission, both were injured as shots were fired at their vehicle.
The situation worsened after a failed coup attempt in which soldiers, led by Captain Steven Lungu, held
the Multi-Media Centre in Lusaka during the night of 28th October 1997. 66 The Government responded
by declaring a State of Emergency, lifted in March 1998, and detaining, among other coup suspects,
leading opposition politicians.67
Alongside the problems of the consolidation of a multi-party system, the role played by other
organisations in civil society has diminished. While the trades unions supported the MMD in the
election campaign, they remained organisationally separate and the role that ZCTU acquired as the de
facto opposition party became redundant under multi-party arrangements. 68 In addition, the vigorous
implementation of structural adjustment policies has resulted in renewed pressures on the trades unions
themselves to protect the immediate interests of their members as employees.69
The movement as a whole has also been weakened by the split in 1994 between ZCTU and a
number of unions which accounted for nearly half of its affiliated membership. 7° The reasons for the
split have been variously presented as representing the division between a pro-MMD faction and the
65 Apart from the legal and constitutional framework in which they were conducted, doubts were
expressed over the procedures for registration and they were boycotted by a number of opposition parties
including UNIP. The elections are assessed by Baylies and Szeftel (1997) and Kees van Donge (1998).
66 Post (29/10/1998) and Africa Confidential (7/11/1997 and 5/12/1997). The coup attempt copied the
similar unsuccessful attempt by Luchembe in 1991, although it is not generally suggested that Lungu
acted with any senior army conspirators.
67 Dean Mung'omba was detained soon after the coup and was charged with treason, although these
were withdrawn during the trial in December 1998. Kenneth Kaunda was abroad at the time of the coup
attempt and, despite assurances to President Mugabe, was detained after returning to Zambia. Kaunda
was released in June and charges of treason by misprison were dropped. Rodger Chongwe who was also
abroad at the time of the coup has not returned to Zambia. Nakatindi Wina, the MMD Chair for
Women's Affairs also faced treason charges which were withdrawn in December 1998 (Post 29/12/1997,
29/1/1998, 22/12/1998; and EIU q3/1998, p.11-2)
68 Ralcner (1992, p.59) quotes ZCTU General Secretary Chirwa, stating in 1991 that "our aim has been
to introduce pluralism. We need a new government, because UNIP has failed. When another party forms
a zovernment, labour will move back to its normal role of a trade union movement."
69 Simutanyi (1995, p.210-7) discusses union involvement on issues of pacing, redundancies and
retraining.
70 Five unions disaffiliated including the Mineworkers Union and the National Union of Teachers,
which had been the largest two unions within ZCTU (Gostner, 1997, p.57-8).
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existing ZCTU leadership, and between Unions who were more or less affected by the policies of
privatisation and structural adjustment. 71
 While the breakaway unions attempted to form themselves
into a rival Federation of Free Trade Unions with a more "pro-active" approach towards the government
policies, by the end of 1997 all but two of the unions had rejoined ZCTU.72
The leadership of ZCTU has continued to state its support for an economic adjustment strategy
that can achieve economic recovery, while expressing concern that the policies being implemented place
too much of the costs of adjustment on their members. 73
 Business organisations have likewise
concentrated on issues of implementation rather than questioning the trajectory of policy, and the
Zambian Association of Manufacturers has consistently expressed concern that the high rates of duty on
imported raw materials and the high rates of interest are damaging industry. 74 It may be noted,
however, that this may be changing, with a recent condemnation by the Chair of ZACCI of IMF
sponsored structural adjustment, suggesting a revaluation of the underlying strategy of economic
policy.75
SECTION 4.2. SCOPE AND DESIGN OF PRIVATISATION.
The scope of the privatisation programme embarked upon by the MMD government was far
broader than that pursued by UNIP. In a statement in December 1991 the Government declared that
As far as the privatisation programme is concerned, there is no sacred lamb! In other words,
the Government is committed to total privatisation of the Parastatal sector. Government will
not engage in business (emphasis in original).76
Despite this undertaking, uncertainty remained over strategic and utility industries. The March
1992 New Economic Recovery Programme, whilst committing the Government to the privatisation of
most state enterprises within five years, emphasised the commercialisation of public utilities and longer
71 See Simutanyi (1996, p.839, note 49), Gostner (1997, p.57-9) and Ginsburg (1997, p.62).
72 While attention has focused on the breakaway from ZCTU, the fragmentation of the unions has been
a more generalised occurrence, prompted by the amending of labour legislation in 1990. The
Mineworkers Union and the Union of Financial and Allied Workers remain outside ZCTU (Times of
Zambia 4/5/1998).
73 Gostner (1997, p.5'7) and Post (27/10/1995). Similar attitudes were reflected at grass roots level.
Trade unionists at the state enterprise Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia supported privatisation as a way to
maintain the enterprise as a going concern, but expressed concern that it would entail redundancies
(Buhlungu and van der Walt, 1997, p.64).
/4 New African (July 1993), Southern African Economist (June 1994, p.21-2) and Post (1/11/1995).
75 Post (12/11/1998).
76 The statement is reproduced in Gardner (1993, p.4'7).
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term restructuring of ZCCM's ownership. 77 Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, Penza, asserted
later that year that strategic enterprises such as ZCCM, PTC and ZESCO would be sold as soon as
possible, while Vice President Mwanawasa suggested that this might take a period of up to twenty years
to achieve and President Chiluba offered assurances that the government would retain a "strategic
interest" in such cases.78 The issue was resolved on the basis that while there would be no negative list
of enterprises that were not for sale, the timing and method of sales would reflect public concerns.79
The administrative framework under which the privatisation programme is being undertaken is
outlined in Section 4.2.1 and the plans for the sequencing of the sales are examined at Section 4.2.2.
While the privatisation process is on-going a number of enterprises, albeit decreasing, have continued be
under state ownership. The arrangements that have been implemented to supervise them are examined
at Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Programme Administration. 
The responsibility for the privatisation programme was handed to the Minister of Commerce
Trade and Industry. In contrast to the ad hoc approach of the preceding regime, the NIMD declared that
they would provide a legal framework for the sales." That framework was provided by the Privatisation
Act which was passed in July 1992, the central provision of which was the establishment of the Zambian
Privatisation Agency. 81 The ZPA was created under the direction of a board consisting of twelve
members, representing both government and independent organisations and whose appointment was
subject to the scrutiny and ratification of the National Assembly. 82 The Board was to be responsible for
the appointment of the staff, including the agency's Director who would act as Chief Executive Officer.
77 Republic of Zambia (1992, p.11-2 and 19).
78 EIU (q1/1993, p.18) and Africa Research Bulletin (15/10/1992, co1.10989).
79 Ngenda, Vice Chair of ZPA (1993, p.299).
80 Republic of Zambia (1992, p.11). The MMD suspended the privatisation programme initiated by
UNIP, until it had established its own framework for divestiture (Kaunga, 1994, p.111).
81 Privatisation Act (II, 3). As Gardner (1993) notes, in implementing privatisation the Government has
also needed to amend a number of other acts that would have restricted its ability to enact sales.
Fundanga and Mwaba (1997) note that without amendment to land and property law, divestiture of
enterprises with certain land and residential housing could not have proceeded.
82 The Act states that the President shall appoint, subject to the scrutiny and ratification of the National
Assembly, the following; the Permanent Secretary to Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry;
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance; the Attorney-General; the Dean of the School of
Business of the Copperbelt University: and representatives of Zambia Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, Zambian Federation of Employers, Law
Association of Zambia, Zambia Institute of Certified Accountants, the churches in Zambia, the Bankers
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The ZPA was given a wide range of duties covering both the design and the implementation of
the policy. 83 It was to recommend to the cabinet privatisation policy guidelines, a sequence plan for the
sales and the method of sale of each individual enterprise. Once approval was granted, the ZPA was
required to screen potential investors through the setting of pre-qualification criteria, prepare all
documentation necessary for a sale, arrange for independent valuation of enterprises and assets to be
sold and evaluate bids. The ZPA was required to appoint independent consultants to undertake the
valuation of enterprises and to negotiate the terms of the sale.
The Privatisation Act defined privatisation as "the transferring to the private sector of part or
the whole of the equity or other interest held by the Government, directly or indirectly, in a State owned
enterprise" and listed a number of methods through which the agency would carry this out. 84 While
including "public offering of shares," "private sale of shares through negotiated or competitive bids" and
the "offer of additional shares... to reduce government shareholding," which could transfer majority
ownership to the private sector, it also included "lease and management contracts" which would leave
the state retaining ultimate ownership of the asset. 85 In addition to this, the ZPA was empowered to
undertake the pre-sale "reorganisation" of enterprises, to unbundle them into a number of separate units,
or to liquidate them. 86 The Act also allowed for the retention by the Minister of Finance of a "golden
share" in a privatised enterprise, defined as "a share with special rights to enable the Government in the
national interest to intervene in the operations of a company."87
Association of Zambia, the farmers (Privatisation Act, II, 5). The National Assembly in fact rejected the
first nominee of the Churches, on the basis that he was not a member of the clergy (ZPA, 31/12/1992,
E.3).3 Privatisation Act (II, 8). While the main duties are outlined below, the Act also required the agency
to monitor and oversee the programme, to seek potential investors, to maintain records, to liase with
other institutions, to publicise its activities and "do all such things as are necessary or incidental or
conducive to the better carrying out of the functions specified in this act." Additional requirements are
stated at (Privatisation Act, IV, 32).
84 Privatisation Act (I, 2 and III, 22.1).
85 The Act also permitted the ZPA to employ "any other method the agency may consider appropriate"
to divest state enterprises (Privatisation Act, IV, 22.1). Chilipamushi's (1994, p.17-8) criticism that the
ZPA's options in designing privatisations were restrictive understates the freedom granted to the agency.
86 Privatisation Act (IV, 22.1 and IV,35)
87 Privatisation Act (I, 2 and IV, 18). The terms of the legislation offered substantial latitude in the
specific rights attached to golden shares. In the case of Maamba Collieries the ZPA reported that "it
would enable the government to appoint a director to Maamba's board as well as to ensure that
significant changes in ownership or business strategy of the Company will be undertaken with the
national interest in mind" (Post 27/11/1997).
132
In evaluating the bids which it received for enterprises, the Act required that the ZPA refer to
four criteria. Firstly, it should avoid the creation of monopolies; secondly, it should consider the price
offered; thirdly, it should consider the bidders' "ability and commitment to develop the enterprise;" and
fourthly, it should consider the bidders "track record... and expertise." 88 The last two criteria, which
examined qualitative factors, where themselves the subject of a broad interpretation. Among other
factors, they were evaluated on the basis of the projected levels of investment, technical and product
innovation, import substitution, export promotion, employment creation and whether the bidders were
Zambian citizen or among the current management or employees of the enterprises.89
The Act sought to offer terms that would attract both foreign and domestic participation in
divestitures. No restrictions were placed on the participation of foreign investors in the privatisation
programme. In addition to this, if their investment met certain criteria, they were eligible to benefit from
incentives available under the Investment Act of 1991.90 However, the Act also made provision for
Zambian citizens to receive preferential treatment in the privatisation process through a number of
mechanisms. Small batches of shares could be made available to Zambian citizens at a discount, as
could bonus issues based on long term retention. While these arrangements were focused on public
offerings, a further concession which allowed citizens to make payments for shares by instalments,
applied equally to private sales.91
The arrangements for the revenue generated by the privatisations was also outlined in the
Act92 Receipts were to be held in a special account at the Bank of Zambia and could only be spent on a
specified activities with the agreement of the Minister of Finance. Principally, these were related either
to facilitating the divestiture of existing state enterprises as going concerns or to the developing of
opportunities for investment by Zambian citizens, although the legislation also allowed for the less
specific uses such as "funding of any social project in the public interest."
88 Privatisation Act (II, 8.2i). The Act also required that the ZPA should sell assets at their market
value (ibid, IV, 22.2).
89 ZPA (30/6/1993, p.48).
90 The Act stated that they must either provide expertise necessary for an enterprise to improve its
efficiency or to undertake exports, or provide investment or foreign technology, or provide international
linkages necessary to the business (Privatisation Act, IV, 30)
91 Apart from this case, the Privatisation Act (IV, 31) stated that "the shares of a State owned enterprise
shall not be sold on credit." The concession did not, however extend to limited companies owned by
Zambians. This was not well understood by bidders who often submitted ineligible bids (ZPA
31/12/1993).
92 Privatisation Act (V,39).
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In addition to these measures, the Act also provided for the establishment of a Trust Fund to
hold shares in newly privatised companies for later sale to Zambian citizens. 93 The Zambia
Privatisation Trust Fund (ZPTF) was established in 1993 to promote the sale of shares to Zambian
citizens. Although the ZPA and the government would receive the sale proceeds and any dividends
accruing to the shares while held by the fund, they would not exercise control over them. To avoid the
Fund itself becoming a new state holding company, restrictions were placed upon its holdings in each
enterprise. The Fund could hold no more than 30 percent of the shares in any enterprise, and in cases in
which no other shareholder owned a controlling interest, the Fund could only hold shares where another
shareholder agreed to be responsible for the management of the enterprise. If at the end of its life, the
fund held any residual holdings, it would be converted into a unit trust.
The Act provided for a high level of transparency and disclosure for the privatisation process.
The incorporation in the ZPA of a wide range of interests from Zambian society and the requirement for
the appointment of independent valuers and negotiators, were supplemented by the requirement that the
Agency publish details of the consultants, valuers, lawyers, public accountants and merchant banks used
in the programme; of the bidders and their offers; the reason for selection of the winning bid and the
price and any special conditions of sale.94
Although the Act included these checks and balances to allay fears that assets would be sold
cheaply or to the benefit of government members, it was criticised, on the one hand, for being too
mechanistic and lacking commercial orientation, while others suggested that the degree of cabinet
control over the ZPA compromised its independence, and that direct accountability to parliament would
have been preferable.95 Neither have arrangements for transparency always been implemented
adequately. In December 1997, a Parliamentary Committee expressed concern that vacancies on the
ZPA Board for representatives of the Churches, the Law Association and the Bankers Association had
been vacant for over a year. 96 In 1998, the absence of Church and Banking representatives from the
93The Trust Deed was signed on 17/6/1993. The Trustees of the Fund represented the Government and
ZPA, the Law Association of Zambia, ZACCI, ZICA and the Bankers' Association of Zambia. Details of
the ZPTF are from Munshi (1995) and World Bank (1993a).
94 Privatisation Act (N,, 38).
95 New African (December 1992) and non-attributable interview. ZAM has subsequently suggested that
political interference has hampered the operation of the agency (Post 5/1/1998).
96 Post (1/12/1997). In addition the Times of Zambia (4/12/1997) reported a complaint by Dipak Patel
MP that the ZPA had ceased to publish the full information that it was required to by the Act.
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Board was again highlighted by a Parliamentary Committee, who additionally drew attention to the re-
appointment of board members previously removed for contravening ZPA regulations and ordered that
the entire Board be reconstituted. 97 Concern has also been expressed that while the choice of particular
consultants and other professionals has been transparent, the criteria for that choice has not and that the
ZPA has favoured a limited number of firms.98
Provisions for transparency, moreover, have not avoided controversy with regard to the
acquisition of enterprises by members of the government and the ruling party. The Act required that a
"political leader" or "public officer" must disclose an intention to bid for shares. 99 When in 1993, the
Deputy Commerce and Industry Minister Paul Tembo, disqualified bids from a government minister,
two deputy ministers and three members of parliament, he was overruled by the ZPA which disputed his
jurisdiction and declared the bids valid. 100
 The ZPA noted that the failure to swiftly draft guidelines led
to this confusion and the regulations were subsequently clarified. 101
 Suggestions have continued to flow
that the privatisation process has favoured leading members of the government and that the funds which
they have used to purchase property have not been legitimately acquired.102
Another area in which the arrangements of the privatisation agency have been problematic is in
the reliance of the ZPA upon the co-operation of other agencies of the Government. The ZPA required
the approval of the cabinet for the method of sale, while for the completion of a sale the co-operation of
the management of an enterprise and the approval of the terms by the Attorney General and the Minister
97 Times of Zambia (8/12/1998).
98 Kapita of the National Lima Party also criticised the agency for favouring a small number of law
firms in their contracting (Post 9/4/1997). Times of Zambia (3/12/1997) raised similar concerns.
99 Privatisation Act (IV,26).
100 Among those involved was Deputy Minister of Tourism, Nataldndi Wina, who held an interest in a
company bidding for Eagle Travel Limited. The bid was unsuccessful (Southern African Economist,
February 1993, p.36; and E/U,q1/1993, p.18). Fred Hirsch (Zambia) a company wholly owned by John
Kalenga, Deputy Minister in the Office of the Vice President, had bid for three first tranche enterprises.
Although shortlisted in two cases, Kalenga's death resulted in the companies withdrawal from
negotiations (ZPA 30/6/1993 and 31/12/1993).
101 ZPA (30/6/1993). Subsequently the guidelines were clarified with a public official being defined as
anyone paid out of state funds, although critics expressed concern that the spouses of leaders and
officials were not required to declare an interest (E/Uq2/1993, p.19; and Profit, December 1994, p.12-
3).
102 Post (2/12/1997) and Institutional Investor (31/12/1998). Despite this, the ZPA has acted against
ministers who have defaulted on purchase payments, including Foreign Minister Christian Tembo,
whose Chilongolo Farm was repossessed and re-advertised (Post 29/5/1996).
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of Finance was necessary. 103 These were not always forthcoming and hindered the effectiveness of the
ZPA.
Concerns have also been raised over the arrangements for the handling of the proceeds from the
sales. In 1998, the Auditor General reported that the Ministry of Finance failed to properly maintain the
ZPA account at the Bank of Zambia, with the result that "it is difficult to ensure that all funds from the
sale of state owned enterprises are used for the purpose stipulated under the privatisation Act.
Despite these problems, the ZPA itself has generally retained a reputation for good administration and
the areas of the privatisation programme to which most criticism has been directed have tended to be
those outside of the control of the ZPA.105
4.2.2. The Sequence Plan.
In accordance with the Act, the ZPA drew up a privatisation sequence plan. The Agency
initially identified a portfolio of 144 enterprises for divestiture. With the exemption of seven, they were
divided into eleven tranches, which would be offered for sale sequentially.106
Explaining the criteria for the selection of the First Tranche, ZPA Director, James Matale
(1995, p.18), noted that:
The selection of small and uncomplicated, enterprises served to test the feasibility of the
process which had been designed to guide the privatisation programme, to train staff and to
create confidence in the public that privatisation was meant to benefit Zambians as none of
the small firms were deemed to be of interest to foreign investors.
It was intended that all of these would be divested through private sales on the basis of competitive bids.
The second tranche consisted of 32 enterprises, of which 25 were classified as being engaged in
agriculture or agro-processing. In contrast to the first tranche, it included enterprises rated as large and
medium sized. It was judged that the inclusion of large and profitable enterprises at this stage in the
103 ZPA (31/12/1993).
104 Post (14/4/1998). In 1997 the Parliamentary Committee on Public Investment has questioned the
destination of ZCCM sale proceeds that have been directed to ZCCM rather than the privatisation
revenue account as the act states (Times of Zambia 4/12/1997).
105 Praise for the agency has come from the World Bank and international business (Post 20/2/1998
and World Bank, 1996b). ZACCI has recently, however, expressed concerns over the level of
transparency and a rare complaint about the ZPA by a bidder was registered by Stocks and Stocks
Holdings Limited of South Africa, who complained that details of their bid for Lusaka Intercontinental
Hotel had been leaked by the ZPA to a rival bidder, to induce them into a bidding war (Times of Zambia
22/8/1996 and 14/1/1997; and Post 1/5/1998).
106 The sequence plan from the ZPA (31/12/1992) stated the timing of ZCCM, Indeni Refinery,
Tazama Pipelines, ZIMOIL, Zambia Railways, ZESCO and PTC were still to be determined.
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privatisation process would assure foreign investors of the Government's commitment to the programme
and provide an opportunity to offer shares to the public. 107 While including a relatively even spread of
enterprises by size, later tranches reflected the strategic significance of certain sectors. Sales of financial
and transport enterprises were not planned until the fourth tranche, and mining enterprises delayed until
the fifth.
This sequence plan was revised in the first half of 1994 and was reduced to seven tranches.108
This reformulation of the plan consisted mainly of combining a number of the outstanding tranches,
although strategic sectors continued to remain outside of the framework. 109 A special emphasis was
also given to the divestiture of the trading sector, with the inclusion of all of these enterprises in the
revised third tranche. Delays in finalising the sales of enterprises from earlier tranches began to present
problems for the agency, which announced in October 1994 that it planned to move away from the
rigidity of the timetable and that enterprises would be advertised when they were ready for sale.11°
4.2.3. Supervision of Enterprises Before Sale.
Enterprises scheduled for privatisation have experienced a number of specific problems in
addition to those faced by the private enterprise sector. While ZIMCO remained in place, movement
towards the dismantling of the infrastructure of the state enterprise sector included the dissolution of its
sub-holding companies including INDEC0. 111 In addition, the 1992 Budget stated that while state
enterprises were required to pay an annual dividend equivalent to 10 percent of the Government equity,
they would not be financially supported by the Government and their debt would not carry a
government guarantee. 112 The Privatisation Act also placed stringent conditions on the functioning of
enterprises scheduled for privatisation. They were to "clear as far as possible all contractual, legal and
107 Matale (1995, p.18)
108 ZPA (30/6/1994).
109The revised third tranche included all of the previous tranche three enterprises and, with few
exceptions, all those from tranches four and five. In addition, it also included a number of enterprises
from later tranches. A revised fifth tranche covered most of the enterprises from tranches seven, eight,
nine and ten, while the revised tranche seven inherited the previous tranche eleven's emphasis on
mining. The new fourth tranche had a financial bias, as did the previous tranche six, although, in what
appears to be an error, many of these enterprises are duplicated in the new sixth tranche (ZPA
30/6/1994).
110 EIU (q4/1994,p.19-20).
111 Africa Economic Digest (17/5/1993).
112 Republic of Zambia (Budget Address 1992,p.28).
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other obligations" and "refrain from taking any action or actions which may cause industrial unrest."113
In addition to this, the Act stated that they could only "undertake any new capital investment
programme" if approved by the ZPA on the following criteria: that it constituted routine renewal; that it
was essential for the continuing operation of the enterprise; that it had a pay-back period of up to two
years; that it promoted exports or import substitution; that the enterprise was not due to be privatised
within two years; that it would not damage the company's financial position.' 14•
With the liquidation of ZIMCO in 1995, the liquidators acquired the responsibility of
overseeing its operating companies. This was delegated to the Directorate of State Enterprise within the
Ministry of Finance, which acted as their agent. The Auditor General was critical of this arrangement
which added to the complexity of their supervision and increased liquidation expenses. 115 The
adequacy of these arrangements for ensuring that state assets were properly protected and utilised
preceding their privatisation has also been questioned, and both the Auditor General and Parliamentary
Committees concerned with state investments have highlighted cases of asset stripping by enterprise
managers.116
Alongside this, and despite emphasising the commercial autonomy of state enterprises,
Ministers have continued to overrule the management of state enterprises in certain commercial
decisions. In 1997, the government succeeded in its plan for the Zambia National Commercial Bank to
merge with the private Chase Trust Bank, despite the resistance from the management of the former,
who argued that it was contrary to their business development strategy. 117 In another case, the efforts of
Development Bank of Zambia to recover outstanding loan payments was prevented by the Commerce
Trade and Industry Minister, Kavindele, who stopped them from placing the recently privatised NIECO
into receivership. 118 In both cases the state financial institutions were pursuing strategies in line with
government instructions of maintaining their commercial viability.
113 Privatisation Act (IV,21). This section of the Act also required the enterprise to follow agency
instructions, maintain good accounts, pay for all expenses of the privatisation and prepare a financial,
investment and staffing plan.
114 privatisation Act (IV, 21g)
115 post (25/10/1996).
116 Post (22/10/1996 and 1/12/1997) and Times of Zambia (11/10/1996). Shortly after its acquisition,
the new owners of National Milling were reported to have uncovered the organised theft of the
companies produce involving members of management (Times of Zambia 16/12/1996).
117 post (9/10/1997 and 1/12/1997).
118 Times of Zambia (16/4/1998).
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SECTION 4.3. IMPLEMENTING PRIVATISATION.
The measurement of the extent to which privatisation has occurred is subject to a number of
problems. While a measure of divestiture, based upon the proportion of state enterprise asset values or
projected earnings transferred to the private sector, would provide the most satisfactory measure, such
data is not readily available. The ZPA itself measures progress against the number of enterprises it has
divested. By the end of 1998 it had recorded 224 privatisations from a total working portfolio of 282
enterprises. 119 A problem with this approach, however, it that it does not differentiate between the sale
of a large or small enterprise, which are given equal weight in the count. In addition to this, the figures
of ZPA sales are on the one hand inflated by the practice of counting multiple sales when a single
company is unbundled and divested to a number buyers, and on the other hand deflated by not including
divestitures of state enterprise which have been handled by other agencies.120
An alternative approach is to evaluate the extent of divestment by reference to the original
portfolio of enterprises compiled by the ZPA in relation to their size. This avoids the double counting of
unbundled enterprises, allows for differentiation of the progress of different sized assets, and provides
some measure of the extent to which assets remain in state ownership. By the end of 1998, of the
original portfolio of 144 enterprises, 107 were privatisd 21 Of enterprises included within the original
tranches, two-thirds of those rated as large and three-quarters of those rated as medium or small were
privati,93:1., although among enterprises that were not tranched, only ZCCM had divested any assets.
The extent of divestiture that has been achieved may also be highlighted with reference to those
enterprises which comprised the INDECO Group. These were generally the most commercially oriented
of the state enterprises, and their prominence in the early tranches of the sequence plan is evidence of
the ZPA's opinion that they represented good prospects for sale. 122 Of INDECO's 34 subsidiaries, eight
were rated large by the ZPA, ten medium sized and sixteen small scale. By the end of 1998, only one of
these, the large enterprise Kafue Textiles, remained in state ownership. 123 While outstanding areas
119 ZPA (1/1999a).
120 This includes, for example, state enterprises which have been divested through creditors liquidation.
121 These enterprises are listed in Appendix 4.
122 These first two tranches included the majority of the enterprises under INDECO, including 6 of its 7
large enterprises, 7 of its 12 medium enterprises and 14 of its 22 small enterprises.
123 Of the 33 divested, 23 had been sold intact, 6 unbundled and 4 liquidated.
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remain, therefore, the implementation of the privatisation policy under the MMD government has been
substantial.
This Section examines the implementation of privatisation in Zambia between 1992 and 1998.
In Section 4.3.1 the chronological sequence of sales is examined. Following initial problems, the rate at
which enterprises were privatised increased substantially from 1995. Section 4.3.2 examines the
methods through which enterprises were privatised. The factors which contributed to the choice of
different methods are examined, with examples provided of the process of their implementation for a
number of enterprises. The development of Zambia's capital markets during the privatisation process is
examined in Section 4.3.3. The privatisation process, it is argued, has both shaped, and been shaped by,
the development of capital markets. At the end of 1998, a number of enterprises remained within state
ownership. Section 4.3.4 identifies the most important of these enterprises and outlines the government
intentions for their future ownership.
4.3.1 Actual Sequence of Sale.
The rate at which the ZPA achieved the divestiture of enterprises can be examined across two
periods. The first period, in which progress was slow, ran from the assessment of first tranche bids, in
early 1993, until late 1994. It was only in mid-1994, two years after the passage of the Act, that the first
large company was sold, at which point only nine of the original nineteen first tranche companies had
been sold. From the end of 1994 to the present; sales have occurred more frequently and have included a
greater number of large enterprises. That the timing of the sales has been uneven should not be
surprising. In many sectors a substantial period of preparation was necessary and the ZPA needed to
acquire experience and develop procedures. However, the delays have been greater than those provided
for, and have exposed a number of state enterprises to insolvency. This section discusses the timing of
sales and some of the problems encountered in the execution of the programme.
The first tranche was approved by the cabinet in September 1992 and was followed by the
approval of enterprises for inclusion in the second tranche in November of that year. The first two sales
announced in June 1993 were Eagle Travel and Autocare Ltd, with the Director of the ZPA Matale
stating that "I can safely say nine more companies will be sold off this month." 124 By the end of 1993,
124 Reuters (Lusaka, 20/6/1993).
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however, the ZPA had completed only four additional sales, all of which were rated sma11. 125 This was
significantly fewer than had been projected by the Government's and the ZPA's own timetable which
aimed to have completed the sales of ten enterprises by the beginning of 1993, with three large
enterprises among those completed by the end of that year.126
The ZPA could point to a number of specific problems which it faced in moving the
privatisation programme forward. Of crucial importance were the administrative difficulties faced
relating to the establishment of the agency and the appointing of a full complement of staff. The funding
of the programme also presented obstacles. Although the Act placed responsibility for funding company
valuations with the enterprises, due to their shortage of funds the ZPA itself had to meet these costs,
which increased the pressure on its finances. 127 In offering for sale the first tranche of enterprises, the
agency also uncovered a number of public misconceptions regarding the implementation of the
programme which it sought to correct.128
Delays occurred in obtaining Cabinet approval of the method of sale for enterprises and in the
Attorney General and the Minister of Finance approving the final completion of sales. Although the
proposed method of privatisation for twelve of the enterprises included in the Second Tranche was
submitted to the Cabinet in June 1993, approval was still awaited by the ZPA in December of that
year. 129
Relations with the managers of State Enterprises scheduled for sale were also problematic and
the ZPA complained that ZIMCO was slow to collate the necessary documentation for the completion of
sales. 13 ° Disputes also occurred over the valuations of enterprises, with ZIMCO arguing that the ZPA
125 The four small enterprises, all from the first tranche were AFE, Coolwell System, Poultry
Processing and Zuva Zuva Designs.
126 Chilanga Cement, Zambia Sugar and ZAMEFA were to have been sold, while negotiations were to
have reached a conclusion on Kafironda and National Milling (Republic of Zambia 1992, and World
Bank, 1993a).
127 ZPA noted that it was reliant on donor funding but that its largest donor, USAID, had held back
funds due to the slow progress of implementation (ZPA 31/12/1993, p.20-1).
128 ZPA (31/6/1993, p.12-'7) noted, for example, that the agency had received many applications for
small blocks of shares rather than for the complete company. Television announcements and letters to
individuals who had submitted these applications were required to address this misunderstanding. The
ZPA also admitted to having included too many bidders on its shortlists for sales negotiations and over
burdening the negotiation teams.
129 ZPA (31/12/1993, p.15)
130 ZPA (31/12/1993, p.22). A "senior official at the ministry of finance" commented that, "ZIMCO is
the biggest obstacle in this process. It should have been scrapped before the privatisation programme
started. They are dragging their feet and want to ensure that nothing takes off because how do you phase
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appointed consultants had undervalued a number of enterprises. The ZPA criticised ZIMCO for leaking
information on valuations and negotiating strategy to the press, and saw in ZIMCO's behaviour an
obstructionist motive:
The presentations made by ZIMCO and the manner in which they were made suggested that
there was an attempt to derail the privatisation process. The interference of ZIMCO resulted
in a slowing of the pace of privatisation and negatively affected the smooth divestiture of the
companies. 131
Criticism at the speed of programme implementation grew throughout 1993. One source of
criticism was the ZACCI magazine, Profit. David Simpson of ZACCI contrasted the rate of privatisation
in Zambia with that achieved in Mexico, Estonia and the Czech Republic, and called for a greater
emphasis on completing sales quickly rather than on obtaining a good sale price or securing guarantees
of future employment levels.132
While admitting that "Privatisation is progressing more slowly than we would like" 133 , Matale
was critical of such comparisons and evaluations of Zambia's implementation simply by reference to the
number of completed sales and argued that
Amongst other things, the privatisation process in Zambia is intended to provide the basis for
economic development and growth. You will no doubt appreciate that satisfying such an
objective obliges the Zambian Privatisation Agency to evaluate bids differently from your
models where the principal objective would appear to be merely getting rid of the
enterprises. 134
Although more substantial progress was made during 1994, with the privatisation of Chilanga Cement,
the Central Division of Zambia Breweries and Nanga Farms, sales continued to consist principally of
small enterprises from the first tranche. 135
 Changes were made in the management of the ZPA in
September 1994, with the removal of the Director, Matale and his deputy Ng'andu. 136 It was announced
that the management of the Agency was to be restructured to speed up the programme and that the rigid
yourself out? ZIMCO wants to reassert its relevance to the economy by contradicting what the ZPA is
doing" (Southern African Economist, May 1994, p.32-3).
131 ZPA (31/12/1993, p.19-20).
132 Profit (November 1993, p.30-1). Criticism by David Simpson and Theo Bull also appeared in Profit
(May 1993, October 1993, and February 1994).
133 Profit (December 1993, p.4)
134 Profit (November 1993, p.30-1 and February 1994, p.27). A Zambia Economic Association meeting
in 1994 viewed the pace as acceptable, noting the long period over which the UK had pursued
privatisation (Zambia Economics Association, 1995, p.42).
135 Additional sales had been those of General Pharmaceutical, Crushed Stones Sales, Prime Marble
and Zambia Maltings
136 Their removal followed a number of reports, based on sources at the ZPA, which claimed that Patel
was the only cabinet minister fully supportive of the programme and that changes in legislation were
needed to speed up the rate of sale (Africa Economist Digest 15/8/1994; and Business Africa 8/9/1994).
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timetable format would be made more flexible. 137
 In addition to this, the liquidation of ZIMCO in early
1995 was seen as a positive step in overcoming internal opposition to the implementation of the
programme. 138
As TableXIX shows, the rate of divestiture in 1995 and 1996 was higher than that recorded in
the previous two years, and in addition, also included a greater number of large and medium sized
enterprises. 139 The extent to which this was the direct result of the management changes at the ZPA
cannot easily be quantified. Administrative problems were not the only cause of delay in
implementation. In late 1994, while noting the improved administration of the programme, President
Chiluba complained that buyers were slow to come forward for the enterprises that were advertised.140
The ZPA also remained dependent on the co-operation of other agencies, and in 1997 renewed its
complaint that the government was too slow in approving enterprises for advertisement.141
In part, the faster pace of sales after 1994 reflected the work that had already been completed in
the process of negotiating the sales of large enterprises. 142 For example, while the sales of ZAMEFA
and Zambia Sugar were completed in this period, both were the subject of long negotiations with
minority shareholders, beginning in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 143 In addition, the sale that had been
achieved had also provided the agency with a secure basis of funding which was not dependent upon
donors.144
137 EIU (q4/1994, p.19). Valentine Chitulu was appointed as the new Director of ZPA in April 1995
(EIUq211995,p.11). Africa Research Bulletin (16/10/1994-15/11/1994) reported that the donors want an
expatriate to head the Agency.
138 Penza noted that, "Donors saw ZIMCO as an impediment to the privatisation process and they will
see this as a greater commitment to privatisation by the government." Donors were pleased that it had
been achieved on time, a representative noting that; "It shows they are serious about privatisation"
(Reuters, Lusaka 31/3/1995).
139 Of the large sized enterprises divested as a single unit, Zambia Sugar was sold in 1995, with
ZAMEFA, BP (Zambia) and National Milling in 1996, and Maamba Collieries and Kafironda in 1997.
140 The President commented that "As far as we are concerned the companies are there for sale. I don't
think the blame is on our part. Everything on our part has been done and we are waiting for people to
react and respond on this" (Reuters, Stockholm, 6/12/1994).
141 Times of Zambia (14/1/1997).
142 Matale (Southern African Economist May 1994, p.33) stated that "when we begin to get out of the
woods we will move very fast and we are confident that without side-tracking issues, we would be
popping these companies out at a high rate. We have not achieved our full potential. We are just at the
threshold of breaking through."
1 43 The ZPA also continued to experience delays in new negotiations that had commenced after the
restructuring. In the case of National Milling, whose sale was completed in late 1996, negotiations with
minority shareholders had commenced in mid 1995 (ZPA, undated IV).
144 Post (10/6/1996).
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Table X IX.
Annual Level of Privatisations by Quantity and by Value.
1993 to 1998.
Year. Number of Units Sold. Value of Units Sold ($ million)
1993 4 3
1994 9 22
1995 52 68
1996 90 54
1997 58 (a) -
1998 11 (a) -
Source: On numbers of units sold ZPA (Privatisation Status Report, 25/1/95 and 30/4/96; and Summary
Status Report, 1/1999a). On value of units sold Pangaea Partners (Companies Privatised in Zambia,
undated I).
Note: (a) Pangaea Partners data only covers the period to 1996.
In 1998 the number of sales slowed, with 11 privatisations being completed. Pressure for
progress on these outstanding enterprises has once again come from business and ZACCI has called for
the government to move ahead with the divestiture of utilities including ZESCO and ZAMTEL.145
With many of the smaller enterprises divested, this may mark the beginning of a third phase of the
privatisation programme in which fewer sales occur, but are of higher value and more strategic
industries.
4.3.2 Methods of Privatisation
As discussed in Section 4.2.1 of this Chapter, the Privatisation Act allowed the ZPA and the
government to choose between a wide range of different methods of privatisation. These choices had
consequences for the ability of the government to realise the objectives which it sought to pursue through
privatisation, for the future structures of the industries involved and for the patterns of private ownership
which resulted. The unbundling of enterprises, for example, reduced the potential for monopolistic
private enterprises and increased the accessibility of small entrepreneurs to acquire the resulting assets.
145 Post (7/7/1997).
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On the other hand, the unbundling process could also reduce the marketability of the resulting assets and
the sales revenue generated by the privatisation. Indigenous ownership could also be promoted by public
sales structured to allow for the creation of a diversified base of shareholders, while the decision to sell
an enterprise to the existing management will target a more limited group.
The choice of the form of privatisation also reflected the constraints under which the
privatisation programme has been undertaken. In particular, commercially weak state enterprises often
required the introduction of a controlling shareholder with access to foreign finance and technology,
such as a transnational corporation. In other cases, the government shared ownership rights over
enterprises with others such as minority shareholders and previous owners, which had to be addressed.
Table XX categorises the enterprises that have been privatised according to the method through
which this has been achieved. Overall most enterprises have been privatised intact through private sales,
with the remainder divided between those that have been unbundled or liquidated. 146 In no case has a
majority interest in any enterprise been divested through public sale. The method of sale has often varied
considerably for different sizes of enterprise. While tendering was used for most small scale enterprises
divested through private sales, sales of large and medium sized enterprises has been more common by
negotiation and has usually involved agreements for the flotation of a minority interest. The pattern of
unbundling has also differed according to the size of enterprise, being confined mainly to large and
medium enterprises. In contrast, the rate of liquidation has been relatively even across all sizes of
enterprise.
This section examines some of the factors which determined the choice of the method of
privatisation and the experience of their implementation. Section 4.3.2a examines the sale of enterprises
intact, while the process of unbundling is outlined in Section 4.3.2b and liquidations are discussed in
Section 4.3.2c. In each section, the primary focus is upon large and medium sized enterprises, the sale of
which have individually had a greater impact on the economy and on which more information has been
available than is the case for small enterprises.
146 Although, unbundling is not in itself a form of divestiture, the difficulties involved in tracing the
resulting assets have led to its treatment as such in this section.
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TABLE XX.
Privatisation by Method.
1992 to 1998.
Large
enterprises,
Medium
enterprises.
Small
enterprises.
Total.
Sold Intact by Private negotiated. 1 1 5 7
-plus minority float. 5 4 - 9
Private tender. - 2 32 34
-plus minority float. 1 2 - 3
Designated MBO. - - 6 6
Returned to Previous
owner.
- - 6 6
Sold Intact sub-total 7 9 49 65
Unbundled. 7 11 3 21
Liquidated. 4 3 14 21
Total. 18 23 66 107
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), Post (various), Pangaea Partners
(undated I) and Reuters (various).
4.3.2a Enterprises Sold Intact.
While over half of the enterprises divested as single units have been sold through private sale
by tender, this largely reflects the experience of small scale enterprises. Among large and medium scale
enterprises, privately negotiated sales have predominated. The most common reason for this has been
the existence of a minority shareholder in the large and medium enterprise, with pre-emptive rights to
the shares held by the govemment. 147 The existence of these rights obligated the ZPA to reach
147 Pre-emptive rights over government were exercised at Chilanga Cement, Zambia Sugar, ZAMEFA,
Kafironda, National Milling, BP (Zambia), Zambia Breweries, Nanga Farms, National Breweries,
Mpongwe Development Company, ZECCO and Agip (Zambia). Cases in which minority shareholders
have exercised pre-emptive rights over small enterprises include Kapiri Glass, Poultry Processing and
Nkwazi Manufacturing (ZPA 30/4/1996 and undated V).
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agreement with the minority shareholders over the terms of the privatisations. In the case of large and
medium enterprise, the ZPA commonly sought to reach a sales agreement in which provision was made
for a minority interest in the enterprise to be sold through a public sale to Zambian citizens and financial
institutions. 148
The arrangements of such a sale can be illustrated by the case of Chilanga Cement, which was
the first large scale enterprise to be divested. 149 As a state owned enterprise, 59.73 percent of Chilanga
Cement shares were held by ZIMCO, with significant minority holdings of 24.23 percent by CDC and
6.09 percent by Anglo American. 15 ° The enterprise had an effective monopoly position, being the only
cement producer in Zambia, and was protected from external competition by the high costs of
transporting its product. 151 It had returned a post-tax profit every year since 1982 and paid an annual
dividend since at least 1986. In this, it met many of the ZPA's criteria for an enterprise which could be
privatised through a public sale. 152 An existing agreement between the shareholders, however, provided
for CDC and Anglo American to exercise pre-emptive rights over the sale of any of the equity held by
ZIMCO.
When Chilanga Cement was announced as a candidate for privatisation, CDC in consultation
with Anglo American, chose to exercise those rights and entered into negotiations with the ZPA to
acquire a majority holding. Despite the strong position of the enterprise in the Zambian economy, CDC
was unable to attract any major cement company as a technical partner to join them in the
acquisition. 153 In October 1994 agreement was reached which increased the shareholding of the CDC
to 50.1 percent and Anglo American's to 12.6 percent, with the 27.4 balance of ZIMCO shares being
148 While many of these sale arrangements were concluded with existing minority shareholders, they
were also reached in the cases of Maamba Collieries, ROP and Zambia Oxygen, which were sold
through competitive tender. Although it possessed no pre-emptive rights over the company, Uniliver had
previously owned the assets that were divested as ROP (1975) Ltd.
149 Details of this sale are drawn from CDC Magazine (1994, no.3), ZPA (30/6/1994), Chilanga
Cement (1995).
150 The balance of 9.88 percent of shares were held by assorted former shareholders.
151 Standard Bank (1995) noted that "The costs of establishing a competing plant of similar capacity in
Zambia are prohibitive. Despite the fact that cement may be more cheaply produced elsewhere using
more modern technology, Chilanga Cement's unique position of industry dominance ensures that
reasonable profit margins can still be earned."
152 ZPA (undated I) required that candidates for flotation should be "large, profitable, and well
managed state owned enterprises that have a strong likelihood for success in the future... [and] where
there is a good chance of regular dividend income or capital appreciation."
153 CDC Magazine (1994, no.3, p.12) noted that "None of them, however, shared CDC's willingness to
take country risk at this stage of the cycle."
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passed to the ZPTF for offer to Zambian citizens and financial institutions. The flotation of the company
on the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) was completed in May 1995.154
The agreement of a minority flotation as part of the privatisation of Chilanga Cement was
followed by similar agreements for other large enterprises, including Zambia Sugar in 1995, Metal
Fabricators and BP (Zambia) in 1996 and Kafironda in 1997. 155 In addition, agreements for minority
flotation were also reached for enterprises that were sold through private tender, including the large
sized Maamba Collieries.156
Despite these public offerings of minority interests, the absence of any privatisation based
primarily on a public offering is significant. Early in the evolution of the programme, the World Bank
expected that 10 enterprises would be sold through public offer in addition to any minority floats.157
Although the government has subsequently reiterated its commitment to implementing privatisation by
public sale, it has included within this minority flotations, and the future sale of any majority interests by
this method remain uncertain.158
A number of enterprises were privatised through management buy-outs. An initiative to
encourage this form of divestiture was launched by the Government in 1994, which targeting a number
of enterprises which would be offered to their management. The initiative was criticised in the National
Assembly, where the rationale for placing the enterprises in the hands of "management's which have
failed to run them" was questioned, and by the ZPA, whose opposition was overruled by Commerce and
Industry Minister Pate1. 159 Those offered consisted of a mixture of small enterprises and unbundled
154 In addition an offer of shares was also made by the ZPTF to a Trust established to hold shares for
subsequent sale to employees of Chilanga Cement.
155 It was also agreed with minority shareholders at the medium sized National Breweries and Agip
(Zambia). In addition, in the medium sized agricultural developments Nanga Farms and Mpongwe
Development Company, it was agreed that a minority flotation would occur after the projects were fully
operational.
156 Minority flotations were also agreed where enterprises had been unbundled. When Zambia
Breweries was unbundled the resulting companies, Zambia Breweries and Northern Breweries, were
both privatised with agreement for minority flotation. Such an agreement was also reached in the sale of
Pamodzi Hotel, formerly part of the National Hotels Development Corporation (ZPA undated II).
157 World Bank (1993a, p.10).
158 In 1995 the Government stated that it expected 14 public sales of enterprises, however this included
cases of minority floatations (Republic of Zambia, 1995a, p.17). By the end of 1998, 15 privatisation
agreements were concluded which included provisions for minority flotations.
159 News From Zambia (2/2/1995). This concern was also expressed in Profit (March 1995, p.32).
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units of some large and medium sized companies. 160
 The success of the initiative was limited, with only
6 of the 14 enterprises offered sold to their management.161
A small number of enterprises were also privatised through a return to their previous owners.
This resulted not from a policy decision but from court rulings ordering the return of mills nationalised
by the government in 1986.162
4.3.2b Unbundled Enterprises.
While in cases where the enterprises were sold intact, the industrial structure was maintained,
the unbundling of existing companies into constituent units allowed both for the promotion of
competition within various sectors of the economy and, by decreasing the size of companies offered for
sale, increased the opportunity for a greater indigenous ownership.
The degree to which the unbundling of an enterprise could be achieved depended partly upon
its degree of internal integration. Generally, unbundling has been limited to sectors such as milling,
trading, farming and hotels, in which companies often consisted of horizontally related enterprises. In
the case of the medium sized Zambia Steel and Building Supplies, the company was created by INDECO
through the merging of its own building supplies company with a number of private companies in which
it acquired a controlling interest. In planning it divestiture, the ZPA could identify six discrete units,
consisting of two factories and four sales outlets, which it could divest separately.163
The ZPA chose to privatise the milling sector through unbundling. As planned, this involved
the division of Amalgamated Milling into three units, INDECO Milling into six units, United Milling
into two, and the large sized National Milling into four units. 164 This was achieved in all cases except
for National Milling, which was sold as a single unit. In this case, the ZPA was constrained by minority
160 zpA (25/1/1995). Amongst these were four enterprises which remained unsold from the first
tranche. They were Norgroup, Nkwazi, Monarch and Consolidated Tyre Services.
161 In addition, a number of units of unbundled enterprises were also divested through this initiative.
These sales have not, however, been the only MBO's, as a number of divestitures through private tender
have included management and employee participation. Management has participated, for example in
the acquisition of Crushed Stone Supplies, NIEC Overseas, Zamcargo, Zambia State Financing
Company and Zambia National Insurance Brokers (ZPA 30/4/1996, 31/8/1996, and undated VI,VII,
VIII and 1X).
162 World Bank (1993a) and ZPA (31/12/1993, p.14-6).
163 ZPA (4/1996)
1 64 ZPA (31/12/1993,p.15 and 18).
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shareholders who held 49 percent of the equity with pre-emptive rights over the remaining 51 percent
held by ZIMC0.165
In the trading sector the growing financial difficulties of the state stores led the ZPA to
formulate a three stage approach. The first two stages involved the sale of peripheral assets and poorly
performing stores in order to raise funds to meet obligations to creditors and provide for redundancy
benefits. The third stage involved the sale of the remaining stores on a going concern basis by
bidding. 166 Following this unbundling 92 percent of the properties purchased were reported to have
been sold to Zambians.167
One potential problem with unbundling is that the Government may secure buyers for the most
profitable portions of the business, but be left with the less marketable ones. In the case of the large
enterprise, Zambia Breweries, the minority shareholder, Anglo American, accepted ZPA proposals to
split the company in two, with the Lusaka Brewery retaining the name Zambia Breweries and the
leading product brand names, while the Ndola brewery took the name Northern Breweries. 168 While
the new Zambian Breweries was sold to Anglo American and South African Breweries in 1994, it was a
further two years before a buyer could be found for Northern Breweries, reflecting the less marketable
assets which it constituted. Subsequently, Northern Breweries experienced difficulties in maintaining
commercial viability, and was sold to Zambia Breweries to prevent its closure.169
4.3.2c Liquidated Enterprises.
Although the ZPA was itself empowered to liquidate companies, many liquidations of state
enterprise that have occurred have not been handled by it. In many cases liquidation has been the result
of the financial collapse of enterprises, and actions by their creditors to secure payment. In other cases
the ZPA has sought to maintain technically insolvent enterprises as going concerns, and secure their sale
to new owners capable of recapitalising them. While a fifth of all state enterprises have been liquidated
during the privatisation process, this contrasts favourably with the 70 percent of enterprises that the ZPA
165 zPA (undated IV)
166 See Profit (December 1994,p.25-6).
167 post (2/10/1996).
168 Reuters (Johannesburg, 21/9/1994), ZPA (31/12/1993, p.16), E/U(q4/1993, p18) and Zambia
Breweries (1997).
169 post (2/2/1999).
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has estimated would have faced closure had the privatisation programme not been pursued. 17° Despite
this, the instances where liquidations have occurred have tended to have been relatively high profile.171
Among large enterprises, all liquidations have been of companies involved in the transport
sector. In the cases of Zambia Airways and United Buses, the reluctance of the Government to address
the problems that they were facing led to creditor led moves to liquidate. Zambia Airway's financial
problems had been an issue for a number of years, and in February 1994 a committee of six ministers,
including the Finance Minister Penza and the Transport and Communications Minister Harrington, was
formed to review the future of the airline. 172 The committee recommended a policy of asset sales to
reduce the debts of the airline and to prepare the company for privatisation. 173 The hand of the
government, however, was forced by creditors seizing three planes in London and New York.174
The Government was divided over its response to the seizures, with Finance Minister Penza's
recommendation that Zambia Airways be placed in liquidation opposed by Transport and
Communications Minister Harrington. Hauington's view initially prevailed at cabinet and the rescue of
the airline was announced. Within a week the cabinet reversed this decision and opted to liquidate the
airline. 175 The rescue package did not gain the support of the Bank of Zambia, which argued that it
breached IMF conditionalities and put the Government's economic programme at risk. 176 The World
Bank's Vice-President for Africa warned that the rescue package would prevent Zambia receiving
Balance of Payment support and that continued uncertainty over the airline was damaging donors'
attitudes to the whole reform programme. 177 The decision to place Zambia Airways in voluntary
liquidation was announced by Zambia's Vice President on 3rd of December 1994.
The Zambia Airways closure was quickly followed by another case in which a state enterprise's
future was dictated by the action of creditors. On 17th January 1995, United Buses of Zambia (UBZ) was
170 American Metal Market (27/6/1997).
171 The high profile liquidations of Zambia Airways, United Buses, Premium Oil, Livingstone Motor
Assembly and Mama Batteries were not conducted under the Privatisation Act, but through normal
commercial law and procedures (Times of Zambia 19/10/1998). An exception to this is the MEMACO
Group, listed as a large enterprise. Since the operating companies were listed separately, the liquidation
of the residual holding company was of little consequence.
172 EIU (q1/1994,p.25).
173 EIU (q3/1994,p.21).
174 EIU (q1/1995,p.16) Harrington noted (African Business, February 1995, p.37) that "the situation
got out of hand because creditors started pouncing on Zambia Airways planes."
175 African Business (February 1995)
176 Reuters (Lusaka, 1/12/1994).
177 Reuters (Lusaka, 3/12/1994).
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put into voluntary liquidation. Total debts stood at $10m. when bailiffs acting for Edesa International,
based in Luxembourg and owed $6.4m, seized assets including 40 of the company's 55 working buses.
The Government had refused appeals by the company, the previous month, to prevent the collapse.178
4.3.3. Developing Capital Markets.
The development of the financial sector is crucial to the implementation of privatisation and to
the subsequent development of the enlarged private sector. In the 1970s and 1980s, much of the
financing of Zambian industry was supplied through the state enterprise sector. The funding
requirements of individual enterprises could be centrally arranged through ZIMCO, and loan and equity
investment channelled into new projects. With the dismantling of this centralised structure, the
development of new financial intermediaries has been necessary to meet the financial requirements of
Zambian commerce and industry.
At the beginning of the 1990's, the Zambian commercial bank sector consisted of mixture of
ownership patterns. 179 Most commercial banks were in foreign or local private ownership, with the
state owned Zambia National Commercial Bank accounting for around 20 percent of the market.18°
Development finance, on the other hand, was provided principally by three state-owned institutions, the
Development Bank of Zambia, EXIM Bank and the Lima Bank.
Following the liberalisation of the financial sector in the early 1990s, the banking sector
became turbulent with a series of closures and enforced mergers principally affecting local private
banks. In 1995, the failure of Meridien BIAO was followed by that of the African Commercial Bank,
Commerce Bank and the Co-operative Bank. 181 The Bank of Zambia stated that a contributory factor in
the failures was that until the enacting of the Banking Act 1994, the necessary legislative framework had
not existed to regulate the sector within a liberalised financial environment. 182 To increase the stability
17 8 Reuters (Lusaka, 14/12/1994 and 17/1/1995).
179 Brownbridge (1998). Harvey (1993) argues that Zambian commercial banks, including those owned
by the state, were financially and managerially stronger than those in Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana,.
180 In addition to those foreign banks which had dominated the sector in the 1960s, a number of other
transnational banks had also entered the Zambian market. The first indigenous privately owned bank
was the Meridian Bank established in 1984.
181 Bank of Zambia (Financial Systems Supervision Annual Report, 1996; and 25/9/1997). On
Meridian see Southern African Economist (April-May 1995,p.20-1), and SAPEM (April 1995, May
1995 and August 1995).
182 Post (4/12/1995) and Bank of Zambia (Financial Systems Supervision Annual Report, 1996). In
response to the continued problems and calls for better supervision, the Bank of Zambia stated its
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of the banking sector, in 1996 the Bank of Zambia increased the minimum level of capital required,
prompting the merger of First Merchant Bank with Safe Deposit Bank under the name of the former,
and the closures of Continental Bank, Mercantile Bank and Royalty Bank. 183 Despite this, failures have
continued. Manifold Bank closed in 1997, followed by First Merchant Bank, Prudence Bank and Credit
Bank of Zambia in 1998.184
Attention has been drawn to the failure of the banking system to move away from short term
loans and overdraft facilities and adequately cater for the longer term financial requirements of Zambian
business. 185 The level of commercial finance available has been further diminished by the liberalised
financial regime, with high rates of interest and the increased risk of default by commercial customers,
inducing financial institutions to limit lending to business. In addition, the state owned financial
institutions which provided longer term finance have also failed to reorientate themselves within the
new economic framework. While, as discussed below, the future of the Development Bank of Zambia
remains uncertain, the agricultural lender Lima Bank was liquidated in 1997 and the export oriented
EXIM Bank was placed in receivership in February 1997, pending a decision on its future.186
An alternative to bank based finance is the funding of enterprises through equity. The principal
role that a stock exchange can play in the development of private enterprise is in the provision of equity
finance through the mobilisation of domestic and foreign savings. 187
 Singh (1992) however, argues that
stock exchanges have rarely led to an increase in aggregate savings and are associated with higher levels
of financial volatility. A greater degree of stability and capacity to provide long term finance, he
suggests, can be created by bank based systems of corporate ownership such as exist in Germany and
Japan. As has been discussed above, however, the Zambian banking system itself remains the subject of
intention to review the provisions of the Act and to establish a deposit protection scheme (EIU
g2/1998,p.21 and Post 28/10/1997 and 23/2/1998; Times of Zambia 24/9/1998).
183 Bank of Zambia (Financial Systems Supervision Annual Report, 1996)
184 Post (5/12/1997 and 25/1/1998), Times of Zambia (30/9/1998) and EIU (q1/1998,p .18).
185 This issue has been raised by, among others, ZACCI and Investment Centre Director General
Ng'andu (Post 9/11/1995, and 10/7/1996; and Times of Zambia 21/7/1997). The ZPA (30/6/1993, p.16)
has also stated that the financial infrastrucure has prevented a number of Zambian companies from
completing the purchase of enterprises.
186 On Exim Bank see Bank of Zambia (25/9/1997). On Lima Bank see Post (19/12/1995, 12/1/1996
and 20/3/1997).
187 Jefferies (1995) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996). On the increasing prominence of
international equity investment in the 1980s and early 1990s see Mobius (1994), Unger (1994) and
Rague (1994).
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instability and, therefore, the potential of the stock exchange to emerge as an important source of
enterprise finance is considerable.
In Zambia, although the Stock Exchange Act of 1990 provided for the establishment of a stock
exchange, it was judged that it provided insufficient provision for the regulation of securities and was
replaced by the Securities Act of 1993. 188
 This created a Securities and Exchange Commission to act as
the central regulatory body, with functions including the licensing of securities, traders, advisors and
collective investment schemes. 189
 In line with the Act the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) was
established and began operation in February 1994.190
As shown in Table XXI, although LuSE has grown in terms of the number of companies listed
on it, the value of shares traded through it and its total capitalisation have reflected a less steady course.
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission has actively sought to encourage enterprise from the
private sector to raise capital through LuSE, the growth that has occurred in the exchange has been
driven primarily by the privatisation process which has resulted in 6 of the 8 listings.191
Table XXI.
Indicators of the Size of the Lusaka Stock Exchange and the Level of Securities Trading.
1995 to 1998.
1995 1996 1997 1998 (a)
Number of Listed Stocks. 2 5 7 8
Market Capitalisation ($ million). 435.0 229.3 705.2 344.9
Trading Value ($ million). 0.3 2.8 8.1 2.8
Source: Lusaka Stock Exchange (Summary of LuSE Market Trading Statistics, 1/1999).
Notes: (a) Data for 1998 was only available to the end of October. The Trading value therefore reflects
only ten months while the comparative figures each reflect twelve months.
188 Ngenda (1994a).
189 profit (March 1995, p.14-16) and Kapumpa (1995).
190 profit (February 1995, p.11). LuSE was established as a non-profit limited liability company and for
the first two years of operation was fmanced by the Government and the United Nations Development
Programme (LuSE, undated I).
191 SEC (Annual Report, 1997). The two listings unrelated to privatisation have been those of Farmers
House in 1996 and Trans-Zambezi Industries in 1997.
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The listings which have been the result of the privatisation process have mainly involved the
flotation of minority interests in enterprises by the ZPTF and have been subject to a number of
delays. 192 After the successful sale of shares in Chilanga Cement in May 1995, the sale of a minority
holding of 18.75 percent of Rothmans later that year was undersubscribed and resulted in the ZPA's
decision to temporarily suspend further flotations. 193 The process resumed in October 1996 by the
flotation of a 6 percent stake in Zambia Sugar, 194 which was oversubscribed by a quarter, and the even
more popular flotation of 10 percent of Zambia Breweries in June 1997, which was oversubscribed by a
half. 195 Despite these successful sales, the low demand for National Breweries shares that were offered
for sale in March 1998 brought a further suspension to the programme of flotations.196
A number of reasons have been cited for the limited capacity of the Zambian economy to absorb
these issues. For example, the undersubscription of Rothmans was ascribed, amongst other factors, to the
spate of bank failures which had tied up investors funds and reduced confidence, as well as the tight
timetable of the offer which did not allow all financial institutions time to secure the approval of their
boards. 197 The SEC and others involved in the privatisation process have also complained that the
minimum number of shares for which application could be made has been set at too high a level for
many Zambians to participate and this has been aggravated by the absence of collective investment
vehicles such as unit trusts.198
While the ZPTF is only permitted to offer shares to Zambian citizens and financial institutions,
the participation of foreign investors is vital to the development of a secondary market. In designing
LuSE, attention was paid to meeting the requirements of international institutional investors. LuSE was
established on the model of a unified market, with a strong regulatory framework and a central share
depository. 199 In addition, no restrictions were placed on the level of foreign shareholdings and the
absence of exchange controls permitted the free repatriation of capital and income.
192 The exception being ZCCM, which was listed on LuSE in 1996 without a share flotation.
193 ETU (q2/1 996,p.11). The Zambian Government had only owned a minority interest in Rothmans,
with control resting with the majority private owners.
194 Post (2/8/1996) and Zambia Sugar (1996). Shares were offered by the ZPTF and CDC to provide for
both domestic and international demand for the shares. As noted above, the ZPTF can only sell shares to
Zambian citizens and institutions, and the international demand for shares was met by CDC.
195 Post (1/10/1996 and 22/5/1997).
196 Post (23/3/1998 and 27/3/1998).
197 Post (20/12/1995) and Africa Economic Digest (8/1/1996).
198 Post (15/8/1996, 5/11/1997 and 5/11/1997).
199 LuSE (undated II).
155
To attract international investment, however, an emerging stock exchange also needs to have a
growing number of listed companies with good prospects for long term growth, situated within a
financially stable environment. Among the factors which have been cited as discouraging international
investment in LuSE have been the continued financial instability of the Zambian economy and the
limited number of stock which can be traded. 200 It may be that the current design of the stock exchange
and the financial liberalisation that has been undertaken have themselves proved as obstacles to
overcoming this. 201 Before his appointment as General Manager of LuSE, Charles Mate, had argued
that a less formal 'over-the-counter' market would be a more assessable way for local companies to raise
finance than the more formal structure of the unified market, stating that;
It would probably look nice and grand and even fashionable to have a section of Cairo Road
converted into a mini Wall Street- but beyond that what about the needs of business people
and potential entrepreneurs in Ndola, Kitwe, Livingstone and the rest of the country.202
It may be, therefore, that the current emphasis on attracting foreign portfolio capital to generate
local investment is misplaced, and that a growing indigenously funded private enterprise sector is itself
the prerequisite for attracting these funds.203
Some within the Zambian financial sector have argued for the establishment of development
capital funds by a public body to provide the long term financial resources which remain unavailable to
many Zambian enterprises.204 Progress in this direction was made in 1996 by the establishment of the
Venture Capital Fund, a subsidiary of CDC, to provide capital to small business and introduce them to
the unlisted section of LuSE and by the establishment, in 1998, of a fund by the World Bank, to be
channelled through existing financial institutions. 205 Such activities replicate those undertaken by the
200 The Reuters (Lusaka, 8/11/1996) and Post (20/2/1998).
201 Similar concerns were expressed by the Chair of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius, Khushiram
(1994), who warned that the establishment of too comprehensive a regulatory framework could place a
disproportionate cost burden on the new exchanges.
202 Profit (January 1993, p.22).
203 Non-attributable interviews. It is notable that among the Stock Markets that have flourished over the
recent period, such as those in Thailand, Mexico, Taiwan and China, restrictions on foreign ownership
have existed either through ceilings on holdings or through the withholding of voting rights (Mobius,
1994, p.139-40).
204 Munshi (1995).
205 The ZVCF is a subsidiary of CDC and has received funds from the European Union, European
Investment Bank, the German development agency DEG and the British Government (Post 7/2/1996,
14/2/1996, 29/10/1996 and 26/2/1997). On the World Bank fund see (Post 1/4/1998 and Times of
Zambia 27/7/1998).
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development finance section of INDECO before 1968 and underline the continued limits to the ability of
the existing private sector to provide for the development of Zambian industry.
4.3.4. Enterprises Remaining in State Ownership. 
While the majority of Zambia's state enterprises have been divested, a number of companies
that were initially listed for privatisation remain under state ownership. In most cases this reflects the
strategic or utility nature of the industries involved. This has frequently resulted in a cautious approach
to their sale by the government, to their purchase by potential investors and to difficulties in negotiating
their terms of sale. As the Zambian privatisation programme is ongoing, the sale of many of these
enterprises may be expected to occur in the coming years, as the programme nears completion. In a
some cases, however, the government has withdrawn enterprises from the privatisation process or failed
to progress with preparations for their sale. This section examines the enterprises which currently
remain within the state sector, with particular emphasis on large, untranched and strategic enterprises
where particular problems or delays have occurred.
Among those enterprises which have been offered for sale, but which still remain within the
state sector, the most prominent are the large sized Nitrogen Chemicals and Kafue Textiles. Both are
based in the town of Kafue, and following financial crises both have ceased operations. 206 Nitrogen
Chemicals was advertised for sale in 1996 and although extensive negotiations had occurred with
SASOL of South Africa, it withdrew from the purchase. It is reported that the ZPA and Investment
Centre are actively looking for other purchasers for NCZ, while the ZPA is undertaking negotiations
over Kafue Textiles with Pakistani interests. 207 Whether these enterprise will be reopened under state
or private ownership, or be subject to liquidation is yet to be determined.
While these are among the few manufacturing enterprises in which progress has not been
achieved, some other sectors of the economy have shown little progress towards privatisation. As
discussed above, the reorientation of the financial sector is an important factor in the restructuring of the
206 Times of Zambia (19/10/1998 and 6/8/1998). Both discuss the impact of the closures on Kafue.
207 Times of Zambia (21/4/1998) and ZPA (1/1999b).
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economy towards a private sector model. The progress towards privatisation in that sector has, however,
been limited.208
An agreement with the World Bank required that the government reformed the state owned
financial institutions, or move to liquidate them. In the case of the Development Bank of Zambia, it was
agreed in 1995 that it would be restructured as an "apex" institution raising long term foreign and
concessionary funds to lend on to Zambian financial institutions. 209
 A continued deterioration in the
commercial viability of the Bank, however, led Finance Minister Penza in October 1996 to
unsuccessfully seek the passage of a Development Bank of Zambia (Collection Agency) Bill, that would
turn the bank into a collection agency for the repayments due to it over a five year period. In the face of
opposition within the MMD, the government was forced to withdraw the bill. 210
 While the future of the
bank remained unclear, DBZ has continued to operate and advance finance to new projects. 211
 In June
1998, Finance Minister Nawakwi reaffirmed the role of the bank as a provider of development finance
and stated the hope that through restructuring, its viability could be secured.212
The ZNBC has also undergone a restructuring exercise, including a reduction in the workforce
and computerisation. 213 The plans for the future ownership structure of the bank remain unclear,
although the government has stated that it intends to sell some ZNCB shares to the public, and to secure
a private sector partner to further strengthen its commercial position. 214 Although progress over the
divestiture of the Zambia National Building Society was delayed due to uncertainty over the legal status
of the government ownership, the ZPA currently states that it is being prepared for sale. 215 ZNBS has
acquired a significant role in government policy as a provider of mortgages for the purchases of publicly
208 In addition to those discussed below, the government also continues to hold a minority interest in
the Indo-Zambian Bank.
209 World Bank (1995a).
210 Post (16/10/1996). The World Bank diverted funds from the Development Bank due to concerns
over the performance of the management, and sought to develop an alternative apex institution (Post
9/10/1996). The Bill failed in the face of opposition from backbench members of the MMD, who argued
that policy was being dictated by donors (Post 17/10/1996).
211 Times of Zambia ( 23/7/1997 and 18/12/1997).
212 Times of Zambia (20/6/1998). This commitment was reiterated in November 1998 (Post
18/11/1998).
213 Times of Zambia (17/12/1997).
214 Post (19/10/1998).
215 ZPA (30/4/1995) and Times of Zambia (3/8/1998).
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owned housing, and in August 1998 the government provided additional funding to the society to
increase its lending potentia1.216
Following a restructuring exercise in 1995, offers were sought for a seventy percent
shareholding in the Zambia State Insurance Company, with the government retaining the balance of the
equity for the later sale to the Zambian public.217 All bids submitted, however, were rejected by the
ZPA, leading to the decision announced in December 1997 that the privatisation would be delayed for a
further period of at least two years, during which time additional restructuring of the business would
take place. 218 It is envisaged that an element of this restructuring process will be the flotation of shares
in the company on LuSE to raise additional capita1. 219 Whether this will be part of an overall
privatisation strategy, that would result in ZISC entering the private sector as an independent company,
is yet to be determined.
The media sector has also been marked by the reluctance of the government to privatise assets.
Despite state ownership of the Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail newspapers, the only media
company to be included in the list of enterprises to be privatised was the Zambia National Broadcasting
Corporation. This limited commitment to privatisation in this sector was further diminished in 1995 by
the commitment of the government to retain ownership of its media assets, which was reiterated by
President Chiluba in 1997.220
 Although the government cited the reason as being to facilitate
democratisation, its reticence to undertake media privatisation has alternatively been presented as
reflecting authoritarian instincts. As Mphaisha (1996, p.72-5) notes, even initial moves towards greater
editorial independence within the state media have been reversed.221
216 Times of Zambia (25/8/1998 and 1/9/1998).
217 ZPA (undated III).
218 Two bids were received for the entire company. Bids were also submitted for the general insurance
business by ZISC management, and the life insurance business by ZISC management with GIO
Australia Holdings (Post 10/12/1997). Explanations for the low levels of the bids included the
restrictions on investing insurance funds off-shore, and the appropriation of company assets by the
existing management (Times of Zambia 1/9/1997).
219 Times of Zambia (30/10/1998).
220 Republic of Zambia (1995b). President Chiluba stated that the government would seek to provide
resources to rehabilitate state media enterprises (Times of Zambia 3/12/1997). The government also
ruled out state media privatisation in October 1997 when National Party MP Sondashi tabled a Private
Members Bill for the sale of the Times of Zambia, Zambia Daily Mail and operational independence for
Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Times of Zambia 16/10/1997).
221 The unwillingness of the Government to reduce its control of the media is discussed by Mphaisha
(1996, p.72-5) in the context of democratisation.
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In many of the utility industries arrangements have been undertaken to ensure that competition
is introduced where possible and that regulatory structures are established. Initially policy towards the
public utility industries did not envisage their immediate divestiture and instead government policy
placed emphasis upon providing conditions under which they could recover costs and avoid
insolvency. 222 For the longer term, the government aimed to establish a regulatory framework for the
industries, the operation of which would open the way for the transfer of the industries to private
ownership.223
An early candidate for privatisation was the telecommunications industry. In 1994 the Post and
Telecommunications Corporation was split in 1994 into a Zambia Telecommunications (ZAMTEL) and
the Zambia Postal Service Corporation (ZAMPOST). The Government licensed a private
telecommunications company, Telecel, to open the sector to competition and announced its intention to
sell a minority stake in ZAMTEL.224 Although the divestiture was initially scheduled for 1996, no
substantive progress towards the sale of the company has been reported to date.225 Measures to
restructure the electricity industry, in order to decrease the degree of monopolisation have also been
considered. In 1997, Energy Minister Suresh Desai stated that ZESCO would be divided into three
separate units, concerned with electricity generation, transmission and distribution respectively.226
ZESCO is currently undertaking a $212.6m. rehabilitation programme to modernise its equipment over
a number of years.227
In the case of Zambia Railways, progress towards privatisation has faced the additional problem
of the need to rehabilitate the company's operations. After four years of negotiations the management, of
Zambia Railways was contracted to Hifab International AB of Sweden in 1997, who were instructed to
undertake a two and a half year restructuring programme and an assessment of the modalities of
222 World Bank (1993a, p.16-7 and 1994a, p.3).
223 Republic of Zambia (1994, p.13) and World Bank (1994a, p.12 and p.21).
224 Republic of Zambia (1995a, p.25) stated that this would be achieved in 1996.
A 40 percent share in ZAMTEL was targeted for sale in late 1996. Telecel is owned 50% by US
interests, 40% by Zambian interests with 10% to be sold to the Zambian public. (E/U,q2/1994, p.21 and
ERJ,q4/1995, p.15).
225 The aim of divesting the company during 1998 was stated by the ZPA in December 1997 (Times of
Zambia 5/12/1997). Among the reasons suggested for the continued delay have been the delay in the
establishing the regulatory Communications Authority and in securing the commercial viability of the
companies operations (Times of Zambia 6/8/1998).
226 Post (21/11/1997).
227 ZIC News (April 1998).
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privatisation.228 By mid 1998 Hifab had put in place a new expatriate led management team, and
presented to the government a survival plan to rescue the near insolvent company. 229
 The restructuring
process has entailed an extensive labour retrenchment, with the ultimate intention of halving the size of
the workforce.23°
The Government has continued to display caution in withdrawing from the oil sector. 231 In
1997, Energy and Water development Minister Suresh Desai stated that privatisation of the oil supply
chain under ZNOC would "be gradual because we think it still needs government participation." 232
 In
the meantime, the government committed itself to refraining from interference in the management of the
companies and to undertake the establishment of a regulatory framework. 233 The high fuel prices and
problems of maintaining supplies, have been a recurring criticism of ZNOC, and prompted ZACCI and
ZAM to call for the dismantling of the company, and the liberalisation of oil supplies under private
sector enterprises.234
SUMMARY.
The aim of this Chapter has been to document and explain the privatisation process in Zambia
in the 1990s. The policy was first introduced to the government agenda by UNIP in 1990 in a restricted
and limited form. Under the MMD the policy was embraced in a comprehensive form and implemented
vigorously. The result of this was that by the end of 1998, the majority of state enterprises had been
privatised, including two-thirds of those rated as large.
A number of factors prompted the adoption of the privatisation programme, and have continued
to underwrite the government's commitment to the policy. As argued in Chapter 3, by the end of the
1980s, the sustainability of many of the state enterprises was doubtful. The difficult economic conditions
228 Hifabs appointment followed four years of negotiations (Post 20/3/1997).
229 Times of Zambia (7/4/1998 and 12/6/1998).
230 Times of Zambia (14/10/1998).
231 ZIMOIL was disbanded and replaced by a new wholly owned state enterprise, Zambia National Oil
company, which has continued the importation of oil (Southern African Economist April/May 1994).
232 The sale of BP and Agip were cited as evidence of the government's gradual approach to the sector
(Post 13/8/1997). In January 1998 the government stated its intention to commission a study on the
modalities of privatising the sector (Times of Zambia 31/1/1998).
233 Post (13/8/1997 and 3/10/1997).
234 Times of Zambia (10/9/1997 and 4/3/1998).
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faced by the Zambian economy in the 1990s continued to increase the commercial pressures which they
operated under, and has been a contributory factor to the cases of liquidation.
Throughout the period the pressure of the international financial institutions and donors has
underwritten the continued commitment to the policy. The initial adoption of the policy by UNIP was in
the context of the re-establishing of relations with the IMF and reflected the policy advice of the World
Bank and major donors. These constraints remained on the MMD when it entered office and have
continued through funding conditionalities. In particular, this was demonstrated in the case of Zambian
Airways, where pressure was applied when the government appeared reluctant to accept the insolvency
of the company.
Domestic discontent with the performance of the state enterprise sector has also contributed to
the programme. The initial adoption of privatisation by IMP was welcomed by the National Assembly
and by ZACCI, and across the diverse groups which came together to form the MMD, there was also a
consensus that the state enterprise sector had performed poorly. While the implementation of
privatisation has impacted negatively on certain groups, this has not resulted in any significant
opposition to the continuation of the programme and at the 1996 elections, all the major parties stated
their commitment to the principle of privatisation.
The implementation of the privatisation programme has been well regarded by a number of
international observers such as the World Bank. Much of this reflects the formal procedures for
transparency and independence that were included in the legislation which created the Zambia
Privatisation Agency. In practice these standards have not always been met and in a number of cases
have resulted in delays. In addition, the widespread corruption that has been documented among the
political leadership has also raised questions as to the propriety of implementation. Nevertheless,
substantial progress in the privatisation of the state sector was achieved between 1992 and 1998.
The choice of the method of sale of individual enterprises reflected both the aims which the
government sought to pursue through the privatisation process, and the constraints under which it was
undertaken. This was reflected in the many large and medium enterprises which were divested through
negotiated sales to minority shareholders, but with the agreement for a flotation of a minority interest
through the ZPTF. The government also sought to reduce the degree of monopoly in the structure of
industry through the unbundling of horizontally diversified companies in sectors such as milling.
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Although a substantial number of enterprises were privatised by the end of 1998, a significant
minority remained under state ownership, most of them situated in strategic and utility industries. In
many cases the government has stated its intention that they should be privatised in the future. Indeed,
the most strategic enterprise in Zambia was the state copper mining company ZCCM, the privatisation
of which is considered within Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5.
THE PRIVATISATION OF ZAMBIA CONSOLIDATED COPPER MINES LIMITED.
The aim of this Chapter is to document and explain the design and implementation of the
privatisation of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM). ZCCM constitutes a particularly
important case of privatisation for Zambia. It was the country's largest single company and generated the
bulk of its foreign exchange earnings. Because of the strategic nature of ZCCM, the Zambian
government examined a number of different strategies through which it could be privatised. This case of
privatisation, therefore, exemplifies the issues of the choice of the method of divestiture and the
constraints under which they were made.
In the early 1990s, ZCCM faced problems related both to its immediate financial viability and
to its long term development. Both the Zambian government and the management of ZCCM recognised
that these were unlikely to be resolved within the existing ownership structure. Section 5.1 deals with
the period between 1992 and 1996 in which the Zambian government examined the different methods
through which the privatisation of the company could be implemented. The three options that were
examined by the government are discussed in Section 5.1.1. The first of these involved one or more
foreign transnational mining corporations acquiring a controlling interest in ZCCM, the second was to
restructure ZCCM by dividing it into a number of different companies which could be offered for sale on
an individual basis and the third was to transfer the ownership of the company into the private sector
under the existing management.
In 1996, following recommendations from the British merchant bank N.M. Rothschild, the
Zambian Government embarked on a strategy based on the unbundling option. The reasons for this
option being accepted are discussed in Section 5.1.2. It is argued that the option of privatising ZCCM as
an independent company was undermined by the continued poor performance of the company under its
existing management. These problems also made the control of ZCCM as a whole less attractive to
transnational mining companies. In this context the option of unbundling offered an opportunity to
introduce a variety of transnational enterprises into a decentralised industry.
The implementation of the Rothschild Plan between 1996 and 1998 is examined in Section 5.2.
The mining operations of ZCCM were divided into nine packages, with the non-mining subsidiary
enterprises and prospective development properties subject to separate negotiations. Section 5.2.1
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outlines the arrangements that were established for the disposal of the assets. Although the privatisation
of these asset packages was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1997, negotiations for some of the
most substantial of these continued into the second quarter of 1998, before failing to produce
agreements. The terms of sale for those assets that were privatised are examined in Section 5.2.2a, the
circumstances of failure at those assets which were not sold is outlined in Section 5.2.2b and the
negotiations for the development of new deposits at Konkola are examined in Section 5.2.2c. As a result
of the failure to privatise all of the outstanding assets, from mid-1998 the Zambian Government
undertook a number of steps to renew the interest of potential investors in the privatisation, which
resulted in further agreements being concluded in late 1998. Section 5.2.3 outlines the factors leading to
the conclusion of the process and examines the agreements which have been reached.
SECTION 5.1. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND POLICY.
ZCCM's ownership structure was more complex than other Zambian state enterprises, with the
shares of the company listed on both the London, Paris and the New York Stock Exchanges. 1 Alongside
the Zambian Government, which held 60.3 percent of equity, the main shareholder was Zambia Copper
Investment, a company controlled by Anglo American, that held 27.3 percent of ZCCM, with the
remaining 12.4 percent of shares in a variety of smaller holdings. 2 Anglo American held pre-emptive
rights to purchase any shares sold by the Government, once the Government share in ZCCM fell below
50 percent, and outstanding agreements with debtors restricted the company from paying dividends.3
When the MMD administration took over in November 1991, ZCCM faced two financial
challenges. Firstly, there was a shortage of long term finance which was needed to develop new and
existing orebodies and, secondly, in the short term the company faced a shortage of working capital to
fund its ongoing operations. While the Zambian Copperbelt was recognised internationally as a "world
1 In addition, ZCCM was listed on LuSE in January 1996 (Post 10/1/1996 and 22/1/1996).
2 The share capital of ZCCM consisted of two classes of shares with different rights attached to them.
The ZIMCO shares constituted the entire 'A' class, while the equity of the other shareholders constituted
the entire 'B' class. Following the removal of the Chair of ITM, Sardanis, from the ZCCM Board of
Directors in 1992, ITM sold its 6.9 percent shareholding in ZCCM, through Credit Lyonnais Laing, to a
number of institutional investors.
3 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1993, p.9). The exact boundaries of the rights held by Anglo American,
however, remained unclear (World Bank, 1995a).
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class orebody," these problems were hampering current operations and undermining the future viability
of the company.4
The corporate structure of ZCCM was based on the division of the company into a 7 operating
divisions5 . Nchanga Division accounted for just over half of the copper produced by the company and
was also its lowest cost producer, drawing most of its ore from the Nchanga Open Pit which was among
the largest open cast mines in the world. The balance of copper production was divided almost equally
between four other divisions: Mufilira, Nkana, Luanshya and Konkola. A further mining division,
Kabwe, undertook lead, zinc and pyrite mining, while the Power Division provided electricity for the
company. The headline figure given for the level of new investment required to keep ZCCM production
levels in the range of 420 to 450 thousand tonnes per annum was estimated by the company to be in the
region of $2 billion over a period of twelve years. 6 This required not just the rehabilitation of existing
operations but the development of new ore sources, in particular the replacement of the Nchanga Open
Pit which was estimated to have a life expectancy ending around 2001. 7 The best development potential
was offered at Konkola, where the development of a new deep mine was considered a prime opportunity
for future production.8
As discussed in Chapter 4, the MMD Government's commitment to the privatisation of
strategic industries remained cautious until the beginning of 1993, and then remained initially non-
committal over the pace at which it would be implemented. This was reflected in the Government's
policy towards ZCCM. The Government's Economic and Financial Policy Framework of 1992 noted that
4 James Capel (1992, p.3) and Smith New Court (1994, p.24).
5 The divisions each contained a selection of mineral and processing assets. A fuller account of these
can be found in Mining Journal (9/10/1992) and the annual reports of ZCCM.
6 EIU (q2/ 1992, p.21). While Anglo American argued that less than $2 billion would be needed if
expenditure was properly targeted, mining analysts continued to estimate the required level of
investment at $2 billion. For estimates from Anglo American see Profit (March, 1995), for NEDCOR
see (NEDCOR, 1995) and Smith New Court see (Smith New Court, 1994). Minister of Mines,
Humphrey Mulemba, identified critical areas for expenditure as being the development of Konkola Deep
Mine, requiring $500 million; the rehabilitation of existing mines, requiring $ lbillion; further
exploration, requiring $450 million and $50 million for a gemstone project (E/Uq3/1992, p.19).
7 This life expectancy of the mine is cited by NEDCOR (1995) and Smith New Court (1994). The need
for ZCCM to mobilise external investment in ZCCM was recognised by Francis Kaunda who stated that
"the investment required to sustain operations for the next 15 years at current levels is enormous and it
is unlikely it can be generated internally" (Reuters, Lusaka, 15/10/1991).
8 Mining Journal (9/10/1992). Doubts have periodically been expressed as to the potential of the
Konkola Deep Mine. Morgan Grenfell (1994, p.29) judged that the mine would not be rich in copper
and would be extremely vulnerable to flooding. RTZ judged that while Konkola did have potential, they
did not rate it to be an exceptional ore body, and expressed concern at the high level of development
costs (RTZ, Interview, 2/10/1995).
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ZCCM was "preparing a long term strategy for its operations covering divestiture, joint ventures and
privatisation" with immediate emphasis on divesting its non-mining assets and introducing private
investment in the development of new mineral sources.9
Progress occurred in a number of these areas. Among the non-mining subsidiaries, Coolwell,
Cleanwell Dry Cleaners and Zuva Zuva Design were included in the first tranche of companies which
the ZPA advertised for sale in 1992. 10 In late 1992, the previous unwritten restriction on companies
other than ZCCM to prospect for copper was lifted, attracting interests from transnational such as
Phelps Dodge, Anglovaal and Biliton.11
Changes were made in the senior management of ZCCM, with Francis Kaunda, the Chair and
Chief Executive since the its creation in 1982, being replaced by Lawrence Bwalya as Chair and Edward
Shamutete as Chief Executive. 12 This responded to the criticism, from among others the Parliamentary
Select Committee appointed in July 1990, which argued that the combining of the two roles reduced the
accountability of the management to the shareholders. 13 The new management aimed to concentrate on
ZCCM's core activity of metal production and enhance the companys commercial viability through a
rationalisation program which included the reduction of expatriate staff levels and the streamlining of
management structure. 14
5.1.1. Options for Privatisation.
Between 1992 and 1996, the Zambian Government examined a number of different strategies
for transferring ZCCM to the private sector. Two issues had to be addressed by the Government in
designing a policy of privatisation, firstly whether control of ZCCM should pass to another mining
company or whether it should enter the private sector under existing management control, and secondly
9 Republic of Zambia (1992, p.19). By early 1993, the Government stated that it was "committed to the
privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines," although warning that "complex nature of
ZCCM and its importance to the Zambian economy requires that the method of privatisation is carefully
defined and that the Government sanctions the stages for its divestiture" (Republic of Zambia, 1993,
lu ZPA Report (4/7/1992-31/12/1992).
11 Mining Journal (22/4/1994). Among other companies undertaking exploration, although not
necessarily for copper, have been RTZ, Gencor, JCI, Anglo American, Western Mining, Southern Era
Resources, Polygon Mines, and Fiat Rimi (Southern African Economist, December 1994/ January 1995,
p.18)
12 Mining Journal (8/11/1991 and 24/1/1992).
13 National Assembly (1990, p.29).
14 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1992, p.6 and 9) and EIU (q4/1992, p.17).
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whether the mining operations of ZCCM should continue as a single unit or be unbundled into a number
of separate companies.
Table XXII
Profitability and Output of ZCCM.
FY 1990 to FY 1996.
Financial
Year.
Pre-tax Profit Margin.
%
Post-tax Profit Margin.
%
Change in Annual
Production of Copper.
%
1990 16.90 7.87 7.95
1991 17.12 7.92 (5.80)
1992 11.60 3.33 (8.29)
1993 18.46 11.57 11.63
1994 (12.42) (12.63) (9.26)
1995 3.11 0.31 (10.71)
1996 (0.67) (1.88) (12.29)
1997 (12.89) (13.21) 4.35
1998 (35.78) (35.96) (11.74)
Source: Calculated from ZCCM (Annual Reports, 1990 to 1998).
Throughout the period on-going commercial viability of ZCCM remained under pressure. As
Table XXII shows, copper production continued in the downward trend that had been established over
the preceding twenty years, and although ZCCM was able to operate profitably until FY 1994, the funds
that it generated were insufficient to provide for the level of investment required for its rehabilitation.15
15 This was publicly recognised in 1994. The Minister of Mines, Kapinga, warned that "in the absence
of new injection of funds, the company can no longer sustain its operations" (Reuters, Lusaka, 4/3/1994)
and a "senior government mining official" stated that ZCCM urgently required new funding as "obsolete
equipment needs to be replaced. At the moment it is welded together every day and there is no way
production efficiency will be achieved" (Reuters, Lusaka, 3/5/1994). This need for new equity financing
to solve this situation had been previously identified by Credit Lyonnais Laing (Africa Research Bulletin
16/12/1993-15/1/1994).
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The three options that were examined by the government are discusseChis Section. The first of
these involved a single or group of foreign transnational mining corporations acquiring a controlling
interest in ZCCM and is examined in Section 5.1.1a. A second option was to restructure ZCCM by
dividing it into a number of different companies which could be offered for sale on an individual basis.
This option is discussed in Section 5.1.1b. The third option, of transferring ZCCM intact into the private
ownership under the existing management, is examined in Section 5.1.1c. In 1996, a privatisation plan
was agreed based on the unbundling option and the factors which led to this choice are examined in
Section 5.1.2.
5.1.1a Partnership with a Transnational Mining Company.
The new Zambian Government began informal discussions with foreign mining companies as
to the best options to rehabilitate and develop ZCCM. Primary among these companies was Anglo
American. It was the second largest shareholder, with representation on the Board of Directors and
extensive rights of veto over the conduct of the company, and also held pre-emptive rights of purchase
over most of the government shareholding.16
Anglo American confirmed in November 1992 that it would be interested in increasing its
involvement in ZCCM if the terms and conditions offered by the Government were attractive. 17 Interest
in participation also came from a range of other companies. In January 1993, Minister of Mines,
Mulemba l8 confirmed that alongside Anglo American, two other South African companies, JCI and
Gencor, had also approached the Zambian Government expressing an interest in ZCCM, while other
reports cited interest from the British company RTZ and from Japanese companies. 19 Because of its
existing involvement in the company, however, Anglo American remained positioned as the principal
transnational with which the Zambian Government was likely to reach an agreement.2°
16 New African (April 1993, p.33) reported that "In November 1992 the Deputy Minister of Mines,
Mathias Mpande said that Anglo had been given the first rights in buying back ZCCM." For early
confirmation of these rights by the Zambian Government see Business Day (2/11/1992 and 3/6/1993).
17 Reuters (Johannesburg, 19/11/1992). It was reported that the Zambian cabinet had rejected an initial
offer by Anglo American to take-over ZCCM and pay a fixed remittance to the Government (Africa
Economic Digest 10/8/1992).
18 Reuters (Lusaka, 27/1/1993)
19 Africa Economic Digest (25/1/1993)
20 RTZ (Interview, 2/10/1995) stated that were Anglo American to decide against a greater involvement
in ZCCM, other transnationals would be extremely cautious about stepping in.
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Despite ongoing discussion between the Government and Anglo American, Ogilvie Thompson,
the Chair of Anglo American, was unable to report any developments by late 1993, but said that "a
mood of realism on behalf of Government" would be necessary for progress. 21
 One issue to be resolved
was the value of ZCCM. Morgan Grenfell (1994) noted that the World Bank had advised the Zambian
Government that it could be worth in the region of $2 billion, which contrasted with Anglo American
estimate of $200 million, around which Gencor and Rio Tinto Zinc concurred, and a market
capitalisation of $317 million. 22 Other valuations suggested that a value between these two figures
could be realised. James Cape! (1992) judged that the market capitalisation of ZCCM at $127 million in
January 1992 significantly undervalued the equity of the company at a price earnings ratio of 0.7, and
stated that on a moderate price earning ratio of 5, the company would be valued at $929 million. 23 If the
profitability of the company could be enhanced in the new political environment, they estimated that
ZCCM could be valued at $1,693 million.24
Concerns also focused on the capacity of Anglo American to resource the rehabilitation and
development of the company. In 1993, a report to the Government by Credit Lyonnais Laing, who were
advising the government on options to privatise ZCCM, cast doubt on Anglo American's ability to
provide the estimated $2 billion required for the future development of the industry. It suggested that
Anglo American would have to overcome the problem of South African exchange controls and that it
would be preoccupied with the transition to majority Government in South Africa and its other industrial
interests.25
21 Reuters (Johannesburg, 30/11/1993). Confirmation of these discussions from the Government was
reported by Africa Economic Digest (23/8/1993) and from Anglo American by Business Day
(26/10/1993).
22 These different valuations reflected divergent assessments of the potential of the assets. For example,
the World Bank estimated that 400,000 tonnes of copper could be produced per annum over a twenty
five year period while Anglo American estimated that production of only 350,000 tonnes per annum
could be maintained over fifteen years.
23 Price earnings ratio (PER) is calculated by dividing the current market price of a company share by
the most recently reported annual earnings per shares. Higher PER are associated with companies for
which the prospects of future growth in profitability are considered to be better.
24 Such a valuation was on the basis that costs could be reduced by sourcing inputs from South Africa,
that the sabotage of the railway in Mozambique ceased, that unit labour cost did not rise above inflation
and that the Zambian Government removed the mineral levy (James Cape!, 1992, p.4).
25 Africa Economic Digest (31/5/1993) and African Business (June 1993, p.44-5). Such views
influenced the Government, Mpande, the Deputy Mines Minister, was reported as arguing that Anglo
American would be unlikely to have the resources to solve these alone (Africa Economic Digest
23/8/1993; Reuters, Lusaka 12/9/1994; and E/Uq4/1994)
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An additional concern was with the monopolised control of the nation's prime asset by a foreign
mining company. Some members of Zambia's business community, such as Theo Bull, argued that if
Anglo American gained control of ZCCM, the rehabilitation of the copper industry and the resulting
recovery of the Zambian economy would become subsidiary to their own corporate interests. Bull's
preferred option was unbundling, which he argued provided the opportunity for the Government to tap
the resources of a number of different transnationals, none of which would dominate the local copper
industry.26
Anglo American also sought to clarify its own preferred options in 1995, announcing that they
"would not, under any circumstances, wish to acquire a controlling interest in ZCCM on our own."27
With a fall in the Government's shareholding to no more than 40 percent, they would not look to
increase their own holding above 30 percent of equity. The proposed mechanism for this restructuring
was a rights issue which could simultaneously raise new capital and allow an extension of shareholding
to the Zambian public and other companies which could contribute expertise to the industry. Progress
along these lines would, however, be subject to a full audit and assessment of the company, and required
that the Government resolved the issues of redundancies, environmental responsibilities and the
company's indebtedness.
NEDCOR's analysis of Anglo American's position was that it sought to gain control of ZCCM
as a whole so that it could itself be the agent of unbundling. Its primary interest, it was claimed, was to
develop Konkola Deep, and with South African exchange controls still in force, the $2 billion required
to rehabilitate ZCCM would be beyond it. Anglo American's plan after having gained control would be
to sell off peripheral assets to raise funds to develop Konkola Deep. 28 Any privatisation of ZCCM on
that basis would leave the future of the Zambian mining industry firmly in the hands of Anglo
American, which could expect to receive the principal benefits of the restructuring process.
While an agreement with Anglo American remained the most likely basis on which a
partnership with a foreign transnational could be concluded, there were widespread doubts over the
implications of this for the future of the copper industry and the Zambian economy as a whole.
Nevertheless, by virtue of its substantial minority shareholding and its pre-emptive rights over the
26 Profit (September 1994, p.28-32 and November 1994, p.31-40).
27 Profit (March 1995, p.30-1 and April 1995, p.24-5) and Reuters (Lusaka, 16/3/1995)
28 NEDCOR (1995).
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Governments shareholding, the co-operation of Anglo American remained central to a strategy of
privatisation based on the participation of it, or any other transnationals.
5.1.1b Unbundling.
The option of restructuring the Zambian copper industry as a integral element of its divestiture
was proposed in "Strategic Options for the Privatisation of ZCCM" (the Kienbaum Report) presented in
July 1994 by Kienbaum Development Services and Inter Africa. 29 The report advised that ZCCM be
broken up, rather than privatised intact, stating that;
The strongest argument for not privatising ZCCM as a whole is that whoever (presumably
foreign) should own an undivided ZCCM will have a very strong influence on the government
of Zambia and the National economy.3°
It was proposed that the current divisions should be restructured into five separate operating
companies, in which private investors would take a majority share through the issue of additional equity.
ZCCM would supply some technical and support services and retain a minority interest in each of the
new companies.
The idea of unbundling ZCCM into a number of operating companies was not new and was
advocated by the MMD before coming to power as well as by members of the Zambian business
community. 31 It received renewed support from some members of the Zambian business community,
such as Bull, who argued that it provided an opportunity to tap the resources of a number of foreign
mining companies, while avoiding the domination of the copper industry by a single one. Further to this
it would increase competition within the industry and provide a batch of new companies to be quoted on
the Lusaka Stock Exchange.32
29 Reuters (Lusaka, 4/6/1994), Mining Journal (8/7/1994), Southern African Economist (September
1994, p.33-4), Profit (September 1994, p.28) and E/U(q3/1994). The report was based on a six month
study funded by the World Bank.
30 Reuters (Lusaka, 4/6/1994).
31 EIU (q3/1991, p.20-1). The widespread influence of the company was criticised. Referring to it as a
"State within a State," the Deputy Minister of Mines, Mpande argued that "The current ZCCM structure
is just like the Zairian Mining Company Gecamines and Malawi's Press Holdings, running for the sole
benefit of the country's Head of State and their local and foreign associates"(Africa Business, January
1992). Bull, an early advocate of unbundling, argued in Profit (October 1992, p.21-2) for the flotation of
each of the operating companies with a dilution of the government share held in them.
32 Profit (September 1994, p.28-32)
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Anglo American, however, was critical of unbundling, viewing it as "long, difficult and
expensive." 33 Its executives believed that the Kienbaum proposals underestimated the degree of
integration within ZCCM, and that unbundling would increase operating costs by duplicating existing
management and create new costs in co-ordinating mineral processing. As individual units, higher cost
mines would be more susceptible to periods of low copper prices, and the overall effect of the
disintegration of the company would be to increase the risk profile and decrease the value of the industry
as a whole.34
Many of these concerns over the practicality of unbundling were shared by others. ZCCM
officials themselves believed that the use of shared facilities within the group would make unbundling
difficult35 and other industry observers also doubted that ZCCM could be easily divided due to its
technical integration and the absence of divisional accounting procedures.36
Alongside these concerns for the development of the Zambian mining industry, Anglo
American also had its own reasons for opposing unbundling. One central concern was that Anglo
American's minority share in ZCCM would be translated into minority shares in each of the operating
companies, leaving them with a selection of small interests, but control of nothing.37
The Zambian Government was also doubtful about whether unbundling ZCCM was a viable
option and was concerned that it would be highly controversia1. 38 While support for unbundling was
voiced by Deputy Minister of Mines, Mpande, and Deputy Minister of Agriculture Food and Fisheries,
33 Reuters (Lusaka, 4/7/1994).
34 Gencor stated that it would be interested in a stake in ZCCM alongside Anglo American, but was
also opposed to unbundling (Business Day, 15/9/1994).
35 Reuters (Kitwe, 22/1/1993).
36 Credit Lyonnais Laing (1994a, p.6) argued that the proposal would encounter a number of practical
difficulties as "not only is concentrate from some mines sent in different proportions to all of the other
divisions with smelters but, also, there is no accounting regime within the company that can determine
whether or not such activity is profitable. With no ability to calculate the turnover and costs of the
separate divisions, and with no contracts ensuring what some of those costs will be, there can be no
bidders." Others took a more hostile position to the proposals. Morgan Grenfell (1994, p.30) stated that
"Mining Consultants knew this was not a workable solution. The major interested parties knew it was
unworkable. Even the Zambian Government knew it was unworkable. So after a long period and a lot of
money, this little known German consultancy came up with suggestions that simply were not practical."
37 Holmes stated that "Anglo will be a minority party in each of those mines. That will mean we will
have a piece of each bit and we do not like that" (Reuters, Lusaka, 4/7/1994).
38African Business (December 1994, p.23) cited "a reliable source within the Cabinet" stating that "the
Kienbaum report has been secretly rejected by Cabinet simply on the grounds that its recommendations
were too controversial."
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Ackson Sejani, others such as President Chiluba, Finance Minister, Penza, and Mines Minister, Paul
Kapinga, were unconvinced.39
The Kienbaum report, moreover, left a number of issues unresolved. The Government believed
that while giving a theoretical basis of the unbundling proposal, it did not provide a strategy through
which it could be implemented. 4° In addition, it failed to address the constraints of Anglo American's
the reSolutionbF
existing rights withouthwhich, it was accepted by the Zambian Government and the World Bank, no
progress could be made.41
Rather than accept or reject the recommendations of the report, the Government's response was
to undertake a number of further studies. In October 1994 President Chiluba, stating that "the Kienbaum
report has not fully answered all our concerns," announced that a team drawn from ZIMCO and the
Government would undertake a further study "with reference to the Kienbaum Report." 42 This position
was reiterated in 1995, when ZPA Chief Executive Chitalu stated that the Kienbaum Report had not
been rejected but that while "logical in its argument" it "could not support itself with the numbers and
there are other technical issues of concern among the interested parties."43
5.1.1c Private and Independent.
Although never articulated as a comprehensive strategy, refinancing ZCCM and establishing it
as an independent private sector mining company emerged as the government's preferred option in
1994.
39 Penza stated that "I think it is very important that we look at ZCCM as one piece of business rather
than something fragmented. It will be less complicated to deal with" (Reuters, Lusaka, 3/8/1994). While
Chiluba argued that; "If unbundled , we will in a short time see the closure of some units. We believe
treating it as one unit helps one unit compensate the losses of the other and together they are a viable
unit. This will help resuscitate the company" (Reuters, Lusaka, 21/10/1994). Minister of Mines, Paul
Kapinga, stated that the privatisation of ZCCM as a single entity was preferable to unbundling (Reuters,
Lusaka, 5/10/1994). Late in 1994 both Mpande and Sejani were dismissed from their positions because
of their support for unbundling, although both were subsequently to return to government (African
Business, December, 1994, p.23 and EIU q1/1995, p.9).
40 Non-attributable interview.
41 World Bank (1995a). Chiluba noted that "Whatever steps we take on ZCCM we are in touch with
Anglo American and will not do anything that will breach our agreements with them. We are mindful of
the law"(Reuters, Lusaka, 21/10/1994)
42 Reuters (Lusaka 21/10/1994).
43 Reuters (Lusaka, 6/6/1995).
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The first elements of this option appeared in 1994 with the decision to appoint Nikko Europe to
raise loan capital to finance ZCCM's own development of Konkola Deep.44
 In May 1994, ZCCM
announced an "Interim Short Term Plan" to cover the period until March 1996. The plan aimed at
concentrating capital expenditure on the most profitable units, disposing of unprofitable and under-
utilised units such as the copper mines at Chambishi and Kanshansi and the Kabwe lead and zinc
mine.45 Alongside this a ten year plan was also being formulated by the management of ZCCM, on the
basis of the company remaining as a single entity without any additional equity investment and with
new projects fmanced through debt.46
While these initiatives appeared to offer a route for ZCCM to establish itself as a viable
enterprise able to finance its own future, they did not address the issue of ownership. This was raised by
Chiluba in July 1994 when he stated the Government would sell between ten and fifteen percent of
ZCCM shares to the public. 47 The Minister of Finance, Penza, reiterated this position the following
month, underlining it as an alternative to passing control to a private mining company and stating that;
We are not looking for Anglo American or Gencor. We are looking to raise capital through
the capital markets. The government will disengage 10 per cent to the Zambian public
initially and then take some shares onto the international stock market.48
This approach was in line with the proposals produced by Credit Lyonnais Laing in 1993,
which suggested an initial sale to the Zambian public of between five and ten percent of equity, followed
by the sale of a similar portion internationally, and a sale of up to twenty percent to a major company
such as RTZ which could balance the influence of Anglo American. 49 A factor with which the Zambian
Government had to contend, however, was the pre-emptive rights of Anglo American should the
Government shareholding fall below 50 percent. Although the Government's holding of around 60
percent of the equity of ZCCM would allow for the placement of an initial ten percent of equity, further
changes in ownership would require agreement with Anglo American.
44 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1994, p.11).
45 Details of the plan are in ZCCM (Annual Report, 1994, p.6 and 12). ZCCM announced the closure of
Kabwe lead and zinc mine in June 1994 with the redeployment of 522 employees and the redundancy of
846 (EIU, q3/1994, p.18). James Capel (1992, p.9) noted that Kabwe had "been the subject of closure
discussions for some time. ZCCM is reluctant to shut the mine down until it has successfully worked out
a redeployment scheme which will enable the town to survive any job losses in the mining sector."
46 Credit Lyonnais Laing (1994a, p.6).
47 Reuters (Lusaka 5/6/1994).
48 Reuters (Lusaka, 3/8/1994). As Chiluba stated, ZCCM "is not being sold. Fresh investment is being
sought for ZCCM so that the proportion of shareholding changes"(Reuters, Lusaka 21/10/1994).
49 African Business (June, 1993, p.44-5).
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It was also not clear that this option would supply the financial resources required for the future
development of ZCCM. While ZCCM announced that considerable interest had been shown by financial
institutions in financing Konkola Deep, 5 ° the viability of adding more debt to the companys balance
sheet was widely questioned. 51
 In addition, the amount that could be raised through reducing the
Government's shareholding to 50 percent, was at most $50 million, a figure small in comparison to
ZCCM's financial needs.52
The question of whether ZCCM could have raised substantial funds through the issue of equity
on an international basis is also open to question. The case of the Ghanaian State Enterprise, Ashanti
Goldfields, which was privatised as an independent company in April 1994, provides a useful
comparison. The company was privatised through a flotation on the London and Ghanaian Stock
Exchanges which diluted the Government's share of equity from 55 percent to 30 percent, leaving
Lonrho the largest shareholder with 44 percent. The Company had been extensively rehabilitated and
developed since 1985 and its management was well respected among investors. 53 By comparison, at
ZCCM the rehabilitation work was still to be done and it was doubted that the existing management had
the ability to achieve it.54
5.1.2. Explanation of the Strategy Adopted.
A plan for privatisation was finally settled upon in 1996, the implementation of which remains
in progress in March 1999. The plan, announced in May 1996, followed the unbundling option for
privatising ZCCM. 55 It was based on recommendations from a report by merchant bankers N.M.
Reuters (Vancouver, 2/6/1994)
51 Holmes, a Director of Anglo American (Reuters, Lusaka, 18/3/1994), Deputy Mines Minister,
Mpande, (Reuters, Lusaka, 12/9/1994) and Bull (Profit, September, 1994, p.28-32).
52 Credit Lyonnais Laing (1994a, p.3) estimated that a one-for-five rights issue could raise in the region
of $50 million while Bull (Profit, September 1994, p.8) put the figure lower, at between $20 million and
$30 million
53 Mining Journal (26/1/1996 p.37-21), Credit Lyonnais Laing (1994b, p.8-12) and James Capel
(1994).
'4 For example a "senior government mining official," claimed that ZCCM had not been reformed
under the MMD and suffered from political interference, poor management, under investment and over
employment (Reuters, Lusaka, 29/12/1993). The Finance Minister, Penza, criticised management,
arguing that "ZCCM could substantially improve its profit position by undertaking radical reforms. Its
overheads are too high, its procurement policy is extravagant, its marketing cost are excessive, and its
labour costs are inconsistent with industry standards" (Reuters, Lusaka, 28/1/1994).
55 See Post (29/5/1996), ZCCM (Annual Report, 1996), Reuters (Lusaka, 28/5/1996), Regulatory News
Service (19/7/1996) and Mining Journal (6/9/1996).
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Rothschild and lawyers Clifford Chance which was one of the those commissioned to further study the
options presented by the Kienbaum Report. 56 The plan envisaged a two-stage approach to privatisation.
In the first phase, the majority shares in the operating companies would be sold to new investors, with
ZCCM maintaining a minority interest of up to 25 percent in each new company, and the Government
retaining a golden share in key assets. With ZCCM transformed into an investment company with
minority shares in a range of independently managed mining companies, phase two would commence,
in which the Government would sell all or most of its shareholding in ZCCM to domestic and
international investors. 57 The Government stated that the resulting companies would be registered in
Zambia, that the Government would retain a golden share in each and that a monitoring group would be
established by the Ministry of Mines with representation from the Ministries of Environment, Legal
Affairs, Finance and Commerce, Trade and Industry.58
This strategy was similar to that outlined in the Kienbaum proposals which had been shelved
two years previously. Like the previous report, Rothschild's suggested the unbundling of ZCCM
operating units, with the Government continuing to hold a minority share in the companies. The re-
emergence of this over other options of privatisation is explained by a number of factors and was the
product of a number of developments which precluded some of the options that had been considered and
increased the attractiveness of others.
In the mid-1990's the on-going viability of ZCCM in its existing form became increasingly
doubtful. The Short Term Interim Plan which the management had undertaken was not achieving the
targets which were set and copper production was continuing to decline. 59 This continued deterioration
led in late 1995 to the Government requesting technical assistance from the World Bank to review
operations and formulate an action plan to stabilise the operations.° The outcome of these studies was a
56 Reuters (Lusaka 6/6/1995).
57 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1996, p.2) notes that the Government will be flexible on these arrangements,
and if assets remain unsold, ZCCM may continue as an operating company.
58 Republic of Zambia (1996) and Post (27/11/1997). Although the unbundling process brought an end
to the privileged tax position of ZCCM, such as the extended periods which it enjoyed for making
payment, the Government announced in January 1997 that laws relating to pollution would be waived
for the company (Times of Zambia 14/7/1997; and EIU, q1/1997/p.17).
59 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1995, p1). The production and profitability performance achieved by ZCCM
in 1995 and 1996 fell materially short of that expected by the company itself and by UK based mining
analysts (Credit Lyonnais Laing ,1994a; Hambros, 1994; Smith New Court, 1994; and NEDCOR,
1995).
60 Republic of Zambia (1995b, p.13).
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restructuring of ZCCM management and the appointment of a number of expatriates to key positions
within the company. 61 Further efforts were made to strengthen the management of the company in
March 1996 by the appointment of Luke Mwananshiku, a former Zambian Finance Minister and an
executive director of the IMF, to the Chair of the company.62
ZCCM's own restructuring plans were also failing to meet expectations. In early 1995, ZPA
approval was given for the sale of Chambishi Mine. The asset had been on a care and maintenance basis
since 1987, and through the sale ZCCM hoped to raise $50 million to contribute to its restructuring
costs. 63
 Bidding companies had to meet strict criteria and bids would be examined by a committee
consisting of ZPA, MUZ and ZCCM. 64 Although interest was shown by a number of mining
companies, no bids were submitted, and the mine continued to be kept on a care and maintenance
basis. 65 Together, these developments underlined the weakness of the existing management of ZCCM
and increased the doubts that the company could enter the private sector under its control.
Alongside the efforts to raise loan finance for ZCCM to develop Konkola, the Government also
sought proposals from foreign mining companies interested in developing the ore body and proposals
were received from Anglo American, Gencor and RTZ. 66 By late 1994 it was becoming clear that
ZCCM would not be able to raise sufficient finance to undertake the Konkola project itself. In January
1995, the Minister of Finance, Penza, announced that Konkola would be developed as a joint venture
61 Reuters (Lusaka, 28/12/1995 and 24/1/1996) and Post (25/1/1996). The changes were welcomed by
ZACCI and the Economics Association of Zambia (Post 30/1/1996). The continued problems in
ZCCM's management were further highlighted when Rob Hunter, a Canadian expatriate appointed to
manage Nchanga Open Pit, resigned, complaining of the level of plunder of resources in the mine" and
stating that he had "warned Shamutete against the dangers of undercapitalisation of the mining
conglomerate. The mines desperately need spare parts for machinery. Unfortunately, the top
management does not see level with me on this matter" (Post, 22/5/1996).
62 Reuters (Lusaka, 13/3/1996) and Post (14/3/1996).
63 A distinction can be drawn between the sale of a peripheral asset, such as Chambishi, as part of a
strategy to maintain the core of ZCCM as a single unit, and asset sales aimed at dividing the core assets
among a number of separate companies.
64 Reuters (Lusaka, 17/1/1995) reported that "Bidders must have a net worth of $50 million, invested
not less than $25 million towards the development or expansion of a metal mine in the last five years,
and operated an underground mine at a rate of not less than 2,000 tonnes of ore per day over the last
three years." NEDCOR (1995, p.17-8) commented that this "precludes consortia of smaller mining
companies applying and big companies specialising in open pit mining who have begun to inch into
underground mining. But then perhaps all this tells one is that the world of entrepreneurial and
innovative thinking, which is an important feature of mining development in the West, has passed by
ZCCM."
65Among those reported to be interested were Hindustan Copper, Kudrenulch Iron Ore Co. Ltd.;
Mineral and Metal Trading Corporation and Bharat Aluminium Company (Reuters, Bombay,
23/9/1994; Reuters, London, 19/7/1995; and Reuters, Lusaka, 19/7/1995).
66 Reuters (Lusaka, 23/2/1994; and Lusaka, 25/3/1994)
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with ZCCM holding a minority of equity and the management of the project in the hands of a private
mining company. The following month Anglo American confirmed that the Zambian Government had
"made a definite proposal for Anglo to consider syndication on Konkola." 67 Following a meeting
between President Chiluba and the Chair of Anglo American in March 1995, it was announced that
Anglo American would engage in a feasibility study of the Konkola Deep deposit. 68 A Letter of
Understanding was signed between the Government and Anglo American in January 1996, agreeing that
Anglo American would form a consortium to develop Konkola Deep in a joint venture with ZCCM. It
was also agreed that smelters from the Konkola and Mufilira divisions would be included in the
venture. 69 The capital required for the project, estimated at $600 million, would be raised by the
consortium while ZCCM's investment would be in the form of assets.7°
The separation of the Konkola project from the rest of ZCCM had two consequences for the
privatisation of the company. Firstly, it diminished the future prospects of the company as an integrated
unit. 71 The Konkola deposits had offered ZCCM a replacement for its steadily depleting current sources
of ore and without them the future position of the company as a major integrated copper producer was of
limited duration. It also removed from ZCCM the prime assets that could attract a transnational mining
company to seek control of the company as a whole. Alongside this, the further declines in the
production and profitability performance of ZCCM brought into question whether any company or
consortium would have the capacity to undertake the rehabilitation of the complete company.72
While these factors made the option of privatising ZCCM as an independent company or
partnership with a foreign mining company less feasible, they also prompted a development in the
position of Anglo American. The concluding of a Letter of Understanding on Konkola Deep between the
Government and Anglo American in January 1996 secured the rights of the latter to develop its target
67 Reuters (Lusaka, 10/1/1995; Lusaka, 30/1/1995; and Lusaka, 24/2/1995). Bussiness Africa
(7/3/1995) reported that the Zambian Government wanted Anglo and Gencor to be partners on Konkola
Deep, with the Government holding a minority stake.
68 Anglo American (Annual Report, 1995).
69 Penza also noted that CDC, the International Finance Corporation, Mitsui and Mitsubishi could have
rights in the new company that would relieve ZCCM of its debt burden (Reuters, Lusaka, 12/1/1996).
7u Reuters (Johannesburg, 15/1/1996).
71 As ZCCM's Chief Executive had noted "Konkola is the jewel in the crown. If we privatise Konkola
the rest of ZCCM is a dead duck" (Africa Research Report 16/9/1994-15/10/1994).
72 An interviewee expressed doubts that any single company or consortium would have been willing or
have the capacity to acquire control of ZCCM in its entirety. Given its range of activities and social
commitments, a degree of separation of the activities of the corporation appeared inevitable.
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asset. Anglo American were less concerned to gain control of the rest of ZCCM and indicated that they
would be willing to waive their pre-emptive rights over the Government shareholder if ZCCM was
privatised.73
In the context of these developments the unbundling of ZCCM into a number of separate
operating companies emerged as the most viable option for transferring the company to the private
sector. The continuing decline of the company's performance under the existing management called for
the introduction of a new controlling shareholder, and while it was unlikely that any agreement could be
reached to sell the control of the company in it existing form, the opportunities to dispose of its
constituent operations appeared to be greater. While Anglo American stated that the unbundling of the
company was not its preferred option, having acquired rights over Konkola Deep, it indicated that it was
willing to co-operate with the Government and itself recognised that unbundling offered an opportunity
for it to acquire any additional assets in which it was interested:74
SECTION 5.2. PRIVATISING ZCCM 1996 to 1998.
Section 2 examines the implementation of the Rothschild Plan for the privatisation of ZCCM
between its adoption in 1996 and the end of 1998. Although the timetable for implementation that was
outlined by the Government expected that the process would be completed by mid 1998, at the end of the
year the implementation remained in progress. Section 5.2.1 outlines the arrangements that were made
for the implementation of the plan by the Zambian Government. In Section 5.2.2 the initial
implementation of the plan to mid 1998 is examined. While in this period a number of assets were
successfully privatised, a number of problems were experienced in the divestiture of others. This resulted
in the Government undertaking a number of initiatives to revive the process and Section 5.2.3 examines
the further progress achieved to the end of 1998.
73 The Sunday Telegraph (31/12/1995). An interviewee noted that continued decline in the performance
of ZCCM also led Anglo American to view more of the assets of the company as liabilities.
74 Non-attributable Interview. Anglo American reiterated their opposition to unbundling following the
acceptance by the Government of the Rothschild plan (Post 3/9/1996; and Reuters, Lusaka, 4/9/1996).
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5.2.1 Implementing the Rothschild Plan.
The packages on sale were announced in September 1996, with some adjustment to the those
that had been proposed by Rothschild.75 Package 'A consisted of the bulk of the Nchanga and Nlcana
Divisions of ZCCM which accounted for around 60 percent of its copper production. 76 Alongside this, a
number of peripheral assets from these divisions were offered as separate packages. Chambishi Mine
which was maintained on a care and maintenance basis was offered as Package 'D', Kanshansi Mine as
Package 'E', Chambishi Cobalt Plant as Package 'G, and the Chingola Refractory Ores as Package 'L'.
The remaining mining and processing assets were divided between a number of packages. Luanshya
Division, which as Package 'B' represented the second largest package to be offered; Package 'C' which
constituted Mufilira Mine and Concentrator, the smelter and refinery being within the Konkola Deep
negotiations; Package 'F' consisting of the Nampundwe Pyrite Mine and Package 'H' consisting of the
Ndola Precious Metals Plant. The electricity distribution system, which constituted the Power Division
of ZCCM, was placed in Package 'J'. 77 The remaining assets of ZCCM were dealt with outside of the
package format. Negotiations on the development of Konkola Deep Mining Project and Konkola North
were continued outside of the framework of packages. The nine non-mining subsidiaries of ZCCM were
to be sold individually on the basis of competitive tender.78
The first stage of the privatisation, in which the operating companies would be privatised, was
to be completed by the end of 1997, with the second stage in which the Government would privatise the
ZCCM holding company, completed by mid 1998. 79 Pre-qualification of bidders was required by late
September 1996, with the deadline for bids set for the end of February 1997.80
75 The proposal by Rothschilds had recommended the division of ZCCM into four units "KonIcCo"
based on the Konkola and Mufilira divisions and including the Konkola Deep prospect; "NCo" based on
the Nchanga and Nkana divisions; "BalubaCo" based on Luanshya division, and Baluba and Chambishi
mines; and "PowerCo" based on the Power Division (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1996).
76 Details of the assets included in each package are outlined in Northern Miner (26/1/1998), Min. ing
Journal (8/11/1996) and Societe Generale Frankel Pollak (1998).
77 The package also included some electricity generating assets. The mining sector accounts for over
two thirds of the electricity used in Zambia (Global Private Power, 26/3/1997).
78 The non-mining subsidiaries are discussed only to the extent to which they became linked to the sale
of the mining packages. By the end of FY 1998, seven had been privatised (ZCCM, Annual Report,
1988; and Mining Journal 31/7/1998).
79 Mining Journal (26/7/1996)
80 Mining Journal (30/8/1996) Excluding Kanshansi for which bidding was scheduled to close at the
end of November 1996. (Mining Journal, 6/9/1996).
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The process attracted initial applications for pre-qualification from 40 companies, including
major transnationals from South Africa, North America, Japan and Australia. 81 The final bids that were
submitted in February 1997 revealed some lessening of interest, with 12 different companies and
consortia bidding for the mining and processing assets and 3 others bidding for electricity packages.82
The course of the bidding process required that the ZPA amended its initial position on a
number of issues. 83
 Originally it had been hoped that some of ZCCM's creditors would bid for
packages, and that the negotiations could involve the swapping of assets for debt. The failure of any of
ZCCM's creditors to pursue an interest in any packages, however, ruled this option out. The ZPA,
therefore, sought to negotiate with bidders over the level of debt which they might assume. Alongside
this, the ZPA found that the bids that were made did not in all cases match the asset packages that had
been offered. The ZPA decided to allow for flexibility in the content of the packages, with any residual
assets returning to ZCCM for later sale.
The negotiation with selected bidders was to be conducted by a joint Government and ZCCM
negotiation team, headed by former Chair and Chief Executive of ZCCM Francis Kaunda. 84 The
negotiation team was to reach an agreement of the terms of sale, and then recommend the terms to a
Cabinet Committee, ZPA Board and ZCCM Board for approval. 85 Anglo American stated that in the
first stage of the privatisation of ZCCM, its Directors would abstain from voting on any proposal
concerning the divestiture of assets to any associate or subsidiary of Anglo American or ZCI, and that
they would otherwise evaluate the proposed terms of sale on the basis of its value. In the second stage of
the privatisation, in which the Zambian Government would diminish its shareholding in ZCCM, ZCI
undertook to waive its pre-emptive rights to those shares on the condition that the Zambian Government
reciprocated by waiving its own pre-emptive rights, agreeing to the removal of the separate 'N and 'B'
81 Post (1/10/1996), Reuters (Lusaka 31/10/1996) and Mining Journal (8/11/1996).
82 ZCCM (28/2/1997)
83 Post (14/3/1997) and E/U(q2/1197/p.15).
84 Post (12/3/1997). A number of concerns were raised as to the appointment of the negotiation team.
Agenda for Zambia MP, Colonel Mwiya Nawa, and Independent MP, Dipak Patel, formerly the Minister
of Commerce, Trade and Industry, questioned whether the appointment of Francis Kaunda by President
Chiluba, rather than the ZPA, was within the provisions of the Privatisation Act, a situation which
Finance Minister, Penza, hoped would be regularised by the appropriate authority (Post 4/12/1997) The
appointment of Francis Kaunda was also criticised by Robert Sichinga and Alex Luhila, both
independent MP's, and Alfred Chioza, an MMD MP. Nawa also criticised the appointment of Kaunda, a
Bemba, alongside ZCCM Chair Luke Mwananshiku and the Head of the Government Privatisation Unit
Willa Mun'gomba, who were also Bemba, which he suggested could lead to corruption (Post 3/12/1997).
85 Times of Zambia (28/8/1998).
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classes of ZCCM shares, ensuring that ZCI could dispose of any of its shares in ZCCM on the same
terms.86
The discussion presented in the following sections is focused primarily on the negotiations of
the terms of sales of the packages between the bidding companies and the Zambian team. It will
highlight a number of issues which emerged in the process that, while not featuring prominently in the
sales agreements, have had an impact on the communities in which they took place.
The first of these relate to the role of ZCCM as a provider of health and educational services to
its employees. 87 Whereas the Kienbaum Report suggested that the medical and educational services of
ZCCM should be taken over by the Government, the Rothschild report recommended that they be
included in the assets sold to the bidders. 88 While not a central issue in the sales negotiations, these
services were not peripheral to the Zambian public. In the mid 1990s it was estimated that ZCCM
provided 12 percent of the financing for the entire Zambian health sector. 89 Although some agreements
have been reported to include the sale of medical facilities, the future terms of access to themare-yet to
emerge."
A related area has been the future of the houses owned by ZCCM. Following moves by the
Government to sell council houses to tenants in 1996, the sale of ZCCM houses was also undertaken.
While allowing Zambians to participate in the sale of ZCCM assets, the process was open to
manipulation at a local leve1. 91 On 30th April 1998 the Government suspended all sales, pending the
establishment of new procedure, on the grounds that anomalies had been reported.92
Concern was also expressed that the new owners of the mines would rely less on local inputs.
While local suppliers hoped that the new investment in the mines would increase the demand for locally
produced inputs, there was concern that the new transnational companies might source their supplies
86 ZCI stated these terms would not be applicable if the Zambian government sought to reduce its
shareholding in ZCCM without the completion of stage one (ZCI Undated I).
87 Smith New Court (1994, p.10-1) estimated the provision of these services to account for 11 percent of
production costs.
68 Non-attributable interview. Finance Minister Penza confirmed that ZCCM schools and hospitals
would be sold (Post 29/5/1996).
89 Post (24/10/1996) and Times of Zambia (25/10/1996).
Binani acquired two hospitals and nine clinics from ZCCM in its purchase of package 'B' and two
clinics in with package 'H' (Times of Zambia, 18/4/1998 and 5/9/1998).
91 See for example Times of Zambia (1/1/1998) which reported the eviction of tenants employed by non-
mining subsidiary companies of ZCCM.
92 This did not, however, affect the sales that had already been completed which the Mineworkers
Union estimated to be 80 percent of cases (Times of Zambia 30/4/1998; and Post 30/4/1998).
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from existing suppliers overseas. 93 Uncertainty also existed over the unbundling of the industry, with
the complaint from suppliers that they would have to deal separately with each unit rather than with a
central purchasing authority.94
The future level of employment in the mining industry has also been an area of concern. While
the central issue has been speculation over the level of redundancies that may occur with the sale of the
mines, concern was also expressed over the possible increase in expatriate miners. 95 In addition, issues
have also been raised about the security of workers terminal benefits and pension arrangements after the
unbundling, when they would become the employees of a multiplicity of new companies.96
5.2.2 Initial Progress in Divestiture. 
Section 5.2.2 examines the progress that was achieved in implementing the privatisation plan
up to mid-1998. Although the implementation timetable had aimed to have completed the first phase of
privatisation by the end of 1997, the negotiations for a number of the asset packages continued beyond
this date. Section 5.2.2a examines those packages for which were sales agreements were reached in this
period, while the asset packages which remained unsold are examined in Section 5.2.2b. Alongside the
sale of existing assets, negotiation were also undertaken for the development of the Konkola prospects,
and these are examined in Section 5.2.2c.
5.2.2a Completed Sales.
An agreement in the first half of 1997 for the sale of Kanshansi Package 'E' to Cyprus Amax
was the first privatisation to be accomplished. 97 The package contained an operational mine, which
continued to be managed by ZCCM, while the development potential of the properties was to be
93 Times of Zambia (2/1/1997; 12/1/1997; and 6/11/1997). The Turborep of South Africa announced
that, in anticipation of the rise in demand for mining equipment, they planned to begin the manufacture
of compressors in Zambia (Times of Zambia, 8/5/1997).
94 Times of Zambia (2/1/1997).
95 Following the appearance of advertisements for mine positions in South African newspapers, the
Zambian government stated that it would not allow the hiring of expatriate workers to take positions for
which Zambian were qualified (Times of Zambia, 19/5/1997).
96 These concerns were raised by MMD MP Vernon Mwaanga (Times of Zambia, 13/11/1996).
97 Mining Journal (18/4/1997). Other bids had been received from Anvil Mining of Australia, Canadian
First Quantum Mining, Reunion Mining of Britain , Woolwich Resources of Hong Kong and a
consortium consisting of Metorex and Randex of South Africa with the Canadian AfriOre Ltd. (Mining
Journal 20/12/1996).
184
explored by Cyprus Amax. 98 Cyprus Amax agreed to invest $5 million in the initial two years to
conduct a pre-feasibility study and if this was successful, a further $15 million investment would follow
on the undertaking of a full feasibility study. Following an initial cash payment of $3 million,
subsequent to a decision to undertake a full feasibility study, Cyprus Amax undertook to pay ZCCM an
additional $10 million, with a further $15 million due should they decide to undertake production. The
assets were incorporated as Cyprus Amax Kanshansi Mine Plc., with ZCCM retaining a 20 percent
interest99
The Luanshya Package 'B' attracted three bids, from First Quantum Minerals Ltd of Canada,
Binani Industries Ltd and Sterlite Industries (India) Limited. MO The award of the package to Binani
Industries was challenged by First Quantum Minerals, who argued that the ZPA led them to believe that
they were the only bidder engaged in negotiations for the sale of the package. 101 Press speculation
suggested that the switch between bidders was prompted by the liquidity crisis of ZCCM, and that an
agreement with Binani could be negotiated more quickly than with First Quantum. 1 °2 In July 1997, the
sale of the package to Binani Industries was announced for a consideration of $35 million, with a
commitment of $69 million of investment. The assets were incorporated as Roan Antelope Mining
Corporation of Zambia Plc. with a 15 percent interest retained by ZCCM. 103
The Chambishi Package 'D' attracted bids from Farrell Associates, First Quantum Minerals,
Sterlite Resources Limited and Aur Resources. Although the package was initially awarded to Ivanhoe
Capital Corporation of Canada in November 1997, they withdrew in March 1998. 104 In June 1998, the
ZPA reached an agreement with Foreign Engineering and Construction, part of China Non-Ferrous
Metal Industries, for the purchase of the package for a cash payment of $20 million, with $70 million of
98 ZPA, The Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) Kanshansi Mine Sale. ZCCM halted
production at the mine in January 1998 in the face of low copper prices (Mining Journal 23/1/1998;
Times of Zambia 16/1/1998; and Post 26/1/1998).
99 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1998) and Cyprus Amax (17/1/1997). ZCCM (16/1/1997) stated that if
Cyprus Amax withdrew from the project, the assets will revert to ZCCM and Cyprus Amax would be
liable to pay to ZCCM half of the value of any outstanding committed investment.
100 In addition, partial bids were received from Reunion Mining and Straits Resources Ltd (ZCCM
18/2/1998).
101 Mining Journal (19/9/1997). First Quantum discontinued legal action against ZCCM in June 1998
(ZCCM, Annual Report, 1998)
102 Post (17/7/1997) and Business Day (21/7/1997)
103 Binani also pledged $69 million of committed investment and $103 of contingent investment
(ZCCM, Annual Report 1998).
104 mining Journal (30/1/1998 and 3/7/1998), Post (10/11/1997) and Financial Times (16/1/1998)
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committed investment and a 15 percent interest retained by ZCCM. The assets were incorporated as
NFC Africa Mining PLC105
Package 'r constituting Power Division assets received bids from Tractebel of Belgium, Eskom
of South Africa and a joint bid from the British based Midlands Power International and National
Grid. 106
 An agreement was reached in 1997 with a Consortium of Midland Power International,
National Grid and five Zambian members of the division's senior management, and the assets were
incorporated as the Copperbelt Energy Consortium. The terms of sale included an cash payment of $50
million, debt assumption of $73 million, committed investment of $25 million and the retaining by
ZCCM of a 20 percent interest.107
Although Chibuluma Mine was originally included in package 'A', it was subject to separate
sale negotiations. The Metorex Consortium approached the Zambian negotiators with the proposal that
the mine should be treated separately, since a large mining company acquiring the whole of package 'A'
would be unlikely to prioritise the development of the relatively small Chibuluma South deposit. 108
 In
August 1997, its sale to the Metorex Consortium was agreed on the basis of a cash payment of $17.5
million, additional payment of $5.5 million net present value relating to copper and cobalt price
participation and $34 million of committed investment to the development of the orebody. The assets
were incorporated as Chibuluma Mine PLC in which ZCCM retained an interest of 15 percent109
Of the four companies that completed successful acquisitions, Cyprus Amax and the Metorex
Consortium both have internationally recognised mining expertise. Cyprus Amax was previously
involved in the Zambian copper industry through ownership of a majority stake in Roan Selection Trust
before its nationalisation in 1969, while the Metorex Consortium combines Canadian and South African
mining companies. 11 ° Non Ferrous Metals Industries is less prominent in the international mining
105 ZCCM (Annual Report, 1988).
106 zCCM (28/2/1998). Midland Power is itself owned by the US based companies Cinergy Corporation
and General Public Utilities of New Jersey.
107 Additional cash payments and debt assumption of up to $79 million are conditional on future
demand for power and the development of Konkola Deep Mine (ZCCM, Annual Report, 1988, and
8/12/1997).
108 Northern Miner (18/8/1997).
109 zcCM (Annual Report, 1988, p.15 and 31/10/1997).
110 The Metorex Consortium consisted of the Canadian Crew Development Corporation with a 35
percent interest, alongside three South African companies Metorex, Miranda Mines and Genbel
Securities, with interests of 15, 30 and 20 percent respectively. The operation of the mine was to be
conducted by Metorex. Crew subsequently acquired a 50 percent stake in Metorex, which itself had an
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industry, but is considered to be financially sound and has existing involvement in the copper
industry. 111 Binani Industries is an Indian based diversified transnational which has bought copper
from Zambia since the 1950s, and in the 1990s extended its interests through the acquisition of the
Inshimbi Copper Rod Making Plant and Kawambwa Tea Estate. 112 Although the company has
experience in metal processing, doubts have been expressed over whether it possesses the necessary
mining expertise.113
5.2.2b Unsold Packages.
The key to the overall success of the privatisation plan was the sale of package 'A'. In February
1997, it was announced that the only bid received for the package was from the Kafue Consortium.114
This consisted of four companies, Avmin of South Africa, Noranda Mining and Exploration
Incorporated of Canada, the Commonwealth Development Corporation of Britain and Phelps Dodge
Corporation of the United States. 115 The Kafue Consortium also bid for Chambishi Cobalt (Package
'G') and Chingola Refractory Ores (Package 'L'), and the negotiations for all three packages was
conducted through a single process.116
It was announced in November 1997 that the assets had been awarded to the Kafue Consortium
subject to contract. 117 However, in the following months, the terms offered by the Consortium became
subject to revision and negotiations ended without the conclusion of an agreement in June 1998.
existing holding of 30 percent interest in Miranda (Mining Journal 8/8/1997 and Times of Zambia
1/8/1997).
111 Non-attributable interviews.
112 Post (1/7/1997). Binani Industries' existing enterprises are involved in metal trading, zinc
processing and the production of glass fibre and cement (Binani, 1998).
113 Non-attributable interviews. Binani have begun the establishment of a new open pit operation at
Muluishi North and have commissioned a feasibility study for the establishment of an Integrated Copper
Recovery Processing plant (Times of Zambia 8/4/1998 and Mining Magazine September, 1998).
114 Two bids were received for parts of the package by the Metorex Consortium and by Straits
Resources Limited (ZCCM 28/2/1997).
115 The formation of the full Consortium was subsequent to the prequalification process in which
Avmin and CDC had prequalified as a single bidder, Noranda and Phelps Dodge had qualified
separately. The consortium is also referred to as the AVMIN Consortium, and Copperbelt Mining
Consortium.
116 Although the Kafue Consortium was the only bidder for Package 'A', the 'G' and 'L' Packages for
which it was also negotiating had attracted rival offers. ZCCM (28/2/1997) states that other bidders for
Package 'G' were First Quantum Minerals, Binani Industries and a ZCCM MBO. For Package 'L' two
bids had been received, from Cyprus Amax and jointly from ZCI and Falconbridge.
117 ZCCM (7/11/1997)
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The terms that were agreed in November 1997 were the product of extensive and combative
negotiations. 118 The negotiations had begun in February 1997 with the Consortium offering a package,
the principal terms of which consisted of a $140 million cash payment, the assumption of $125 million
of debt, committed investment of $200 million and a 10 percent retained interest for ZCCM. The terms
were dependent upon the agreement that the privatised company would receive certain tax concessions
from the Government over a period of twenty years. The Zambian negotiation team rejected this bid, and
the Kafue Consortium made a revised offer in June 1997. This was based on increasing the cash element
million
of the agreement to $160 ,with debt assumption rising to $150 million. Committed investment was
increased to $400 million and the interest of ZCCM was raised to 12 percent. The offer was, however,
still subject to the agreement of tax concessions, without which the cash element of the offer would be
reduced to $75 million. This offer continued to be unacceptable to the Zambian negotiators. In October
1997 the Kafue Consortium made a further revised offer which the Zambian negotiation team accepted
in the following month. While the cash element of the offer was $150 million, with an assumption of
$75 million of debt, the demands for tax concessions were withdrawn. The investment commitment of
$400 million was maintained, as were the terms of ZCCM's 12 percent retained interest.
The acceptance of the terms offered by the Consortium in October 1997 reflected a number of
factors. The Zambian negotiators had increased the terms initially offered by the Consortium for the
cash payment, the level of committed investment and the retained interest by ZCCM. Although the level
of debt to be assumed by the Consortium had diminished, the demand for tax concessions had been
removed from the negotiations and certain assets, such as Chibuluma Mine, were also excluded. In
addition, the timetable for the implementation of stage one of the Rothschild Plan had projected that
privatisation of all of the packages would be completed by the end of 1997 and the Government was
under pressure from the World Bank and donors to meet that deadline.119
118 The terms offered by the consortium during the negotiations were not made public. The discussion
below relies on the subsequent account of the negotiation in the Times of Zambia (8/4/1998). They differ
from those suggested by Mining Journal for November 1997 of $220 million cash, plus $750 million
capital expenditure and $250 million in social obligations and debt assumption (Mining Journal
14/11/1997). These figures latter are also cited by E/U(q1/1998/p,16)
119 Despite the agreement of terms in November 1997, the following month the World Bank postponed
a Consultative Meeting of Zambia's donors because of continued concerns over the slow pace of ZCCM
privatisation (EIUq1/1998, p.19).
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On the 10th March 1998, however, the Kafue Consortium revised the terms which were offered
in October 1997. The initial cash element was reduced to $50 million, with a further $150 million
payable over four years, subject to the level of the copper price. The debt assumption was reduced to $35
million, with an additional assumption of $40 million over 5 years being conditional on the copper
price. 120 In addition to this the Consortium requested the inclusion of Ndola Lime Company,
Nampundwe Mine and Dar Es Salaam port facilities to be included in the package at no additional cost.
On the 31st March 1998 the Consortium suggested a further revision based on a cash payment of $l05
million and a $35 million debt assumption, subject to extensive further options. Additionally they
renewed their demands for extensive tax concessions and for the addition of extra assets within the
package. 121 The terms of both of these offers were rejected by the Zambian negotiation team.
In April 1998, ZCCM announced that the negotiations between the Kafue Consortium and the
Zambian privatisation team had broken down, and further exploratory talks between the Consortium and
Zambian bodies did not result in their recommencement. 122
 Subsequently, Noranda Incorporated and
Phelps Dodge withdrew from the consortium in late May, and in June, Avmin and CDC decided against
pursuing a further involvement in the sale of the assets.123
Apart from the failure to reach agreement on the assets under negotiation with the Kafue
Consortium three other asset packages remained outstanding in mid-1998. No bids were received for the
acquisition of Nanpundwe Mine (Package 'F') and none of the three bids which were received for
Mufilira (Package 'C') or Ndola Precious Metals Plant (Package 'H') proceeded to negotiations.124
120The retained interest of ZCCM was maintained at 12 percent although the benefits attached to their
holding were reduced.
121 The tax exemptions requested by the Kafue Consortium are reported to have included the
suspension of mineral royalty tax for 7 years and excise duty on electricity for 5 years, and an exemption
from import declaration fees and any import duties on imported finished fuel products (Times of Zambia
8/4/1998).
122 See Mining Journal (10/4/1998); Times of Zambia (3/4/1998 and 1/5/1998); and Post (1/5/1998).
123 Mining Journal (5/6/1998) and Post (10/6/1998). Renewed attempts to restart talks in late June
1998 also proved unsuccessful (E/U(q3/1998,p.17; and Post 15/6/1998).
124 Post (2/2/1998). ZCCM (28/2/1997) stated that bids had been received for Package 'C' from Farrell
Associates, Sterlite Resources and Aur Resources, while Avmin had bid for a management contract for
Package 'F' and First Quantum was the sole bidder for Package 'H'.
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5.2.2c The New Development Properties.
Securing the long term future of the Zambian mining industry required not only the
rehabilitation of the existing mines but also agreements relating to the development of new ore sources
of Konkola Deep and Konkola North. The development of these projects, however, also remains to be
finalised. Following the agreement of a Letter of Understanding between the Zambian Government and
Anglo American in January 1996, the latter formed a consortium consisting of itself, Gencor, and the
Western Mining Company of Australia. 125
 Progress towards the agreement of a Memorandum of
Understanding between the parties was slow, however, prompting Finance Minister, Penza, to warn
Anglo American that there were other mining companies willing to develop Konkola Deep if they were
not. 126 The Consortium faced further difficulty in October 1996 when Western Mining withdrew from
the project, although a replacement was found in the Canadian company Falconbridge.127
Konkola Deep Mine Project was the subject of a further Memorandum of Understanding
between the Consortium led by Anglo American, ZCCM and the Zambian Government in February
1997, which granted the consortium the exclusive right to conduct a feasibility study of the prospect.128
This confirmed that the Consortium would take the lead in the project, and that ZCCM would contribute
the Mufilira smelter and refinery and retain a 20 percent interest in the company. The revised capital
cost of the project was estimated at between $700 million and $800 million The finalisation of the
agreement was to be subject to a number of conditions including the completion of the privatisation of
Nchanga and Nkana Division of ZCCM and the successful completion of due diligence studies. The
consortium would be required to reach a decision on whether to continue with the project by the date of
the privatisation of the Nchanga and Nkana Divisions of ZCCM, with the asset returning to the control
of ZCCM if they decided against its development.129
125 Reuters (Johannesburg, 24/6/1996 and Johannesburg, 19/11/1996).
126 Reuters (Cape Town, 24/5/1996; Lusaka, 3/7/1996; and Lusaka, 22/719/1996). Anglo American
had sought the inclusion of the Konkola North prospect alongside Konkola Deep. The Zambian
Government had been concerned that this would delay the development of the former, for which other
companies had expressed an interest (Africa Confidential 21/6/1996, p.2).
127 Western Mining, stated that while the project was viable, it entailed too great a commitment to
Africa for the company (Post 4/10/1996). In its place, entered the Canadian mining company,
Falconbridge in November 1996 (Post 25/11/1996).
128 For details of the agreement see ZCCM (12/2/1997) and Mining Journal (14/2/1997).
129 At the time of this agreement, the sale of the Nchanga and Nkana divisions was scheduled to be
completed within 6 months.
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In May 1997 Gencor withdrew from the consortium and was followed by Falconbridge in
March 1998 which cited lower copper price forecasts as the reason for their reassessment. 130 By August
1998, the completion of the feasibility study of Konkola Deep was still awaited, and the sole remaining
member of the consortium, Anglo American, warned that the undertaking of the projects still depended
on the sourcing of third party finance and the completion of the privatisation of ZCCM. 131 By the
second half of 1998, the delay in undertaking the project prompted speculation over its potential for
commercial viability. Some sources within the industry estimate that the cost of developing the project
may be as high as $1.5 billion and that the level operational costs at which copper could be produced
would not be profitable at prevailing prices.132
Although the subject of less exploration, the Konkola North orebody is potentially as extensive
as that identified at Konkola Deep. The two developments were separated, with ZCCM reaching an
agreement with Avmin for the study of Konkola North in July 1996. 133
 A Memorandum of
Understanding was agreed between the Zambian Government, ZCCM and Avmin in February 1997.134
The terms of the agreement committed Avmin to conduct a pre-feasibility study, and on the basis of its
results, to either undertake a bankable feasibility study, or return the assets to ZCCM. 135 Should a
mining development go ahead, ZCCM would be able to retain a holding of 10 to 15 percent. In the
undertaking of its pre-feasibility study, Avmin reached agreement with the Korea Zinc Company for the
latter to take a 30 percent stake in Avmin's subsidiary, Konnoco Zambia Ltd, through which the
exploration was being undertaken.136
130 On Gencor's withdrawal see Mining Journal (12/9/1997), Business Day (22/5/1997) and Financial
Post (23/5/1997). On Falconbridge see Mining Journal (27/3/1998) and American Metal Market
(26/3/1998).
131 Mining Journal (7/8/1998). It has been suggested that Anglo American sought to delay the final
agreement, perceiving that the greater pressure on Zambia to secure an early start to the project would
increase its bargaining position over time (EIU q1/19981p .9). Anglo American stated in March 1998
that the completion of the feasibility study was scheduled for the second quarter (Times of Zambia
26/3/1998).
132 Non-attributable interviews.
133 Reuters (Johannesburg, 8/7/1996).
134 Republic of Zambia (1997), Post (24/1/1997) and Mining Journal (12/9/1997)
135 The assets will also revert to ZCCM if no decision to develop the project has been taken within 5
years of the agreement of the Memorandum.
136 ZCCM (1988) and Post (29/7/1997).
191
5.2.3 Repackaging and Progress to December 1998. 
By the end of June 1998 the implementation of the Rothschild Plan was behind schedule. It was
intended that by this date the second phase of the privatisation of ZCCM as an investment holding
company would have been completed. Instead, major operational assets that were to have been divested
in the first phase remained unsold. In addition, these delays were an obstacle to the finalisation of the
negotiations on the Konkola Deep Project, the swift undertaking of which was vital to the future
development of copper mining in Zambia.
The successful privatisation of Nchanga and Nkana Divisions remained central to the
completion of phase one of the privatisation plan. The primary factor which the Zambian negotiators
cited for the breakdown of the negotiation with the Kafue Consortium was that the revised terms offered
by the Kafue Consortium in March 1998 were too low and did not reflect the true value of the assets that
they were seeking to acquire. As the Zambian team stated at the breakdown of talks in April 1998:
even at current prices, the assets represent a valuable and unique opportunity for investors to
acquire significant existing copper and cobalt producing assets with potential for
expansion. 37
The Zambians entered the negotiations aiming for a price of $300 million for the assets. 138 The terms
agreed in November 1997 of a combined cash and debt assumption of $225 million had, therefore,
required the Zambian side to lower their initial expectations. The revised terms offered in March 1998,
with the guaranteed cash and debt assumption reduced to $85 million moved the price into territory
which the Zambian negotiators would not contemplate.
While President Chiluba expressed support of the stand taken by the negotiating team, stating
that the mines should be sold for their full value, others suggested that the Government should have
concluded an agreement on the terms that were available. 139
 International financial opinion has tended
137 Post (3/4/1998). The Consortiums estimated future life of 10 years for Nkana was below that
expected by ZCCM; the copper prices projected by the Consortium were between 10 and 20 percent less
than those expected by ZCCM, while the difference on the cobalt price was even greater. In addition to
this, ZCCM believed that the discount rates used in the investment projections of the Consortium were
excessive and that the costs of redundancy that would be incurred were significantly exaggerated (Times
of Zambia 8/4/1998).
138 Times of Zambia (19/11/1997) and Mining Journal (14/11/1997).
139 President Chiluba's position was reported in the Times of Zambia (8/4/1998, 16/4/1998 and
15/8/1998). Finance Minister Nawakwi also defended the rejection of the terms offered by the
Consortium (Post 9/4/1998). Profit (May 1998) speculated that one of the reasons for the dismissal of
Penza as Finance Minister on 20th March 1998 was the result of his recommendation of the acceptance
• of the terms offered.
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to support the view that the terms offered by the Kafue Consortium were the best that were available to
the Government. 140 As the Economist magazine stated;
few believe that Zambia will get a better deal than the one Kafue is offering... Zambians, who
are among the world's poorest people, could be paying a high price for their government's
belief that the family silver is worth more then it is.141
This perspective was also reflected within Zambia. Among others, Ben Kapita, the President of
the National Lima Party, expressed concern that an agreement had not been concluded with the
Consortium, stating that "a very good deal" had been lost because of the failure of the Government to
finalise the sale. 142 Some local observers suggested that the negotiation team had placed too great an
emphasis on the cash element of the agreement, and argued that the long term value of the sale to
Zambia depended more on the commitment of future investment that could revive the industry.143
Members of the Consortium stated that the lower price that they had offered was a response to
the effects of the financial crisis in East Asia, which materially reduced expectations of future copper
prices, and the continued physical deterioration of the assets which they sought to acquire. 144 The
economic problems arising from the Asian financial crisis were certainly a key factor in the failure of
the two parties to reach an agreement. By late 1997, copper mining capacity was being reduced
worldwide in response to lower copper prices, and the outlook for future price trends appeared
uncertain. 145
 These conditions also affected investors of other packages, and were cited among the
reasons for the withdrawal of Ivanhoe Capital from the acquisition of package 'D' and of Falconbridge
from the Konkola Deep consortium.146
1 40 Non-attributable Interviews.
141 Economist (9/5/1998).
142 post (4/5/1998). Mining Consultant Silane Mwenechanya also suggested that the failure to finalise
the November agreement was due to the prolonged and excessive process of Zambian political
supervision of the agreement (Post 11/6/1998). At the time of the November 1997 agreement, Theo Bull
was critical of the decision by ZCCM not to settle with the Consortium in August 1997 on what he
judged to be better terms (Times of Zambia 19/11/1997).
1 43 For example Silane Mwenechanya, a mining consultant addressing an Economic Association of
Zambia meeting (Post 11/6/1998), and Theo Bull (Post 10/6/1998).
144 Mining Journal (10/4/1998) and Post (3/4/1998 and 2/4/1998).
145 Financial Times (20/1/1998). Financial Times (30/1/1998) reported the recent closure of 110
thousand tonnes of capacity world wide in the copper industry, and expected that mines producing a
further 250 thousand tonnes were vulnerable to closure. Between the first offer made by the Consortium
in June 1997, and the revised offer made in March 1998, the copper price had declined by 30 percent
(Post 19/3/1998).
146 Financial Times (16/1/1998).
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While attention has focused on the distance between the terms offered by the Consortium and
those sought by Zambia, other factors may also account for the inability of the two sides to reach a
compromise. The Zambian side in the negotiations were starting from a weaker position than the
Consortium, with both the financial position of ZCCM and pressure from donors placing a high
premium on their agreement of terms. It received only one bid for the entire package from a consortium
formed by a number of companies that pre-qualified on a separate basis, an outcome which some, such
as Moses Banda of the Economic Association of Zambia, interpreted as a deliberate move by the
companies to avoid bidding the price higher. 147 The pressure from the Consortium for additional assets
and tax exemptions may have heightened the apprehension of the Government over the of degree control
that it would relinquish to a single group of companies and led them to stall in the negotiations.
On the Consortium side, the Economist Intelligence Unit has speculated that the decline in the
copper price was such that the Consortium may have chosen to withdraw from the deal by making an
unacceptable offer to ZCCM, in order to avoid having to bear anticipated heavy losses in the Nkana and
Nchanga divisions.
have been a factor in the failure of negotiations. As noted previously, Avmin and CDC had pre-qualified
for bidding as a consortium and initially sought to continue with negotiations with the Zambian
Government following the withdrawal from the negotiations of Phelps Dodge and Noranda in May
1998. Noranda's associated company, Falconbridge, had withdrawn from the Anglo American led
consortium to develop Konkola Deep in March 1998, and both Noranda and Phelps Dodge were
subsequently reported to have turned their attentions towards mining opportunities elsewhere 149 . CDC
and Avrnin, however, continued to pursue the acquisition of various ZCCM assets which had been
among those included in the negotiations.15°
In response to the failure of negotiations with the Kafue Consortium, the Government undertook a
number of steps to restart the privatisation process for the outstanding assets. A pro-active approach to
finding buyers was pursued with the British based Hong Kong and Shanghai Investment Bank engaged
147 post (20/10/1997) While Amin and CDC had prequalified as a single group, Phelps Dodge and
Noranda had prequalified individually (Times of Zambia 8/4/1998).
148 E/U(q2/1998, p.16).
149 Post (22/4/1998 and 2/6/1998) and Metal Bulletin (4/6/1998)
150 CDC unsuccessfully sought to acquire the ZCCM subsidiary Ndola Lime, while Avmin's subsequent
purchase of the Chambishi Cobalt Plant is discussed below.
" 148 The emergence of differences between members of the Consortium may also
194
to identify potential investors. 151 The Government also indicated its willingness to unbundle the
remaining asset packages to improve their marketability. 152 This approach met with some initial
success and an agreement was reached in August 1998 with Avmin for the sale of the Chambishi Cobalt
Plant from package 'G' and the Nkana Slag dump for a cash payment of $50 million with an investment
commitment of $120 million over 3 years. 153
 Zambian Government ministers pointed to this as
evidence of the continuing implementation of the privatisation programme and proof that the assets for
which the Kafue Consortium had bid could be sold to other investors at better terms. 154 In addition, the
bidding for Package H, the Ndola Precious Metals Plant, was successfully reopened and an agreement
reached for its sale to Minerva, a subsidiary of Binani Group, in September 1998.155
However, the ability of the Government and ZCCM to further prolong the privatisation process
was limited by a number of factors. Pressure was brought upon the Zambian Government to complete
the first phase of the privatisation process by donors who postponed the release of $530 million of
balance of payments support pledged in May 1998 until this condition had been met. 156
 Concerns were
also expressed within the Zambian business community over the costs of the continued delay in
privatisation to the economy as a whole and its secondary effects on other sectors.157
Alongside this, the continued viability of ZCCM as a going concern appeared to be increasingly
doubtful. The falling copper price that prompted potential investors to re-examine their commitments,
also impacted on the financial position of ZCCM. 158 In August 1998 the Zambian Government and
151 Post (27/7/1998).
152 Reuters (Johannesburg, 23/4/1998), Platt's Commodity News (21/7/1998) and Reuters (Lusaka,
4/9/1998). The further unbundling of the large asset packages to allow smaller companies to enter
negotiations had previously been advocated by Moses Banda, the Chair of the Economic Association of
Zambia and by some at the Ministry of Mines (Post 6/8/1997, 20/10/1997 and 7/4/1998).
153 The assets were to be incorporated as Chambishi Metals Plc. with a 10 percent interest retained by
ZCCM and the potential for further payment linked to the price of cobalt (Times of Zambia 28/8/1998
and 29/8/1998; and Business Day 17/8/1998).
154 This argument has been made by Finance Minister Edith Nawalcwi and Mines Minister
Syamukayumbu Syamujaye (Times of Zambia 29/8/1998).
155 Times of Zambia (5/9/1998) reported the sale to Minerva for $350,000 with a commitment to invest
$1.4 million in rehabilitation work.
156 Times of Zambia (6/1/1999) .
157 ZACCI's concerns were reported by Post (3/4/1998). The point was also made by Murray Sanderson
of the Kitwe Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Post 7/4/1998).
158 Mark O'Donnell of the Zambian Association of Manufacturers also expressed concern that ZCCM
could be forced into liquidation by the pre-emptive actions of secured creditors (Times of Zambia,
7/4/1998). In April 1998, ZCCM had announced that as a consequence of the failure of the sale of
Package 'A', it had suspended all labour retrenchment because it could not fund termination payments
(Times of Zambia, 29/4/1998).
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Anglo American, as the major shareholders in ZCCM, drew-up a survival plan aimed at maintaining the
company as a going concern until the end of March 1999, during which time the remaining assets of
ZCCM could be privatised. 159 The plan underlined the critical financial state of ZCCM and included
provisions for managing the possible liquidation of the company and for safeguarding its assets in such a
outcome. 160
Despite the renewed attempts of the Zambian Government to identify investors interested in
acquiring the mines, few were willing to pursue the assets. 161 The British based Reunion Mining
emerged as the only party interested in the acquisition of the Mufilira mine, while Anglo American
agreed to undertake studies of the remaining assets of the Nkana and Nchanga Divisions.162
The potential acquisition of the Nkana assets by Anglo American had consequences for the
Mufilira assets that remained outstanding. In the January 1996 agreement with Anglo American for the
development of Konkola Deep, ZCCM undertook to contribute the Mufilira smelter and refinery to the
project, leaving the Mufilira Mine and concentrator to be included as Package 'C of the Rothschild
Plan. 163 No acceptable bids had been submitted for this asset Package and the future operation of the
Mufilira Mine was in doubt. The Nkana Division, however, included processing facilities which could
substitute for those of the Mufilira Division, and allow for the sale of the Mufilira Division as an
integrated unit. An offer for the Mufilira Division as a whole was received from a consortium consisting
of the British based Reunion Mining, the CDC and the existing managers of the division, and a
Memorandum of Understanding was concluded between the parties in November 1998. 164 The
finalisation of this, however, remained subject to Anglo American agreeing to waive its existing rights
159 Platt's Commodity News (2/10/1998), Reuters (Lusaka, 14/10/1998) and Mining Journal
(23/10/1998).
160 Particular concern was expressed at the potentially irreparable damage that could be caused to the
mines through flooding (Platt's Commodity News 23/10/1998)
161 Discussions were reported with, among others, Chinese, Indian and South African interests. See
Mining Journal (31/7/1998 and 7/8/1998), E/U(q3/1998/p.18), Post (15/5/1998), Times of Zambia
(29/8/1998) and Financial Times (2/6/1998).
162 Platt's Commodity News (16/9/1998) and Metal Bulletin (14/9/1998).
163 The unbundling of Mufilira division was criticised in the National Assembly by MMD member
Steven Chilombo, and independent Robert Sichinga (Post 3/12/1997 and 20/2/1997).
164 Times of Zambia (4/10/1998) and Regulatory News Service (3/11/1998). It was planned for the
assets to be incorporated as Mufilira Copper Mines PLC, with ten percent of equity retained by ZCCM
(Business Day, 4/1/1999). The cash price agreed was reported to be $17 million (Metal Bulletin
4/2/1999).
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over the smelter and refinery, which depended upon their successful acquisition of the NIcana
Division. 165
Further negotiations resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding being concluded with Anglo
American for the acquisition of the Nchanga and Nlcana Divisions, the Nampundwe Mine, the Chingola
Refractory Ores and Konkola Deep development rights in November 1998. The assets are to be
incorporated into a new company in which ZCCM would retain 20 percent of equity 166 . The terms of
sale were to include a cash payment of $90 million, investment commitments of $300 million over three
years and an undertaking to implement the Konkola Deep project with a capital investment of $800
million. The agreement also entailed the purchase by the Zambian Government of Anglo American's
minority stake in ZCCM. The conclusion of a final agreement on these terms remained conditional on
the satisfaction of a number of criteria, including Anglo American successfully forming a consortium
with other companies to undertake its commitments, and the Zambian Government sourcing donor
funding for specified retrenchments at ZCCM. It was envisaged that the transaction would be completed
by 31st of March 1999 and Anglo American placed personnel at the assets to facilitate the transfer of
ownership. The agreement of December 1998 also involved Anglo American waiving its rights to the
Mufilira smelter and refinery, which facilitated the conclusion of the sale of the Mufilira Division to the
Consortium led by Reunion Mining. In February 1999 Reunion mining stated that they expected that
this would soon be achieved.167
The Zambian Government stated that the terms of the agreement reached with Anglo American
were an improvement on those offered by the Kafue Consortium. 168 The evaluation of this claim is,
however, subject to a number of difficulties. Firstly, the assets for which the Kafue Consortium bid are
not the same as those which Anglo American would acquire. For example, the Kafue Consortium bid
included the Chambishi Cobalt Plant and the Nkana Slag Dump which were sold separately to Avmin,
while the agreement with Anglo American included the rights for the development of the Konkola Deep
mine. Secondly, the full terms of the agreement between the Zambian Government and Anglo American
remained to be disclosed. The Post, for instance, reported that the agreement included the granting of
165 Mining Journal (23/10/1998) and Reuters (Johannesburg, 5/10/1998).
166 Times of Zambia (22/12/1998; 23/12/1998 and 23/1/1999) and Regulatory News Service
(22/1/1999).
167 Metal Bulletin (4/2/1999).
168 Platt's Commodity News (29/1/1999) and Reuters (Cape Town, 4/2/1999).
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tax exemption which effectively reduced the price to around $8 million. 169 Thirdly, the terms concluded
with Anglo American included non-monetary benefits, in particular the facilitating of the divestiture of
the entire Mufilira Division, whose future was uncertain under the terms agreed with the Kafue
Consortium.
With the conclusion of the agreements with Anglo American and Reunion Mining, the
privatisation of all the mining assets that were offered for sale in the first phase of the Rothschild Plan
would be achieved. This would allow for the conversion of the ZCCM holding company into the mining
investment company which would itself be privatised under in the second stage of the Rothschild Plan.
SUMMARY.
This Chapter has examined the design and implementation of the privatisation of ZCCM. The
discussion has emphasised the degree of choice open to the Zambian government to decide on the
method of privatisation. Whereas a private sale of a majority interest would have transferred control of
the industry to a foreign based mining transnational, a public sale of equity could have resulted in the
creation of a major independent private enterprise under indigenous control. The unbundling option
which was finally chosen has resulted in the control of the industry passing to a plurality of
transnational mining enterprises, although Anglo American is pre-eminent among these.
The choices which were made by the government were shaped by a number of factors, of which
the financial and commercial weakness of ZCCM was particularly important. The initial decision to
privatise the company reflected the view that neither existing operations, or the development of new
sources of ore, could be undertaken without the introduction of additional investment. Given the
financial constraints on the government, this had to be sourced from the private sector, and given the
outstanding indebtedness of ZCCM, had to include equity investment.
Between 1994 and 1996, the weakness of ZCCM also precluded the option of privatising it as
an independent company. The failure of the Short Term Interim Plan to revitalise the performance of the
operating units, and the inability to source third party finance for the development of the Konkola
prospect, ensured that a new controlling shareholder was required. Alongside this, the continued
deterioration of the company resulted in it being less attractive to potential investors. In particular, this
169 Post (13/1/1999).
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prompted Anglo American to redefine its strategy towards the acquisition of particular assets rather than
of the company as a whole, which facilitated the adoption of the unbundling option.
The implementation of the Rothschild Plan was adversely affected by the declines in the
international price of copper which were a result of the East Asian financial crisis. While this
contributed to the continued commercial decline of ZCCM, it also lowered the bidders perceptions of the
value of the assets that were to be privatised. In particular, this contributed to the failure of the
negotiations between the Government and the Kafue Consortium for the important Nchanga and Nkana
assets.
Throughout the process of privatisation the choices open to the government were also affected
by the actions of other actors. The principal actor in the privatisation process, apart from the Zambian
Government, was Anglo American. As a major shareholder, with pre-emptive rights over most of the
government shareholding, and a right of veto over the sales of assets, the co-operation of Anglo
American was crucial for the implementation of the privatisation of ZCCM. While Zambian concerns
over their influence were an important factor in preventing their takeover of the whole of ZCCM in the
early 1990s, Anglo American's opposition to the unbundling of ZCCM was influential in the shelving of
the Kienbaum Report in 1994.
Nevertheless, the degree to which in 1998 Anglo American re-emerged as the principal
company involved in the Zambian mining industry was not only a result of its influential position. With
the exception of the Konkola Deep project, the government had the opportunity to divest the other assets
to Kafue Consortium. That it did not, reflected the government's apprehension over the concentration of
ownership within a single private company, and the expectation that they could achieve a higher sale
price for the assets. The result, however, has been to produce a greater concentration of ownership in
Anglo American. That the Government chose to accept this in December 1998, reflected the pressure
from donors, who had withheld financial assistance, and the possibility of the liquidation of ZCCM,
unless an agreements with the available bidders.
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CHAPTER 6.
CONCLUSION.
This thesis has examined the growth, operation and privatisation of the Zambian State
Enterprise Sector between 1968 and 1998. Throughout, the focus has been upon the choices made by the
Zambian state between alternative policy instruments, through which it could pursue its objectives.
These were made within a constrained environment and were subject to uncertain outcomes. This
Chapter summarises the primary factors which the study has identified as material to this process, and
the arguments that have been advanced through the thesis.
At independence in 1964, the Zambian economy was dominated by the copper mining industry.
The industry was under foreign ownership, producing metals for export, and had minimal links to other
sectors of the Zambian economy. Nevertheless, the industry provided an important source of revenue to
the newly independent state, which allowed it to undertake ambitious plans for economic development.
The primary aim of these development plans was to overcome the dependence of the economy on the
copper mining industry through the creation of a diversified industrial sector. This was pursued through
a policy framework which offered incentives to the existing private sector. Among other measures, tax
incentives were offered to promote the establishment of new industries, tariffs were set to encourage
domestic production of imported goods and limited restrictions were placed on capital flows. Direct
investment by the state was concentrated on infrastructural projects, and productive investment was
limited to sectors in which private enterprise was unwilling to invest or which were of particular
strategic significance.
In the late 1960's, the government increasingly came to doubt that this approach provided the
most effective means for it to implement its policy objectives. In particular it perceived that the existing
foreign and expatriate private sector was unwilling to reinvest the profits that it was deriving from the
economy. In addition, the South African and Rhodesian connections of many of these enterprises
contributed to the mistrust of them by the government.
Progress in encouraging the emergence of an indigenous private enterprise was also
disappointing. Among the problems that were identified were the difficulties of competing with
established expatriate enterprises and in obtaining finance from the established private sector financial
200
institutions. While a number of policy initiatives were undertaken by the government to address these
issues, it was recognised that the development of indigenous private enterprise would require active
support over a long period.
In contrast to these experiences, the government's use of state enterprise appeared to be
successful. Through INDECO it established a number of new industries with the participation of a
variety of transnational investors. The extension of the state enterprise sector was not, however, the only
policy option pursued by the government to overcome the problems in the performance of the private
sector. For example, in 1968 limits were placed upon the levels of dividends to encourage private
enterprise to increase its level of reinvestment. The continued reluctance of private enterprise to
positively respond to such measures further encouraged the government to choose state enterprise as the
means through which they would implement policy.
The structure of the state enterprise sector that was created reflected both the industrial
to
structure of the Zambian economy and the strategy through which the state sought ittransform it. Within
ZIMCO the state mining enterprises constituted the majority of the state enterprise assets and were also
the main source of Group profits. INDECO was refocused towards industrial development and relied on
the funds that could be raised from profitable activities within the INDECO Group and by other
profitable divisions within the ZIMCO Group.
In this, the Zambian government replicated within the state enterprise sector the dependence on
the copper mining industry that characterised the economy as a whole. As long as the copper industry
provided revenues, INDECO could direct these towards new investments, which in time could provide
an alternative basis of economic activity. If; however, the copper revenues declined, the state enterprise
sector would lose its primary source of investable funds and could become a burden on government
finances.
The fall in the international copper price in the 1970s, therefore, had a number of consequences
for the Zambian economy as a whole and on the state enterprise sector in particular. While the copper
price had previously been cyclical, these declines were the beginning of a prolonged downward trend
which was the result of the changing dynamics of the global economy and the international copper
industry. In the space of a few years, the Zambian economy faced drastic reductions in its ability to fund
imports and in the revenues which the government received from the copper mines. The result of this
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was that Zambia became dependent upon external financial support and the conduct of economic policy
became increasingly focused on the ability of the government to reach agreement with the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund.
Within the state enterprise sector, the downturn in the copper industry undercut the strategy of
industrial diversification by removing the source of investable funds. The continued expansion of the
state enterprise sector became reliant on the provision of new funds from the government and minority
shareholders, or through increased borrowing. Reflecting the financial constraints upon the
Government, and the reluctance of many minority shareholders to increase their equity investments, the
state enterprise sector became increasingly reliant on debt fmance.
The decline in the copper industry was not the only problem faced by the state enterprise sector
during this period and reference has been made to the many reports which cited the inadequate
management of state enterprises. To overcome the problems faced by the state enterprise sector, the
government undertook a number of measures during the 1970's to re-organise the structure of
supervision. This reflected the view among the government and many of its political opponents that the
state enterprise sector could be restructured to become an effective agent of development.
Through the 1980's the state enterprise sector concentrated increasingly upon the rehabilitation
of existing state enterprises. This reflected the increasing problems which were being experienced in
maintaining the commercial viability of many enterprises and the financing of these rehabilitations also
demonstrated the growing dependence of the Zambian government and the state enterprise sector on the
support of the World Bank and donors.
In 1990 the Zambian government adopted a limited programme of privatisation. The scope of
this was extended in 1991 to cover all non-strategic enterprises outside of the utility sectors, and
following the accession to government of the MMD, to all state enterprises. The principal factor
prompting the initial adoption of the policy was the pressure placed on the government by the IMF, the
World Bank and international donors. Their ability to influence the government at this time was a
product of the increasing dependence of the government and the state enterprise sector on funds which
they provided.
While this continued to be an important factor in the commitment to implement privatisation, it
was also contributed to by a number of other factors. Despite the rehabilitation work which had been
202
undertaken, and the return of many enterprises to profitability, the state enterprise sector remained in
need of new investment which the government was unable to provide. In this context, privatisation has
frequently, therefore, been an alternative to the closure of enterprises. In addition, domestic support for
the continued existence of the state enterprise sector had declined and, since the re-establishment of a
multi-party system, all major political parties have supported privatisation.
On achieving power in 1991, the MMD suspended the programme of assets sale that was begun
under UNIP and established a more formal framework based upon new legislation. The central provision
of the Privatisation Act of 1992 was the creation of the ZPA as the body charged with the
implementation of the privatisation process. The subsequent progress has been substantial. By the end of
1998 the majority of all state enterprises had been privatised, including two-thirds of those rated as large
and three-quarters of those rated as medium and small. The minority of enterprises which remained
outstanding were often those situated in strategic or utility industries, and in most cases the government
remains committed to their sale.
The choice of method through which these enterprises have been privatised has reflected both
the objectives which the government has sought to achieve through the privatisation process and the
constraints under which it has been undertaken. While public sales offered the opportnnjty v estahath a
number of independent private enterprises with diversified ownership, this option was constrained by the
pre-emptive rights of existing minority shareholders, which required that they were divested through
private negotiated sales. Nevertheless, in many cases the ZPA was able to secure a limited public
participation in ownership through the flotation of minority interests in enterprises. Minority interests
also limited the degree to which monopolistic state enterprise could be demerged prior to privatisation,
to prevent the creation of privately owned monopolies.
In addition to these legal constraints, the financial and commercial weakness of many
enterprises was also a factor in the method through which they were privatised. Often this required the
introduction of a new controlling shareholder. In other instances, however, it resulted in the liquidation
of enterprises.
The influence of donors has also affected the process of implementation and on two occasions
was particularly explicit. In 1994 the failure of the Zambian government to produce a rescue plan for
Zambian Airways that was within the financial parameters agreed with the IMF brought direct pressure
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from the donors for the government to liquidate the enterprise. In 1998, following the failure of the
government to reach an agreement for the privatisation of the Nchanga and Nkana assets with the Kafue
Consortium, donors withheld balance of payments support until the completion of the assets sales. Such
interventions have, however, been rare, and donors have generally directed their influence towards
quickening the overall pace of implementation, rather than to influence the policy towards particular
enterprises.
The design of the privatisation of ZCCM constituted an important example of the interaction of
these factors in the choice of the method of privatisation. Between 1992 and 1996, the Zambian
government examined a number of options through which the company could be divested. Central to
this were the choices of whether the company should remain as a single entity or be unbundled into a
number of smaller units, and whether it should be privatised under the control of the existing
management or through the introduction of a new controlling shareholder.
The government's ability to choose between these options was constrained by a number of
factors. While ZCCM traded profitably during the early 1990s, the existing operations and the
development of new sources of ore urgently required new investment which would have to be sourced in
the private sector. In addition, Anglo American held pre-emptive rights over the much of the
governments shareholding, and a right of veto over the sale of any of the assets of the company.
The choice in 1996 to implement a plan based on the demerger option reflected a number of
factors. Although the government's preferred option had been the privatisation of ZCCM under the
control of the existing management, the commercial and financial weakness of the company proved too
great an obstacle to this. The failure of the management to revive the performance of ZCCM through the
Short Term Interim Plan and to raise loan finance for the development of Konkola Deep finally
precluded this option. A substantial obstacle to the unbundling of ZCCM had been the opposition of
Anglo American. By the mid-1990's, the financial and commercial weakness of ZCCM had reduced the
attractiveness of the company as a whole. In this context, Anglo American re-oriented its strategy to
securing the rights to develop Konkola Deep and co-operate with the government in the unbundling of
ZCCM.
Although the process of divesting the assets of ZCCM has resulted in the re-emergence of
Anglo American as principal owner of Zambia's mining industry, other transnational mining companies
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have been introduced into the sector and the concentration of ownership is less than it would have been
had ZCCM been privatised intact. In addition, the government has secured golden shares in the new
mining companies that have been established and the equity interests retained by the ZCCM holding
company will allow for its privatisation.
Given the scale of the state enterprise sector in Zambia at the beginning of the 1990's, the
process of privatisation has restructured the ownership and structure of much of the economy. The
Zambian government has sought, through the privatisation process, to strengthen the commercial and
financial position of the enterprises within the economy, and to promote competitive industrial
structures and indigenous ownership. As with the construction of the state enterprise, the results of this
will only become apparent over time.
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APPENDIX 1. 
ZIMCO FINANCIAL RESULTS. 
1.1: ZIMCO. Summary Profit and Loss Account. Financial Year 1971 to Financial Year 1989.
Financial
Year.
Turnover.
Kwacha
Profit before
Tax.
Kwacha
Profit after
Tax.
Kwacha
Profit
Attributable
to ZIMCO.
Kwacha
Pre-Tax
Profit
Margin.
Post-Tax
Profit
Margin.
Attributable
Profit
Margin.
millions, millions. millions. millions. % % %
1971 1,027 398 187 90 38.75 18.21 8.76
1972 728 150 105 49 20.60 14.42 6.73
1973 843 178 128 60 21.12 15.18 7.12
1974 1,246 523 217 116 41.97 17.42 9.31
1975 1,248 264 111 53 21.15 8.89 4.25
1976 1,041 (46) 12 7 (4.42) 1.15 0.67
1977 1,404 169 24 3 12.04 1.71 0.21
1978 1,328 (4) (7) (7) (0.30) (0.53) (0.53)
1979 1,521 75 50 23 4.93 3.29 1.51
1980 2,172 307 200 135 14.13 9.21 6.22
1981 2,193 57 49 20 2.60 2.23 0.91
1982 2,220 (83) (134) (93) (3.74) (6.04) (4.19)
1983 2,265 (87) (134) (101) (3.84) (5.92) (4.46)
1984 3,121 142 (2) (16) 4.55 (0.06) (0.51)
1985 3,890 168 (35) (49) 4.32 (0.90) (1.26)
1986 7,062 472 15 (28) 6.68 0.21 (0.40)
1987 12,438 974 (8) 81 7.83 (0.06) 0.65
1988 19,197 1,961 (a) - (a) - 10.22 (a) - (a) -
1989 29,786 4,492 3,017 (a) - 15.08 10.13 (a) -
Source: Ca culated from ZIMCO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1971 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for
1973 to 1981, (Annual Report, 1986) for 1982 to 1986, (Annual Report 1987) for 1987, ZIMCO (1990)
for 1988, Republic of Zambia (Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies
1988) for 1989(b), and calculations.
Note: (a) data unavailable from sources consulted. (b) The Report of the Auditor-General on the
Accounts of Parastatal Bodies (1988) was in fact presented in March 1990.
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1.2: ZIMCO. Capital Structure. Financial Year 1971 to Financial Year 1989.
Financial
Year.
Shareholders
Funds
Kwacha
million,
Minority
Interests.
Kwacha
million,
Long Term
Debt.
Kwacha
million.
Total
Capital
Employed,
(a)
Kwacha
million.
Shareholders
Funds as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
Minority
Interests as
a share of
Capital
Employed.
%
Long Term
Debt as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
1971 139 269 287 695 20.00 38.71 41.29
1972 183 296 346 825 22.18 35.88 41.94
1973 262 339 366 994 27.09 35.06 37.85
1974 320 372 407 1,136 29.12 33.85 37.03
1975 535 394 496 1,467 37.54 27.65 34.81
1976 514 399 633 1,595 33.25 25.81 40.94
1977 516 417 732 1,724 30.99 25.05 43.96
1978 559 439 1,054 2,120 27.24 21.39 51.36
1979 677 439 1,266 2,466 28.42 18.43 53.15
1980 897 485 1,254 2,735 34.03 18.40 47.57
1981 963 510 1,370 2,962 33.87 17.94 48.19
1982 971 465 1,591 3,166 32.08 15.36 52.56
1983 920 423 1,790 3,297 29.36 13.50 57.13
1984 757 435 2,077 3,467 23.16 13.31 63.54
1985 2,190 1,183 2,323 5,935 38.45 20.77 40.78
1986 6,995 4,655 6,521 18,455 38.50 25.62 35.89
1987 10,166 7,291 9,660 27,493 37.49 26.89 35.62
1988 8,822 4,606 9,264 23,172 38.88 20.30 40.82
1989 11,337 5,394 10,526 27,832 41.59 19.79 38.62
Source: Calculated from ZIMCO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1971 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for
1973 to 1981, (Annual Report, 1986) for 1982 to 1986, (Annual Report 1987) for 1987, ZIMCO (1990)
for 1988, Republic of Zambia (Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies
1988) for 1989(b), and calculations.
Notes:(a) Total capital employed has been calculated by adding together shareholders funds minority
interests and long term debt. This excludes certain other liabilities stated in the Group's accounts. The
most significant of these was Insurance Funds, related to the activities of ZISCO, and at no point did
these did not exceed 6 percent of ZINICO's capital employed. (b) The Report of the Auditor-General on
the Accounts of Parastatal Bodies (1988) was in fact presented in March 1990.
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APPENDIX 2.
STATE MINING ENTERPRISES. FINANCIAL RESULTS.
2.1: Combined Summary Profit and Loss Account of NCCM and RST. Financial Year 1971 to
Financial Year 1982.
Financial
Year.
Turnover.
US $
millions.
Profit before
Tax.
US $
millions.
Profit after
Tax.
US $
millions.
Pre-Tax
Profit
Margin.
%
Post-Tax
Profit
Margin.
1971 935 404 204 43.21 21.82
1972 755 224 164 29.67 21.72
1973 936 285 204 30.45 21.79
1974 1493 775 452 51.91 30.27
1975 1161 277 141 23.86 12.14
1976 859 (90) (6) (10.48) (0.70)
1977 1028 83 29 8.07 2.82
1978 807 (75) (26) (9.29) (3.22)
1979 1116 126 113 11.29 10.13
1980 1329 284 172 21.37 12.94
1981 1312 42 68 3.20 5.18
1982 1061 (186) (189) (17.50) (17.81)
Source: Radetzlci (1985, p.120) and calculations.
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2.2. ZCCM. Summary Profit and Loss Account. Financial Year 1981 to Financial Year 1998.
Financial
Year.
Turnover.
Kwacha
millions.
Profit before
Tax.
Kwacha
millions.
Profit after
Tax.
Kwacha
millions.
Pre-Tax
Profit
Margin.
%
Post-Tax
Profit
Margin.
1981 1093 34 57 3.11 5.22
1982 977 (171) (173) (17.50) (17.71)
1983 973 (123) (127.5) (12.64) (13.10)
1984 1,426 97 1 6.80 0.07
1985 1,862 145 0.7 7.79 0.04
1986 4,097 300 (56) 7.32 (1.37)
1987 6,976 211 (562) 3.02 (8.06)
1988 11,882 644 372 5.42 3.13
1989 18,135 2,723 1,832 15.02 10.10
1990 32,876 5,556 2,586 16.90 7.87
1991 65,559 11,225 5,189 17.12 7.92
1992 123,333 14,310 4,103 11.60 3.33
1993 359,086 66,293 41,557 18.46 11.57
1994 574,957 (71,409) (72,638) (12.42) (12.63)
1995 1,121,301 34,823 3,461 3.11 0.31
1996 1,591,158 (10,637) (29,981) (0.67) (1.88)
1997 1,504,730 (193,996) (198,722) (12.89) (13.21)
, 1998 1,301,797 (465,720) (468,108) (35.78) (35.96)
Source: ZCCM (Annual Report, 1982) for 1981 and 1982, respective Annual
Reports for 1983 for 1998, and calculations.
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2.3: Combined NCCM and RST. Capital Structure. Financial Year 1971 to Financial Year 1982.
_
Financial
Year.
Shareholders
Funds.
US $ million.
Long Term Debt.
US $ million.
Total Capital
Employed.
US $ Million.
Shareholders
Funds as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
Long Term
Debt as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
1970 585 46 631 92.71 7.29
1971 707 50 757 93.39 6.61
1972 771 111 882 87.41 12.59
1973 942 153 1095 86.03 13.97
1974 1034 183 1217 84.96 15.04
1975 1113 285 1398 79.61 20.39
1976 1099 360 1459 75.33 24.67
1977 911 314 1225 74.37 25.63
1978 870 244 1114 78.10 21.90
1979 1209 267 1476 81.91 18.09
1980 1314 234 1548 84.88 15.12
1981 1349 337 1686 80.01 19.99
, 1982 1033 502 1535 67.30 32.70
Source: Radetzki (1985, p.120) and calculations.
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2.4: ZCCM. Capital Structure. Financial Year 1981 to Financial Year 1998.
Financial
Year.
Shareholders
Funds.
Kwacha
Millions.
Long Term
Debt.
Kwacha
Millions.
Total
Capital
Employed,
(a)
Kwacha
Millions.
Shareholders
Funds as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
Long Term
Debt as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
1981 1,124 207 1,331 84.45 15.55
1982 951 405 1,356 70.13 29.87
1983 1,062 545 1,607 66.09 33.91
1984 1,063 710 1,773 59.95 40.05
1985 2,925 1,027 3,952 74.01 25.99
1986 11,019 3,926 14,945 73.73 26.27
1987 15,831 5,970 21,801 72.62 27.38
1988 10,203 5,261 15,464 65.98 34.02
1989 11,294 5,773 17,067 66.17 33.83
1990 8,306 13,816 22,122 37.55 62.45
1991 59,221 31,566 90,787 65.23 34.77
1992 43,598 76,605 120,203 36.27 63.73
1993 311,173 273,293 584,466 53.24 46.76
1994 1,338,955 334,735 1,673,690 80.00 20.00
1995 1,342,733 384,429 1,727,162 77.74 22.26
1996 1,164,639 504,039 1,668,678 69.79 30.21
1997 994,499 435,289 1,429,788 69.56 30.44
1998 (294,725) 508,275 213,550 (b) - (b) -
Source: ZCCM (Annual Report, 1982) for 1981 and 1982, respective Annual
Reports for 1983 for 1998, and calculations.
Notes: (a) Total capital employed has been calculated by adding together
shareholders funds minority interests and long term debt. This excludes certain
other liabilities stated in the Group's accounts. The most significant of these
was deferred liabilities, which principally related to provisions for employees
retirement benefits, and minority interests, which were only stated in the
accounts after FY 1993. (b) Shareholders funds are negative and long term
debt exceeds capital employed.
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APPENDIX 3.
INDECO FINANCIAL RESULTS.
3.1: INDECO Summary Profit and Loss Account. Financial Year 1970 to Financial Year 1989.
Financial
Year.
Turnover.
Kwacha
Profit before
Tax.
Kwacha
Profit after
Tax.
Kwacha
Profit
Attributable
to INDECO.
Kwacha
Pre-Tax
Profit
Margin.
Post-Tax
Profit
Margin.
Attributable
Profit
Margin.
thousands. thousands. thousands. thousands. % %
1970 123,753 10,997 9,281 5,989 8.89 7.50 4.84
1971 183,084 17,456 11,320 5,767 9.53 6.18 3.15
1972 247,096 23,523 14,313 7,078 9.52 5.79 2.86
1973 286,022 27,046 15,332 7063 9.46 5.36 2.47
1974 329,670 28,895 17,817 9,361 8.76 5.40 2.84
1975 292,414 8,690 2,840 2,474 2.97 0.97 0.85
1976 308,035 3,197 (3,065) (6,380) 1.04 (1.00) (2.07)
1977 347,637 8,802 3,868 2,179 2.53 1.11 0.63
1978 397,860 9,204 1,167 993 2.31 0.29 0.25
1979 406,013 (12,139) (20,668) (15,066) (2.99) (5.09) (3.71)
1980 465,704 (7,364) (15,796) (14,745) (1.58) (3.39) (3.17)
1981 526,928 3,504 (6,616) (11,552) 0.66 (1.26) (2.19)
1982 604,905 32,529 13,217 5,066 5.38 2.18 0.84
1983 713,178 13,144 5,630 (4,284) 1.84 0.79 (0.60)
1984 827,702 10,200 (1,601) (7,051) 1.23 (0.19) (0.85)
1985 972,650 11,702 (1,430) (11,495) 1.20 (0.15) (1.18)
1986 1,372,966 103,574 75,644 32,786 7.54 5.51 2.39
1987 2,266,601 250,387 192,720 117,806 11.05 8.50 5.20
1988 3,501,588 402,740 315,844 224,642 11.50 9.02 6.42
1989 4,684,757 702,843 502,101 372,571 15.00 10.72 7.95
Source: INDECO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1970 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for 1973 to 1980,
(Annual Report, 1989) for 1981 to 1989, and calculations.
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3.2. INDECO. Capital Structure. Financial Year 1970 to Financial Year 1989.
Financial
Year.
Shareholders
Funds.
Kwacha
thousands,
Minority
Interests.
Kwacha
thousands,
Long Term
Debt.
Kwacha
thousands.
Total
Capital
Employed,
Kwacha
thousands.
Shareholders
Funds as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
Minority
Interests as
a share of
Capital
Employed.
%
Long Term
Debt as a
share of
Capital
Employed.
%
1970 44,142 15,266 60,459 119,867 36.83 12.74 50.44
1971 56,927 19,357 69,608 145,892 39.02 13.27 47.71
1972 62,198 25,009 80,663 167,870 37.05 14.90 48.05
1973 71,367 40,921 110,905 223,193 31.98 18.33 49.69
1974 83,308 45,180 119,293 247,781 33.62 18.23 48.14
1975 68,166 30,433 91,013 189,612 35.95 16.05 48.00
1976 65,109 32,495 103,485 201,089 32.38 16.16 51.46
1977 68,660 33,513 131,031 233,204 29.44 14.37 56.19
1978 73,258 32,221 252,884 358,363 20.44 8.99 70.57
1979 58,514 25,304 294,905 378,723 15.45 6.68 77.87
1980 61,348 30,491 343,962 435,801 14.08 7.00 78.93
1981 113,633 35,148 343,600 492,381 23.08 7.14 69.78
1982 207,651 40,715 343,930 592,296 35.06 6.87 58.07
1983 228,165 48,563 250,549 527,277 43.27 9.21 47.52
1984 222,322 52,750 265,445 540,517 41.13 9.76 49.11
1985 273,508 62,657 307,057 643,222 42.52 9.74 47.74
1986 276,229 111,610 364,036 751,875 36.74 14.84 48.42
1987 584,729 264,227 498,725 1,347,681 43.39 19.61 37.01
1988 849,630 315,732 477,768 1,643,130 51.71 19.22 29.08
1989 1,262,923 353,589 505,129 2,121,641 59.53 16.67 23.81
Source: INDECO (Annual Report, 1972) for 1970 to 1972, (Annual Report, 1981) for 1973 to 1980,
(Annual Report, 1989) for 1981 to 1989, and calculations.
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APPENDIX 4.
PRIVATISED ENTERPRISES AT DECEMBER 1998.
4.1. Privatised Large-Sized Enterprises. (a)
Enterprise. Tranche.
(a)
Method of Privatisation. Sector. (a)
BP Zambia Ltd. 10 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1996).
Energy.
C hi langa Cement. 2 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1994).
Construction.
Consumer Buying
Corporation of Zambia.
3 Unbundled. Trading.
Contract Haulage Ltd. 6 Liquidated (1994). Transport.
Chemicals.Kafironda. 2 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1997).
Maamba Collieries. 9 Private tender sale with minority
flotation (1997).
Mining.
MEMCO Group. 11 Liquidated (1996). Mining.
Metal Fabricators of
Zambia
2 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1996).
Engineering.
National Home Stores
Ltd.
4 Unbundled. Trading.
National Hotel
Development
Corporation.
5 Unbundled. Tourism.
National Milling
Company.
2 Private negotiated sale (1996). Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Nchanga Farms. 4 Unbundled. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
United Bus Company. 6 Liquidated (1995). Transport.
Transport.Zambia Airways
Corporation Ltd.
11 Liquidated (1994).
Zambia Breweries Ltd. 2 Unbundled. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Zambia Hotel
properties.
2 Unbundled. Tourism.
Zambia National
Wholesale and
Marketing Co.
3 Unbundled. Trading.
Zambia Sugar Co. 2 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1995).
Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), Post (various), Pangaea Partners
(undated I) and Reuters (various).
Note: (a) The list includes enterprises for which privatisation has been completed which were included
in the portfolio of the ZPA (Progress Report, 31/12/1992). The classification of enterprises by size,
sector and tranche is from ZPA (ibid).
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4.2. Privatised Medium-Sized Enterprises. (a)
Enterprise. Tranche.
(a).
Method of Privatisation. Sector. (a)
AGIP (Zambia) Ltd. 11 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1996).
Energy.
Amalgamated Milling
Co.
2 Unbundled. Agriculture/ Agro
Industry
Dairy Produce Board. 2 Unbundled. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Indeco Milling Ltd. 2 Unbundled. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Kabwe Industrial
Fabrics.
5 Private tender sale (1996). Packaging.
Lint Company of
Zambia
2 Unbundled. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Lusaka Engineering
Co.
2 Private tender sale (1996). Engineering,
Mpelembe Properties. 5 Liquidated (1995). Construction.
Mpongwe Development
co.
2 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1995).
Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Mwaiseni Stores Ltd. 5 Unbundled. Trading„
Nanga Farms. 2 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotati on (1993).
Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
National Air Charters
(Zambia) Ltd.
11 Liquidated (1995), Transport,
National Breweries Ltd. 2 Private negotiated sale with minority
flotation (1995),
Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Premium Oil Industries
Ltd.
2 Liquidated (1996). Agriculture/ Agro
Industa_
ROP Ltd. 2 Private tender sale with minority
flotation (1995),
Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Supa Baking. 3 Unbundled, Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
United Milling Ltd. 2 Unbundled, Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Zambia Agricultural
Development Ltd.
2
_
Unbundled, Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Zambia Cold Storage
Corporation.
2 Unbundled, Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Zambia Engineering
and Contractinl.
2 Private negotiated sale (1995). C,onstruetion,
Zambia Horticultural
Products
2 Unbundled, Agriculture! Apo-
Industry
Zambia Oxygen Ltd. 7 Private tender sale with minority
flotation (1997. 
Chemicals.
Zambia Steel and
Building Supplies.
5 Unbundled, Construction,
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), Post (various),. Pangaea Partner§
(undated I) and Reuters (various).
Note: (a) The list includes enterprises for which privatisation has been completed which were inchided
in the portfolio of the ZPA (Progress Report, 31/12/1992), The classification of enterprises by sive,
sector and tranche is from ZPA (ibid).
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4.3. Privatised Small-Sized Enterprises. (a)
Enterprise. Tranche. Method of Privatisation. Sector. (a)
(a).
'APE Ltd. 1 Private tender sale (1993). Not Stated.
Africa Bound Ltd. 4 Liquidated (1995). Tourism.
Anros Industries. 9 Liquidated (1996). Real Estate.
Antelope Milling 2 Returned to Previous Owner. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Auto Care Ltd. 1 Private tender sale (1993). Not Stated.
Buildwell Construction. 5 Liquidated (1995). Construction.
Chico Milling. 2 Returned to Previous Owner. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Chimanga Milling. 2 Returned to Previous Owner. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Circuit Safaris Ltd. 9 Unbundled. Tourism.
City Radio and 7 Liquidated (1994). Trading.
Refrigeration Supplies.
Cleanwell Dry 1 Private tender sale (1996). Not Stated.
Cleaners.
Consolidated Tyre 1 Private tender sale (1996). Not Stated.
Service
Coolwell Systems. 1 Private tender sale (1993). Not Stated.
Crushed Stone Sale. 1 Private tender sale (1994). Not Stated.
Eagle Travel 1 Private tender sale (1993). Not Stated.
General 1 Private tender sale (1994). Not Stated.
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
Intercontinental travel 7 Private tender sale (1996). Transport,
Ltd.
Jamas Milling. 2 Returned to Previous Owner. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Kabwe Milling. 2 Returned to Previous Owner, Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Kapiri Glass. 2 Private negotiated sale (1995), Packaging,
Kawambwa Tea Co. 5 Private tender sale (1996). Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Lake Hotels Ltd. 4 Private tender sale (1996). Tourism,
Livingstone Motors 9 Liquidated (1995). Transport,
Assembly.
Luangwa Industries 7 Private tender sale (1997). Transport.
Ltd.
Lub lend Ltd. 4 Private negotiated sale (1997), Energy,
Mansa Batteries Ltd. 8 Liquidated (1994), Manufacturing,
MEMACO farms. 5 Private tender sale (1996). Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
MIL Construction. 4 Privatised by management buy-out
(1996),
Construction,
MIL Engineering and
Tooling.
5 Privatised by management buy-out
(1995).
Engineering,
MIL Sawmilling and 8 Private tender sale (1996). Agriculture/ Agro-
Joinery Ltd. Industry
MINDECO Small
mines Ltd.
6 Privatised by management buy-out
(1996).
Mining,
Mines Air Services Ltd. 8 Private tender sale (1998), Transport,
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Monarch Zambia 1 Privatised by management buy-out
(1995).
Not Stated.
Mulungushi Traveller. 4 Private tender sale (1996). Transport.
Mwinilunga Canneries
Ltd
1 Liquidated (1995). Not Stated.
National Drug Co. 5 Unbundled. Chemicals.
National Drum and
Can Co.
1 Liquidated (1997). Not Stated.
National Tobacco Co. 2 Private tender sale (1996). Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
NIEC Agencies Ltd. 8 Unbundled. Trading..
NIEC Farm. 4 Private tender sale (1996). Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
NIEC Overseas
Services.
10 Private tender sale (1995). Trading.
Nkwazi Manufacturing
CO.
1 Private negotiated sale (1995). Not Stated.
Norgroup Plastics Ltd. 1 Private tender sale (1997). Not Stated.
Olympic Milling. 2 Returned to Previous Owner. Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Poultry Processing
Company
1 Private negotiated sale (1993). Not Stated.
Prime Marble Products. 1 Private tender sale (1994). Not Stated.
Redirection Placement
Ltd.
5 Liquidated (1995). Trading.
Rycus Heavy Haulage
Ltd.
8 Privatised by management buy-out
(1996).
Transport.
State Insurance
Medical Trust.
6 Private tender sak (1995). Finarrce,
ZAL Elevators. 4 Privatised by management buy-out
(1996).
Engineering,
Zambia Cashew Co. 2 Private tender sale (1997). Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Zambia Ceramics Ltd. 1 Private tender sale (1996). Not Stated.
Zambia Clay Industries 1 Private tender sale (1995). Not Stated.
Zambia Coffee Co. 6 Private tender sale (1996), Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
Zambia Concrete Ltd. 11 Private tender sale (1997). Transport.
Mining.Zambia Emerald
Industries Ltd.
7 Liquidated (1998).
Zambia Housing
Development Fund.
11 Liquidated (1995). Finance.
Zambia Maltings Ltd. 1 Private tender sale (1994). Not Stated.
Zambia National
Insurance Brokers
9 Private tender sale (1997). Finance.
Zambia National
Shipping Co.
11 Liquidated (1995). Transport.
Zambia State Financing
Company.
6 Private tender sale (1997). Finance.
Zambia State Property
Development Co.
6 Liquidated (1995), Finance.
Zambia State Security
Ltd.
6 Liquidated (1995). Finance.
Zamcargo Zambia Ltd. 9 Private tender sale (1996). Transport
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Zamlube Rerefiners
Ltd.
10 Private negotiated sale (1996). Energy.
Zuva Zambia. 1 Private tender sale (1993). Not Stated.
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), Post (various), Pangaea Partners
(undated I) and Reuters (various).
Note: (a) The list includes enterprises for which privatisation has been completed which were included
in the portfolio of the ZPA (Progress Report, 31/12/1992). The classification of enterprises by size,
sector and tranche is from ZPA (ibid).
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APPENDIX 5. 
ENTERPRISES AND ASSETS REMAINING WITHIN THE STATE ENTERPRISE SECTOR
AT DECEMBER 1998. 
5.1 Large-Sized Enterprises (a).
Enterprise. Tranche.
(a)
Sector. (a) Changes in Status not
Resulting in Privatisation.
Kafue Textiles. 3 Manufacturing. -
MEMCO Trading, London 11 Mining. Sold to ZCCM (1996).
National Airports Corporation. 9 Transport. -
Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia
Ltd.
9 Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
-
Reserved mineral Corporation Ltd. 7 Mining. -
Zambia Forestry and Forest
Industries Ltd.
8 Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
-
Zambia National Building Society. 6 Finance. -
Zambia National Commercial
Bank.
4 Finance. -
Zambia State Insurance
Corporation.
6 Finance. -
Note: (a) The list includes enterprises for which privatisation has been completed which were included
in the portfolio of the ZPA (Progress Report, 31/12/1992). The classification of enterprises by size,
sector and tranche is from ZPA (ibid).
5.2 Medium-Sized Enterprises. (a)
Enterprise. Tranche.
(a)
Sector. (a) Changes in Status not
Resulting in Privatisation.
Dunlop Zambia ltd. 8 Transport. -
Indo-Zambia Bank Ltd. 8 Finance. -
Zambia National Broadcasting
Corp.
11 Communications. Withdrawn from the
Privatisation Process.
Zambia Seed Co. 6 Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry.
Note: (a) The list includes enterprises for which privatisation has been completed which were included
in the portfolio of the ZPA (Progress Report, 31/12/1992). The classification of enterprises by size,
sector and tranche is from ZPA (ibid).
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5.3 Small-Sized Enterprises. (a)
Enterprise. Tranche.
(a)
Sector. (a) Changes in Status not
Resulting in Privatisation.
Africa Intercontinental Ins.
Services Ltd.
6 Finance. -
Duncan Gilby Matheson. 9 Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
-
Engineering Services Corp. 10 Transport. -
Indeco Estate Development. 10 Real Estate. -
Kagem Mining. 7 Mining. -
Kariba Amethyst Marketing Ltd. 7 Mining. -
Kariba Minerals Ltd. 7 Mining. -
Lukanga Investment and
Development Company.
2 Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
-
Lusaka Urban Rail Transport. 5 Transport. -
MEMCO Services Ltd. 11 Mining. Sold to ZCCM.
MEMCO Trading, USA. 11 Mining. Sold to ZCCM.
Mpulunga Harbour Corporation. 6 Transport. -
Mundawanga Zoo and Botanical
Gardens.
5 Tourism. -
Zambezi Sawmills (b). 4 Agriculture/ Agro-
Industry
-
ZIMCO Properties Ltd. 10 Construction. -
Notes: (a) The list includes enterprises for which privatisation has been completed which were included
in the portfolio of the ZPA (Progress Report, 31/12/1992). The classification of enterprises by size,
sector and tranche is from ZPA (ibid). (b) Zambezi Sawmills was subsequently privatised in 1999.
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5.4 Enterprises Size Unclassified. (a)
Enterprise. Tranche. (a) Sector. (a) Changes in Status not
Resulting in Privatisation.
Development Bank of Zambia. 6 Not Stated. -
Import and Export Bank of
Zambia.
6 Not Stated. -
Indeni petroleum Refinery. Untranched. Not Stated. -
Post and Telecomunications
Corp.
Untranched. Not Stated. Although unbundled, to create
Zambia Telecommunications
(ZAMTEL) and the Zambia
Postal Service (ZAMPOST),
none of the resulting assets
have been privatised.
Tazama Pipelines. Untranched. Not Stated. -
Zambia Electricity Supply
Corporation.
Untranched. Not Stated. -
Zambia Railways. Untranched. Not Stated. -
ZCCM Untranched. Not Stated. Privatisation through
unbundling in progress.
Zimoil Division. Untranched. Not Stated. Reconstituted as the Zambia
National Oil Company
(ZNOC).
Note: (a) The list includes enterprises for which privatisation has been completed which were included
in the portfolio of the ZPA (Progress Report, 31/12/1992). The classification of enterprises by size,
sector and tranche is from ZPA (ibid).
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